Chapter Six

The Origins of the Second War of Italian Independence: 1856–59

Cavour returned from Paris determined to take advantage of the anti-Austrian, pro-Italian sentiments of Napoleon III to reopen the Piedmontese conflict with the Habsburgs and wage a Second War of National Liberation. Convinced that the Emperor nourished a secret rancour against Austria, and vividly remembering the revolutionary events of 1831, in which he had taken part, Cavour concluded that the interests of France and Piedmont were compatible. For this reason he sought to conciliate the enigmatic Emperor while strengthening his resolve. He cautioned Italian journals such as Il Fischietto, which were critical of the French Emperor, to cease their attacks upon him, as he seemed to hold the key to the Italian solution. Cavour placed his confidence in such men as Benedetti, the political director of foreign affairs in France, who was Corsican by birth but Italian at heart. He was reassured by Napoleon’s prediction that the peace would not last long, and did all within his means to fulfil the Emperor’s prophecy.¹

Cavour’s anti-Austrian stance encouraged some of the revolutionary party to look to Piedmont for leadership. Daniele Manin, leader of the Venetians against the Habsburgs in 1848–49, was among the first to denounce sporadic violence and break with Mazzini. Assured that the House of Savoy would risk the throne of Piedmont for the sake of gaining that of Italy, he accepted collaboration with Cavour. Manin convinced the Marquis Giorgio Pallavicino, who initially feared the intrigues of Cavour even more than those of Mazzini or Murat, that Cavour’s intelligence and ambition were necessary to fulfil Italian aspirations. Garibaldi, in England in 1856, likewise appreciated Cavour’s role. The general pronounced that the signal for the second round against Austria would have to be given by Piedmont. By this time the defender of the Roman Republic referred to Cavour as ‘our great friend’. Even Mazzini belatedly, if reluctantly, agreed that Piedmont had a role to play in the national liberation.

Cavour hesitated to openly court the former radicals and republicans who were willing to compromise their ideals to attain national unity under the aegis of the House of Savoy. He worried that any official connection between himself and the revolutionary party would alarm England and alienate the goodwill of Napoleon. Nonetheless, the obvious limits of diplomacy at Paris convinced him to meet with Manin. Although he had reservations about Manin’s ultimate ends, and questioned his means, Cavour recognized the need to bolster his diplomatic policy by garnering popular support.

Subsequently Cavour met secretly with the former Sicilian revolutionary, Giuseppe La Farina, who later wrote for the radical Piccolo Corriere d’ltalia. According to La Farina, the meeting of 12 September 1856 in the Palazzo Cavour, was the first of many clandestine encounters. During the course of these secret sessions the man who posed as the enemy of the revolutionary party, covertly encouraged their organization and courted their support in the projected war against Austria. Indeed, Cavour instructed Marco Minghetti to remain in continuous contact with those revolutionaries who in 1857 formed the National Society, without necessarily joining their ranks. Metternich, unaware of the depth of Cavour’s involvement with the revolutionaries, denounced his Cabinet’s policy as one of lies and deceit.²

The Vienna government resented the press campaign against Austria that the Turin government tolerated, even if it did not promote it. When Franz-Josef visited Milan at the end of 1856, Cavour prevailed upon the Lombards to resist Habsburg blandishments, suggesting even extra-legal means to frustrate the attempt to achieve conciliation. His efforts proved successful as public ceremonies were ignored and receptions boycotted. To further antagonize and humiliate the Austrians, Cavour chose the occasion of Franz-Josef’s entry into Milan early in 1857 to have the press announce that city’s decision to build a monument to the Piedmontese army. He maliciously insinuated that Felice Orsini’s extraordinary escape from an Austrian prison lent some credence to the suspicion that Austria secretly supported the revolutionary cause. Cavour’s propaganda campaign proved successful, provoking the Austrians to sever diplomatic relations between Vienna and Turin. Cavour countered that Austria’s declared enmity rallied honest men of all parties round his government.³

Although patriots increasingly looked to Cavour and Piedmont, rather than to Mazzini and his party of action, the ‘soul’ of Italian unification remained neither silent nor inactive. The small Mazzinian uprising in Sicily at the end of 1856 was followed in the summer of 1857 by the expedition of the Neapolitan Carlo Pisacane against the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, aimed to coincide with ‘spontaneous’ uprisings in Leghorn and Genoa. The expedition to the south ended disastrously. The Neapolitan Count shot himself at Sapri rather than be hacked to pieces by the Sanfedisti peasantry, and only the arrival of the Neapolitan army stopped the slaughter of his followers. The risings in Leghorn and Genoa were suppressed with less bloodshed, but proved no more successful than the Pisacane expedition.

