CHAPTER SEVEN

The Outbreak of the Korean War

Taiwan and Korea

The outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950 saw the fusing of two crises in East Asia that had been linked but which had been handled separately by the United States to this point - developments in the Korean peninsula and in Taiwan. Some members of the UN, notably Great Britain, sought to maintain the distinction between the two: Britain supported the American reaction to events in Korea but had no wish to be dragged into conflict with China over Taiwan. This chapter examines the sequence of developments preceding and following the start of the Korean War. The contacts between South Korea and Taiwan will be considered first and the contribution made by the dispute over the future of Taiwan to the initial stages of fighting in Korea. From the summer of 1949 onwards there were frequent, enigmatic exchanges between Syngman Rhee's government and the declining Kuomintang regime in Taiwan. Chiang had visited Seoul in August 1949 for talks with Rhee; the Generalissimo had urged the conclusion of a Pacific pact involving South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines, to be underwritten if possible by the United States. Chiang wanted an understanding with the ROK providing for limited military cooperation with a contingency arrangement for Chiang to be given asylum in Seoul should the Chinese communists succeed in capturing Taiwan. The American State Department was aware of the general trend of Chiang's exchanges with the authorities in Seoul and Manila but was not conversant with all the details. Niles Bond, the officer mainly responsible for dealing with Korean matters in the State Department, wrote to John J. Muccio in Seoul on 1 June 1950 explaining that he had heard informally from the Navy Department that representatives of Chiang Kai-shek had opened negotiations with the South Korean and Philippines governments for asylum to be granted if Taiwan fell. It was understood that the Philippines was unwilling to cooperate and Bond commented to an emissary from the Navy Department:

... President Rhee would ... be loath to have such a conspicuous albatross as the Generalissimo hung about his neck. In reply to a further question I added that I believed that it would be the Department's view that the Korean Government would be acting most unwisely were it to agree to accord asylum to the Generalissimo and that it should in no way be encouraged to do so.¹

1. Letter from Bond to Muccio, 1 June 1950, State Department records, 795.00/1-750, RG59, box 4682, National Archives, Washington.

Bond requested Muccio to investigate and report back. Muccio replied on 23 June, just after the visit to Seoul of John Foster Dulles and John M. Allison from the State Department. Muccio began by remarking on Korean-Taiwanese contacts, 'There are indications that maneuverings have been going on but I have not been able to put my finger on anything concrete,'² Muccio had asked the acting Prime Minister of any approaches from Chiang and he had denied that any had occurred. Certain rumours had reached Muccio, although he had been unable to verify their accuracy. One was that Colonel Whang Woo, the Kuomintang's military attache, had pursued inquiries on behalf of Chiang. The South Korean government had apparently refused to permit any Kuomintang group to be located in South Korea. A further rumour was that a Chinese consul-general had visited Seoul on the same basis. It was unclear who had been contacted in the South Korean government and Muccio thought it was probable that approaches would have been made to Korean leaders close to the Chinese, such as Lee Bum Suk, Shin Ik Hi or General Chi Chung Chun, rather than to Rhee or the acting Prime Minister, Captain Sihn. Another report to Muccio had indicated that Chiang had offered to send rifles and ammunition to South Korea, apparently in exchange for Chiang being granted asylum. Muccio, Dulles and Allison met President Rhee and the Foreign Minister, Ben C. Limb, for discussions on 19 June: the significance of Dulles's visit in the Korean context will be considered later and for the moment only Taiwan will be considered. Rhee advocated a pact between anti-communist nations in the Pacific region but Dulles countered that formal pacts or alliances were not necessary for common action against an enemy. Dulles stated that American policy on Taiwan was being reviewed and that economic aid plus licences for exporting military equipment to Taiwan had been agreed before he left Washington. Dulles asked Rhee outright whether the ROK would allow Chiang and other high Kuomintang officers to settle in Seoul if Taiwan fell. Rhee held that every country should stand on its own feet; it was obvious that he did not enthuse at Chiang's wish to find a safe haven in South Korea.³ The exact nature of the discussions between the ROK and the Kuomintang remains murky and is a subject for legitimate speculation. Chiang was in a desperate situation; while the danger of Kuomintang troops in Taiwan defecting to the communists had subsided, he was faced with the likelihood of an invasion of Taiwan being attempted in August or September 1950. Chiang appeared doomed unless the United States intervened to save him or a third world war began, in which circumstances all governments or areas hostile to Communism could expect support. It could well be in Chiang's interest to encourage conflict in Korea, for American policy would probably change and Taiwan would benefit therefrom. There is no solid evidence pointing to Kuomintang complicity in the events immediately preceding the beginning of the Korean War. All that can be said is that it would be in Chiang's interest to stimulate South Korean belligerence.

2. Letter from Muccio to Bond, 23 June 1959, ibid.

3. FRUS 1950 (7), p. 109, memorandum by Allison, 19 June 1950.

General MacArthur became alarmed at the communist threat to Taiwan in the spring of 1950. This, too, is a murky topic in which much remains obscure. MacArthur had taken a deep interest in Taiwan in 1949-50 and had encouraged American and Japanese involvement in Taiwan.⁴ MacArthur was in communication with the able American-educated Kuomintang general, Sun Li-jen, now commander-in-chief, Taiwan; Sun was regarded by many as the one slender hope of rescuing the Kuomintang in Taiwan and of giving the moribund regime a new lease of life.⁵ Some felt that the United States might engineer a coup whereby Sun replaced Chiang Kai-shek, and this might have happened but for the escalation of the Korean struggle into a major war. MacArthur expressed his views trenchantly in a memorandum dated 29 May and sent to the joint chiefs of staff. Information brought to his attention had shown Sino-Russian cooperation in the Shanghai and Peking areas and that Soviet jets had been sent to the Chinese communist air force. The problem of Taiwan had become an urgent one. MacArthur emphasised that the consequences of the capture of Taiwan would be grave. Such an eventuality would increase drastically the Soviet threat to the American military position in the western Pacific. If Soviet forces could use Taiwan, the Malay-Philippine—Japan shipping lanes could be cut and Japan isolated. Taiwan would give the Soviet Union the capability for operating against the central and southern flanks of the existing American strategic frontier of the littoral island chain from Hokkaido through to the Philippines. Soviet possession of air bases in northern Taiwan would greatly increase the Soviet air threat against Okinawa. Communist ability to intervene in South-East Asia would be facilitated through Soviet occupation of Taiwan. He stated in ringing terms:

4. See Chapter 5 above.

5. For MacArthur's interest in Taiwan, see W. W. Stueck Jr., The Road to Confrontation (Chapel Hill, NC, 1981), pp. 138-40, 150, and N. B. Tucker, Patterns in the Dust (New York, 1983), p. 310, n. 39.

In the event of war between the United States and the USSR, Formosa's value to the Communists is the equivalent of an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender, ideally located to accomplish Soviet strategy as well as to checkmate the offensive capabilities of the central and southern positions of the FEC [Far East Command] front line. This unsinkable carrier-tender has the current capacity to operate ten air groups, and can readily be modified to accommodate twice that number. The Communist 'fleet' can be acquired and maintained at an incomparably lower cost to the USSR than could its equivalent of ten or twenty heavy aircraft carriers.⁶

6. MacArthur to Department of Army, 29 May 1959, RG6, box 8, Formosa File, MacArthur Papers, MacArthur Memorial.

MacArthur added that extensive reinforcements to American air strength would be imperative if Taiwan fell.

American policy towards Taiwan underwent a fundamental change in May-June 1950: the joint chiefs of staff were fully aware of the arguments put forward by MacArthur and urged steps to neutralise Taiwan. President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson were also reconsidering the issue. The reassessment was regarded as highly confidential in the State Department. The British ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks, met Acheson for one of their frequently private discussions after dinner on 5 June. Acheson was contemplating ways of denying Taiwan to the Chinese communists short of outright American military intervention in the island. The repercussions of the possible fall of Taiwan would be very serious in East and South-East Asia. Acheson had no solution in mind but it was clear that the Truman administration would seek to delay an attempt to invade Taiwan.⁷ The British reaction was sombre: the permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office minuted, 'There are the seeds of trouble here.'⁸ On 22 June the British embassy confirmed that policy concerning Taiwan was being reappraised - 'Curiously enough no one in the State Department junior to Dean Rusk knows of this reconsideration, nor have they heard that Acheson had spoken to the Ambassador about Formosa.'⁹ The British embassy was aware of consideration being given in the State Department to placing Taiwan under the control of MacArthur, as a reversion to Taiwan's undetermined status pending the conclusion of a Japanese peace treaty; the White House was said to be contemplating a declaration analogous to the Monroe Doctrine.¹⁰ Intelligence from Taiwan on 13 June suggested that the Chinese communists might attack Taiwan in September with the invading forces coming from Amoy, Swatow and the Chusan islands. It seemed to be in the interest of the communists to attack Taiwan in 1950, although some observers believed an invasion was more likely in 1951.¹¹ An additional reason why Acheson was prepared to consider changing policy was his desire to secure bipartisan cooperation in Congress on matters relating to the Far East. Since the Republicans had criticised the administration's policy in this region for a lengthy period and had referred specifically to the importance of avoiding the fall of Taiwan, it followed that Acheson would have to placate his critics.¹² Franks believed the new attitude resulted from a combination of strategic and political pressures which had compelled Truman and Acheson to change line.¹³

7. Letter from Franks to Dening, 7 June 1950, FC10345/9, FO 371/83320. Acheson thought highly of Sir Oliver Franks and had decided, soon after becoming Secretary of State, to meet the ambassador privately for informal 'off the record' discussions; see Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the Staff Department (London, 1970), p. 323.

8. Minute by Strang, 10 June 1950, FC10345/9, FO 371/83320.

9. Letter from Graves to Shattock, 22 June 1950, FC1345/12, FO 371/83320.

10. Ibid.

11. State Department to SCAP, 13 June 1950, relaying Taipei to Washington, 12 June 1950, RG6, box 80, Formosa File, MacArthur Memorial.

12. For Acheson's wish to promote a bipartisan policy, see dispatch from Franks to Bevin, 30 June 1950, FC10345/10, FO 371/83320.

13. Ibid.

When the Korean War began Chiang Kai-shek offered military assistance to South Korea. The Kuomintang Foreign Minister, George Yeh, plaintively commented that there were some effective fighting units in Taiwan despite the sad experiences in the mainland in 1948-49. He believed that the North Korean attack was an isolated probing tactic, although full Soviet prestige was almost certainly involved. He did not feel an attack on Taiwan was imminent.¹⁴ Chiang Kai-shek was both reassured and alarmed at Truman's statement of 27 June in which he referred to Korea and Taiwan. Truman stated that the developments in Korea had raised the menace of wider aggression. A communist occupation of Taiwan would therefore be a threat to peace in the Pacific and could not be permitted:

14. Taipei to State Department, 26 June 1950, State Department records, 795.00/1-750, RG59, box 4682, National Archives.

Accordingly I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of Security in the Pacific, a peace setdement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.¹⁵

15. FRUS 1950 (7), p. 203, statement by Truman, 27 June 1950.

Taiwan was protected against communist attack but equally the freedom of the Kuomintang government had been severely circumscribed. It could not take action against China and the very future of the island was to be determined and conceivably on a basis contrary to the Kuomintang's wishes. Taiwan might be placed under MacArthur pending a Japanese peace settlement or under the UN prior to a decision that might lead to Taiwanese independence as advocated by Taiwanese autonomists. Truman and Acheson, long disillusioned with Chiang Kai-shek, had no intention on 27 June of committing themselves to propping him up for an indefinite period. They had acted because they had already decided before 25 June that Taiwan must not fall to the communists: the events in Korea became the occasion of announcing the new policy. For Truman and Acheson it was the easiest method of dealing with the dilemma confronting them, but the combining of Taiwan and Korea created much difficulty in American relations with many other countries, including the Soviet Union, Britain, India, and, most obviously, Communist China. Ironically it had the effect of underpinning Chiang Kai-shek for the rest of his life and of complicating American relations with Peking until the 1990s.

Start of the war

To turn now to the tortuous events in the Korean peninsula in June 1950. What exactly happened? Did North Korea launch a sudden, well-coordinated onslaught against South Korea as was generally believed? Or did South Korea attack first and thus provoke the conflict? It is impossible to determine with absolute accuracy precisely what occurred on 25 June 1950, since wildly divergent accounts were given by the two sides and their respective supporters. It is appropriate to begin with the report of UNCOK, since the task of this body was to observe the situation, particularly along the 38th parallel. The key report on behalf of UNCOK was submitted by two Australian military observers appointed in May, as a response to a request by UNCOK. The observers were Major F. S. B. Peach and Squadron Leader R. J. Rankin.¹⁶ They devoted the period from 9 June to 23 June to inspecting ROK troops stationed along the parallel. Peach and Rankin stated that the ROK forces were organised 'entirely for defence' and were 'in no condition to carry out an attack on a large scale against the forces of the north'.¹⁷ South Korean troops were not concentrated and there was no massing at any point. In certain places the North Korean forces were effectively in possession of salients on the south side of the parallel and there was no indication that South Korean troops were about to act against them. Some South Korean troops were engaged in anti-guerrilla operations when guerrillas had infiltrated. The inadequate resources of the ROK army, in particular the absence of armour, air support and heavy artillery, rendered a South Korean invasion impossible in military terms. There were no signs that the ROK army were preparing an attack: their commanders demonstrated an attitude of'vigilant defence'. As regards the position north of the parallel, civilians had recently been transferred from areas adjacent to the parallel northwards. A report that there was military activity near Chwiyari, just north of the parallel, had been received. 'No report, however, had been received of any unusual activity on the part of the North Korean forces that would indicate any imminent change in the general situation of the parallel.'¹⁸ Peach and Rankin submitted their report on 24 June and it was fundamental to the conclusion of UNCOK that North Korea was responsible for the military action that marked the beginning of the war. At 5 p.m. on 25 June the field observers had reported that North Korean forces had that morning mounted a surprise attack all along the 38th parallel. Kim Il Sung had claimed in a broadcast made on 26 June at 9.20 a.m. that South Korea had attacked the north in the section of Haeju, thus provoking counter-attacks. In the light of the report by Peach and Rankin, UNCOK unanimously rejected the North Korean contention and stated categorically that no offensive could possibly have been launched by South Korea; UNCOK continued:

16. Robert O'Neill, Australia in the Korean War, 1950-1953, vol. 1, Strategy and Diplomacy (Canberra, 1981), p. 12.

17. Ibid., p. 14.

18. Cited ibid.

The invasion launched by the North Korean forces on 25 June cannot have been the result of a decision taken suddenly in order to repel a mere border attack or in retaliation for such an attack. Such an invasion involving amphibious landings and the use of considerable numbers of troops carefully trained for aggressive action and in relation to the area of great quantities of weapons and other war material, presupposes a long-premeditated, well prepared and well-timed plan of aggression. The subsequent steady advance of the North Korean forces supplies further evidence if further evidence is needed of the extensive nature of the planning and preparation for the aggression.

It is the considered opinion of the commission that this planning and preparation were deliberate and an essential part of the policy of the North Korean authorities. The objective of this policy was to secure by force what could not be gained by any other means. In furtherance of this policy the North Korean authorities on 25 June initiated a war of aggression without provocation and without warning.¹⁹

19. Report of the United Commission on Korea: Covering the-Period from 15 December 1949 to 4 September 1950, General Assembly, Official Records: Fifth Session, Supplement no. 16 A/1250 (New York, 1950), p. 4. The report was signed by Arup Singh (Chairman) (India), A. B. Jamieson (Rapporteur) (Australia), Li Yu-wan (China, Kuomintang), Angel Gochez Marin (El Salvador), Henri Brionval (France), Benabe Africa (Philippines) and Kamil Idil (Turkey).

The phraseology was emphatic but the fact remained that UNCOK was not clear exactly what had happened at the moment when fighting commenced. In addition, they side-stepped the question of the inflammatory rhetoric emanating from Rhee, revealing his ardent desire to unite the country, and ignored the provocation for which South Korea had been responsible on occasions in 1949-50 and which had worried KMAG.

Stalin supports Kim Il Sung's plans

What were the views of North Korea, the Soviet Union and China in June 1950? Who took the initiative in the chain of events? The end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the adoption of a more open policy in China regarding access to certain archives has facilitated investigation into the policies of the communist states in the period leading to the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950. However, it is important to keep in mind that full access to files has not been granted. For example, Stalin's private papers and various KGB files are not available; the same applies to the central archives of the CCP in Peking. More pieces of the jigsaw puzzle have come to light since the first edition of this volume was published in 1986 but we do not possess all of the puzzle. The trend in interpretation represents a partial reversion to the views expressed from the 1950s to the early 1970s, that is to say, that the Soviet Union was important in precipitating the war. Stalin encouraged Kim Il Sung to move south and provided the personnel and equipment necessary for Kim's onslaught. Yet the release of the new evidence does not represent a return to the opinion held contemporaneously in the West in 1950 that Kim Il Sung was a puppet controlled by Stalin, the kind of relationship between Stalin and Kim once described by an American army colonel as similar to that obtaining between Walt Disney and Donald Duck.²⁰ The new evidence confirms the ability and skill of Kim II Sung, as analysed by a number of historians who have produced studies since the mid-1970s.²¹ Kim was a dedicated nationalist, committed passionately to the unification of his country and a leader of great ruthlessness. He had worked with the Chinese and the Russians in earlier stages of his career and could not have become the leader of the DPRK without Soviet support. But Kim entertained no particular affection for either of the communist giants. He discerned the rivalry implicit in their relationship and determined to exploit it for his own reasons. Kim required the support of the Soviet Union or China in order to unite Korea. He preferred the former, since it was unlikely that Stalin would wish to intervene too deeply in Korean affairs, given his preoccupations in Europe. China was another matter, for Mao wished to develop Manchuria for economic and political reasons and the pro-Chinese faction in the NKWP represented a potential threat to Kim's position. In the approach to the outbreak of the war, in June 1950, Kim aimed to work closely with Stalin and to keep Mao at a distance.²²

20. See Bruce Cumings (ed.), Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953 (London, 1983), p. 61.

21. Most notably by Cumings in his challenging The Origins of the Korean War, 2 vols. (Guildford and Princeton, NJ, 1981-90).

22. See S. N. Goncharov, J. W. Lewis and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War (Stanford, Calif., 1994), pp. 133-47, 215.

In the conduct of foreign relations Stalin was usually cautious and averse to gambling. He was concerned primarily with bolstering his authority within the Soviet Union and did not intend to take any action which could cause internal difficulties and conceivably threaten his dominance. However, Stalin's policy towards Korea between April and June 1950 diverged from the normal pattern. Stalin was interested in using Korea to outmanoeuvre the United States and to counter the 'reverse course' in Japan, which pointed unmistakably to the political, economic and strategic revival of Japan, prior to the regaining of Japanese sovereignty. The United States had refrained from giving a binding promise of support to the ROK and the nature of American policy towards Syngman Rhee's regime was ambiguous. Of course, Stalin was in receipt of valuable information from his spies, notably Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, and Kim Philby, which would have included the outline of NSC 68.²³ Stalin was innately suspicious, a characteristic which did not diminish with the passage of the years rather the reverse occurred. It is likely that he regarded some of the reports from his spies as 'disinformation', planted by the Americans in order to mislead him.²⁴ Kim visited the Soviet Union for most of April 1950. On 30 January Stalin had indicated that he might change policy and support a North Korean offensive. Now Stalin decided to support an advance south by the DPRK army.²⁵ The amber light switched to green but on certain conditions. These were that Kim must be sure of swift success, which would entail receiving sufficient support from guerrillas in the ROK; there should be no likelihood of military action by the United States; the North Korean offensive should be completed before serious international complications ensued; above all, the Korean situation must not escalate into a third world war. Stalin was tending towards the conclusion that another world war would take place but he believed that the Soviet Union was not prepared for such a huge struggle before the mid-1950s.²⁶

23. Cumings (ed.), Child of Conflict, p. 38.

24. David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939—1956 (London, 1994), pp. 115, 174.

25. See E. Bajanov 'Assessing the Politics of the Korean War 1949-51' in J. G. Herschberg (ed.) The Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues 6-7, The Cold War in Asia (Washington, D.C., 1996) p. 87.

26. Ibid., pp. 212-13.

Between May and June 1950 substantial Soviet aid was dispatched to the DPRK. Existing Soviet military personnel were replaced with men possessing battle experience. The plans for the North Korean offensive were drawn up jointly by Russian and DPRK officers.²⁷ Kathryn Weathersby argues that Stalin's decision to support Kim II Sung was motivated by fear and insecurity rather than confidence. Stalin feared that, unless the DPRK moved first, then Rhee might implement his shrill threats and an attack from the ROK to the north might produce a situation he could not control. A deeper defensive motive resulted from the tense relations between the Soviet Union and China. Stalin was determined to prevent rapprochement between the United States and China and this rendered action in Korea desirable.²⁸

27. Ibid., pp. 142-7 and Anthony Farrar-Hockley, The British Part in the Korean War, vol. 2, An Honourable Discharge (London, 1995), p. 3.

28. Kathryn Weathersby, Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945—1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Washington DC, 1993), p. 29.

Role of China

This leads us to consider the role of China. Kim II Sung had no desire to encourage Chinese action. He visited Peking in May 1950 and informed Mao Tse-tung of his designs in broad terms.²⁹ Kim stated that he was confident of success without having to request Chinese intervention. This is profoundly ironic, given the course of events subsequently. Mao's attitude to the coming of the war in Korea was influenced heavily by the problem of Taiwan - another example of the fusing of the two crises in the summer of 1950. Mao chafed at his failure to conclude the last stage of the Chinese civil war on a note of resounding triumph with the liquidation of the Kuomintang. He was irate at the inability of the PRC's armed forces to capture islands off the Chinese coast in October-November 1949.³⁰ He was infuriated at the developing signs that the United States would frustrate a Chinese attempt to invade Taiwan. Mao was immensely proud, and justifiably so, of his great achievement in leading the CCP to victory. China was a great power in the making and could not acquiesce in American arrogance. Mao's relations with Stalin were tense and he disliked the fact that he was excluded effectively from the Soviet-North Korean planning.³¹ Mao was compelled to bide his time. China did not play an important part in the approach of the Korean War but Mao's determination to assert Chinese power made it probable that China would intervene in Korea, if Kim Il Sung's confidence in attaining swift victory was not fulfilled.

29. Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York, 1994), p. 112.

30. Ibid., pp. 89-90, 98-102.

31. Ibid., p. 134.

Dulles visits South Korea

Now to consider the political situation in South Korea in June and developments in American policy-making. Syngman Rhee's support had waned in 1949-50 following the President's increasingly autocratic behaviour, the effects of inflation, and the revelations of corruption and incompetence in the administration. Rhee experienced a setback in the general election held on 30 May with those supporting him suffering appreciable losses.³² The most striking feature was the large increase in the number of independents. There were various minor groups but the independents clearly constituted the key element. The British minister in Seoul summarised by predicting that some independents would subsequently join Rhee but that the defeat of men prominent in public life could only be interpreted 'as a demonstration of public feeling against the President and his associates and the Police'.³³ North Korea launched a propaganda campaign on 7 June with Pyongyang radio broadcasting an appeal from the Democratic Front for all Koreans - except Rhee's clique - to coalesce in support of unification: this would be achieved through holding a general election for the whole of Korea on 5 August with a new national legislature meeting in Seoul on 15 August; political leaders of north and south, again excluding Rhee and his close associates, would assemble to decide on arrangements for holding the election and UNCOK would be excluded from advising on the unification process.³⁴ Rhee was still confident of retaining control and the tone of his pronouncements on the future of Korea under his leadership did not change significandy. The nature of the assembly elected on 30 May pdinted to Rhee encountering more problems with the body in future, but the President revealed few signs of doubting his ability to surmount, any problems.

32. As communicated in letter from Holt to Tomlinson, 7 June 1950, FK1015/12, FO 371/84056.

33. Ibid.

34. Letter from Holt to Tomlinson, 16 June 1950, FK1015/16, ibid.

Rhee's most significant engagement in mid-June was to receive an important American visitor, John Foster Dulles. Mystery surrounds the precise motives for Dulles's visit to Seoul. Dulles had accepted appointment in April 1950 as special consultant to the State Department with particular responsibility for handling the negotiations over the Japanese peace treaty. He was a firm advocate of resisting communism and his statements in Seoul were generally but not entirely encouraging to Rhee. The principal reason for Dulles's trip was to visit Tokyo for talks on the peace treaty and it was agreed after deliberations in the State Department that he should go to Seoul. John J. Muccio had drawn attention to the feeling of isolation in South Korea, and the absence of distinguished American visitors seemed to underline lack of interest in the fate of Korea. Given the tougher approach being adopted behind the scenes in Washington over Taiwan, a visit to Seoul was opportune. Dulles was accompanied by John M. Allison, a leading State Department official and a hardliner where encounters against communism were concerned. The South Korean assembly met on 19 June and was addressed by Dulles. He compared the Korean struggle for independence after colonial oppression to the American experience in escaping from British imperialism. The generosity of the United States in assisting peoples to secure and maintain their freedom was emphasised. He concluded, in the words of the British minister, 'with an eloquent assurance that the American people welcomed the Koreans as an equal partner in the great company of those who comprised the free World, a world which commanded vast moral and material power and in which any despotism which waged aggressive war doomed itself to unalterable disaster'.³⁵

35. Letter from Holt to Bevin, 20 June 1950, FK.1015/79, FO 371/84059.

Dulles met Rhee for private talks on 19 June at the President's request. Rhee wanted greater American commitment in Korea and East Asia in total. Dulles regarded subversion as a more likely danger for South Korea than a direct North Korean attack; to combat subversion it was essential that governments took ' active steps to create conditions within their countries which would prohibit growth of communism'.³⁶ This required 'true allegiance to the principles of representative government and a real effort to self-control and hard work to create a stable economy and a government which deserved the support of its people ...'³⁷ Dulles's public rhetoric conveyed the image of a more assertive American role which, when taken in conjunction with his activity in working for a Japanese peace treaty, must have alarmed North Korea. In a famous photograph, afterwards produced in North Korean literature, Dulles was shown wearing his characteristic Homburg hat, peering intendy across the 38th parallel at the communist hordes to the north. This was regarded in Pyongyang as demonstrating Dulles's aggressive intentions. Dulles's purpose certainly was to put more backbone into South Korea but he did not anticipate the developments that were shortly to take place. Alvary Gascoigne, head of the British liaison mission in Japan, reported to London on Dulles's return to Tokyo. Dulles described Syngman Rhee's mood as ebullient and said that, far from passively awaiting an attack from North Korea, Rhee might instead take an initiative against the north. A British official in London commented with some embarrassment:

36. FRUS 1950 (7), p. 108, memorandum by Allison, 19 June 1950.

37. Ibid.

It is quite clear that Mr. Dulles had not the faintest inkling of what was impending. Read in the light of subsequent events, Mr. Dulles's words seem unfortunate. It is true that Syngman Rhee who, although very reactionary is no realist, has talked in terms of solving the problem of Korean disunity by force. It is clear, however, that Mr. Dulles merely meant to indicate that the South Koreans were in a buoyant frame of mind.³⁸

38. Minute by Tomlinson, 5 July 1950, on dispatch from Gascoigne to Bevin, 22 June 1950, FJ1021/97, FO 371/8381.

The CIA produced a lengthy assessment of the capabilities of North Korea on 19 June, based on information made available on 15 May. It examined political, economic and strategic aspects. The chief points brought out were the degree of Soviet control, the disciplined character of the state with efficient armed forces; and that while factionalism existed, it did not represent a serious problem. The morale of North Korean troops was good. The ultimate objective of the Soviet Union was to unify the Korean peninsula under a communist government. The vulnerability of South Korea to a determined onslaught from the north was underlined, although it was felt that Soviet or Chinese participation would be necessary to ensure total military victory over the south.³⁹ To observers in Seoul on the eve of the war, all appeared relatively calm and there was no suggestion of imminent crisis. Holt, the British minister, wrote to the Foreign Office on 22 June that the most impressive occurrence had been the arrival of rain, which averted the threatened drought.⁴⁰ At 10 a.m. on 25 June John J. Muccio reported urgently to Washington that North Korean forces had invaded the south at several places that morning. Action had started at about 4 a.m. when Ongjin was attacked by North Korean artillery fire. Two hours later North Korean infantry began crossing the parallel in the vicinity of Ongjin and in the areas of Kaesong and Chunchon; an amphibious landing on the east coast south of Kangnung was also reported. Kaesong had apparently been captured at 9 a.m. and fighting was proceeding at the places indicated.⁴¹ It should be pointed out that there was thirteen hours' difference in local time between Seoul and Washington; between the hours of 12 midnight and 1 p.m. Korea was one day ahead of Washington. Muccio's message sparked off hectic activity in Washington, New York and in world capitals. The United States faced the first real challenge of the Cold War, in terms of contemplating the use of appreciable numbers of American forces in a 'hot' war and one that could esculate into a far greater conflict involving the Soviet Union and (or) China.

39. FRUS 1950 (7), pp. 109-21, memorandum by CIA, 19 June 1950.

40. Letter from Holt to Tomlinson, 22 June 1950, FK1017/23, FO 371/84077.

41. FRUS 1950 (7), pp. 125-6, Muccio to Acheson, 25 June 1950.

The United States decides to act

President Truman was in Independence, Missouri, when the crisis broke and the immediate decisions were taken by Dean Acheson. The Secretary of State consulted the President by telephone and it was decided to raise the situation in the UN Security Council. In Tokyo General MacArthur was taken by surprise by the news of the North Korean advance and did not at first attach significance to it. MacArthur believed it was yet another of the numerous border incursions of the previous eighteen months and did not grasp the magnitude of the development. Dulles at once understood the implications, having only just returned from Seoul. There was no affection lost between MacArthur and Dulles, for each was suspicious of the other in the handling of the Japanese peace treaty and they represented diverging attitudes within the Republican Party. Dulles visited MacArthur late in the evening of the 25th, and impressed the gravity of the situation upon him.⁴² Dulles and Allison recommended on 25 June that if necessary American forces should be deployed in Korea:

42. Ibid, j pp. 237-8, memorandum by Dulles, 29June 1950, andj. M. Allison, Ambassador from the Prairies, paperback edn (Tokyo, 1975), pp. 132, 134-5.

To sit by while Korea is overrun by unprovoked armed attack would start disastrous chain of events heading most probably to world war. We suggest that Security Council might call for action on behalf of the organization under Article 106 by the five powers or such of them as are willing to respond.⁴³

43. FRUS 1950 (7), p. 140, Sebald to Acheson, 25 June 1950, enclosing views of Dulles and Allison.

The Soviet Union had absented herself from meetings of the UN Security Council since January 1950, ostensibly because China was represented in the body by the defunct Kuomintang regime in Taiwan rather than by the Chinese communist government. Whether this was the reason for Soviet absence is a matter for conjecture. Bebler, the Yugloslav representative in the Security Council, believed Soviet behaviour was motivated by other considerations:

Bebler had taken the line that the whole Korean incident had been engineered by the Russians in order thoroughly to embroil the United States with Communist China. Moscow was, according to Bebler, apprehensive of the growth of Communist China's power and determined not to have the latter in the United Nations. It was for this reason that the Russians had recognised Ho-Chi-minh [sic]. Now by prevailing on the United States to take action in respect of Formosa this had effectively embroiled the Americans with the Chinese Communists and put a stop to any likelihood of the latter's early admission to the United Nations.⁴⁴

44. Washington to FO, 29 June 1950, based on information given by Perkins of the State Department to Hoyer Miller of the British embassy, FK1022/24, FO 371/84080.

Yugoslavia's relations with the Soviet Union were such that exaggeration of jaundiced interpretation could be expected, particularly as there were rumours of Russian troop movements in the Balkans.⁴⁵ However, it is likely that Stalin was not enthusiastic to see Mao Tse-tung's delegate participating in the Security Council openly. The Soviet absence was an immense bonus for Truman and Acheson in their decision to use the Security Council. American policy moved with rare speed, decisiveness and success in the initial phase of the Korean War. The Security Council adopted a resolution on 25 June by nine votes to nil with one abstention (Yugoslavia) and one not present (Soviet Union). This deplored the North Korean attack, termed the action a breach of the peace, and urged the cessation of hostilities with the withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel.⁴⁶

45. Ibid.

46. FRUS 1950 (7), pp. 155-6, resolution adopted by UN Security Council, 25 June 1950.

Truman returned to Washington by air on 25 June and was met at the airport by Acheson, Louis Johnson (Secretary of Defense) and James E. Webb (Assistant Secretary of State), According to Webb's retrospective account, they travelled from the airport in the same car as the President to facilitate discussion before an important meeting to be held over dinner at Blair House that evening. Webb stated that Truman's first remark was that he intended to act resolutely and uttered words to the effect, 'By God I'm going to let them have it.'⁴⁷ Johnson expressed full agreement but Webb stated that much thought had been devoted to the complexity of the crisis and it was essential for the President to consider the outcome before acting; Webb wrote that he spoke on these lines rather than Acheson because of the acrimonious relationship between Johnson and Acheson. When the party reached Blair House, Webb spoke privately to Truman before they joined the assembled guests for dinner. The recommendations of the State Department and the Pentagon were to eliminate as many North Korean tanks as possible through air attack, since the tanks were fast advancing on Seoul and Americans had to be evacuated from the city. The South Korean forces urgendy required relief. The second recommendation was to use the Seventh Fleet to prevent an invasion of Taiwan. The third recommendation, which, in the opinion of Acheson and certain others, would have to be implemented soon, was to send American military forces to South Korea to halt and reverse the North Korean advance,⁴⁸ The latter obviously had to be handled delicately at this time because the whole problem was under discussion in the UN. Those present at the dinner included the joint chiefs of staff. After the meal the major issues concerning Korea and Taiwan were debated. General Bradley did not believe the Soviet Union intended to begin a world war beause she was not ready for it. He endorsed the actions recommended by Acheson, which included authorising MacArthur to supply Korea with arms and equipment under the terms of the existing aid programme and dispatching the Seventh Fleet to prevent a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

47. Letter from Webb to John W. Snyder, 25 Apr. 1975, general correspondence, S., 1973-75, folder 2, Webb Papers, Truman Library.

48. Ibid.

Louis Johnson raised the sensitive and highly important aspect of the relationship between Washington and General MacArthur: this soon became one of the major themes and controversies of the Korean War until MacArthur was ultimately dismissed by Truman. Johnson thought that instructions to MacArthur should be detailed 'so as not to give him too much discretion'.⁴⁹ Johnson held that 'there should not be a real delegation of Presidential authority to General MacArthur'.⁵⁰ However, other matters were so pressing that this was not pursued further. Johnson and the joint chiefs were opposed to using American ground troops in Korea; air and naval action could be taken but it would not be wise to deploy ground troops. Truman decided that MacArthur should send supplies to Korea together with a survey group. Elements of the American fleet were to be sent to Japanese waters; the air force should prepare a contingency plan for eliminating Soviet air bases in the Far East. The State and Defense departments should assess areas of the globe where Soviet action might take place.⁵¹

49. FRIJS 1950 (7), p. 160, memorandum byjessup, 25 June 1950.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid.

The United States embassy in Moscow recommended a firm response to the North Korean attack but did not think that the Soviet Union desired a general war.⁵² In South Korea panic prevailed and Syngman Rhee apparently suffered a nervous breakdown. In the face of the drive south of the North Korean forces, Rhee was unable to discuss matters coherently and wished to leave Seoul for Taejon.⁵³ Everett Drumright, counseller of the American embassy, wrote privately that Rhee had gone 'off his head' for a time but had quickly recovered.⁵⁴ The North Korean forces were superior in equipment and morale but the South Korean forces put up some resistance; as Muccio later observed, had they not done so, the North Koreans would have been in Seoul on the afternoon of 25 June rather than three days afterwards.⁵⁵ Truman and his advisers prepared the ground for dispatching United States forces to Korea under the authority of the UN. The President remarked that: 'he had done everything he could for five years to prevent this kind of situation. Now the situation is here and we must do whatever we can to meet it.'⁵⁶ Acheson began contacting America's allies to enlist their support in the UN. His message to the British government stated that developments in Korea made clear that ' centrally directed Communist Imperialism has passed beyond subversion in seeking to conquer independent nations and now is resorting to armed aggression and war'.⁵⁷ Ernest Bevin was ill in hospital and Kenneth Younger, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office, handled day-to-day issues. The British response to the Korean crisis was to deplore the aggression that had occurred, but there was no wish to become embroiled - or to see the United States deeply embroiled - in Korea when the most dangerous potential Soviet challenge was located in Europe.⁵⁸ The Foreign Office advised against including the reference to centrally directed communist imperialism since this would not permit the Soviet Union to undertake a diplomatic retreat should Stalin wish to do so.⁵⁹ The British representations succeeded and the reference was omitted from Truman's definition of American policy, Truman's statement of 27 June has already been cited in the context of policy over Taiwan. The paragraph dealing with Korea emphasised the true meaning of the fighting in the peninsula: 'The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war.'⁶⁰ On the same day the UN Security Council carried by seven votes to one (Yugoslavia opposing) and two members not voting (Egypt and India), with the Soviet Union still absent, a resolution condemning the breach of the peace, calling on North Korean forces to return to the 38th parallel, recognising that urgent military measures were necessary, and recommending member states to extend such assistance to South Korea as might be needed in order to repel the armed attack and restore peace.⁶¹

52. Ibid., pp. 139—40, Kirk to Acheson, 25 June 1950.

53. Ibid., pp. 141-2, Muccio to Acheson, 26 June 1950.

54. Letter from Drumright to Allison, 8 July 1950, selected State Department records relating to the Korean War, box 4, Truman Papers, Truman Library.

55. Muccio Oral History, interview between Muccio and R. D. McKinzie, p. 11, copy in Truman Library.

56. FRUS 1950 (7), p. 183, memorandum by Truman, 26 June 1950.

57. Ibid., pp. 186-7, Acheson to Douglas, 27 June 1950.

58. For British views, see Alan Bullock, Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, vol. 3 (London, 1983), pp. 790-3.

59. FRUS 1950 (7), p. 187, n. 3.

60. Ibid., p. 202, statement by Truman, 27 June 1950.

61. Ibid., p. 212, resolution adopted by UN Security Council, 27 June 1950.

On 29 June MacArthur was instructed to use the naval and air resources of Far East Command to support the South Korean forces; to restrict the employment of the army to essential communications and service units; to defend Taiwan against attack and to ensure that Chiang Kai-shek's forces should not be used to attack the mainland; the Seventh Fleet would come under MacArthur's operational control; air operations could be extended to North Korea if and when this became necessary and such operations would concentrate on air bases, depots, tanks and other military targets (special care should be exercised to keep clear of the frontiers of Manchuria and the Soviet Union); munitions and supplies should be dispatched to Korea; the decision to commit American forces did not connote a decision to become involved in war with the Soviet Union, but if the Russians intervened then MacArthur's forces should defend themselves before reporting to Washington for further instructions.⁶² MacArthur went to Korea and assessed the military position on 30 June. He reported that the South Korean forces were retreating in confusion and that the calibre of leadership had been poor. The South Korean army had been organised as a light defensive force and was faced by a challenge for which it was ill-equipped. Defensive preparations were inadequate and much equipment had been lost. The civilian population was tranquil but growing numbers of people were fleeing south to escape the North Koreans. Supplies were being maintained as best he could through the air-head at Suwon and the southern port of Pusan. It was imperative to stop the North Koreans and the answer was obvious:

62. Ibid., pp. 240-1, joint chiefs of staff to MacArthur, 29 June 1950.

The only assurance for the holding of the present line, and the ability to regain later the lost ground is through the introduction of US ground combat forces into the Korean battle area. To continue to utilize the forces of our air, and navy without an effective ground element cannot be decisive.⁶³

63. Ibid., p. 249, MacArthur to Acheson and joint chiefs of staf, 30 June 1950.

Muccio's view was the same as MacArthur's. Muccio worked frantically to sustain South Korean morale but, in a telephone conversation on 30 June, he described the situation as desperate. He was unsure how long he could prop up the ROK government without tangible American assistance.⁶⁴ The ROK army had suffered 60 per cent casualties and had been reduced to a strength of 30,000 as against a North Korean strength of 100,000.⁶⁵

64. Ibid., pp. 254-5, Sebald to Acheson, 30 June 1950, summarising views ofMuccio.

65. Ibid., p. 255, n.

Soviet response and British desire for compromise

The reaction of the Soviet Union was muted in the first ten days of the war. Stalin made no major statement and senior Soviet officials were reluctant to meet American and British diplomats. Pravda on 28 June published a front-page article stating that the imperialistic instigators of war had not stopped half-way in seeking to attain their aims. A provocative advance of South Korean troops had caused the conflict:

Clique of Syngman Rhee entered on the road of military adventure. They counted in advance on military aid from their masters across the sea. Aggressive plans of their patrons now begin to show themselves. Truman had given orders to United States Air and Naval forces to give armed 'support' to South Korea and has ordered the 7th American Fleet to 'prevent an attack on Formosa', which constitutes an order for the occupation in effect, of part of the territory of China by American armed forces. This statement means that United States Government has undertaken direct acts of aggression. Have they not, however, gone too far? The American Government is grossly violating the constitution ofUnited Nations and is acting as if United Nations did not exist. Question arises who authorised United States Government to take this step? In bringing its armed forces into action did the United States Government accord its policy with United Nations? Where and when did the Security Council take the decision freeing hands ofUnited States Government to undertake actions in regard to Korea and China which Truman announced yesterday? In undertaking its openly aggressive acts it is evident that purpose ofUnited States Government was to confront United Nations with a fait accompli.⁶⁶

66. Moscow to FO, 28 June 1950, enclosing summary of front-page article in Pravda, 28 June 1950, FK1015/52, FO 3 71 /8405 7.

In the Soviet press reports were published on 29 June giving the reactions of North Korea and China, in addition to the Soviet Union. A communique issued by the North Korean army claimed victory in a rout of the South Korean forces. The People's Army was proceeding to liberate Chunchon, Honchen and areas to the south. Naval detachments were landed at Kannon and Semchon in the southern part of Kanwon province and had joined forces with guerrillas to liberate bordering areas. Further districts were in the process of being liberated. Seoul had been captured on 28June at 11.30 a.m.; Kim II Sung broadcast to congratulate the troops on their 'brilliant new victory' and to congratulate the inhabitants of Seoul on being freed from the yoke of Syngman Rhee.⁶⁷ From New York Tass reported that the Korean crisis began with 'the adventurist attempt of the Syngman Rhee puppet clique directed by the USA, to invade the Korean People's Democratic Republic'.⁶⁸ This had been carefully prepared with the help of KMAG, more than 500 strong, commanded by Brigadier-General Roberts. Selective quotations from the American press underlined the dominant American impact on South Korea and Dulles's visit was emphasised. Rhee's past promises to unite Korea were cited, including a speech made by Rhee on 1 March 1950. Tass reported the comments of the Peking paper, Jen Min Jih Pao; the latter had published an editorial article headed 'The Korean people fighting against the invaders' and stated that the Korean People's Democratic Republic had been forced to respond to the aggression of Rhee's 'puppet troops'.⁶⁹ The Rhee clique was controlled by the Unfed States and had 'made use of all barbarian stratagems possible for the persecution, arrest, murder and suppression of patriots and also to hinder and thwart the realisation of the proposals of the united democratic patriotic front for the peaceful unification of the country'.⁷⁰ Rhee and his followers were responsible for starting a civil war but fundamentally it was an American responsibility:

67. Soviet Monitor, 29 June 1950.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

The chief political intriguers and those responsible for the civil war are the American imperialists, and there is no need to declare that they have carried out the necessary preparations for the commencement of war.

On June 19 State Department adviser Dulles, speaking to the so-called National Assembly of South Korea, openly announced the readiness of the USA to give all necessary moral and material support to South Korea, which is fighting against Communism.

These facts are irrefutable proof that the American imperialists have incited the Syngman Rhee bloc in organising the civil war in Korea.⁷¹

71. Ibid.

The British Foreign Office believed that it was 'virtually certain that the Soviet Government had connived at if they have not instigated the aggression by the Communists of North Korea'.⁷² It was most likely a probing act to see how the West responded; unless it was effectively opposed, it could stimulate Soviet initiatives elsewhere, as in Iran. The evaluations of George F. Kennan and Charles E. Bohlen, the two leading American authorities on Soviet policy-making, were similar. Bohlen told Kennan that it was 'a very clear case of typical Stalin methods whereby he initiates action not formally and directly involving the Soviet Union which he can and will press to the full if only weakness is encountered while leaving himself a way out without too direct loss of Soviet face if he considers the risks were becoming too great'.⁷³

72. FO memorandum, 26 June 1950, prepared for Bevin, FK1015/62, FO 371/84058.

73. FRUS 1950 (7;, p. 174, Bruce (Paris) to Acheson, enclosing personal message from Bohlen for Kennan. For Kennan's views, see G. F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (London, 1968), pp. 395, 486.

The tone of the earlier statement in Pravda and of a subsequent statement on 29 June was interpreted by the American embassy in Moscow as meaning that the Soviet Union had adopted a waiting posture without committing herself too positively; the statements were ambiguous and seemed to offer scope for the Russians either to support North Korea or to avoid involvement. Admiral Kirk, the ambassador in Moscow, recommended a cautious approach, concentrating on refuting Soviet allegations against South Korea and stressing the UN dimension while seeing how matters evolved.⁷⁴ Kirk had met the elusive Andrei Gromyko., deputy Soviet Foreign Minister, on 29 June. Gromyko's comments were restricted to blaming South Korea for starting the war and pointing out that the Soviet Union had withdrawn forces from Korea before the United States. He reaffirmed the Soviet Union's traditional policy of non-interference in the affairs of other states.⁷⁵ While the situation was a delicate one, there was a possibility of eliciting Soviet cooperation, and the British Foreign Office favoured standing firm but without antagonising the Russians. The British ambassador in Moscow, Sir David Kelly, sought to convince Gromyko of the merits of cooperation in defusing the Korean crisis. Gromyko told Kelly on 6 July that the Soviet government desired a peaceful solution and invited British reactions. Kelly replied that the Soviet Union could exert influence with North Korea to halt the bloodshed; the British wish was for the war to be stopped on the basis of reverting to the status quo ante. Gromyko nodded assent. Kelly inquired whether he could inform London that the Soviet Union would be willing to intervene diplomatically to achieve a settlement. Gromyko simply stated that the ambassador was aware of the Soviet position.⁷⁶ The British government urged the United States not to take action which might exacerbate matters and explained that British public opinion felt that the Russians themselves realised they had gone too far in Korea.⁷⁷

74. FRUS 1950 (7), pp. 253—4, Kirk to Acheson, 30 June 1950.

75. Ibid., pp. 229-30, Kirk to Acheson, 29 June 1950.

76. