8

The Action off the River Plate

Surface Raiders — The German Pocket Battleship — Orders of the German Admiralty — British Hunting Groups — The American Three-Hundred-Mile Limit — Offer of Our Asdics to the United States — Anxieties at Home — Caution of the “Deutschland” — Daring of the “Graf Spee” — Captain Langsdorff’s Manoeuvres — Commodore Harwood’s Squadron off the Plate — His Foresight and Fortune — Collision on December 13 — Langsdorff’s Mistake — The “Exeter” Disabled — Retreat of the German Pocket Battleship — Pursuit by “Ajax” and “Achilles” — The “Spee” Takes Refuge in Montevideo — My Letter of December 17 to the Prime Minister — British Concentration on Montevideo — Langsdorff’s Orders from the Fuehrer — Scuttling of the “Spee” — Langsdorff’s Suicide — End of the First Surface Challenge to British Commerce — The “Altmark” — The “Exeter” — Effects of the Action off the Plate — My Telegram to President Roosevelt.

ALTHOUGH it was the U-boat menace from which we suffered most and ran the greatest risks, the attack on our ocean commerce by surface raiders would have been even more formidable could it have been sustained. The three German pocket battleships permitted by the Treaty of Versailles had been designed with profound thought as commerce-destroyers. Their six eleven-inch guns, their twenty-six-knot speed, and the armour they carried had been compressed with masterly skill into the limits of a ten-thousand-ton displacement. No single British cruiser could match them. The German eight-inch-gun cruisers were more modern than ours, and if employed as commerce-raiders, would also be a formidable threat. Besides this, the enemy might use disguised heavily armed merchantmen. We had vivid memories of the depredations of the Emden and Koenigsberg in 1914, and of the thirty or more warships and armed merchantmen they had forced us to combine for their destruction.

There were rumours and reports before the outbreak of the new war that one or more pocket battleships had already sailed from Germany. The Home Fleet searched but found nothing. We now know that both the Deutschland and the Admiral Graf Spee sailed from Germany between August 21 and 24, and were already through the danger zone and loose in the oceans before our blockade and northern patrols were organised. On September 3, the Deutschland, having passed through the Denmark Straits, was lurking near Greenland. The Graf Spee had crossed the North Atlantic trade route unseen and was already far south of the Azores. Each was accompanied by an auxiliary vessel to replenish fuel and stores. Both at first remained inactive and lost in the ocean spaces. Unless they struck, they won no prizes. Until they struck, they were in no danger.

The orders of the German Admiralty issued on August 4 were well conceived:

Task in the Event of War

Disruption and destruction of enemy merchant shipping by all possible means…. Enemy naval forces, even if inferior, are only to be engaged if it should further the principal task….

Frequent changes of position in the operational areas will create uncertainty and will restrict enemy merchant shipping, even without tangible results. A temporary departure into distant areas will also add to the uncertainty of the enemy.

If the enemy should protect his shipping with superior forces so that direct successes cannot be obtained, then the mere fact that his shipping is so restricted means that we have greatly impaired his supply situation. Valuable results will also be obtained if the pocket battleships continue to remain in the convoy area.

With all this wisdom the British Admiralty would have been in rueful agreement.

* * * * *

On September 30, the British liner Clement, of five thousand tons, sailing independently, was sunk by the Graf Spee off Pernambuco. The news electrified the Admiralty. It was the signal for which we had been waiting. A number of hunting groups were immediately formed, comprising all our available aircraft carriers, supported by battleships, battle cruisers, and cruisers. Each group of two or more ships was judged to be capable of catching and destroying a pocket battleship.

In all, during the ensuing months the search for two raiders entailed the formation of nine hunting groups, comprising twenty-three powerful ships. We were also compelled to provide three battleships and two cruisers as additional escorts with the important North Atlantic convoys. These requirements represented a very severe drain on the resources of the Home and Mediterranean Fleets, from which it was necessary to withdraw twelve ships of the most powerful types, including three aircraft carriers. Working from widely dispersed bases in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, the hunting groups could cover the main focal areas traversed by our shipping. To attack our trade the enemy must place himself within reach of at least one of them. To give an idea of the scale of these operations, I set out the full list of the hunting groups at their highest point on page 514.

