CONCLUSION:

Poitiers, the Black Prince and his Military Retinue

The battle of Poitiers confirmed the military reputation of the English in general and the Black Prince in particular. The English military reputation rose from the nadir of Bannockburn so that after 1356, their archers and infantry were known as being among the finest soldiers in Christendom. The victory at Poitiers was dependent, in many ways, on another triumph for the English in France ten years earlier although the similarities between the encounters are limited except in terms of broad strategy, personnel and, to a degree, luck. As Froissart commented ‘at the battle of Poitiers, fortune was very mean and cruel for the French, and quite similar to that of Crécy.’¹

Although the prince played a very limited role in the strategic and tactical decision-making in 1346, Edward III attributed the victory to his son. The expedition proved to be the foundation upon which the Black Prince built his career, and it shaped the ideals and expectations of a nation. In more prosaic and practical terms it also reinforced specifically military ideas. Although not the first campaign to put into practice the developments that have been described as the Edwardian military revolution, it established thechevauchée as the predominant means of waging war in France and proved the advantage of mixed retinues of men-at-arms, infantry and archers fighting in a defensive formation.

The concept of a military revolution has been much debated, and Michael Robert’s original thesis has been extended chronologically by some to include the period of the Hundred Years War. Some aspects of the thesis certainly bear upon the changes being instituted in England and later in France at this time. The war itself encouraged change both on the battlefield and the means by which troops were supplied, armed and recruited. This process of change gathered further momentum with the development of effective artillery in the fifteenth century. Henry V’s campaigns showed the implications of artillery for siege warfare, and the ordinances of Charles VII capitalised on such developments and allied them to the potential power of the emerging nation-state. By the end of the war, France had a fully professional army and emerged from 116 years of devastation while England sunk into her own civil war.

This would have seemed inconceivable to the English victors in 1346 and 1356. The military experiences of the prince in the victory at Crécy and the subsequent capture of Calais were highly significant. Many of his future retinue were involved in the campaign, the most illustrious of whom were to be numbered among the Order of the Garter. ‘The scale and importance of that mighty victory encouraged a bond between those who had fought there...’² The Crécy campaign ‘blooded’ the prince and his retinue and provided its foundations in terms of personnel and the application of strategy and tactics. These were implemented when the prince took his first independent command.

By 1355, the prince’s retinue was a close-knit organisation beginning to develop into an affinity worthy of the heir-apparent. It was a group broadly associated with Edward III’s foreign struggle and linked particularly through the role played by the Black Prince. This is evident in a number of ways; links between members of the retinue can be seen in a variety of domestic, administrative and political activities. Perhaps more telling are those statements which were left for posterity. Around the sides of the tomb of Reginald 1st Lord Cobham (d. 1361) at Lingfield is a series of coats of arms showing the families of Berkeley, Stafford, Badlesmere, Ros, Paveley, Mortimer, Bohun, Vere, Arundel, Cosington and Burghersh, all of whom fought with the Black Prince, and most of whom participated in the 1355-6 expeditions. It indicates ‘the sense of companionship and pride felt by Edward III’s military elite.’³ Such fraternal feeling is also evident in the Gloucester cathedral window dedicated to the fallen at Crécy, and the memorial brass of Sir Hugh Hastings at Elsing in Norfolk. In later years, Sir Thomas Erpingham who commanded the archers at Agincourt dedicated a window in a Norwich church to all those knights of Norfolk and Suffolk who had fought in the wars with France and died without a male heir. A number of the Black Prince’s retinue were among them. They also were remembered as part of the military elite.

The most powerful national statement of the shared military struggle was the Order of the Garter itself. Founded in celebration of the triumph at Crécy, the Garter bound together as a brotherhood those who represented the shifting international coalition created by Edward III and his successors against France.

The military experience at the prince’s disposal in 1355 was very considerable and together, Edward and his commanders implemented the military policy they had witnessed to such good effect in Normandy. The 1355 chevauchée proved to be a classic example of a strategy used throughout the war to great psychological and financial effect though it failed to recoup great territorial or political gains. By contrast, the raid of the following year culminated in the battle of Poitiers – ‘there died [that day] ... the full flower of French chivalry’⁴ and those who did not fall were taken captive alongside their king. Matteo Villani described it as ‘the incredible victory’⁵ and it outstripped that of ten years before and was later only equalled by Agincourt.

It may be asked why King Jean forced the issue. Why, after all he knew of the English military successes, did he engage in battle? The main reason was political, as it had been in 1346. At the time Geoffrey d’Harcourt was campaigning against him in Normandy, Robert le Coq was conspiring against Valois authority, and Etienne Marcel was gathering strength in Paris. The financial contributions to the army had been very great and he had nothing to show for them.⁶ Jean needed a victory, and with rather more luck, rather more co-ordination within the ranks of the French hierarchy, and a rather bolder approach, he might have had one.

What, then, were the consequences of the battle of Poitiers? Essentially, the treaty of Brétigny-Calais formed the conclusion of the negotiations which began when King Jean was first brought as a prisoner to Bordeaux. The agreement had long-term consequences of its own. If the Hundred Years War until 1360 was about Gascony and the treaty of Paris (1259), then the war from 1369 until 1420 (the treaty of Troyes) was about the treaty of Brétigny. When Richard II married Isabella in 1396, the truce that accompanied the marriage was sweetened with a dowry of over £130,000. This was offered in some compensation for the fact that the English never received full payment for Jean’s ransom agreed in 1360. And when Henry V led his troops to Agincourt, it was to make good his claim that the stipulations of Brétigny should be fulfilled. In many ways, the victory at Poitiers shaped the Hundred Years War for more than 60 of its 116 years.⁷