Cavour, angered and embarrassed by Mazzini’s actions, was humiliated by the fact that the Piedmontese police proved unable to arrest Mazzini, who remained in hiding in Genoa. His government worked to discourage revolutionary agitation and useless uprisings, he proclaimed in the Piedmontese Chamber. He also worried about the impact the abortive revolutions would have upon Napoleon III and his commitment to the Italian cause, complaining to the Marquis Villamarina, his Minister at Paris, that French suspicion of Piedmontese complicity with the revolutionaries was unjustified, and that he would welcome Napoleon’s assistance in capturing the elusive Mazzini. The Piedmontese Minister could not gauge the impact of the latest Mazzinian outburst upon the French Emperor or his Italian plans. Word spread that the revolutionary action discouraged the French ruler, but Cavour privately believed that the Mazzinian actions might have the opposite effect, spurring Napoleon to move more quickly and decisively on their behalf.⁴

Internally, the abortive revolutions helped Cavour and strengthened the Piedmontese cause throughout Italy by further eroding Mazzini’s support. Agostino Bertani, who had taken part in the Milanese uprising against the Austrians in 1848, and later worked with Mazzini and Garibaldi in defence of the Roman Republic of 1849, questioned the republican’s tactics. He and other former Mazzinians argued that the master was mistaken in his assumption that the masses of Italy were prepared to initiate and support a revolutionary upheaval. They denounced these ‘fatal delusions’ which had led many of Mazzini’s former followers to turn to other parties and policies. Bertani and others cautioned Mazzini not to impose action without adequate preparation, but to wait until men and money had been gathered to counter and confront their well-organized enemies.

In the minds of an increasing number of Italians, adequate preparation for a confrontation with Austria meant that Italian liberation must rely on Cavour and the Piedmontese state. This was the programme of the National Society, formed by Daniele Manin, Giorgio Pallavicino and Giuseppe La Farina in July 1857. It channelled the support of former radicals, revolutionaries and republicans into Cavour’s camp, acknowledging his leadership in the national movement. The credo of the new organization subordinated the issue of eventual political formulation to the more pressing need for independence, and supported the House of Savoy so long as it worked on behalf of Italy. Garibaldi’s adherence to the party proved crucial for its success in working in tandem with the Piedmontese to undermine the established order in the peninsula. In response to those who questioned his association with the radical National Society, Cavour responded that it worked to erode the position of the Mazzinians and therefore he could not, and would not, oppose it.⁵ He also recognized its potential as a useful ally when the conflict with Austria and her Italian allies resumed.

Although anxious for a second round with Austria, Cavour avoided provoking it prematurely. While energetic and firm, he shunned imprudence.⁶ During the course of 1857 he proposed, and the Subalpine parliament passed, legislation improving the fortifications of Alessandria while moving the military arsenal from Genoa to La Spezia. Determined not to repeat the errors of 1848–49 during the first War of Italian Independence, Cavour recognized that Italy could not ‘do it alone’ and required allies. By 1857 he despaired of British assistance, conscious of the fact that while public opinion in Britain was favourable to the Italian cause, her men of affairs remained pro-Austrian. More than ever he relied on Napoleon III as the sole sovereign in Europe able and willing to champion the Italian cause. Piedmont therefore had to march with Napoleon, or not at all. Not surprisingly, Cavour’s Turin showed itself sensitive to criticism from Paris, and very likely Rattazzi’s removal from the Cabinet early in 1858 was orchestrated to satisfy Napoleon.⁷

Although some questioned Cavour’s ‘prudent audacity’ and determination to secure the support of France, by the beginning of 1858 even Garibaldi appreciated the need to wait for Turin’s signal. Cavour, for his part, did not discount the need for internal as well as international preparations for the inevitable conflict. Contacts with La Farina’s National Society were preserved and patriotic committees in Tuscany were encouraged to undermine the ducal regime. Similar organizations, seeking internal subversion, were funded in the duchies of Parma and Modena, while Cavour’s diplomacy openly criticized the Habsburg policy of intervention in central Italy.

Cavour waited anxiously for Napoleon to fulfil his promise to do something for Italy; meanwhile Italian revolutionaries and Mazzinians grew impatient, questioning the Emperor’s resolve and commitment. In June of 1857 three Italians, Tibaldi, Bertolotti and Galli, arrived in Paris with the intention of assassinating the reluctant revolutionary, who was accused of abjuring his carbonarist faith. Their plot was frustrated by the police who apprehended the trio before the apartment of the Contessa di Castiglione, whom Napoleon often visited clandestinely. However, other revolutionaries assumed the burden of assassinating the Emperor, and on 14 January 1858, Felice Orsini, Antonio Gomez, Carlo di Rudio and Giuseppe Pieri were responsible for hurling bombs at the Imperial carriage which wounded or killed some 150 guards and spectators. Although physically unharmed, the Emperor was psychologically shaken by this latest attempt to take his life.

