Military history

Appendices

Appendix A, Book I

A CONVERSATION WITH COUNT GRANDI

September 28, 1935.

Mr. Churchill to Sir Robert Vansittart.

Though he pleaded the Italian cause with much address, he of course realises the whole position….

I told him that since Parliament rose, there had been a strong development of public opinion. England, and indeed the British Empire, could act unitedly on the basis of the League of Nations, and all parties thought that that instrument was the most powerful protection against future dangers wherever they might arise. He pointed out the injury to the League of Nations by the loss of Italy. The fall of the régime in Italy would inevitably produce a pro-German Italy. He seemed prepared for economic sanctions. They were quite ready to accept life upon a communal basis. However poor they were, they could endure. He spoke of the difficulty of following the movements of British public opinion. I said that no foreign ambassador could be blamed for that, but the fact of the change must be realised. Moreover, if fighting began in Abyssinia, cannons fired, blood was shed, villages were bombed, etc., an almost measureless rise in the temperature must be expected. He seemed to contemplate the imposition of economic sanctions which would at first be ineffective, but gradually increase until at some moment or other an event of war would occur.

I said the British Fleet was very strong, and, although it had to be rebuilt in the near future, it was good and efficient at the present moment, and it was now completely ready to defend itself; but I repeated that this was a purely defensive measure in view of our Mediterranean interests, and did not in any way differentiate our position from that of other members of the League of Nations. He accepted this with a sad smile.

I then talked of the importance of finding a way out: “He that ruleth his spirit is greater than he that taketh a city.” He replied that they would feel that everywhere except in Italy. They had to deal with two hundred thousand men with rifles in their hands. Mussolini’s dictatorship was a popular dictatorship, and success was the essence of its strength. Finally, I said that I was in favour of a meeting between the political chiefs of the three countries…. The three men together could carry off something that one could never do by himself. After all, the claims of Italy to primacy in the Abyssinian sphere and the imperative need of internal reform [in Abyssinia] had been fully recognised by England and France. I told him I should support such an idea if it were agreeable. The British public would be willing to try all roads to an honourable peace. I think there should be a meeting of three. Any agreement they reached would of course be submitted to the League of Nations. It seems to me the only chance of avoiding the destruction of Italy as a powerful and friendly factor in Europe. Even if it failed, no harm would have been done, and at present we are heading for an absolute smash.

Appendix B, Book I

MY NOTE ON THE FLEET AIR ARM

WRITTEN FOR SIR THOMAS INSKIP, MINISTER FOR THE CO-ORDINATION OF DEFENCE, IN 1936

1. It is impossible to resist an admiral’s claim that he must have complete control of, and confidence in, the aircraft of the battle fleet, whether used for reconnaissance, gun-fire or air attack on a hostile fleet. These are his very eyes. Therefore the Admiralty view must prevail in all that is required to secure this result.

2. The argument that similar conditions obtain in respect of Army co-operation aircraft cannot be countenanced. In one case the aircraft take flight from aerodromes and operate under precisely similar conditions to those of normal independent air force action. Flight from warships and action in connection with naval operations is a totally different matter. One is truly an affair of cooperation only; the other an integral part of modern naval operations.

3. A division must therefore be made between the air force controlled by the Admiralty and that controlled by the Air Ministry. This division does not depend upon the type of the undercarriage of the aircraft, nor necessarily the base from which it is flown. It depends upon the function. Is it predominantly a naval function or not?

4. Most of these defence functions can clearly be assigned. For instance, all functions which require aircraft of any description (whether with wheels, floats, or boats; whether reconnaissance, spotters or fighters, bombers or torpedo seaplanes) to be carried regularly in warships or in aircraft carriers, naturally fall to the naval sphere.

5. The question thus reduces itself to the assignment of any type operating over the sea from shore bases. This again can only be decided in relation to the functions and responsibilities placed upon the Navy. Aircraft borne afloat could discharge a considerable function of trade protection. This would be especially true in the broad waters, where a squadron of cruisers with their own scouting planes or a pair of small aircraft carriers could search upon a front of a thousand miles. But the Navy could never be required – nor has it ever claimed – to maintain an air strength sufficient to cope with a concentrated attack upon merchant shipping in the Narrow Waters by a large hostile air force of great power. In fact, the maxim must be applied of air force versus air force and Navy versus Navy. When the main hostile air force or any definite detachment from it is to be encountered, it must be by the British Royal Air Force.

6. In this connection it should not be forgotten that a ship or ships may have to be selected and adapted for purely air-force operations, like a raid on some deep-seated enemy base, or vital centre. This is an air-force operation and necessitates the use of types of aircraft not normally associated with the Fleet. In this case the rôles of the Admiralty and the Air Ministry will be reversed, and the Navy would swim the ship in accordance with the tactical or strategic wishes of the Air Ministry. Far from becoming a baffle, this special case exemplifies the logic of the “division of command according to function.”

7. What is conceded to the Navy should, within the limits assigned, be fully given. The Admiralty should have plenary control and provide the entire personnel of the Fleet air arm. Officers, cadets, petty officers, artificers, etc., for this force would be selected from the Royal Navy by the Admiralty. They would then acquire the art of flying and the management of aircraft in the Royal Air Force training-schools – to which perhaps naval officers should be attached – but after acquiring the necessary degree of proficiency as air chauffeurs and mechanics they would pass to shore establishments under the Admiralty for their training in Fleet air arm duties, just as the pilots of the Royal Air Force do to their squadrons at armament schools to learn air fighting. Thus, the personnel employed upon fleet air functions will be an integral part of the Navy, dependent for discipline and advancement as well as for their careers and pensions solely upon the Admiralty. This would apply to every rank and every trade involved, whether afloat or ashore.

8. Coincident with this arrangement whereby the Fleet air arm becomes wholly a naval Service, a further rearrangement of functions should be made, whereby the Air Ministry becomes responsible for active anti-aircraft defence. This implies, in so far as the Navy is concerned, that, at every naval port, shore anti-aircraft batteries, lights, aircraft, balloons and other devices will be combined under one operational control, though the officer commanding would, of course, with his command be subordinate to the fortress commander.

9. In the same way, the control of the air defences of London and of such other vulnerable areas as it may be necessary to equip with anti-air defences on a considerable scale should also be unified under one command and placed under the Air Ministry. The consequent control should cover not only the operations, but as far as may conveniently be arranged, the training, the raising and administration of the entire personnel for active air defence.

10. The Air Ministry have as clear a title to control active anti-air defence as have the Navy to their own “eyes.” For this purpose a new department should be brought into being in the Air Ministry, to be called “Anti-Air,” to control all guns, searchlights, balloons and personnel of every kind connected with this function, as well as such portion of the Royal Air Force as may from time to time be assigned to it for this duty. Under this department there will be air force officers, assisted by appropriate staffs, in command of all active air defences in specified localities and areas.

11. It is not suggested that the Air Ministry or Air Staff are at present capable of assuming unaided this heavy new responsibility. In the formation of the anti-air command recourse must be had to both the older services. Well-trained staff officers, both from the Army and the Navy, must be mingled with officers of the existing Air Staff.

N.B. – The question of the recruitment and of the interior administration of the units handed over to the anti-air command for operations and training need not be a stumbling-block. They could be provided from the present sources unless and until a more convenient solution was apparent.

12. This memorandum has not hitherto dealt with matériel, but that is extremely simple. The Admiralty will decide upon the types of aircraft which their approved functions demand. The extent of the inroad which they require to make upon the finances and resources of the country must be decided by the Cabinet, operating through a priorities committee under the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence. At the present stage this Minister would, no doubt, give his directions to the existing personnel, but in the event of war or the intensification of the preparations for war he would give them to a Ministry of Supply. There could of course be no question of Admiralty priorities being allowed to override other claims in the general sphere of air production. All must be decided from the supreme standpoint.

13. It is not intended that the Admiralty should develop technical departments for aircraft design separate from those existing in the Air Ministry or under a Ministry of Supply. They would however be free to form a nucleus technical staff to advise them on the possibilities of scientific development and to prescribe their special naval requirements in suitable technical language to the Supply Department.

14. To sum up, therefore, we have:

First – The Admiralty should have plenary control of the Fleet air arm for all purposes which are defined as naval.

Secondly – A new department must be formed under the Air Ministry from the three Services for active anti-aircraft defence operations.

Thirdly – The question of matériel supply must be decided by a priorities committee under the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, and executed at present through existing channels, but eventually by a Ministry of Supply.

Appendix C, Book I

A NOTE ON SUPPLY ORGANISATION

JUNE 6, 1936

1. The existing Office of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence comprises unrelated and wrongly grouped functions. The work of the Minister charged with strategic co-ordination is different, though not in the higher ranges disconnected, from the work of the Minister charged with: (a) securing the execution of the existing programmes, and (b) planning British industry to spring quickly into wartime conditions and creating a high control effective for both this and the present purpose.

2. The first step therefore is to separate the functions of strategic thought from those of material supply in peace and war, and form the organisation to direct this latter process. An harmonious arrangement would be four separate departments – Navy, Army, Air Force, and Supply – with the Co-ordinating Minister at the summit of the four having the final voice upon priorities.

3. No multiplication of committees, however expert or elaborate, can achieve this purpose. Supply cannot be achieved without command. A definite chain of responsible authority must descend through the whole of British industry affected. (This must not be thought to imply State interference in the actual functions of industry.) At the present time the three service authorities exercise separate command over their particular supply, and the fourth, or planning, authority is purely consultative, and that only upon the war need divorced from present supply. What is needed is to unify the supply command of the three service departments into an organism which also exercises command over the war expansion. (The Admiralty would retain control over the construction of warships and certain special naval stores.)

4. This unification should comprise not only the function of supply but that of design. The service departments prescribe in general technical terms their need in type, quality, and quantity, and the supply organisation executes these in a manner best calculated to serve its customers. In other words, the Supply Department engages itself to deliver the approved types of war stores of all kinds to the services when and where the latter require them.

5. None of this, nor the punctual execution of any of the approved programmes, can be achieved in the present atmosphere of ordinary peacetime preparation. It is neither necessary nor possible at this moment to take wartime powers and apply wartime methods. An intermediate state should be declared called (say) the period of emergency preparation.

6. Legislation should be drafted in two parts – First, that appropriate to the emergency preparation stage, and second, that appropriate to a state of war. Part I should be carried out now. Part II should be envisaged, elaborated, the principles defined, the clauses drafted and left to be brought into operation by a fresh appeal to Parliament should war occur. The emergency stage should be capable of sliding into the war stage with the minimum of disturbance, the whole design having been foreseen.

7. To bring this new system into operation there should first be created a Minister of Supply. This Minister would form a Supply Council. Each member would be charged with the study of the four or five branches of production falling into his sphere. Thereafter, as soon as may be, the existing service sub-departments of supply, design, contracts, etc., would be transferred by instalments to the new authority, who alone would deal with the Treasury upon finance. (By “finance” is meant payments within the scope of the authorised programmes.)

Appendix D, Book I

MY STATEMENT ON THE OCCASION OF THE DEPUTATION OF CONSERVATIVE MEMBERS OF BOTH HOUSES TO THE PRIME MINISTER, JULY 28, 1936

In time of peace the needs of our small Army, and to some extent of the air force and Admiralty, in particular weapons and ammunition, are supplied by the War Office, which has for this purpose certain Government factories and habitual private contractors. This organisation is capable of meeting ordinary peace-time requirements, and providing the accumulation of reserves sufficient for a few weeks of war by our very limited regular forces. Outside this there was nothing until a few months ago. About three or four months ago authority was given to extend the scope of War Office orders in certain directions to ordinary civil industry.

On the other hand, in all the leading Continental countries the whole of industry has been for some time solidly and scientifically organised to turn over from peace to war. In Germany, of course, above all others, this became the supreme study of the Government even before the Hitler régime. Indeed, under the impulse of revenge, Germany, forbidden by treaty to have fleets, armies, and an air force, concentrated with intense compression upon the perfecting of the transference of its whole industry to war purposes. We alone began seriously to examine the problem when everyone else had solved it. There was, however, still time in 1932 and 1933 to make a great advance. Three years ago when Hitler came into power we had perhaps a dozen officials studying the war organisation of industry as compared with five or six hundred working continuously in Germany. The Hitler régime set all this vast machinery in motion. They did not venture to break the treaties about Army, Navy, and air force until they had a head of steam on in every industry which would, they hoped, speedily render them an armed nation unless they were immediately attacked by the Allies.

What is being done now? Preparation cannot reach a stage of mass deliveries for at least eighteen months from the date of the order. If by ammunition is meant projectiles (both bombs and shells) and cartridge-cases containing propellant, it will be necessary to equip the factories with a certain amount of additional special-purpose machine-tools, and to modify their existing lay-out. In addition jigs and gauges for the actual manufacture must be made…. The manufacture of these special machine-tools will have to be done in most cases by firms quite different from those to whom the output of projectiles is entrusted. After the delivery of the special machine-tools, a further delay is required while they are being set up in the producing factories, and while the process of production is being started. Then and only then, at first in a trickle, then in a stream, and finally in a flood, deliveries will take place. Not until then can the accumulation of war resources begin. This inevitably lengthy process is still being applied on a relatively minute scale. Fifty-two firms have been offered contracts. Fourteen had last week accepted contracts. At the present moment it would be no exaggeration to state that the German ammunition plants may well amount to four or five hundred, already for very nearly two years in full swing.

Turning now to cannon: by cannon I mean guns firing explosive shells. The processes by which a cannon factory is started are necessarily lengthy, the special plants and machine-tools are more numerous, and the lay-out more elaborate. Our normal peace-time output of cannon in the last ten years has, apart from the Fleet, been negligible. We are therefore certainly separated by two years from any large deliveries of field guns or anti-aircraft guns. Last year it is probable that at least five thousand guns were made in Germany, and this process could be largely amplified in war. Surely we ought to call into being plant which would enable us, if need be, to create and arm a national army of a considerable size.

I have taken projectiles and cannon because these are the core of defence; but the same arguments and conditions, with certain modifications, apply over the whole field of equipment. The flexibility of British industry should make it possible to produce many forms of equipment, for instance, motor lorries and other kindred weapons such as tanks and armoured cars, and many slighter forms of material necessary for an army, in a much shorter time if that industry is at once set going. Has it been set going? Why should we be told that the Territorial Army cannot be equipped until after the Regular Army is equipped? I do not know what is the position about rifles and rifle ammunition. I hope at least we have enough for a million men. But the delivery of rifles from new sources is a very lengthy process.

Even more pertinent is the production of machine-guns. I do not know at all what is the programme of Browning and Bren machine-guns. But if the orders for setting up the necessary plant were only given a few months ago, one cannot expect any appreciable deliveries except by direct purchase from abroad before the beginning of 1938. The comparable German plants already in operation are capable of producing supplies limited only by the national manhood available to use them.

But this same argument can be followed out through all the processes of producing explosives, propellant, fuses, poison gas, gas-masks, searchlights, trench-mortars, grenades, air-bombs, and all the special adaptations required for depth-charges, mines, etc., for the Navy. It must not be forgotten that the Navy is dependent upon the War Office and upon an expansion of national industry for a hundred and one minor articles, a shortage in any one of which will cause grave injury. Behind all this again lies of course the supply of raw materials, with its infinite complications.

What is the conclusion? It is that we are separated by about two years from any appreciable improvement in the material process of national defence, so far as concerns the whole volume of supplies for which the War Office has hitherto been responsible, with all the reactions that entails, both on the Navy and the War Office. But upon the scale on which we are now acting, even at the end of two years, the supply will be petty compared either with our needs in war, or with what others have already acquired in peace.

Surely if these facts are even approximately true – and I believe they are mostly understatements – how can it be contended that there is no emergency; that we must not do anything to interfere with the ordinary trade of the country; that there is no need to approach the trade unions about dilution of trainees; that we can safely trust to what the Minister of Co-ordination of Defence described as “training the additional labour as required on the job”; and that nothing must be done which would cause alarm to the public, or lead them to feel that their ordinary habit of life was being deranged?

Complaint is made that the nation is unresponsive to the national need; that the trade unions are unhelpful; that recruiting for the Army and the Territorial Force is very slack, and even is obstructed by elements of public opinion. But as long as they arc assured by the Government that there is no emergency these obstacles will continue.

I was given confidentially by the French Government an estimate of the German air strength in 1935. This tallies almost exactly with the figures I forecast to the Committee of Imperial Defence in December last. The Air Staff now think the French estimate too high. Personally I think it is too low. The number of machines which Germany could now put into action simultaneously may be nearer two thousand than fifteen hundred. Moreover, there is no reason to assume that they mean to stop at two thousand. The whole plant and lay-out of the German air force is on an enormous scale, and they may be already planning a development far greater than anything yet mentioned. Even if we accept the French figures of about fourteen hundred, the German strength at this moment is double that of our Metropolitan air force, judged by trained pilots and military machines that could go into action and be maintained in action. But the relative strength of two countries cannot be judged without reference to their power of replenishing their fighting force. The German industry is so organised that it can certainly produce at full blast a thousand a month and increase the number as the months pass. Can the British industry at the present time produce more than three hundred to three hundred and fifty a month? How long will it be before we can reach a war-potential output equal to the Germans? Certainly not within two years. When we allow for the extremely high rate of war wastage, a duel between the two countries would mean that before six months were out our force would be not a third of theirs. The preparation for war-time expansion at least three times the present size of the industry seems urgent in the highest degree. It is probable however that Germany is spending not less than one hundred and twenty millions on her Air Force this year. It is clear therefore that so far as this year is concerned we are not catching up. On the contrary, we are falling farther behind. How long will this continue into next year? No one can tell.

* * * * *

It has been announced that the programme of one hundred and twenty squadrons and fifteen hundred first-line aircraft for home defence would be completed by April 1, 1937. Parliament has not been given any information how this programme is being carried out in machines, in personnel, in organisation, or in the ancillary supplies. We have been told nothing about it at all. I do not blame the Government for not giving full particulars. It would be too dangerous now. Naturally, however, in the absence of any information at all, there must be great anxiety and much private discussion…. I doubt very much whether by July next year we shall have thirty squadrons equipped with the new types. I understand that the deliveries of the new machines will not really begin to flow in large numbers for a year or fifteen months. Meanwhile we have very old-fashioned and obsolete tackle.

There is a second question about these new machines: When they begin to flow out of the factories in large numbers fifteen months hence, will they be equipped with all necessary appliances? Take, for instance, the machine-guns. If we are aiming at having a couple of thousand of the latest machines, i.e., fifteen hundred and five hundred in reserve in eighteen months from now, what arrangements have been made for their machine-guns? Some of these modern fighting machines have no fewer than eight machine-guns in their wings. Taking only an average of four with proper reserves, that would require ten thousand machine-guns. Is it not a fact that the large-scale manufacture of the Browning and Bren machine-guns was only decided upon a few months ago?

Let us now try the airplane fleet we have built and are building by the test of bombing-power as measured by weight and range. Here I must again make comparison with Germany. Germany has the power at any time henceforward to send a fleet of airplanes capable of discharging in a single voyage at least five hundred tons of bombs upon London. We know from our war statistics that one ton of explosive bombs killed ten people and wounded thirty, and did fifty thousand pounds worth of damage. Of course, it would be absurd to assume that the whole bombing fleet of Germany would make an endless succession of voyages to and from this country. All kinds of other considerations intervene. Still, as a practical measure of the relative power of the bombing fleets of the two countries, the weight of discharge per voyage is a very reasonable measure. Now, if we take the German potential discharge upon London at a minimum of five hundred tons per voyage of their entire bombing fleet, what is our potential reply? They can do this from now on. What can we do? First of all: How could we retaliate upon Berlin? We have not at the present time a single squadron of machines which could carry an appreciable load of bombs to Berlin. What shall we have this time next year? I submit for your consideration that this time next year, when it may well be that the potential discharge of the German fleet is in the neighbourhood of a thousand tons, we shall not be able to discharge in retaliation more than sixty tons upon Berlin.

But leave Berlin out of the question. Nothing is more striking about our new fleet of bombers than their short range. The great bulk of our new heavy and medium bombers cannot do much more than reach the coasts of Germany from this Island. Only the nearest German cities would be within their reach. In fact the retaliation of which we should be capable this time next year from this Island would be puerile judged by the weight of explosive dropped, and would be limited only to the fringes of Germany.

Of course, a better tale can be told if it is assumed that we can operate from French and Belgian jumping-off grounds. Then very large and vital industrial districts of Germany would be within reach of our machines. Our air force will be incomparably more effective if used in conjunction with those of France and Belgium than it would be in a duel with Germany alone.

I now pass to the next stage. Our defence, passive and active, ground and air, at home. Evidently we might have to endure an ordeal in our great cities and vital feeding-ports such as no community has ever been subjected to before. What arrangements have been made in this field? Take London and its seven or eight million inhabitants. Nearly two years ago I explained in the House of Commons the danger of an attack by thermite bombs. These small bombs, little bigger than an orange, had even then been manufactured by millions in Germany. A single medium airplane can scatter five hundred. One must expect in a small raid literally tens of thousands of these bombs which burn through from storey to storey. Supposing only a hundred fires were started and there were only ninety fire brigades, what happens? Obviously the attack would be on a far more formidable scale than that. One must expect that a proportion of heavy bombs would be dropped at the same time, and that water, light, gas, telephone systems, etc., would be seriously deranged. What happens then? Nothing like it has ever been seen in world history. There might be a vast exodus of the population, which would present to the Government problems of public order, of sanitation and food-supply which would dominate their attention, and probably involve the use of all their disciplined forces.

What happens if the attack is directed upon the feeding-ports, particularly the Thames, Southampton, Bristol, and the Mersey, none of which are out of range? What arrangements have been made to bring in the food through a far greater number of subsidiary channels? What arrangements have been made to protect our defence centres? By defence centres I mean the centres upon which our power to continue resistance depends. The problem of the civil population and their miseries is one thing; the means by which we could carry on the war is another. Have we organised and created an alternative centre of Government if London is thrown into confusion? No doubt there has been discussion of this on paper, but has anything been done to provide one or two alternative centres of command with adequate deep-laid telephone connections, and wireless from which the necessary orders can be given by some coherent thinking-mechanism? …

Appendix E, Book I

Appendix A, Book II

TABLES OF NAVAL STRENGTH

SEPTEMBER 3, 1939

BRITISH AND GERMAN FLEETS

UNITED STATES

FRANCE

ITALY

JAPAN

Appendix B, Book II

PLAN “CATHERINE”

Minute of September 12, 1939

PART I

(1) For a particular operation special tools must be constructed. D.N.C. thinks it would be possible to hoist an “R” [a battleship of the Royal Sovereign class] nine feet, thus enabling a certain channel where the depth is only twenty-six feet to be passed. There are at present no guns commanding this channel, and the States on either side are neutral. Therefore there would be no harm in hoisting the armour belt temporarily up to the water level. The method proposed would be to fasten caissons [bulges] in two layers on the sides of the “R,” giving the ship the enormous beam of one hundred and forty feet. No insuperable difficulty exists in fixing these, the inner set in dock and the outer in harbour. By filling or emptying these caissons the draught of the vessel can be altered at convenience, and, once past the shallow channel, the ship can be deepened again so as to bring the armour belt comfortably below the waterline. The speed when fully hoisted might perhaps be sixteen knots, and when allowed to fall back to normal draught, thirteen or fourteen. These speeds could be accepted for the operation. They are much better than I expected.

It is to be noted that the caissons afford admirable additional protection against torpedoes; they are in fact super-blisters.

It would also be necessary to strengthen the armour deck so as to give exceptional protection against air bombing, which must be expected.

(2) The caissons will be spoken of as “galoshes” and the strengthening of the deck as the “umbrella.”

(3) When the ice in the theatre concerned melts (?) about March, the time for the operation would arrive. If orders are given for the necessary work by October 1, the designs being made meanwhile, we have six months, but seven would be accepted. It would be a great pity to waste the summer; therefore the highest priority would be required. Estimates of time and money should be provided on this basis.

(4) In principle two “Rs” should be so prepared, but of course three would be better. Their only possible antagonists during the summer of 1940 would be the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. It may be taken for certain that neither of these ships, the sole resource of Germany, would expose themselves to the fifteen-inch batteries of the “Rs,” which would shatter them.

(5) Besides the “Rs” thus prepared, a dozen mine-bumpers should be prepared. Kindly let me have designs. These vessels should be of sufficiently deep draught to cover the “Rs” when they follow, and be worked by a small engine-room party from the stern. They would have a heavy fore-end to take the shock of any exploding mine. One would directly precede each of the “Rs.” Perhaps this requirement may be reduced, as the ships will go line ahead. I can form no picture of these mine-bumpers, but one must expect two or three rows of mines to be encountered, each of which might knock out one. It may be that ordinary merchant ships could be used for the purpose, being strengthened accordingly.

(6) Besides the above, it will be necessary to carry a three months’ reasonable supply of oil for the whole expeditionary fleet. For this purpose turtle-back blistered tankers must be provided capable of going at least twelve knots. Twelve knots may be considered provisionally as the speed of the passage, but better if possible.

PART II

(1) The objective is the command of the particular theatre [the Baltic], which will be secured by the placing [in it] of a battle squadron which the enemy heavy ships dare not engage. Around this battle squadron the light forces will act. It is suggested that three 10,000-ton eight-inch-gun cruisers and two six-inch should form the cruiser squadron, together with two flotillas of the strongest combat destroyers, a detachment of submarines, and a considerable contingent of ancillary craft, including, if possible, depot ships, and a fleet repair vessel.

(2) On the approved date the “Catherine” Fleet would traverse the passage by night or day, as judged expedient, using if desired smoke screens. The destroyers would sweep ahead of the fleet, the mine-bumpers would precede the “Rs,” and the cruisers and lighter vessels would follow in their wake. All existing apparatus of paravanes and other precautions can be added. It ought, therefore, to be possible to overcome the mining danger, and there are no guns to bar the channel. A heavy attack from the air must be encountered by the combined batteries of the Fleet.

Note: An aircraft carrier could be sent in at the same time and kept supplied with reliefs of aircraft reaching it by flight.

PART III

It is not necessary to enlarge on the strategic advantages of securing the command of this theatre. It is the supreme naval offensive open to the Royal Navy. The isolation of Germany from Scandinavia would intercept the supplies of iron ore and food and all other trade. The arrival of this Fleet in the theatre and the establishment of command would probably determine the action of the Scandinavian States. They could be brought in on our side; in which case a convenient base could be found capable of being supplied overland. The difficulty is that until we get there, they do not dare; but the three months’ oil supply should give the necessary margin, and if the worst comes to the worst, it is not seen why the Fleet should not return as it came. The presence of this Fleet in the theatre would hold all enemy forces on the spot. They would not dare to send them on the trade routes, except as a measure of despair. They would have to arm the whole northern shore against bombardment, or possibly even, if the alliance of the Scandinavian Powers was obtained, military descents. The influence of this movement upon Russia would be far-reaching, but we cannot count on this.

Secrecy is essential, as surprise must play its full part. For this purpose the term “Catherine” will always be used in speaking of the operation. The caissons will be explained as “additional blisters.” The strengthening of the turtle-deck is normal A.A. precaution.

I commend these ideas to your study, hoping that the intention will be to solve the difficulties.

W. S. C.

Appendix C, Book II

NEW CONSTRUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION

First Lord to First Sea Lord and Others.

October 8, 1939.

1. It is far more important to have some ships to fight with, and to have ships that Parliament has paid for delivered to date, than to squander effort upon remote construction which has no relation to our dangers!

2. A supreme effort must be made to finish King George V and Prince of Wales by their contract dates. The peace-time habit of contractors in booking orders and executing them when they please cannot be allowed to continue in time of war. Advise me of the penalties that may be enforced, in order that a case may be stated, if necessary, to the Law Officers of the Crown. Advise me also of the limiting factors. I suppose as usual the gun-mountings. It must be considered a marked failure by all concerned if these ships are not finished by their contract dates. I will myself inquire on Friday next into the condition of each of these ships, and will see the contractors personally at the Admiralty in your presence. Pray arrange these meetings from 5 P.M. onwards. It is no use the contractors saying it cannot be done. I have seen it done when full pressure is applied, and every resource and contrivance utilised. In short, we must have K.G.V. by July, 1940, and P. of W. three months later. The ships we need to win the war with must be in commission in 1940.

Pray throw yourselves into this and give me your aid to smooth away the obstacles.

3. The above remarks apply also to the aircraft carriers. Illustrious is to be five months late, and we know what that means. Victorious is even to be nine months late. Formidable from the 1937 programme is six months late, and Indomitable five months late. All these ships will be wanted to take part in the war, and not merely to sail the seas – perhaps under the German flag (!) – after it is over. Let me appeal to you to make this go. The later construction of aircraft carriers will not save us if we are beaten in 1940.

4. Thirdly, there are the cruisers. Look, for example, at the Dido, which was contracted to be finished in June, 1939, and is now offered to us in August, 1940. What is the explanation of this fiasco?

5. We have at this moment to distinguish carefully between running an industry or a profession, and winning the war. The skilled labour employed upon vessels which cannot complete during 1940 should, so far as is necessary or practicable, be shifted on to those that can complete in 1940. Special arrangements must be made as required to transfer the workmen from the later ships to those that are needed for the fighting. All ships finishing in 1941 fall into the shade, and those of 1942 into the darkness. We must keep the superiority in 1940.

6. The same principles apply even more strongly to destroyers and light craft; but these seem to be going on pretty well, and I have not yet had time to look in detail into their finishing dates. But we most urgently require two new battleships, four aircraft carriers and a dozen cruisers commissioned and at work before the end of 1940.

W. S. C.

* * * * *

First Lord to First Sea Lord.

October 21, 1939.

I address this to you alone, because together we can do what is needful.

We must have a certain number of capital ships that are not afraid of a chance air bomb. We have been able to protect them by bulges and Asdics against the U-boats. We must have them made secure against the air. It is quite true that it may well be a hundred to one against a hit with a heavy air torpedo upon a ship, but the chance is always there, and the disproportion is grievous. Like a hero being stung by a malarious mosquito! We must work up to the old idea of a ship fit to lie the line against whatever may be coming.

To come to the point. I want four or five ships made into tortoises that we can put where we like and go to sleep content. There may be other types which will play their parts in the outer oceans; but we cannot go on without a squadron of heavy ships that can stand up to the battery from the air.

I wrote you this morning about the Queen Elizabeth. But we must make at least five other ships air-proof, i.e., not afraid of a thousand-pound armour-piercing bomb, if by chance it should hit from ten thousand feet. This is not so large a structural rearrangement as might appear. You have got to pull a couple of turrets out of them, saving at least two thousand tons, and this two thousand tons has to be laid out in flat armour of six or seven inches, as high as possible, having regard to stability. The blank spaces of the turrets must be filled with A.A. guns. This means going down from eight guns to four. But surely four fifteen-inch can wipe out Scharnhorst or Gneisenau. Before the new German battleship arrives, we must have King George V and Prince of Wales. Let us therefore concentrate on having five or six vessels which are not afraid of the air, and therefore can work in narrow waters, and keep the high-class stuff for the outer oceans. Pull the guns out and plaster the decks with steel. This is the war proposition of 1940.

How are you going to get these ships into dockyards hands with all your other troubles?

Do not let us worry about the look of the ship. Pull the superimposed turrets out of them. Do one at Plymouth, one at Portsmouth, two on the Clyde, and one on the Tyne. These four-gun ships could be worked up to a very fine battery if the gunnery experts threw themselves into it. But, after all, they must bristle with A.A. and they must swim or float wherever they choose. Here is the war motif of 1940, and we now have the time.

How all this reinforces our need for armoured ammunition ships, and armoured oilers, is easily seen. In all this we have not got to think so much of a sea action as of sea-power maintained in the teeth of air attack.

All this ought to be put in motion Monday, and enough information should be provided to enable us to take far-reaching decisions not later than Thursday. On that day let us have Controller, D.N.C. and D.N.O. and shift our fighting front from the side of the ship to the top.

* * * * *

It looks to me as if the war would lag through the winter with token fighting in all spheres, but that it will begin with mortal intensity in the spring.

Remember no one can gainsay what we together decide.

W. S. C.

Appendix D, Book II

NEW CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMMES

Appendix E, Book II

FLEET BASES

First Lord to D.C.N.S. and others.

1.II.39.

It was arranged at a conference between the First Lord, the First Sea Lord and the C.-in-C. on Nelson, October 31, 1939, that the following arrangements should be made at Fleet bases:

1. Scapa cannot be available, except as a momentary refuelling base for the Fleet, before the spring. Work is, however, to proceed with all possible speed upon

(a) blockships in the exposed channels:

(b) doubling the nets and placing them specially wherever required. They are to be at least as numerous and extensive as in the last war, plus the fact that the modern net is better. The routine of the gates is to be studied afresh with a view to briefer openings and greater security.

(c) The trawler and drifter fleet on the scale used in the Great War is to be earmarked for Scapa, and its disposition carefully considered by Plans Division. However, all these trawlers and drifters will be available for the Forth until it is time to use Scapa as a main base, i.e., not before the end of February, 1940.

(d) The work on the hutments is to proceed without intermission.

(e) Gun platforms are to be made in concrete for the whole of the eighty guns contemplated for the defence of Scapa. The work on these is to proceed throughout the winter; but the guns will not be moved there or mounted until the spring, when everything must be ready for them.

(f) The aerodromes at Wick are to be increased to take four squadrons.

(g) The R.D.F. work is to be gone on with, but must take its turn with more urgent work.

Meanwhile, Scapa can be used as a destroyer refuelling base, and the camouflaging of the oil tanks and the creation of dummy oil tanks should proceed as arranged. Staff at Scapa is not to be dimin ished, but there is no need to add to the oil storage there beyond the 120,000 tons already provided. The men now making the underground storage can be used for other work of a more urgent nature, even within the recent Board decision.

2. Loch Ewe. Port A is to be maintained in its present position with its existing staff. A permanent boom and net is to be provided even before the Scapa nets are completed. The freshwater pipe is to be finished and any minor measures taken to render this base convenient as a concealed resting-place for the Fleet from time to time.

3. Rosyth is to be the main operational base of the Fleet, and everything is to be done to bring it to the highest possible efficiency. Any improvements in the nets should be made with first priority. The balloons must be supplied so as to give effective cover against low-flying attack to the anchorage below the Bridge. The twenty-four 3.7 guns and the four Bofors which were lately moved to the Clyde are to travel back, battery by battery, in the next four days to the Forth, beginning after the Fleet has left the Clyde. It is not desired that this move should appear to be hurried, and the batteries may move as convenient and in a leisurely manner, provided that all are in their stations at the Forth within five days from the date of this minute. Strenuous effort with the highest priority for the R.D.F. installations which cover Rosyth must be forthcoming. Air Vice-Marshal Dowding is today conferring with the C.-in-C., Home Fleet, upon the support which can be forthcoming from A.D.G.B. The arrangement previously reached with the Air Ministry must be regarded as the minimum, and it is hoped that at least six squadrons will be able to come into action on the first occasion the Fleet uses this base.

D.C.N.S. will kindly find out the upshot of the conference between the C.-in-C. and Vice-Marshal Dowding and report the results. We must certainly look forward to the Fleet being attacked as soon as it reaches the Forth, and all must be ready for that. Thereafter this base will continue to be worked up in every way until it is a place where the strong ships of the Fleet can rest in security. Special arrangements must be made to co-ordinate the fire of the ships with that of the shore batteries observing that a seventy-two-gun concentration should be possible over the anchorage.

4. The sixteen balloons now disposed at the Clyde should not be removed, as they will tend to mislead the enemy upon our intentions.

I should be glad if D.C.N.S. will vet this minute and make sure it is correct and solid in every detail, and, after obtaining the assent of the First S.L., make it operative in all Departments.

W. S. C.

First Lord to First Sea Lord.

3.I.40.

Scapa Defences

1. When in September we undertook to man the Scapa batteries, etc., the number of Marines required was estimated at 3,000. This has now grown successively by War Office estimates to 6,000, to 7,000, to 10,000, or even 11,000. Of course, such figures are entirely beyond the capacity of the Royal Marines to supply.

2. Moreover, the training of the Royal Marines “hostilities only” men can only begin after March 1, when the necessary facilities can be given by the Army. Nothing has, in fact, been done since September except to gather together the nucleus of officers and N.C.O.s with about eight hundred men. These can readily be used by us either for the Marine striking force or the mobile defence force.

The War Office, on the other hand, have a surplus of trained men in their pools, and seem prepared to man the guns at Scapa as they are mounted at the rate of sixteen a month. As we want to use the base from March onwards, it is certain that this is the best way in which the need can be met.

3. If by any chance the War Office do not wish to resume the reponsibility, then we must demand from them the training facilities from February 1 and their full assistance with all the technical ratings we cannot supply; and also make arrangements for the gradual handing-over of the staff. It is clear, however, that the right thing is for them to do it, and we must press them hard.

4. I do not wish the Admiralty to make too great a demand upon the Army. It would seem that the numbers required could be substantially reduced if certain tolerances were allowed. The figure of thirty men per gun and fourteen per searchlight is intended to enable every gun and searchlight to be continuously manned at full strength, night and day, all the year round. But the Fleet will often be at sea, when a lower scale of readiness could be accepted. Moreover, one would not expect the guns to be continuously in action for very prolonged attack. If these attacks were made, the Fleet would surely put to sea. It is a question whether the highest readiness might not be confined to a proportion of the guns, the others having a somewhat longer notice.

5. Is it really necessary to have 108 anti-aircraft lights? Is it likely that an enemy making an attack upon the Fleet at this great distance would do it by night? All their attacks up to the present have been by day, and it is only by day that precise targets can be hit.

6. When the Fleet is ready to use Scapa, we must shift a large proportion, preferably half, of the guns and complements from Rosyth. We cannot claim to keep both going at the same time on the highest scale. Here is another economy.

7. It is suggested, therefore, by me that five thousand men should be allotted to the Scapa defences, and that the Commander should be told to work up gradually the finest show of gun-power he can develop by carefully studying local refinements which deal with each particular battery and post.

8. For a place like Scapa, with all this strong personnel on the spot, parachute landings or raids from U-boats may be considered most unlikely. There is, therefore, no need to have a battalion in addition to the artillery regiments. The Commander should make arrangements to have a sufficient emergency party ready to deal with any such small and improbable contingencies.

9. The case is different with the Shetlands, where we should be all the better for a battalion, though this need not be equipped on the Western-Front scale.

W. S. C.

Appendix F, Book II

NAVAL AID TO TURKEY

Note by the First Lord of the Admiralty.

November 1, 1939.

The First Sea Lord and I received General Orbay this afternoon, and informed him as follows:

In the event of Turkey being menaced by Russia, His Majesty’s Government would be disposed, upon Turkish invitation and in certain circumstances, to come to the aid of Turkey with naval forces superior to those of Russia in the Black Sea. For this purpose it was necessary that the anti-submarine and anti-aircraft defences of the Gulf of Smyrna and the Gulf of Ismid should be developed, British technical officers being lent if necessary. These precautions would be additional to the existing plans for placing anti-submarine nets in the Dardanelles and in the Bosphorus.

We were not now making a promise or entering into any military engagement; and it was probable that the contingency would not arise. We hoped that Russia would maintain a strict neutrality, or even possibly become friendly. However, if Turkey felt herself in danger, and asked for British naval assistance, we would then discuss the situation with her in the light of the Mediterranean situation and of the attitude of Italy with the desire to enter into a formal engagement. It might be that the arrival of the British Fleet at Smyrna would in itself prevent Russia from proceeding to extremities, and that the advance of the British Fleet to the Gulf of Ismid would prevent a military descent by Russia on the mouth of the Bosphorus. At any rate, it would be from this position that the operations necessary to establish the command of the Black Sea would be undertaken.

General Orbay expressed himself extremely gratified at this statement. He said that he understood perfectly there was no engagement. He would report to his Government on his return, and the necessary preparatory arrangements at the bases would be undertaken.

I did not attempt to enter into the juridical aspect, as that would no doubt be thrashed-out should we ever reach the stage where a formal Convention had to be drawn up. It was assumed that Turkey would ask for British aid only in circumstances when she felt herself in grave danger, or had actually become a belligerent.

Appendix G, Book II

THE BLACK-OUT

Note by the First Lord of the Admiralty.

November 20, 1939.

I venture to suggest to my colleagues that when the present moon begins to wane, the black-out system should be modified to a sensible degree. We know that it is not the present policy of the German Government to indulge in indiscriminate bombing in England or France, and it is certainly not their interest to bomb any but a military objective. The bombing of military objectives can best be achieved, and probably only be achieved, by daylight or in moonlight. Should they change this policy, or should a raid be signalled, we could extinguish our lights again. It should have been possible by this time to have made arrangements to extinguish the street-lighting on a Yellow Warning. However, so far as night-bombing for the mere purpose of killing civilians is concerned, it is easy to find London by directional bearing and the map, whether the city is lighted or not. There is no need to have the “rosy glow” as a guide, and it would not be a guide if it were extinguished before the raiders leave the sea. But there is not much in it anyway.

2. There is, of course, no need to turn on the full peace-time street-lighting. There are many modified forms. The system in force in the streets of Paris is practical and effective. You can see six hundred yards. The streets are light enough to drive about with safety, and yet much dimmer than in time of peace.

3. The penalty we pay for the present methods is very heavy: First, the loss of life; secondly, as the Secretary of State for Air has protested, the impediment to munitions output, and also work at the ports, even on the west coast; thirdly, the irritating and depressing effect on the people which is a drag upon their war-making capacity, and, because thought unreasonable, an injury to the prestige of His Majesty’s Government; fourthly, the anxieties of women and young girls in the darkened streets at night or in blacked-out trains; fifthly, the effect on shopping and entertainments.

I would therefore propose that as from December 1:

(a) Street-lighting of a dimmed and modified character shall be resumed in the cities, towns, and villages.

(b) Motor cars and railway trains shall be allowed substantially more light, even at some risk.

(c) The existing restrictions on blacking-out houses, to which the public have adapted themselves, shall continue; but that vexatious prosecutions for minor infractions shall not be instituted. (I see in the newspapers that a man was prosecuted for smoking a cigarette too brightly at one place, and that a woman who turned on the light to tend her baby in a fit was fined in another.)

(d) The grant of these concessions should be accompanied by an effective propaganda continuously delivered by the broadcast, and handed out to motorists at all refuelling stations, that on an air-raid warning all motorists should immediately stop their cars and extinguish their lights, and that all other lights should be extinguished. Severe examples should be made of persons who, after a warning has been sounded, show any light.

4. Under these conditions we might face the chances of the next three winter months in which there is so much mist and fog. We can always revert to the existing practice if the war flares up, or if we do anything to provoke reprisals.

W. S. C.

Appendix H, Book II

THE MAGNETIC MINE, 1939–1940

A Note on the Measures Against the Magnetic Mine

Although the general characteristics of magnetic firing-devices for mines and torpedoes were well understood before the outbreak of war, the details of the particular mine developed by the Germans could not then be known. It was only after the recovery of a specimen at Shoeburyness on November 23, 1939, that we could apply the knowledge derived from past research to the immediate development of suitable counter-measures.

The first need was for new methods of mine-sweeping; the second was to provide passive means of defence for all ships against mines in unswept or imperfectly swept channels. Both these problems were effectively solved, and the technical measures adopted in the earlier stages of the war are briefly described in the following paragraphs.

ACTIVE DEFENCE – MINE-SWEEPING METHODS

The Magnetic Mine

To sweep a magnetic mine, it is necessary to create a magnetic field in its Vicinity of sufficient intensity to actuate the firing mechanism and so detonate it at a safe distance from the minesweeper. A design for a mine-destructor ship had been prepared early in 1939, and such a ship was soon brought into service experimentally, fitted with powerful electro-magnets capable of detonating a mine ahead of her as she advanced. She had some success early in 1940, but the method was not found suitable or sufficiently reliable for large-scale development.

At the same time various forms of electric sweep were developed for towing by shallow-draught vessels; and electro-magnetic coils carried in low-flying aircraft were also used, but this method presented many practical difficulties and involved considerable risk to the aircraft. Of all the methods tried, that which came to be known as the L.L. sweep showed the most promise, and efforts were soon concentrated on perfecting this. The sweeping gear consisted of long lengths of heavy electric cable known as tails, towed by a small vessel, two or more of which operated together. By means of a powerful electric current passed through these tails at carefully adjusted time-intervals, mines could be detonated at a safe distance astern of the sweepers. One of the difficulties which faced the designers of this equipment was that of giving the cables buoyancy. The problem was solved by the cable industry, in the first instance by the use of a “sorbo” rubber sheath, but later the method employed for sealing a tennis ball was also successfully adapted.

By the spring of 1940, the L.L. sweepers were coming into effective operation in increasing numbers. Thereafter the problem resolved itself into a battle of wits between the mine-designer and the mine-sweeping expert. Frequent changes were made by the Germans in the characteristics of the mine, each of which was in turn countered by readjustment of the mechanism of the sweep. Although the enemy had his successes and for a time might hold the initiative, the counter-measures invariably overcame his efforts in the end, and frequently it was possible to forecast his possible developments and prepare the counter in advance. Up to the end of the war the L.L. sweep continued to hold its own as the most effective answer to the purely magnetic mine.

The Acoustic Mine

In the autumn of 1940, the enemy began to use a new form of mine. This was the “Acoustic” type, in which the firing mechanism was actuated by the sound of a ship’s propellers travelling through the water. We had expected this development earlier and were already well prepared for it. The solution lay in providing the minesweeper with means of emitting a sound of appropriate character and sufficient intensity to detonate the mine at a safe distance. Of the devices tried, the most successful was the Kango vibrating hammer fitted in a watertight container under the keel of the ship. Effective results depended on finding the correct frequency of vibration, and, as before, this could only be achieved quickly by obtaining a specimen of the enemy mine. Once again we were fortunate; the first acoustic mine was detected in October, 1940, and in November two were recovered intact from the mud flats in the Bristol Channel. Thereafter, successful counter-measures followed swiftly.

Soon it transpired that both acoustic and magnetic firing devices were being used by the enemy in the same mine, which would therefore respond to either impulse. In addition, many anti-sweeping devices appeared, designed to keep the firing mechanism inactive during the first or any predetermined number of impulses, or for a given period of time after the mine was laid. Thus, a channel which had been thoroughly swept by our minesweepers, perhaps several times, might still contain mines which only “ripened” into dangerous activity later. Despite all these fruits of German ingenuity and a severe set-back in January, 1941, when the experimental station on the Solent was bombed and many valuable records destroyed, the ceaseless battle of wits continued to develop slowly in our favour. The eventual victory was a tribute to the tireless efforts of all concerned.

Passive Defence – Degaussing

It is common knowledge that all ships built of steel contain permanent and induced magnetism. The resulting magnetic field may be strong enough to actuate the firing mechanism of a specially designed mine laid on the sea bed, but protection might be afforded by reducing the strength of this field. Although complete protection in shallow water could never be achieved, it was evident that a considerable degree of immunity was attainable. Before the end of November, 1939, preliminary trials at Portsmouth had shown that a ship’s magnetism could be reduced by winding coils of cable horizontally round the hull, and passing current through them from the ship’s own electrical supply. The Admiralty at once accepted this principle; any ship with electric power could thus be given some measure of protection, and whilst pressing on with further investigation to determine the more precise requirements, no time was lost in making large-scale preparations for equipping the Fleet with this form of defence. The aim was to secure immunity for any ship in depths of water over ten fathoms, whilst mine-sweeping craft and other small vessels should be safe in much shallower depths. More extensive trials carried out in December showed that this “coiling” process would enable a ship to move with comparative safety in half the depth of water which would be needed without such protection. Moreover, no important interference with the ship’s structure and no elaborate mechanism were involved, although many ships would require additional electric power plant. As an emergency measure temporary coils could be fitted externally on a ship’s hull in a few days, but more permanent equipment, fitted internally, would have to be installed at the first favourable moment. Thus, in the first instance there need be little delay in the normal turn-round of shipping. The process was given the name of “degaussing,” and an organisation was set up under Vice-Admiral Lane-Poole to supervise the fitting of all ships with this equipment.

The supply and administrative problems involved were immense. Investigation showed that whereas the needs of degaussing would absorb fifteen hundred miles of suitable cable every week, the industrial capacity of the country could only supply about one-third of that amount in the first instance. Although our output could be stepped up, this could only be done at the expensce of other important demands, and the full requirements could only be met by large imports of material from abroad. Furthermore, trained staffs must be provided at all our ports to control the work of fitting, determine the detailed requirements for each individual ship, and give technical advice to the many local authorities concerned with shipping movements. All this refers to the protection of the great mass of ships comprising the British and Allied merchant fleets.

By the first weeks of 1940, this organisation was gathering momentum. At this stage the chief preoccupation was to keep ships moving to and from our ports, particularly the east coast ports where the principal danger lay. All efforts were therefore concentrated on providing temporary coils, and the whole national output of suitable electric cable was requisitioned. Cable-makers worked night and day to meet the demand. Many a ship left port at this time with her hull encased in festoons of cable which could not be expected to survive the battering of the open sea, but at least she could traverse the dangerous coastal waters in safety and could be refitted before again entering the mined area.

Wiping

Besides the method described above, another and simpler method of degaussing was developed which came to be known as “wiping.” This process could be completed in a few hours by placing a large cable alongside the ship’s hull and passing through it a powerful electric current from a shore supply. No permanent cables need be fitted to the ship, but the process had to be repeated at intervals of a few months. This method was not effective for large ships, but its application to the great multitude of small coasters which constantly worked in the danger zone gave much-needed relief to the organisation dealing with “coiling” and yielded immense savings in time, material, and labour. It was of particular value during the evacuation of Dunkirk, when so many small craft of many kinds not normally employed in the open sea were working in the shallow waters round the Channel coasts.

Memorandum by the First Lord of the Admiralty.

15.III.40

Degaussing of Merchant Ships

My colleagues will be aware that one of our most helpful devices for countering the magnetic mine is the demagnetisation or degaussing of ships. This affords immunity in waters of over ten fathoms.

The number of British ships trading to ports in the United Kingdom which require to be degaussed is about 4,300.

The work of degaussing began in the middle of January, and by March 9, 321 warships and 312 merchant vessels were completed. Two hundred and nineteen warships and approximately 290 merchant vessels were in hand on the same date.

The supply of cable, which has up to the present governed the rate of equipment, is rapidly improving; and it is now the supply of labour in the shipyards which is likely to control the future rate of progress.

It would be a substantial advantage if part of the work of degaussing of British ships could be placed in foreign yards. The number of neutral ships engaged in trade with this country is about seven hundred. Neutral crews and in particular the crews of Norwegian ships are beginning to be uneasy about the dangers from enemy mines on the trade-ways to our ports. The importance to us of the safety of these neutral ships and of the confidence of their crews is a strong argument for disclosing to neutral countries the technical information which they require to demagnetise their ships which trade with this country.

Against the substantial advantages of arranging for some British ships to be demagnetised in foreign yards and of extending demagnetisation to neutral ships must be set any disadvantages of a loss of secrecy. If the enemy is informed of the measures which we are taking, he may (a) increase the sensitivity of his mines, or he may (b) mix mines of opposite polarity in the same field. If secrecy could be preserved, its advantage would be to delay these reactions of the enemy. But technical details of our degaussing equipment have had to be given to all ship-repairing firms in this country. Information which has been so widely distributed almost certainly becomes quickly known to the enemy.

Moreover (a) and (b) have the disadvantages to the enemy that –

(a) would make the mines easier to sweep and reduce the damage to non-degaussed ships by placing the explosion further forward or even ahead of the ships; and

(b) reversal of polarity would only be effective against certain ships which are difficult to demagnetise thoroughly, and would also require a sensitive setting of the mine.

The above position has altered since the arrival of the Queen Elizabeth at New York and the subsequent publicity given to the subject in the press. The enemy now knows the nature of the protective measures we are taking and, knowing the mechanism of his own mine, it will not be difficult for him to deduce the manner in which degaussing operates. He can therefore now adopt any counter-measures within his power. The press notices have had the further effect of increasing demands for information from neutrals, and to continue to refuse such information conflicts with our general policy of encouraging neutral ships to trade in this country.

It is considered, therefore, by my advisers that we shall not be losing an advantage of any great importance by ceasing to treat the information as secret.

The Admiralty recommend, therefore –

(i) that shipyards in neutral countries be used, if necessary, to supplement resources in this country for the degaussing of British merchant ships;

(ii) that technical information of our methods of demagnetisation be supplied as and when necessary to neutral countries for the degaussing of neutral ships trading with this country.

W. S. C.

Appendix I, Book II

EXTRACT FROM WAR DIARY OF U.47

On 29.11.39 the following entry was made in the war diary of Admiral von Doenitz: “Following the report that U.47 had torpedoed a cruiser, Propaganda claimed a sinking. From the service-man’s point of view, such inaccuracies and exaggerations are undesirable.”

Appendix J, Book II

CULTIVATOR NUMBER 6

Note by the Author

During these months of suspense and paralysis I gave much thought and compelled much effort to the development of an idea which I thought might be helpful to the great battle when it began. For secrecy’s sake this was called “White Rabbit Number 6,” later changed to “Cultivator Number 6.” It was a method of imparting to our armies a means of advance up to and through the hostile lines without undue or prohibitive casualties. I believed that a machine could be made which would cut a groove in the earth sufficiently deep and broad through which assaulting infantry and presently assaulting tanks could advance in comparative safety across No-Man’s-Land and wire entanglements, and come to grips with the enemy in his defences on equal terms and in superior strength. It was necessary that the machine cutting this trench should advance at sufficient speed to cross the distance between the two front lines during the hours of darkness. I hoped for a speed of three or four m.p.h.; but even half-a-mile would be enough. If this method could be applied upon a front of perhaps twenty or twenty-five miles, for which two or three hundred trench-cutters might suffice, dawn would find an overwhelming force of determined infantry established on and in the German defences, with hundreds of lines-of-communication trenches stretching back behind them, along which reinforcements and supplies could flow. Thus we should establish ourselves in the enemy’s front line by surprise and with little loss. This process could be repeated indefinitely.

When I had had the first tank made twenty-five years before, I turned to Tennyson d’Eyncourt, Director of Naval Construction, to solve the problem. Accordingly I broached the subject in November to Sir Stanley Goodall, who now held this most important office, and one of his ablest assistants, Mr. Hopkins, was put in charge with a grant of one hundred thousand pounds for experiments. The design and manufacture of a working model was completed in six weeks by Messrs. Ruston-Bucyrus of Lincoln. This suggestive little machine, about three feet long, performed excellently in the Admiralty basement on a floor of sand. Having obtained the active support of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Ironside, and other British military experts, I invited the Prime Minister and several of his colleagues to a demonstration. Later I took it over to France and exhibited it both to General Gamelin and later on to General Georges, who expressed approving interest. On December 6, I was assured that immediate orders and absolute priority would produce two hundred of these machines by March, 1941. At the same time it was suggested that a bigger machine might dig a trench wide enough for tanks.

On February 7, 1940, Cabinet and Treasury approval were given for the construction of two hundred narrow “infantry” and forty wide “officer” machines. The design was so novel that trial units of the main components had first to be built. In April, a hitch occurred. We had hitherto relied on a single Merlin-Marine type of engine, but now the Air Ministry wanted all these, and another heavier and larger engine had to be accepted instead. The machine in its final form weighed over a hundred tons, was seventy-seven feet long, and eight feet high. This mammoth mole could cut in loam a trench five feet deep and seven-and-a-half feet wide at half-a-mile an hour, involving the movement of eight thousand tons of soil. In March, 1940, the whole process of manufacture was transferred to a special department of the Ministry of Supply. The utmost secrecy was maintained by the three hundred and fifty firms involved in making the separate parts, or in assembling them at selected centres. Geological analysis was made of the soil of Northern France and Belgium, and several suitable areas were found where the machine could be used as part of a great offensive battle plan.

But all this labour, requiring at every stage so many people to be convinced or persuaded, led to nothing. A very different form of warfare was soon to descend upon us like an avalanche, sweeping all before it. As will presently be seen, I lost no time in casting aside these elaborate plans and releasing the resources they involved. A few specimens alone were finished and preserved for some special tactical problem or for cutting emergency anti-tank obstacles. By May, 1943, we had only the pilot model, four narrow and five wide machines, made or making. After seeing the full-sized pilot model perform with astonishing efficiency, I minuted “cancel and wind up the four of the five ‘officer’ type, but keep the four ‘infantry’-type in good order. Their turn may come.” These survivors were kept in store until the summer of 1945, when the Siegfried Line being pierced by other methods, all except one was dismantled. Such was the tale of “Cultivator Number 6.” I am responsible but impenitent.

Appendix K, Book II

BRITISH MERCHANT VESSELS LOST BY ENEMY ACTION DURING THE FIRST EIGHT MONTHS OF THE WAR

(Numbers of ships shown in parentheses)

Appendix L, Book II

OPERATION “ROYAL MARINE”

Note by the First Lord of the Admiralty.

March 4, 1940.

1. It will be possible to begin the naval operation at any time at twenty-four hours’ notice after March 12. At that time there will, as planned, be available two thousand fluvial mines of the naval type, comprising three variants. Thereafter a regular minimum supply of one thousand per week has been arranged. The detachment of British sailors is on the spot, and the material is ready. All local arrangements have been made with the French through General Gamelin and Admiral Darlan. These mines will, it is believed, affect the river for the first hundred miles below Karlsruhe. There is always risk in keeping men and peculiar material teed-up so close (four to six miles) to the enemy’s front, although within the Maginot Line. The river is reported to be in perfect order this month. It will probably be deepened by the melting of the snows in April, involving some lengthening of the mine-tails; also the flow from the tributaries may be temporarily stopped or even reversed.

2. The air force will not be ready till the moon is again good in mid-April. Therefore, unless our hand is forced by events, it would seem better to wait till then, so as to infest the whole river simultaneously, and thus also confuse the points of naval departure. By mid-April the air force should have a good supply of mines which could be laid every night during the moon in the reaches between Bingen and Coblentz. All mines of both classes will become harmless before reaching the Dutch frontier. Before the end of April it is hoped that a supply of the special mines for the still-water canals may be ready, and by the May moon the mines for the mouths of rivers flowing into the Heligoland Bight should be at hand.

3. Thus this whole considerable mining campaign could be brought into being on the following timetable:

Day 1. Issue of proclamation reciting the character of the German attacks on the British coasts, shipping, and river mouths, and declaring that henceforth (while this continues), the Rhine is a mined and forbidden area, and giving neutrals and civilians twenty-four hours’ notice to desist from using it or crossing it.

Day 2. After nightfall, deposit as many mines as possible by both methods, and keep this up night after night. The supply by that time should be such as to keep all methods of discharge fully employed.

Day 28. Begin the laying of the mines in the still-water canals and river mouths, thereafter keeping the whole process working, as opportunity serves, until the kind of attacks to which we are being subjected are brought to an end by the enemy, or other results obtained.

4. The decisions in principle required are:

(a) Is this method of warfare justified and expedient in present circumstances?

(b) Must warning be given beforehand, observing that the first shock of surprise will be lost? However, this is not considered decisive, as the object is to prevent the use of the river and inland waterways rather than mere destruction.

(d) What reprisals, if any, may be expected, observing that there is not natural or economic feature in France or Great Britain in any way comparable with the Rhine, except our coastal approaches, which are already beset.

5. It is desirable that the Fifth Sea Lord, who has the operation in charge, should go to Paris on Thursday, concert the details finally, and ascertain the reactions of the French Government. From the attitude of M. Daladier, General Gamelin, and Admiral Darlan it is thought these will be highly favourable.

W. S. C.

Appendix M, Book II

NAVAL LOSSES IN NORWEGIAN CAMPAIGN

APRIL–JUNE, 1940

GERMAN NAVAL LOSSES, APRIL–JUNE, 1940

Ships Sunk