* * * * *

Organisation of Hunting Groups — October 31, 1939

At this time it was the prime objective of the American Governments to keep the war as far from their shores as possible. On October 3, delegates of twenty-one American Republics, assembled at Panama, decided to declare an American security zone, proposing to fix a belt of from three hundred to six hundred miles from their coasts within which no warlike act should be committed. We were anxious to help in keeping the war out of American waters – to some extent, indeed, this was to our advantage. I therefore hastened to inform President Roosevelt that, if America asked all belligerents to respect such a zone, we should immediately declare our readiness to fall in with their wishes – subject, of course, to our rights under international law. We should not mind how far south the security zone went, provided that it was effectively maintained. We should have found great difficulty in accepting a security zone which was to be policed only by some weak neutral; but if the United States Navy was to take care of it, we should feel no anxiety. The more United States warships there were cruising along the South American coast, the better we should be pleased; for the German raider which we were hunting might then prefer to leave American waters for the South African trade route, where we were ready to deal with him. But if a surface raider operated from the American security zone or took refuge in it, we should expect either to be protected, or to be allowed to protect ourselves from the mischief which he might do.

At this date we had no definite knowledge of the sinking of three ships on the Cape of Good Hope route which occurred between October 5 and 10. All three were sailing homeward independently. No distress messages were received, and suspicion was only aroused when they became overdue. It was some time before it could be assumed that they had fallen victims to a raider.

The necessary dispersion of our forces caused me and others anxiety, especially as our main Fleet was sheltering on the west coast of Britain.

The appearance of Scheer off Pernambuco and subsequent mystery of her movements, and why she does not attack trade, make one ask, did the Germans want to provoke a widespread dispersion of our surplus vessels, and if so, why? As the First Sea Lord has observed, it would be more natural they should wish to concentrate them in home waters in order to have targets for air attack. Moreover, how could they have foreseen the extent to which we should react on the rumour of Scheer in South Atlantic? It all seems quite purposeless, yet the Germans are not the people to do things without reason. Are you sure it was Scheer and not a plant, or a fake?

I see the German wireless boast they are driving the Fleet out of the North Sea. At present this is less mendacious than most of their stuff. There may, therefore, be danger on the east coast from surface ships. Could not submarine flotillas of our own be disposed well out at sea across a probable line of hostile advance? They would want a parent destroyer perhaps to scout for them. They should be well out of our line of watching trawlers. It may well be there is something going to happen, now that we have retired to a distance to gain time.

I should be the last to raise those “invasion scares,” which I combated so constantly during the early days of 1914/15. Still, it might be well for the Chiefs of Staff to consider what would happen if, for instance, twenty thousand men were run across and landed, say, at Harwich, or at Webburn Hook, where there is deep water close inshore. These twenty thousand men might make the training of Mr. Hore-Belisha’s masses very much more realistic than is at present expected. The long dark nights would help such designs. Have any arrangements been made by the War Office to provide against this contingency? Remember how we stand in the North Sea at the present time. I do not think it likely, but is it physically possible?

* * * * *

The Deutschland, which was to have harassed our lifeline across the Northwest Atlantic, interpreted her orders with comprehending caution. At no time during her two and a half months’ cruise did she approach a convoy. Her determined efforts to avoid British forces prevented her from making more than two kills, one being a small Norwegian ship. A third ship, the United States City of Flint, carrying a cargo for Britain, was captured, but was eventually released by the Germans from a Norwegian port. Early in November, the Deutschland slunk back to Germany, passing again through Arctic waters. The mere presence of this powerful ship upon our main trade route had, however, imposed, as was intended, a serious strain upon our escorts and hunting groups in the North Atlantic. We should in fact have preferred her activity to the vague menace she embodied.

The Graf Spee was more daring and imaginative, and soon became the centre of attention in the South Atlantic. In this vast area powerful Allied forces came into play by the middle of October. One group consisted of the aircraft carrier Ark Royal and the battle cruiser Renown, working from Freetown, in conjunction with a French group of two heavy cruisers and the British aircraft carrier Hermes, based on Dakar. At the Cape of Good Hope were the two heavy cruisers Sussex and Shropshire, while on the east coast of South America, covering the vital traffic with the River Plate and Rio de Janeiro, ranged Commodore Harwood’s group, comprising the Cumberland, Exeter, Ajax, and Achilles. The Achilles was a New Zealand ship manned mainly by New Zealanders.

The Spee’s practice was to make a brief appearance at some point, claim a victim, and vanish again into the trackless ocean wastes. After a second appearance farther south on the Cape route, in which she sank only one ship, there was no further sign of her for nearly a month, during which our hunting groups were searching far and wide in all areas, and special vigilance was enjoined in the Indian Ocean. This was in fact her destination, and on November 15 she sank a small British tanker in the Mozambique Channel, between Madagascar and the mainland. Having thus registered her appearance as a feint in the Indian Ocean, in order to draw the hunt in that direction, her Captain – Langsdorff, a high-class person – promptly doubled back and, keeping well south of the Cape, re-entered the Atlantic. This move had not been unforeseen; but our plans to intercept him were foiled by the quickness of his withdrawal. It was by no means clear to the Admiralty whether in fact one raider was on the prowl or two, and exertions were made, both in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans. We also thought that the Spee was her sister ship, the Scheer. This disproportion between the strength of the enemy and the counter-measures forced upon us was vexatious. It recalled to me the anxious weeks before the actions at Coronel and later at the Falkland Islands in December, 1914, when we had to be prepared at seven or eight different points, in the Pacific and South Atlantic, for the arrival of Admiral von Spee with the earlier edition of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. A quarter of a century had passed, but the puzzle was the same. It was with a definite sense of relief that we learnt that the Spee had appeared once more on the Cape-Freetown route, sinking two more ships on December 2 and one on the seventh.

* * * * *

From the beginning of the war, Commodore Harwood’s special care and duty had been to cover British shipping off the River Plate and Rio de Janeiro. He was convinced that sooner or later the Spee would come towards the Plate, where the richest prizes were offered to her. He had carefully thought out the tactics which he would adopt in an encounter. Together, his eight-inch cruisers Cumberland and Exeter, and his six-inch cruisers Ajax and Achilles, could not only catch but kill. However, the needs of fuel and refit made it unlikely that all four would be present “on the day.” If they were not, the issue was disputable. On hearing that the Doric Star had been sunk on December 2, Harwood guessed right. Although she was over three thousand miles away, he assumed that the Spee would come towards the Plate. He estimated with luck and wisdom that she might arrive by the thirteenth. He ordered all his available forces to concentrate there by December 12. Alas, the Cumberland was refitting at the Falklands; but on the morning of the thirteenth, Exeter, Ajax, and Achilles were in company at the centre of the shipping routes off the mouth of the river. Sure enough, at 6.14 A.M., smoke was sighted to the east. The longed-for collision had come.

Harwood in the Ajax, disposing his forces so as to attack the pocket battleship from widely divergent quarters and thus confuse her fire, advanced at the utmost speed of his small squadron. Captain Langsdorff thought at the first glance that he had only to deal with one light cruiser and two destroyers, and he too went full speed ahead; but a few moments later, he recognised the quality of his opponents, and knew that a mortal action impended. The two forces were now closing at nearly fifty miles an hour. Langsdorff had but a minute to make up his mind. His right course would have been to turn away immediately so as to keep his assailants as long as possible under the superior range and weight of his eleven-inch guns, to which the British could not at first have replied. He would thus have gained for his undisturbed firing the difference between adding speeds and subtracting them. He might well have crippled one of his foes before any could fire at him. He decided, on the contrary, to hold on his course and make for the Exeter. The action, therefore, began almost simultaneously on both sides.

Commodore Harwood’s tactics proved advantageous. The eight-inch salvos from the Exeter struck the Spee from the earliest stages of the fight. Meanwhile, the six-inch cruisers were also hitting hard and effectively. Soon the Exeter received a hit which, besides knocking out B turret, destroyed all the communications on the bridge, killed or wounded nearly all upon it, and put the ship temporarily out of control. By this time, however, the six-inch cruisers could no longer be neglected by the enemy, and the Spee shifted her main armament to them, thus giving respite to the Exeter at a critical moment. The German battleship, plastered from three directions, found the British attack too hot, and soon afterwards turned away under a smoke screen with the apparent intention of making for the River Plate. Langsdorff had better have done this earlier.

After this turn the Spee once more engaged the Exeter, hard hit by the eleven-inch shells. All her forward guns were out of action. She was burning fiercely amidships and had a heavy list. Captain Bell, unscathed by the explosion on the bridge, gathered two or three officers round him in the after control station, and kept his ship in action with her sole remaining turret until at 7.30 failure of pressure put this, too, out of action. He could do no more. At 7.40 the Exeter turned away to effect repairs and took no further part in the fight.

The Ajax and Achilles, already in pursuit, continued the action in the most spirited manner. The Spee turned all her heavy guns upon them. By 7.25 the two after turrets in the Ajax had been knocked out, and the Achilles had also suffered damage. These two light cruisers were no match for the enemy in gun-power, and finding that his ammunition was running low, Harwood in the Ajax decided to break off the fight till dark, when he would have better chances of using his lighter armament effectively, and perhaps his torpedoes. He, therefore, turned away under cover of smoke, and the enemy did not follow. This fierce action had lasted an hour and twenty minutes. During all the rest of the day the Spee made for Montevideo, the British cruisers hanging grimly on her heels with only occasional interchanges of fire. Shortly after midnight, the Spee entered Montevideo and lay there repairing damage, taking in stores, landing wounded, transshipping personnel to a German merchant ship, and reporting to the Fuehrer. Ajax and Achilles lay outside, determined to dog her to her doom should she venture forth. Meanwhile, on the night of the fourteenth, the Cumberland, which had been steaming at full speed from the Falklands, took the place of the utterly crippled Exeter. The arrival of this eight-inch-gun cruiser restored to its narrow balance a doubtful situation.

It had been most exciting to follow the drama of this brilliant action from the Admiralty War Room, where I spent a large part of the thirteenth. Our anxieties did not end with the day. Mr. Chamberlain was at that time in France on a visit to the Army. On the seventeenth I wrote to him:

December 17, 1939.

If the Spee breaks out, as she may do tonight, we hope to renew the action of the thirteenth with the Cumberland, an eight eight-inch-gun ship, in the place of the six-gun Exeter. The Spee knows now that Renown and Ark Royal are oiling at Rio, so this is her best chance. The Dorsetshire and Shropshire, who are coming across from the Cape, are still three and four days away respectively. It is fortunate that the Cumberland was handy at the Falklands, as Exeter was heavily damaged. She was hit over a hundred times, one turret smashed, three guns knocked out, and sixty officers and men killed and twenty wounded. Indeed the Exeter fought one of the finest and most resolute actions against superior range and metal on record. Every conceivable precaution has been taken to prevent the Spee slipping out unobserved, and I have told Harwood (who is now an Admiral and a K.C.B.) that he is free to attack her anywhere outside the three-mile limit. We should prefer, however, that she should be interned, as this will be less creditable to the German Navy than being sunk in action. Moreover, a battle of this kind is full of hazard, and needless bloodshed must never be sought.

The whole of the Canadians came in safely this morning under the protection of the main fleet and [are] being welcomed by Anthony, Massey, and I trust a good part of the people of Greenock and Glasgow. We plan to give them a cordial reception. They are to go to Aldershot, where no doubt you will go and see them presently.

There have been ten air attacks today on individual ships along the east coast from Wick to Dover, and some of the merchant ships have been machine-gunned out of pure spite, some of our people being hit on their decks.

I am sure you must be having a most interesting time at the Front, and I expect you will find that change is the best kind of rest.

From the moment when we heard that action was joined, we instantly ordered powerful forces to concentrate off Montevideo, but our hunting groups were naturally widely dispersed and none was within two thousand miles of the scene. In the north, Force K, comprising the Renown and Ark Royal, was completing a sweep which had begun at Capetown ten days before and was now six hundred miles east of Pernambuco, and twenty-five hundred miles from Montevideo. Farther north still, the cruiser Neptune with three destroyers had just parted company with the French Force X and were coming south to join Force K. All these were ordered to Montevideo; they had first to fuel at Rio. However, we succeeded in creating the impression that they had already left Rio and were approaching Montevideo at thirty knots.

On the other side of the Atlantic, Force H was returning to the Cape for fuel after an extended sweep up the African coast. Only the Dorsetshire was immediately available at Capetown and was ordered at once to join Admiral Harwood, but she had over four thousand miles to travel. She was followed later by the Shropshire. In addition, to guard against the possible escape of the Spee to the eastward, Force I, comprising the Cornwall, Gloucester, and the aircraft carrier Eagle from the East Indies station, which at this time was at Durban, was placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic.

* * * * *

Meanwhile, Captain Langsdorff telegraphed on December 16 to the German Admiralty as follows:

Strategic position off Montevideo. Besides the cruisers and destroyers, Ark Royal and Renown. Close blockade at night; escape into open sea and break-through to home waters hopeless…. Request decision on whether the ship should be scuttled in spite of insufficient depth in the Estuary of the Plate, or whether internment is to be preferred.

At a conference presided over by the Fuehrer, at which Raeder and Jodl were present, the following answer was decided on:

Attempt by all means to extend the time in neutral waters…. Fight your way through to Buenos Aires if possible. No internment in Uruguay. Attempt effective destruction, if ship is scuttled.

As the German envoy in Montevideo reported later that further attempts to extend the time limit of seventy-two hours were fruitless, these orders were confirmed by the German Supreme Command.

Accordingly, during the afternoon of the seventeenth the Spee transferred more than seven hundred men, with baggage and provisions, to the German merchant ship in the harbour. Shortly afterwards Admiral Harwood learnt that she was weighing anchor. At 6.15 P.M., Watched by immense crowds, she left harbour and steamed slowly seaward, awaited hungrily by the British cruisers. At 8.54 P.M., as the sun sank, the Ajax’s aircraft reported: “Graf Spee has blown herself up.” The Renown and Ark Royal were still a thousand miles away.

Langsdorff was broken-hearted by the loss of his ship. In spite of the full authority he had received from his Government, he wrote on December 19:

I can now only prove by my death that the fighting services of the Third Reich are ready to die for the honour of the flag. I alone bear the responsibility for scuttling the pocket battleship Admiral Graf Spee. I am happy to pay with my life for any possible reflection on the honour of the flag. I shall face my fate with firm faith in the cause and the future of the nation and of my Fuehrer.

That night he shot himself.

Thus ended the first surface challenge to British trade on the oceans. No other raider appeared until the spring of 1940, when a new campaign opened, utilising disguised merchant ships. These could more easily avoid detection, but on the other hand could be mastered by lesser forces than those required to destroy a pocket battleship.

* * * * *

As soon as the news arrived of the end of the Spee, I was impatient to bring our widely scattered hunting groups home. The Spee’s auxiliary, the Altmark, was, however, still afloat, and it was believed that she had on board the crews of the nine ships which had been sunk by the raider.

Now that the South Atlantic is practically clear except for the Altmark, it seems of high importance to bring home the Renown and Ark Royal together with at least one of the eight-inch-gun cruisers. This will give us more easement in convoy work and enable refits and leave to be accomplished. I like your plan of the two small ships anchoring tomorrow in Montevideo inner harbour, but I do not think it would be right to send Force K so far south. Moreover, perhaps so many warships would not be allowed in at one time. It would be very convenient if, as you proposed, Neptune relieved Ajax as soon as the triumphal entry [into Montevideo harbour] is over; and it would be very good if all the returning forces could scrub and search the South Atlantic on their way home for the Altmark. I feel that we ought to bring home all that are not absolutely needed. The Northern Patrol will require constant support in two, or better still three, reliefs from the Clyde as long as we stay there. I agree with Captain Tennant that the German Admiralty will be most anxious to do something to get their name back.

Perhaps you will let me know what you think about these ideas.

I was also most anxious about the Exeter, and could not accept the proposals made to me to leave her unrepaired in the Falkland Islands till the end of the war.

This preliminary report of damage to Exeter shows the tremendous fire to which she was exposed and the determination with which she was fought. It also reflects high credit on the Constructors’ Department that she should have been able to stand up to such a prolonged and severe battering. This story will have to be told as soon as possible, omitting anything undesirable [i.e., what the enemy should not know].

What is proposed about repair? What can be done at the Falklands? I presume she will be patched up sufficiently to come home for long refit.

We ought not readily to accept the non-repair during the war of Exeter. She should be strengthened and strutted internally as far as possible, and should transfer her ammunition, or the bulk of it, to some merchant ship or tender. Perhaps she might be filled up in part with barrels or empty oil drums, and come home with reduced crew under escort either to the Mediterranean or to one of our dockyards. If nothing can be done with her then, she should be stripped of all useful guns and appliances, which can be transferred to new construction.

The above indicates only my general view. Perhaps you will let me know how it can be implemented.

I have not seen the answer to the telegram from the Rear Admiral, South America, about it not being worth while to repair Exeter, on which I minuted in the contrary sense. How does this matter now stand? I gathered from you verbally that we were all in agreement she should come home and be thoroughly repaired, and that this need not take so long as the R.A. thought.

What is going to happen to Exeter now? How is she going to be brought home, in what condition, and when? We cannot leave her at the Falklands, where either she will be in danger or some valuable ship will be tethered to look after her. I shall be glad to know what is proposed.

My view prevailed. The Exeter reached this country safely. I had the honour to pay my tribute to her brave officers and men from her shattered deck in Plymouth Harbour. She was preserved for over two years of distinguished service, until she perished under Japanese guns in the forlorn battle of the Straits of Sunda in 1942.

* * * * *

The effects of the action off the Plate gave intense joy to the British nation and enhanced our prestige throughout the world. The spectacle of the three smaller British ships unhesitatingly attacking and putting to flight their far more heavily gunned and armoured antagonist was everywhere admired. It was contrasted with the disastrous episode of the escape of the Goeben in the Straits of Otranto in August, 1914. In justice to the admiral of those days it must be remembered that all Commodore Harwood’s ships were faster than the Spee, and all except one of Admiral Troubridge’s squadron in 1914 were slower than the Goeben. Nevertheless, the impression was exhilarating, and lightened the dreary and oppressive winter through which we were passing.

The Soviet Government were not pleased with us at this time, and their comment on December 31, 1939, in the Red Fleet is an example of their factual reporting:

Nobody would dare to say that the loss of a German battleship is a brilliant victory for the British Fleet. This is rather a demonstration, unprecedented in history, of the impotence of the British. Upon the morning of December 13, the battleship started an artillery duel with the Exeter, and within a few minutes obliged the cruiser to withdraw from the action. According to the latest information the Exeter sank near the Argentine coast, en route for the Falkland Islands.

* * * * *

On December 23, the American Republics made a formal protest to Britain, France, and Germany about the action off the River Plate, which they claimed to be a violation of the American security zone. It also happened about this time that two German merchant ships were intercepted by our cruisers near the coast of the United States. One of these, the liner Columbus of thirty-two thousand tons, was scuttled and survivors were rescued by an American cruiser; the other escaped into territorial waters in Florida. President Roosevelt reluctantly complained about these vexations near the coasts of the Western Hemisphere; and in my reply I took the opportunity of stressing the advantages which our action off the Plate had brought to all the South American Republics. Their trade had been hampered by the activities of the German raider and their ports had been used for his supply ships and information centres. By the laws of war the raider had been entitled to capture all merchant ships trading with us in the South Atlantic, or to sink them after providing for their crews; and this had inflicted grave injury on American commercial interests, particularly in the Argentine. The South American Republics should greet the action off the Plate as a deliverance from all this annoyance. The whole of the South Atlantic was now clear, and might perhaps remain clear, of warlike operations. This relief should be highly valued by the South American States, who might now in practice enjoy for a long period the advantages of a security zone of three thousand, rather than three hundred, miles.

I could not forbear to add that the Royal Navy was carrying a very heavy burden in enforcing respect for international law at sea. The presence of even a single raider in the North Atlantic called for the employment of half our battle-fleet to give sure protection to the world’s commerce. The unlimited laying of magnetic mines by the enemy was adding to the strain upon our flotillas and small craft. If we should break under this strain, the South American Republics would soon have many worse worries than the sound of one day’s distant seaward cannonade; and in quite a short time the United States would also face more direct cares. I therefore felt entitled to ask that full consideration should be given to the burden which we were carrying at this crucial period, and that the best construction should be placed on action which was indispensable if the war was to be ended within reasonable time and in the right way.