Cavour, striving to cement an alliance with the French, was dismayed to learn of Italian involvement in the terrorist plot. He expected Napoleon to react to the attempt on his life, and indeed he did. The assassination attempt, and the ensuing public debate, were instrumental in prompting Napoleon to make two decisions: firstly, to persuade, and if needs be pressure, the Piedmontese to take stronger measures against the radicals in their state; secondly, to take steps to provide a solution to the Italian problem. The two measures were interrelated in the Emperor’s mind as his letter of 8 February 1858 to Vittorio Emanuele clearly illustrates. If the Piedmontese government showed itself liberal but firm in dealing with radical journals, incendiary groups and the demagogues, the Emperor promised, it could count on the full support of France. If, on the contrary, it encouraged or even tolerated outrageous behaviour, then he would have to regard Piedmont as a dangerous source of agitation.⁸

Cavour recognized the need for some concessions to assuage the Emperor’s anger. At the end of January he wrote his friend and supporter, Michelangelo Castelli, that the times were dangerous and difficult, the sects grew more unrestrained, and steps were needed to curb their excesses. At the same time he instructed the intendant at Genoa to curb the press there, and if at all possible, in order to preserve the goodwill of France, to silence Mazzini’s Italia e Popolo. Although insisting that Piedmont would continue to pursue a liberal path, Cavour introduced legislation which defined the crime of political assassination, imposing penalties for conspiring against the life of foreign sovereigns and heads of government.

Cavour’s tokens of goodwill mollified Napoleon as was manifest during the trial of Felice Orsini, whose defence was assumed by Jules Favre. The latter portrayed Orsini as a patriot and a martyr, whose life was dedicated to the liberation of his country. From his prison cell, Orsini wrote a latter (11 February 1858) to the Emperor whom he had tried to assassinate, pleading for the Italian cause. Orsini did not ask that French blood be shed for his country, only that he prohibit the German Bund from supporting Austria in the war for Italian independence expected to erupt shortly. Free Italy, he concluded, and the benediction of twenty-three million Italians would enshrine the French ruler in posterity. On 3rd March, Orsini penned a second letter to Napoleon, thanking him for having had his first letter read in open court, and concluding that his patriotic pleas had found an echo in the heart of the Emperor.

The publication of these letters aroused fears in Vienna that they reflected the French Emperor’s sentiments. Austria’s concern was compounded when the Piedmontese were encouraged by Napoleon to publish them in the Gazzetta Piemontese, the official journal of the Turin government. Cavour, delighted by the turn of events, decided to capitalize further on the publication. He suggested an introduction to the correspondence, indicating where and how the documents were obtained, emphasizing the role played by Napoleon. He wanted Italians as well as Austrians to see who was behind them. He compared the publication of these letters to another bomb, that would fall on Vienna while pleasing patriots at home.⁹ This represented the first Franco-Piedmontese action against the Austrians; others were to follow.

Through several intermediaries, including his cousin Prince Jerome Napoleon, son of the ex-King Jerome of Westphalia, and his half-Italian personal physician, Dr Henri Conneau, Napoleon let Cavour know that he wished to discuss privately the Italian situation. Concomitantly Cavour learned from his agent Alessandro Bixio that the Piedmontese Minister in Paris had obtained little from the French Foreign Minister, advising Cavour to deal directly with the Emperor outside ordinary diplomatic channels. Cavour welcomed a direct contact with Napoleon, but expressed reservations about a meeting until such time as a definite agreement seemed probable, if not certain. Fearing the international reverberations certain to follow such an encounter, Cavour hesitated to arouse suspicions until these could be counterbalanced by the prospect of an Franco-Piedmontese accord.

To prepare the groundwork Cavour sent his private secretary, Costantino Nigra, to Paris. In May his emissary telegraphed Turin that Napoleon had confirmed three essential points: a marriage uniting his house with the Savoy dynasty, a Franco-Piedmontese war to be waged against Austria for the liberation of northern Italy, and the Piedmontese formation of a Kingdom of Northern Italy. At the end of May, Napoleon sent Dr Conneau to Turin to talk with Vittorio Emanuele and Cavour. The Italophile physician reported that the Emperor planned to spend a month in Plombières, near the Piedmontese border, and would be disposed to meet with Cavour to discuss the Italian situation. Discounting the Emperor’s lack of appreciation of the distances involved, Cavour acknowledged the political signal transmitted and agreed to venture to Plombières.

Turin reported officially that Cavour had left for Switzerland and was stopping in Savoy to examine work on the railways there. Only the king and General Alfonso La Marmora knew his eventual destination and intended mission. Cavour travelled to Plombières as Giuseppe Benso, accompanied only by a young undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, de Veillet. The two reached Plombières on 20th July, intending to stay in a hotel, but a messenger from the Emperor invited them to stay with him. During the course of their momentous meeting of 21 July 1858, Napoleon informed Cavour that he had decided to champion Piedmont’s cause against Austria, provided the conflict were undertaken to create stability in the peninsula and could be justified before the courts of Europe.¹⁰

Following the meeting, Cavour compiled a short report of the discussion to brief Vittorio Emanuele, despatching a longer account on 24th July, when he left Plombières for Baden-Baden. These are the only direct reports of what transpired in July as the prime minister of Piedmont and the Emperor of France plotted war against Austria for the reorganization of Italy. According to Cavour’s narrative, Napoleon insisted that the Pope and the King of Naples be treated with circumspection. Cavour agreed, replying that Pius IX could be assured of the possession of Rome, by the presence of the French garrison there, while the provinces of the Romagna revolted. As for the King of Naples, he would be left unmolested so long as he did not attempt to aid the Austrians.

Regarding the ultimate objective of the war, Napoleon agreed with Cavour on the need to push the Habsburgs out of the Peninsula, leaving them without even an inch of territory south of the Alps or west of the River Isonzo. The two conspirators had a lengthy discussion concerning the subsequent reorganization of Italy, the details of which Cavour spared his monarch. The gist of their compromise called for the formation of four states that would form an Italian Confederation, similar to the German Bund. Specifically the valley of the Po, the Romagna and the Legations would constitute a Kingdom of Upper Italy, under the House of Savoy, while Rome and its immediate environs would be left to the Papacy. The remaining provinces of the Papal States would be absorbed by Tuscany to form a Kingdom of Central Italy. The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies would continue unchanged.

Napoleon insisted that the presidency of the confederation be conferred upon the Pope, as partial compensation for the loss of the greater part of his territory. Cavour had reservations both about the efficacy of the confederation and the leadership of the Pope, but raised no objections. His willingness to accept these terms flowed from his appreciation of the importance of the French alliance and the inclusion of an escape clause within the agreement. The latter stipulated that the principle of reorganization the two outlined was subject to modification dependent on the course of the war. Cavour and Napoleon examined the prospect that the thrones of the new Kingdom of Central Italy and Naples might be left vacant if their rulers should retire to Vienna. Although no definite decisions were concluded to cover the possibility, Napoleon suggested Murat for Naples, and Cavour proposed that the Duchess of Parma might be compensated by occupying the Pitti Palace.

Napoleon pondered both the diplomatic and military aspects of the conflict, which he perceived were interrelated. It was necessary that Austria should be the sole enemy, and she would therefore have to be isolated as such. Consequently, Napoleon continued, the casus belli was of crucial importance, while the fears and jealousies of the continental powers had to be addressed. Napoleon believed that Britain would remain neutral, but prudently pressed Cavour to court British public opinion to assure their non-intervention. Alexander of Russia, the Emperor continued, had promised on numerous occasions, both formally and informally, not to interfere with the French reorganization of the peninsula. Finally he counted on the Prince of Prussia’s antipathy towards Austria to prevent any assistance from that quarter.

Napoleon speculated that, even alone, Austria was a formidable foe who would have to endure several defeats before evacuating Italy. The Emperor estimated that their victory would require an army of at least 300,000 front-line soldiers, proposing that France supply two-thirds of this force, and Piedmont and her Italian allies, the remaining third. The French army would be commanded by Napoleon personally, the Italian army by King Vittorio Emanuele. So far as financing the war was concerned, Napoleon promised to provide the Piedmontese with whatever weapons they required, facilitating loans in Paris. Napoleon encouraged Cavour to solicit contributions of money and material from the other Italian provinces, but to do so cautiously. Cavour, for his part, approved these stipulations.

In compensation for his services Napoleon wondered whether Vittorio Emanuele would cede Savoy and the county of Nice. Cavour responded that since his king adhered to the principle of national self-determination he was prepared to sacrifice the cradle of the dynasty which should be united to France. Nice, far more Italian than French, was another matter, and Cavour suggested that its cession to France violated the very principle which prompted the projected conflict with Austria. Having no immediate rejoinder, the Emperor nervously stroked his moustache, indicating that there were secondary issues which could be resolved later. Although Napoleon did not make an issue of the cession of Nice, he persisted in his acquisitive scheme.

The Emperor again raised the issue of the dynastic connection between his house and the dynasty of Savoy to be effected by the marriage of his cousin, Jerome Napoleon, to Princess Clotilde, daughter of the Piedmontese king. Cavour tried tactfully to convey his king’s reservations, citing his reluctance to give his young daughter away in marriage and his determination not to impose an unwelcome choice upon the child. Napoleon, undismayed, stressed that the marriage, which would seal the dynastic alliance, was very important to him. Cavour, in his correspondence with the king, noted that the Emperor did not go so far as to make the marriage a sine qua non of the military alliance and the waging of the war against Austria. Nonetheless, Cavour warned his king that Napoleon, being highly sensitive, would never forget a service or a slight, and would perceive the rejection as a blood insult. Thus Cavour reported that to accept the alliance while rejecting the marriage would be an immense political error, posing grave consequences.¹¹

The Plombières agreement delighted Cavour. Upon his return he explained to Marco Minghetti that initially Napoleon had been reluctant to touch the states of the Church, and only upon his insistence had the Emperor eventually relented. Napoleon consented to have the Legations up to Ancona included within the projected Kingdom of Upper Italy, but insisted this be kept quiet. Likewise, the Emperor did not wish the planned cession of Nice and Savoy to leak out. Cavour recognized that there were those who questioned the Emperor’s motives and commitment, but he did not share their suspicions. He assured another close associate, Michelangelo Castelli, that during the course of his recent conversations with Napoleon, it was clear that the French ruler’s attitudes towards Austria, the Roman question, and even the future of Italy, approximated his own. Cavour confided that at Plombières, he had the distinct feeling that he was not dealing with the Emperor of the French, but an Italian liberal.¹²

Following his departure from Plombières, Cavour visited Germany, where he met a number of princes, most important of whom was William, prince regent of Prussia, and future King of Prussia and German Emperor. William was delighted to make the acquaintance of Cavour, finding him quite different from the turbulent revolutionary he had anticipated. Cavour, likewise, was impressed with William’s resolve, and from that moment envisioned an alliance with Prussia to complement that with France. Cavour considered it compatible with the Napoleonic connection, but before making any proposals determined to approach the Emperor through the intermediary of the Marquis Gioacchino Pepoli of Bologna. Napoleon responded enthusiastically, indicating that should Prussia join France and Piedmont against Austria, she would not only be associated with the just Italian cause, but would assure the future of German nationalism. Prussia, however, could not be persuaded to join the coalition.

Despite the cloak of secrecy, word immediately leaked out of Cavour’s visit to Napoleon. Indeed, while the two were in conference, the Emperor received a telegram and then turned to his coconspirator, reporting that Walewski, his Foreign Minister had learned of Cavour’s presence at Plombières. Small wonder that Count Hubner, the Austrian Ambassador at Paris, was haunted by the thought of what Cavour and Napoleon had concluded. Walewski could tell the Austrian little, knowing nothing about the meeting, but hoping to learn something soon. Walewksi no less than Hubner had few kind words for Cavour, accusing him of employing deceit, intrigues and trickery to wring concessions from the French Emperor.¹³

The Austrian apprehension was shared by the British, who were alarmed by the prospect that the peace might be shattered. As long as Cavour remained Minister of the King of Sardinia, Austrian diplomats complained in London, Austria would have no peace and the tranquillity of Europe would be constantly threatened. Cavour’s rejoinder that he was only doing his duty, did not calm the courts. While the government of Lord Malmesbury, Lord Derby and Disraeli supported Cavour’s internal reformism, it decidedly opposed his efforts to revise the map of Europe by belligerent means. Lord Malmesbury indicated that, wishing Piedmont to preserve its position in Europe, he counselled it not to become embroiled with Austria or threaten the peace. Nor did the British appreciate Turin’s overtures to Russia.

British fears were confirmed when Cavour informed the Cabinet, via Hudson, that the Piedmontese were determined to push the Habsburgs out of Italy – even at the cost of razing their own cities. Austrian diplomats in London and Vienna were quick to take advantage of British misgivings, and Cavour’s agents reported that London and Vienna remained in close communication, adding that Count Buol lost no opportunity to denounce Sardinian actions. English hostility to his foreign policy objectives disturbed but did not deter the energetic Cavour. There were, he calculated, three major powers in Europe interested in disrupting the status quo: France, Prussia and Russia; while two powers, Austria and England, wished to preserve it. Though it distressed him that the first three were not the most liberal, self-interest dictated a close association with those favouring change. Cavour complained that London did not understand that Italian liberals had few choices available; since Russia opposed Austria she had good reason to support Piedmont.¹⁴

The British were upset by Cavour’s machinations for war, but even more so by the news from Paris. French relations with Austria were as poor as those of Sardinia and prominent voices in the French capital foresaw war as inevitable. Napoleon made no secret of his intentions. He informed Palmerston, who visited Paris in the autumn, that the present situation in Italy could not continue and would provoke a crisis detrimental to Austrian interests. He might have added that the crisis would also undermine the Pope’s temporal power, which he was committed to preserve. Small wonder that Filippo Antonelli, the older brother of the Cardinal Secretary of State, and his confidant, questioned French foreign policy. Cavour alone was pleased. Reading an anti-Austrian article in La Presse, which supported a French war against Austria, he commented that if he were the Austrian Ambassador he would immediately request his passport.¹⁵

Rome was alarmed by the anti-Austrian tone of the French and Piedmontese press. Articles appeared in Paris expressing sympathy for the Italian nation and were widely known to be inspired by the government. Word reached Rome that Napoleon had even subsidized the establishment of a new journal to champion his Italian policy. The Papal Nuncio in Paris, Sacconi, reported to Antonelli that public personages in Paris, even some members of the Imperial family, spoke unkindly of the Papal government, and there was a growing sentiment that the Pope’s territory should be restricted so he would have fewer problems. The Papal Nuncio urged Antonelli to move expeditiously to eliminate the foreign troops which continued to occupy parts of the Papal territory. In this fashion, Sacconi explained, the enemies of the Pope could no longer claim that his regime survived only by means of foreign bayonets. Meanwhile Cavour’s memorandum to the Cabinets of London, Berlin and St Petersburg, suggesting that much of the anti-Austrian sentiment in Lombardy-Venetia flowed from Vienna’s concordat with the Papacy, aroused and angered Pius IX, who denounced Turin’s policies.

Back home, Cavour hastened preparations for the war that had been planned at Plombières. Preliminary to the formal alliance was the marriage proposal, and Cavour pressed both the king and his daughter to please Napoleon on this matter. By the end of August 1858 his will had prevailed. Even before Clotilde has given her formal consent, Cavour despatched a note to his co-conspirator outlining what had been agreed at Plombières, beginning with the fact that a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance was to be concluded between the Emperor of the French and the King of Sardinia for the liberation of Italy. Further articles detailed the contribution of each partner, the means of provoking and financing the war, and the subsequent reorganization of the peninsula. Cavour indicated that he would use recruits and volunteers, but they would be incorporated into the Sardinian army.¹⁶

Cavour sought to implement the last provision by means of Garibaldi and the National Society. Using La Farina and Pallavicino of the National Society as intermediaries, Cavour informed Garibaldi he had important matters to discuss with him. In December the ‘brain’ and the ‘sword’ of Italian unification met, and the former appraised the latter of part of his discussion with Napoleon at Plombières. In preparation for the impending war, Cavour asked Garibaldi to enrol and command a volunteer force for the struggle, and the latter accepted. Cavour thus established the base for Garibaldi’s ‘Cacciatori delle Alpi’ and his commission as major-general in the Royal Army of Piedmont. Conservatives in Turin questioned Cavour’s contacts with the National Society and Garibaldi, but he was neither dismayed nor dissuaded by their arguments, replying that many instruments were needed in an orchestra. However, he was determined to remain conductor. No one else had the means and the nerve to coordinate the campaign.

Cavour was assisted in provoking the war by his co-conspirator who dropped a bombshell during his reception for the diplomatic corps on New Year’s Day. During the festivities, Napoleon turned to Baron Hubner, the Austrian Ambassador to the Tuileries, expressing regret that relations between their countries were strained. The veiled threat did not come as a complete surprise. Indeed, since mid-November 1858, the Austrians had considered mobilization plans. The Papal Nuncio, fearing the consequences of a Franco-Austrian conflict, left the reception ‘pale as death’. Although the Emperor sought to soothe the apprehensions of the Austrian Ambassador the next day, and the French Foreign Minister discounted the rumours of war, as did an article in the official journal, Le Moniteur, the rumours continued to mushroom. Lord Minto was one of the few who seemed to accept Napoleon’s reassurances; the Papal Nuncio was not convinced. Sacconi reported to Rome that while the Emperor claimed his aims were peaceful, he could not foresee the eventualities of the next two or three months.¹⁷

Rome’s scepticism was reinforced on 10 January 1859 by Vittorio Emanuele’s speech from the throne, indicating that, despite respect for the 1815 treaties, he could not remain immune to the cries of anguish emanating from all parts of Italy. Hudson, the Italophile British representative in Turin, characterized the king’s message as nothing less than a rocket falling on the treaties, dashing the hopes of those who wished to preserve the peace. In fact, Cavour confided to friends that things would inevitably go ahead, that there would be no turning back, and he took steps to assure that the established order would collapse. The Apostolic Nuncio at Florence decried the fact that Cavour and his lieutenant, La Farina, aided and encouraged local revolutionaries, and feared for the safety of the Papal States. Furthermore, though Napoleon expressed peaceful intentions, his actions belied his words, as his government continued to arm and prepare for a military campaign.

The march towards war alarmed not only Rome and Vienna, but many in Paris, London and Turin as well. Ollivier questioned the Emperor’s aims in his journal, positing that the Emperor’s bellicose stance was geared to make the French forget about their lost freedom rather than to provide for Italian liberty. The Ministry and the Salons aligned themselves against the war. Thiers wrote a memorandum against it, which reached Napoleon. In Turin Solaro della Margarita warned of the dire consequences of Cavour’s Italian policy and the unfortunate impact on the Pope’s temporal power.

In London Lord Malmesbury hoped for an Italian regeneration without violence, perhaps by constraining the King of Naples and the Pope to reform their respective regimes. He deplored Piedmont’s bellicose policy which risked both its institutions and its future. Noting he was primarily concerned for neither Austria nor France, Malmesbury confessed that he and Lord Derby would do all within their means to prevent war, which would cost 100,000 lives and desolate one of the most beautiful areas of Europe. He dedicated himself to the preservation of the peace.¹⁸

The task assumed by Malmesbury proved difficult. The journals noted that Prince Napoleon had ventured to Turin in January and wrote of his impending marriage to Princess Clotilde. Following the prince’s arrival in mid-January, a marriage agreement and an offensive-defensive alliance between France and Piedmont were concluded on 18 January 1859, with the marriage occurring at the end of the month. Cavour told Pasolini that all was accomplished, certain that with the marriage Piedmont could count on French support (the marriage having been the necessary preliminary to the war they had planned). On that occasion Vittorio Emanuele gave Cavour a magnificent ring, which Cavour accepted, reminding his king that he had no wife and did not intend to take one. Your bride, responded Vittorio Emanuele, is the patria.¹⁹

The marriage and the alliance caused new consternation in London and Rome. Sacconi warned Cardinal Antonelli that in the light of these actions, one had to conclude that Napoleon had not abandoned his plans for the reorganization of Italy and would seize the opportunity to realize them. In the expectation of French support in the impending war, Cavour procured permission from the Sub-alpine parliament to float a loan of fifty million lire for extraordinary expenditure. While the Prince Consort of England, opposed to Cavour’s policies, predicted he would not succeed in raising the money, the loan was in fact oversubscribed, and more than eighty million lire was collected. The war loan, and the news that Cavour had met with Garibaldi, enlisting his services, electrified the country.

When Napoleon opened the French Chambers, on 7 February 1859, he sought to calm Europe and soothe the Austrians. Although Napoleon repeated the declaration of Bordeaux that the Empire meant peace, many doubted his sincerity; some even questioned his ability to control matters. Rome was not reassured, especially since the publication of La Guerronière’s pamphlet ‘Napoleon III et L’ltalie’ on 4 February 1859, which reflected the Emperor’s sentiments. Pointing to the abnormal condition of Italy in general, and the situation in the Papal States in particular, the pamphlet called for a diminution of the temporal power, conferring upon Pius a type of moral ascendancy that flowed from his presidency over an Italian Confederation. It thus presaged the war in Italy, providing a justification that might even appeal to the English, who opposed the temporal power.

Pope Pius IX, fearing that war was inevitable, worried that the Austrian and French forces which occupied parts of his territory would wage their conflict on his territory. He therefore pressed Antonelli to call for an Austrian and French withdrawal, insisting that the Papal government was sufficiently strong to provide for its own defence. The Secretary of State, aware of the danger cited by the Pope, dreaded the revolutionary agitation and the schemes of Cavour and his allies. Thus he moved cautiously to end the foreign occupation. The only good news received by Rome came from Hubner, the Austrian Ambassador at the Tuileries, who confided to Sacconi, the Papal Nuncio in Paris, that while Vienna was disposed to make some concessions to Napoleon, it would never put pressure upon the Holy See, or any of the Italian states, to grant reforms they did not deem appropriate.²⁰

Cavour sought to convince the British that they had to choose between him and Mazzini in Italy. London, however, would have preferred an alternative, and following the Austrian request for mediation, asked Paris and Turin to catalogue their complaints. While Cavour delayed, revealing his disbelief that diplomatic means could resolve the peninsula’s problems, the French responded. Walewski, on Napoleon’s behalf, indicated the French conditions for relations to return to normal. These included the Austrian abrogation of its protective treaties with the Italian states, the introduction of constitutionalism in these same states and the creation of a separate administration for the Legations. This prompted the extraordinary mission of Lord Cowley, the British Ambassador in Paris, to Vienna, in an attempt to avert a war between France and Austria. In February Lord Cowley was cordially received by the Emperor Franz-Josef.

At this juncture a rift developed between Napoleon, willing to pursue the diplomatic initiative, and Cavour, bent upon waging the war planned at Plombières. The conditions he proposed, including the formation of autonomous regimes for Lombardy and Venetia, and the pontifical provinces east of the Appenines, Cavour knew would not be accepted either by Vienna or Rome. Napoleon, in turn, by means of an article in the Moniteur (4 March 1859), proclaimed that he had promised no more than to protect Sardinia if she were menaced by an Austrian attack. Anything beyond this he deemed the exaggerations of the press, lies and folly. The article created a sensation in Europe, distressed Turin and roused the wrath of Cavour.

Prince Napoleon reacted first, resigning his position as Minister in Algeria and denouncing the Emperor for his apparent change of heart. The Piedmontese were angered and remembered the warnings of Hudson, who had predicted that Napoleon would start them dancing and then leave them dangling. His prediction seemed prophetic. However, the Piedmontese pressed ahead and during the Cabinet meeting of 6 March 1859, the king authorized Cavour to call forward the reserves. A few days later the government recalled to active service all soldiers from the class of 1828–32. Then on 17th March, Vittorio Emanuele formally signed the decree nominating Garibaldi commander of the ‘Cacciatori delle Alpi’. The bomb had been packed, Cavour told his confidants, and it had to explode; if necessary, he continued, it would explode in the faces of those who had first encouraged and then abandoned the cause.²¹

Fortunately for Turin, Cowley’s mission proved inconclusive and he left Vienna on 10th March, convinced that Piedmont would have to disarm before Austria would enter negotiations. Soon after a new danger arose with the Russian suggestion for the calling of a congress of the five major European powers to resolve the differences between Paris and Vienna. Napoleon agreed to participate. The call for the congress was questioned in the capitals, most notably in Turin, London and Vienna. An angry Cavour confided to his friend Massari that while Napoleon, the sovereign of a state of over thirty-five million subjects, could delay and play games, the much smaller Piedmont could only survive by talking frankly and walking straight. He insisted on Piedmontese participation in the projected congress, threatening to resign if it were held without his country. The Papal Nuncio in France surmised that Cavour was determined to force Napoleon’s hand.

The British government urged Napoleon to constrain his ally to disarm, and did not favour Piedmontese inclusion in the Congress alongside Britain, France, Russia, Prussia and Austria. The last power not only refused to have Piedmontese participation and insisted on its disarmament, but posed a third condition for the calling of a congress – there would be no discussion of altering the Italian territorial situation. Napoleon did not reject or approve Vienna’s conditions, startled by Cavour’s outburst of indignation. On 24th March, Cavour was invited to Paris, and word circulated that the Emperor would force his ally to disarm, though it was made clear that she could not expect equal entry to the circle of the major powers. Indeed, on 26th March, Napoleon informed Cavour that Sardinia and the other Italian states would have only a consultative role in the projected congress. Cavour concluded that though his co-conspirator wanted to wage war against Austria in Italy, his foreign minister Walewski opposed it, while the Emperor was perplexed as to the means to effect his desired end. The European Congress threatened to frustrate all of his plans. Cavour thus left Paris with despair in his heart and tears in his eyes.²²

Nonetheless, once back in Turin, Cavour continued to prepare for war even as the powers sought to preserve the peace. Apparently he had not lost confidence in Napoleon, explaining to those in his inner circle that only the Emperor and Prince Napoleon appreciated the importance of the Italian question. Rome shared his assessment, convinced that Napoleon had not abandoned his liberal and national ideas and sought to reorganize the peninsula. Britain, likewise, fully realized that Piedmontese disarmament could only be attained if Paris insisted on it. The British, therefore, called upon the French to persuade Sardinia to disarm, while they collectively worked to invite Turin to the congress on an equal footing with other powers. On 18th April, the French Foreign Minister informed Cavour that his country accepted the British plan for disarmament. The distraught Cavour prepared to comply, contemplating emigration or perhaps even suicide. He was spared either alternative on 21 April 1859, by the news of an Austrian ultimatum insisting on immediate disarmament. Cavour finally had what he wanted: a clear intention of Austrian aggression and a French commitment to provide assistance. On 26th April, Turin rejected the ultimatum and Vienna declared war. The Machiavellian minister had managed to precipitate the conflict which even his old adversary, Mazzini, deemed a master stroke.

Notes

1. Michelangelo Castelli, Il Conte di Cavour, Ricordi di Michelangelo Castelli, ed. Luigi Chiala (Turin: Roux, 1886), pp. 190–1.

2. Marco Minghetti, Miei Ricordi (3rd edn, Turin: Roux, 1888), III, p. 136; Memoires … par le Prince de Metternich, VIII, p. 394.

3. Costantino Nigra (ed.), Count Cavour and Madame de Circourt: Some Unpublished Correspondence, trans: Arthur John Butler (London: Cassell and Co., 1894), p. 73; Edmondo Mayor (ed.), Nuove lettere inedite del Conte di Cavour (Turin: Roux, 1895), p. 356.

4. Minghetti, III, p. 460.

5. Ibid., III, p. 125; Domenico Masse, Cattolici e Risorgimento (Rome: Edizione Paoline, 1961), p. 47; Giuseppe Massari, Il Conte di Cavour. Ricordi biograrfici (Turin: Botta, 1873), p. 160.

6. Nigra (ed.), Count Cavour and Madame de Circourt, p. 71.

7. Mayor (ed.), Nuove lettere inedite del Conte di Cavour, pp. 506–52.

8. Il Carteggio Cavour-Nigra dal 1858 al 1861 ed. National Commission for the Publication of the Papers of Count Cavour (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1961), I, p. 63.

9. Castelli, Ricordi, pp. 79, 196; Massari, Il Conte di Cavour, pp. 221, 235.

10. Castelli, Ricordi, pp. 75–7.

11. Mack Walker (ed.), Plombières: Secret Diplomacy and the Rebirth of Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 27–37.

12. Castelli, Ricordi, pp. 75–7; Minghetti, III, p. 219.

13. Giuseppe Massari, Diario dalle cento voci (Bologna: Cappelli, 1959), p. 75; Walker, pp. 37–8.

14. Massari, Diario, pp. 1, 12, 27, 42, 54; Massari, Il Conte di Cavour, p. 239.

15. Massari, Diario, pp. 26, 73; Mournier to Filippo Antonelli, 5 June 1858, Archivio di Stato di Roma, Fondo Famiglia Antonelli, busta 7, fascicolo 6.

16. Mariano Gabriele, Il Carteggio Antonelli-Sacconi (1858–1860) (Rome: Istituto per la Storia del Risorgimento Italiano, 1962), I, pp. 5–7; Walker, pp. 232–4.

17. Massari, Diario, pp. 50, 83, 104–6; Gabriele, I, pp. 10–4; Imbert de Saint-Armand, France and Italy (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1899), p. 8.

18. Massari, Diario, pp. 104–6, 113–15; Gabriele, I, pp. 10–14, 20; Nuncio at Florence to Antonelli, 10 January 1859, Archivio di Stato di Roma, Miscellanea di Carte Politiche o Riservate, b. 131, f. 4665; Harry Hearder, ‘La politica di Lord Malmesbury verso l’Italia nella primavera del 1859,’ Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento, XLIII, (January-March 1956), p. 40.

19. Massari, Diario, p. 128.

20. Gabriele, I, pp. 22–3, 37; Giuseppe Pasolini, Memorie, 1815–76, ed. P.D. Pasolini (3rd edn, Turin: Bocca, 1887), p. 226.

21. Massari, Diario, p. 118; Gabriele, I, p. 54; Saint-Armand, p. 69.

22. Gabriele, I, pp. 48–9, 60; Massari, Diario, p. 166.