Chapter Five
During the second restoration, following the failure of the First War of Italian Independence, nationalists in the peninsula watched their dreams of self-determination and unification shatter. In Italy, as in most of Central Europe, the status quo was championed by Austria, which remained anchored to the past. In their quest for stability, the Habsburgs found conspicuous and valuable allies in Tsar Nicholas of Russia and Pope Pius IX who had been respectively frightened and disillusioned by the turmoil of the 1840s, pursuing decidedly conservative courses in the aftermath. Queen Victoria, with her German connections and English desire to avoid continental commitments, likewise proved sympathetic to Vienna’s goal to preserve the existing boundaries.
Louis Napoleon, nephew of the great Napoleon, overwhelmingly elected President of France at the end of 1848 (he gained three and a half million more votes than all his rivals combined), remained something of an enigma. The twists and turns of his mind and heart were difficult, if not impossible, to chart. His unpredictability frightened the Austrian government. Frederick William of Prussia, infected by nationalist ambitions in Germany, represented another obvious danger to Austrian hegemony. Vittorio Emanuele’s Piedmont, though less potent than Prussia, had grandiose ambitions in Italy that also threatened the Austrian position. It was thus not surprising that the French ruler considered Prussia and Piedmont potential allies against his Habsburg rival.
Recollecting his revolutionary experiences of the 1830s, Louis Napoleon regarded the Italian question not only as a political issue but a national one as well. Following his election, when Italian patriots in the French capital enquired what he would do for their patria, Napoleon quietly responded that he was a Bonaparte who understood the obligations the name imposed. Moderates in the peninsula, as well as their more radical confrères, sought French support. Liberals in Piedmont seconded Napoleon’s contention that Pius IX should be restored as a constitutional monarch, maintaining that the struggle in Italy was between absolutism and moderate reformism. Lord Palmerston warned that Austria retained Italy only so long as Louis Napoleon allowed, predicting that the French would seize the first opportunity to push the Habsburgs out of Lombardy and Venetia. Clearly, Vienna could no longer rely on French acquiescence in their domination of northern Italy and widespread influence throughout the peninsula.1
On the issue of the liberalization of the Papal States, Paris and Turin concurred, sharply disagreeing with the Austrian stance. France, no less than Piedmont, resented the Motu proprio decree of 12 September 1849, which failed to provide for public participation in political affairs, thus re-establishing a paternalistic regime. In turn, Pius IX and his Secretary of State, Antonelli, resisted the calls for reforms emanating in Paris and echoed in Turin. Austria, on the other hand, while approving the broad conservative sweep of the Papacy, feared the consequences of its political intransigence, and therefore encouraged the Pope to make some concessions, lest Napoleon champion constitutionalism and the national cause to the detriment of the European peace and the Habsburg position in Italy. The Austrians sought to isolate the Piedmontese who were expected to resume their acquisitive policies.2
Even moderate Piedmontese longed for a second round against Austria, but learning from the mistakes of 1848–49, demanded better preparation for the next war. Insisting that the cause of Italian liberalism and nationalism was tied to the progress made by Piedmont, Cavour’s Risorgimento championed the creation of a progressive, well-ordered state to set an example.3 Cavour’s strategy found broad support in Paris and London, which contrasted the efficiency of Piedmont with the backwardness of the Papal States and Naples. While Napoleon considered revisionist Piedmont a likely ally against the conservative eastern bloc, liberal England was impressed by her reformist bent and free trade bias.
Capitalizing on the Papacy’s identification with the Austrian enemy since the allocution of April 1848, Massimo D’Azeglio, who assumed power in May 1849, proposed radical changes in Church-state relations, and a restriction of the role of the Church in Piedmontese affairs. Both Turin’s initial legislative proposals on altering Church-state relations, as well as the critical tone of their press towards Rome, antagonized Pius IX. Accusing the Piedmontese of expansionist designs, he appreciated that its ambitions worked to undermine the Papal States and his own position.4 The reformism that distressed Rome impressed Protestant England, which perceived it as the initiation of a second Reformation. Whatever the motivation behind its policies, Piedmont was increasingly hailed in Italy and abroad as the only oasis in the sandy desert of political absolutism which comprised the peninsula.
The same year that Pio Nono returned to Rome – his hair having turned grey during the ordeal of his exile – in Turin the forty-year-old Camillo di Cavour entered the Cabinet of Massimo D’Azeglio as Minister of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce. Firmly convinced of the advantages of economic liberalism and free trade, he inspired the government to sign a series of agreements with England, France and Belgium, providing for a lower tariff and a freer economy. His customs reform had political as well as economic advantages, linking Piedmont to England and France, the more enlightened powers in Europe, against the conservative bloc of Austria and Russia. Cavour constantly sought to contrast Piedmontese progressivism with the rigidities imposed by the imperial systems of the eastern powers; in so doing, he hoped to create a European climate favourable to Turin and critical of Vienna.
Part and parcel of his strategy of liberal affirmation was Cavour’s support of ecclesiastical reform. Unable to resolve the national problem swiftly on the battlefield, Cavour encouraged the country to look inward, solving a host of problems long neglected. Piedmont’s constitutionalism, parliamentary life and religious liberty served as beacons to the oppressed of the peninsula, casting a shadow upon Austria and her Italian satellites. In 1850 he supported the Siccardi Laws, which abrogated various forms of ecclesiastical jurisdiction hitherto enjoyed by the Piedmontese Church, eliminated the Church’s right of asylum, provided for the suppression of mortmain, and sought to regulate the civil aspects of marriage. ‘I believe this reform should clearly manifest what the real sentiments of the Crown are, and by whom it is counselled,’ Cavour pleaded in the Sub-alpine parliament. This consideration is of such gravity for me, of so high an importance, that it would suffice to decide my vote, were there no other considerations in favour of the proposed legislation.’5 By this ecclesiastical policy Cavour sought to attract national elements in the peninsula, while winning liberal, anti-Catholic England to his cause.
Vienna quickly perceived the political implications of Piedmont’s religious policies. The official gazette observed that Turin wished to differentiate herself from Catholic Austria by antagonizing the Papacy which had wounded national sentiment during the course of the recent war. The Austrians concluded that they should not bend or alter their policy in the face of Piedmontese opportunism, but rather show themselves increasingly Catholic as Piedmont betrayed her ‘heretical’ sentiments. The Habsburgs had other reasons to remain loyal to the Church, and above all the need to preserve their position in Germany. Prince Schwarzenberg suspected that the King of Prussia had granted religious freedom to his Catholic subjects to attract wider support in Germany, with the thought of eventually exercising dominion over the entire nation. Austria could not allow the Prussian initiative to succeed, and therefore had to outbid the Prussians for Catholic support in Germany.6
Vienna monitored the aims and actions of the French and Piedmontese as well as the Prussians, Russians and the English. It also confronted massive internal problems, and most notably those associated with the Hungarians, who like the Italians in 1848, challenged Habsburg control. The Papal Nuncio in Vienna, writing to Cardinal Antonelli, Papal Secretary of State, identified Italy and Hungary as the two cancerous bodies currently disturbing Austria, containing forces of insurrection prepared to explode should the opportunity arise. He predicted that if things remained quiet in Europe, and France was crucial in this matter, then the Austrian army could preserve the peace and maintain the viability of the Habsburg Empire.7 Nonetheless, the situation remained perilous. The Austrian position was precarious, menaced not only by French and Piedmontese intrigues, but also by Prussian ambitions in Germany, leading Prince Schwarzenberg to fear the outbreak of war. For this reason, the Nuncio informed the Pope that the prince courted the goodwill of Russia, while improving his diplomatic relations with France. However, his success in this was to prove partial and temporary.
France remained crucial to the diplomatic situation in Europe, and Louis Napoleon the key to Gallic policy. Consequently the coup d’état of 2 December 1851 created consternation in the conservative camp. Cavour understood the importance of Napoleon’s coup at the end of 1851, appreciating the possible advantages that Piedmont and Italy could draw from this development.8 Cavour, who in 1851 had been entrusted with the portfolio of finance in addition to that of agriculture already held, further strengthened his internal position early in 1852 by forming an alliance with Urbano Rattazzi of the centre-left. During the course of the parliamentary debate on the revision of the country’s press law, Count Ottavio di Revel, noting the similarity of position between the followers of Cavour and Rattazzi, dubbed their alliance a connubio or marriage. Cavour considered this alliance of the centre-right and centre-left the most important act of his political career – and so it was.9 It offered him the parliamentary support that enabled him first to challenge and later to replace D’Azeglio as prime minister.
Cavour, confirmed in office in November 1852, did not assume the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was assigned to General Giuseppe Dabormida. Another General, Alfonso La Marmora, was named Minister of War, and later Cavour’s political ally, Rattazzi, took the Ministry of the Interior. Conscious of the importance of economic and financial issues, which he deemed prerequisites for Piedmont’s political expansion, Cavour retained the Portfolio of Finance in his own hands. Determined that the country be adequately prepared for the second war of Italian Independence, the king and La Marmora reorganized and modernized the army following the disastrous defeat of 1848–49. Cavour pressed for more, recognizing that the country could not achieve its national objectives without additional assistance, and therefore sought the support of a powerful ally in the crusade.
As in 1848, Cavour looked to Paris for reinforcement. He remained convinced that Napoleon was moved by Italian interests, regretting the resistance of Pio Nono and Antonelli to reformism, and the pressure placed upon him by the ultramontane party in France. Cavour believed that Napoleon, no less than Rattazzi, sought to keep the court of Rome in check. These convictions were confirmed during the course of his visit to Paris and interview with Louis Napoleon, prior to assuming power in Piedmont. On that and subsequent occasions, Louis Napoleon revealed his desire for an Italian federation under the honorary presidency of the Pope, but effectively directed by Piedmont. Thus Cavour reacted favourably to the overwhelmingly popular vote cast for converting the French Republic into the Empire at the end of 1852, and the proclamation of the Empire in December. He had reason to rejoice, for that very year Napoleon promised General Collegno, the Piedmontese Minister in Paris, that at an appropriate moment his country could expect French help. The two would find themselves companions in arms on behalf of the Italian cause. Similar promises were made later to the general’s successor, the Marquis Villamarina.10 Paris thus assured Turin that it would not wage the second war of liberation alone, as it had the first.
The conservative powers, on the other hand, regretted Napoleon’s re-establishment of the Empire. Vienna, St Petersburg and Berlin feared that the proclamation of the Empire signalled the prelude to the return of imperial ambitions, leading France to challenge the treaties of 1815 and the status quo in Europe. The fact that Louis Napoleon termed himself Napoleon III was perceived as portentous, providing recognition of the Prince of Rome as Napoleon II, and thereby questioning the agreements made by the powers in the Peace of Paris and the Congress of Vienna. Having reviewed the unfortunate consequences of refusing to accept the French Empire, the conservative empires did not block its recognition. Speaking on behalf of the eastern powers, Prince Schwarzenberg pronounced that they would not intervene in internal Gallic affairs, so long as France respected the peace and the treaties.
The Vatican, like the Ballplatz, scrutinized developments in Paris as well as Turin. The Papal Nuncio in the French capital, commenting on the Emperor’s insistence on marrying Eugénie in the face of considerable opposition, concluded that the same stubbornness might later create problems for Rome.11 Perhaps this played a part in Pio Nono’s refusal to travel to Paris to crown Napoleon – a slight which, while it offended Napoleon, nevertheless won Austrian approval. Napoleon also disliked the Austrian form of address towards his person, which differed somewhat from the usage towards Louis Philippe. Although word spread that the French Emperor was angry with Nicholas of Russia, who had remained consistent in his approach, the Papal Nuncio reported that Austria rather than Russia had upset Napoleon.12 In fact the Emperor was also offended by Nicholas’s refusal to refer to him as a cousin or brother, rather he called the French ruler his good friend. Napoleon made the best of the situation, and on receiving the credentials of the Russian representative commented that one had to accept one’s relatives, but could choose one’s friends.
Napoleon knew that Russia, as well as Britain, Austria and Prussia feared possible French aggression and disruption of the peace; thus he sought to reassure them for the time being. At Bordeaux he proclaimed that the Empire did not mean war, but peace, asserting he would respect both Europe’s boundaries and treaties. Thus the proclamation of the Empire did not lead the eastern courts to break off relations with Paris, and Prince Schwarzenberg hoped that the Emperor could be persuaded to pursue a conservative course. To be sure, Russia, Prussia and Austria, as well as England, were alarmed by the publication of the article entitled ‘Les limites de la France’, which called for French expansion and its absorption of Belgium. Napoleon quickly denied the expansionist ideas expressed therein, indicating that they reflected neither his sentiments nor those of his government. Many inside and out of France questioned the sincerity of Napoleon’s peaceful pronouncements, distressed as they were by his nationalist rhetoric and schemes.
In April 1852, Prince Schwarzenberg, who followed a conciliatory but cautious policy towards Napoleon, died, to be succeeded by Count Buol-Schauenstein, the former Austrian Ambassador in London. Like his predecessor, Buol wished to cooperate with Napoleon, preventing him from championing liberal and nationalist programmes in Europe. Unfortunately Buol lacked the ability of his predecessor as well as the confidence of Franz Josef enjoyed by the prince. Furthermore, Vienna had other problems. In 1853 the indefatigable and roving Mazzini, then based in Lugano, sought to orchestrate a revolutionary upheaval in Milan. The rebellion attracted little support, and with the information provided by the Turin government, equally suspicious of the republican revolutionary, it was easily suppressed. Not content with their success the Austrians overreacted, and in February 1853 passed a decree sequestering the property of exiled Lombards. Cavour’s country, a refuge for over 20,000 Lombard families, protested against the Austrian action which violated international law. Despite almost universal condemnation, the Austrians refused to rescind their decree, providing Turin with a moral victory. The Piedmontese Minister, Adriano Thaon de Revel, was recalled from Vienna. Cavour gloated that rather than hurting or humiliating Piedmont, Austria had antagonized all the Cabinets of Europe. He predicted that Piedmont would profit from the blunder by crossing the Ticino and opening the Second War of Independence, sooner rather than later.13
With Turin and Vienna still embroiled in the sequestration confrontation, the peace of Europe was troubled by the differences between France and Russia in the Near East. Although these two empires sanctimoniously claimed to defend the rights of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches in the Ottoman Empire in general, and Constantinople in particular, the overriding issue remained that of Russian pressure upon Turkey, and the French determination to prevent the Tsarist regime from dismembering the Ottoman Empire. Russian expansionism pressed for the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, assuring the Tsar control over the Dardanelles and ready access to the Mediterranean. The prospect alarmed Britain, which worked to preserve the Porte. Suspicious of the Russians since they had proposed a partition of the Ottoman Empire, Britain deemed the Russian plan dangerous for the stability of the region and the peace of the Continent.
Napoleon’s objectives were neither conservative nor cautious. Having been frustrated in his desire to summon a congress of the great European powers to revise the treaties of 1815, settling a number of disruptive matters in the process, he sought other means to effect territorial change. Increasingly, the impenetrable and impulsive Emperor envisioned a war against Russia as the mechanism for disrupting the Holy Alliance, which he perceived as the main barrier to his reorganization of Europe along national lines. Inklings of his revisionist plans could be gleaned from the Emperor’s disinclination to reaffirm the treaties of 1815 vis-à-vis Italy, as well as his broad policy towards Germany. He steadfastly refused to sanction the Habsburg attempt to include the entire Austrian Empire in the Bund (German Confederation), deeming it detrimental to French power and prestige in Europe.
The Emperor anticipated that a defeat of the conservative collossus would undermine the status quo, allowing him to implement his nationalist schemes. Indeed he encouraged his trusted journalist Granier de Cassagnac to explain his programme in a pamphlet entitled ‘La Révision de la Carte d’Europe’. Napoleon’s ministers, sensing the alarm the piece would provoke in the chancelleries of Europe, persuaded him to suppress its distribution, but not before some copies were circulated. Furthermore, during the course of his conversations and discourses, the sphinx-like ruler scattered hints of the outline and gist of his grand design. The Napoleonic plan called for pushing Russia out of the Near East, forcing the Romanovs to cede not only the Black Sea area, but Poland and Finland as well. Thus the Russian pressure upon the Balkans and eastern Mediterranean would be eradicated.
Though autocratic in his domestic policies, Napoleon pursued a liberal and dynamic policy abroad. In his partition plan, which formed part of his greater reorganization scheme, Finland would go to Sweden, while Poland was to be placed under the control of a German prince, perhaps the King of Saxony. Austria might be compensated by acquiring Bessarabia and other Balkan territory, but constrained to cede Lombardy, and perhaps Venice as well, to the Kingdom of Sardinia. Prussia, in turn, would be allowed to strengthen her base in Germany and to preside over a stronger, pro-French German confederation. For France, Napoleon determined to gain the left bank of the Rhine, Nice and Savoy – territorial ambitions which he nourished secretly, unwilling to alienate the English, whose support he courted in his campaign against Russia and the Holy Alliance.
The actions of the Eastern Colossus facilitated Napoleon’s ploys. Early in 1853 Tsar Nicholas dispatched a mission to Constantinople and ordered the mobilization of his army. The Russians also occupied the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, rousing Britain as well as Austria. Palmerston, who still influenced English foreign affairs, continued decidedly hostile to Russia. Russian pressure upon the Porte might have sufficed, but for the support the Turks received from Britain and France. Thus the Turkish declaration of war against the Russians in October 1853 was followed by the allied entry of the Anglo-French fleet into the Black Sea. In the light of the stance assumed by France and Britain on the one hand, and Russia on the other, little ground remained for diplomatic manoeuvring.
Franz-Josef, concerned about the impact of the Russian-Turkish quarrel on the situation in Europe in general and on conditions in Hungary and Italy in particular, implored Tsar Nicholas to resolve the dispute. However, his attempted mediation proved abortive. By March 1854 the Austrian fears of a European conflict materialized, as France and England were ranged alongside the Turks against the Russians. In September the allied armies landed in the Crimea. Both the Western allies and the Russians expected Austrian support, but Vienna distrusting Piedmont’s machinations, refused to enter the fray. In Turin Cavour, the Piedmontese Machiavelli, plotted for a confrontation with the occupying Habsburgs and a struggle for the mastery of Italy.14 The Austrians, pressed by both sides, satisfied neither. A state of the centre, Metternich wrote, could not allow itself to be drawn either to the side of the West nor that of the East.15 Cavour, on the other hand, appreciating that the struggle between East and West would inevitably influence Italian affairs, foresaw an active role for Piedmont.
Cavour longed for Austria to join her conservative ally so that a progressive bloc of Piedmont, England and France could not only wage war upon the Russians in the Near East, but also dislodge the Habsburgs from northern Italy. The French, for their part, sought to draw Austria into the anti-Russian coalition, reassuring them that they would uphold the status quo in Italy so long as the fighting continued in the east. Despite this commitment, the Ballplatz stopped short of declaring war against Russia, content to have the Russians evacuate the principalities, followed by an Austrian occupation of the area. Cavour, however, pledged to drag Piedmont into the war in return for some territorial advantage or even the promise of support for the termination of the Austrian sequestration decree against the Lombard exiles. The allies refused to make any commitment, and Cavour’s Cabinet rejected entry into the conflict under these circumstances. Even Rattazzi, Cavour’s political ally, opposed participation without any concrete inducement.
Cavour, knowing that Vittorio Emanuele had assured the English and French he would join them in the war, and personally anxious to preserve Napoleon’s goodwill, engineered a political arrangement to achieve the necessary support to bring his country into the conflict. Cavour would bolster Rattazzi’s Law of Convents, which envisioned the suppression of over 300 religious houses and their orders, in return for Rattazzi’s unconditional support for Piedmont’s participation in the Crimean War. On this basis the left-centre alliance survived, committed to continuing restricting the privileges of the Catholic Church at home, and joining the allies in waging the war against Russia. In April 1855, an expeditionary force commanded by General La Marmora left for the Crimea. Cavour surmised that their efforts would determine what advantages, if any, the country would draw from the war. If this army performed well, as he believed it would, Piedmont would see its authority and credit grow and the allies would eventually be forced to support and second its aims. Some of the officers shared Cavour’s opinion, with one of them predicting that out of the mud of the Crimea, Italy would emerge.
During the course of 1855, relations between Turin and Vienna steadily deteriorated. The favourable concordat which Franz-Josef accorded the Church during that year contrasted sharply with the policies pursued by the Piedmontese vis-à-vis Rome. Furthermore, while Austria vacillated between war and peace, attempting to retain the goodwill of both Russia and the Western allies, Piedmont closed ranks with France and England in the war against Russia. To cement relations with her allies, Cavour accompanied Vittorio Emanuele and Massimo D’Azeglio to London and Paris in November 1855.
In London Cavour tried to translate British admiration for Piedmontese progress into active support for their confrontation with Austria. King Vittorio Emanuele, in his own gruff manner also sought to elicit British support, but cautioned that a king had to be certain that a war was both necessary and just before breaking the peace. Queen Victoria neither appreciated nor agreed with the king’s rejoinder that God was prepared to pardon a mistake. Cavour realized the responsibility he had assumed when he brought his country into the war, but remained certain that he had done the right thing.16 The attempt to win the active support of Britain in remaking the map of Italy failed, for while British public opinion generally sympathized with the patriots of the peninsula, her statesmen were committed to preserving the peace and the treaties of Vienna.
The Piedmontese found a more receptive climate in Paris, where Napoleon III envisioned a radical revision of the map of Europe, largely at Turkish expense. Above all, the object of the Emperor’s eastern policy was to benefit Italy and Poland. Although Russia no longer seemed capable of blocking his plans, Austrian obstinacy remained. Napoleon looked to Piedmont and Prussia as his two swords against the champion of the status quo, Austria. The British, Prussians, and even the Austrians, were given hints of Napoleon’s dreams and designs. While the European courts tended to dismiss Napoleon’s revisionist suggestions, they were applauded by the Piedmontese. Thus when the Emperor asked Cavour and D’Azeglio, what he could do for Italy, they were quick to give an answer.17
By the end of 1855 Napoleon sought to close the eastern war, convinced that its continuation would not lead to his projected territorial changes. The fall of Sebastopol secured French honour and Napoleon confided to Queen Victoria that he would be willing to continue the conflict, which had cost some 100,000 French lives, only if it would assist the national liberation of the oppressed peoples of the continent. Thus when the French Foreign Minister, Walewski raised the spectre of a revolutionary war to frighten both his ally England, and his adversary Russia to bring them to the peace table, he reflected Napoleon’s thought.
In mid-January 1856 Tsar Alexander II, who had succeeded Nicholas I in the previous spring, accepted in principle the Austrian ultimatum and the four points that the allies had imposed. They included: (1) the Russian rejection of any pretension vis-à-vis Serbia and the Principalities; (2) the assurance of free navigation on the River Danube; (3) a revision of the treaties of 1841 relating to the Black Sea and the Dardanelles in the interest of the European ‘balance of power’; and (4) Russian abandonment of any attempt to establish a protectorate over the Sultan’s Christian population.
On 1st February, the representatives of Austria, Russia, France, England and Turkey agreed in a protocol upon the terms which would serve as the basis of the final peace to be decided at the Congress of Paris, which was scheduled to open within three weeks. It opened on 25 February 1856, and the envoys of the major powers and Piedmont-Sardinia met in the French capital to frame the peace. The presidency of the Congress by diplomatic tradition fell to the French Foreign Minister, Count Walewski.
Cavour persuaded the elder statesman, Massimo D’Azeglio, whose aid he had earlier enlisted to respond to Napoleon’s query as to what he could do for Italy, to represent his country at the Congress of Paris. There were three main reasons for Cavour’s decision. Firstly, Cavour, directing the ministries of commerce and finances, did not have much experience in diplomacy, having assumed a role in foreign affairs only when his Foreign Minister refused to bring the country into the Crimean conflict. Secondly, D’Azeglio was well liked in London and Paris, and could be expected to exercise considerable moral influence. Thirdly (and in the eyes of some, most importantly), Cavour did not expect any tangible concession to come out of a conference largely orchestrated by the Austrian peace initiative. Hence he preferred to have D’Azeglio at Paris rather than tarnish his own prestige by the expected disappointment.
Vittorio Emanuele remained more sanguine, having been assured by the enigmatic Emperor that he would protect his interests at the Congress.18 His optimism was not justified, for unbeknown to the Piedmontese king, Napoleon had made similar vows to Pio Nono. Furthermore, the Emperor had raised no objection to the notion that the Piedmontese representative should sit in only those sessions involving the country’s direct interests, excluded from those sittings which tackled broader themes. Cavour had withheld this information from his projected emissary, who nonetheless discovered the condition. D’Azeglio, still bristling over the fact that Cavour had not utilized his long letter in response to Napoleon’s enquiry about what he could do for Italy, dispatching his own brief response instead, was further scandalized by the subordination of his country at the Congress. Asserting that he would humiliate neither himself nor Piedmont, he rejected Cavour’s entreaties to attend.
Following D’Azeglio’s eleventh-hour refusal to represent his country at the Congress, Cavour had no alternative but to place his own position in jeopardy by going to Paris. Convinced of the need to reinvigorate the Emperor’s resolve to champion the Italian cause, he enlisted the aid of his ‘cousin’, the sultry Contessa di Castiglione.19 The contessa, who was commissioned by Cavour to seduce and incite Napoleon to war against Austria, succeeded in the first endeavour and, according to her own accounts, played a major role in the second. Cavour, who left for Paris on 13th February, almost immediately commenced the political seduction of the representatives of the allies, and even sought to win the goodwill of the recently defeated Russians. Thus before the opening of the Congress at the Palais D’Orsay on 25th February, Cavour had extracted a promise from Clarendon to speak on the Italian issue should it be brought before the body. Napoleon, in turn, affirmed that Italian matters would be aired prior to the departure of the representatives.
During the negotiations which led to the peace signed on 30 March 1856 (the 42nd anniversary of the fall of Paris in 1814), Cavour and Villamarina tactfully remained aloof from the broader discussion that did not impinge upon their direct interests. In order to ingratiate himself with the French and defend the principle of nationality, Cavour supported Napoleon’s plan to unite the Principalities into a single Romanian state. In addition, behind the scenes, Cavour quietly sought some tangible concession to bring home, such as the acquisition of Parma or Modena, but proved unsuccessful. To make matters worse, he soon discovered that Walewski did not share the Italophile sentiments of his cousin, Napoleon. The latter, meanwhile, seemed more preoccupied by the impending birth of his first child than the fate of the Congress, and being anxious to enlist the Pope as godfather, was reluctant to antagonize him. Still, Cavour did manage to persuade the English representatives of the need for an airing of the Italian situation, earn the goodwill of Orloff and Brunnow (the Russian representatives) and establish communication with the Emperor by means of Henri Conneau, the latter’s personal physician.
During the session of 8th April, Walewski, at his Emperor’s behest, proposed an exchange of ideas on a number of problems that had the potential for disturbing the peace. Among other things the President of the Congress referred to troubling developments in Greece, Belgium and Italy. Clarendon, fulfilling his pledge to Cavour, spoke on the Italian question, denouncing the policies of Papal Rome, which required the military presence of Austrian and French forces to preserve itself, and the abuses of the Neapolitan regime. Walewski then proceeded to ask the other representatives to present their views. Count Buol, visibly angry, observed that his Emperor had not provided instructions on these matters, and he could not discuss them. His position was echoed by Count Orloff of Russia, likewise citing his lack of instructions.
Cavour, who had precipitated the discussion, was prepared. Conscious of addressing the tribunal of public opinion as well as the representatives of the powers, he assumed a moderate stance. He could adopt a tranquil pose, because Clarendon had already cited the abuses plaguing the peninsula. Nonetheless, Cavour did assess the cause of Italy’s problems, placing much of the blame on Austria’s occupation and pernicious political influence. Cavour’s public denunciation of the Habsburg position in Italy, and his insistence that his comments be inserted in the protocol, represented a moral victory of sorts, although he had hoped for more.
On 16th April, Cavour, in similar notes to the English and French, elaborated on the Italian question, arguing that the status quo in Italy worked not to protect the peace, but to precipitate revolution and war. If Cavour had entertained the illusion that the British would rush to remake the map of the peninsula at Austria’s expense, this was dispelled during his visit to London following the close of the Congress. There he learned that Her Majesty’s Government would neither abandon its Austrian ally, nor precipitate a continental war to cure the abuses cited by the Piedmontese and the British in the Congress. More than ever, Cavour realized that only Napoleonic France was willing and able to wage war to alter the map of Europe, but not all Italians or even Piedmontese shared his views.
Cavour’s role and achievement at the Congress was debated by contemporaries and is still contested. When the Count returned to Turin without even the smallest duchy in his pocket, his reception proved lukewarm. Early in May, when he analysed the work of the Congress before the Chamber of Deputies, the most he could report was there had been no rapprochement between Piedmont and Austria, which moved along different tracks. Nevertheless, the Italian question had been aired in an international setting, the conservative alliance of Austria, Russia and Prussia had been smashed, and Napoleon’s France, which sought revision in Europe, had a greater voice. This new fluidity in international relations worked to the detriment of Buol and Austria and to the advantage of Cavour and Piedmont. It encouraged Cavour to plan in earnest for the Second War of Italian Independence.
Notes
1. Il Risorgimento, 21 February 1849; 3 July 1849; 13 August 1849.
2. Archivio Segreto del Vaticano, Segreteria di Stato, Corrispondenza da Gaeta e Portici, 1849, Rubrica 242, sottofascicoli 24, 76–81.
3. Il Risorgimento, 23 July 1849.
4. Pius IX to Archbishop Dupont, 10 June 1849, Archivio Segreto del Vaticano, Archivio Particolare Pio Nono, Francia, Particolari, n. 18.
5. Legge Siccardi sull’ abolizione del foro e delle immunita’ ecclesiastiche tornate del Parlamento Subalpino (Turin: Pomba, 1850), p. 77.
6. Michele Viala Prela to Antonelli, Archivio Segreto del Vaticano, 19 April 1849, Segreteria di Stato Esteri, Corrispondenza da Gaeta e Portici, Rubrica 247, sottofascicoli 197–8, 214–15.
7. Viala Prela to Antonelli, 31 January 1850, ASV, SSE, CGP, Rubrica 247, sottofascicolo 222.
8. Marco Minghetti, Miei Ricordi (3rd edn; Turin: Roux, 1898), III, p. 14.
9. Michelangelo Castelli, Ricordi di Michelangelo Castelli, ed. Luigi Chiala (Turin: Roux, 1888), p. 66.
10. Ibid., pp. 176–7; Minghetti, III, p. 84.
11. French Nuncio to Antonelli, 20 January 1853, ASV, Segreteria di Stato Esteri, Rubrica 242, fascicolo 6, sottofascicolo 40.
12. Ibid., sottofascicoli 124–5.
13. Giuseppe Massari, Il Conte di Cavour, Ricordi biografici (Turin: Botta, 1873), p. 93; Mémoires, documents et écrits divers laissés par le Prince Metternich, ed. Prince Richard Metternich, VIII, p. 143.
14. Arthur Irwin Dasent, John Thadeus Delane, Editor of ‘The Times’. His Life and Correspondence (London: John Murray, 1908), I, p. 165.
15. Mémoires … par le Prince Metternich, VIII, p. 376.
16. Massari, Il Conte di Cavour, pp. 108, 125.
17. Ibid., pp. 130–1.
18. Charles W. Hallberg, Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, 1852–1864 (New York: Octagon Books, 1973), p. 109.
19. Frédéric Loliée, Women of the Second Empire: Chronicles of the Court of Napoleon III, Compiled from Unpublished Documents (New York: John Lane Co., 1907), p. 16.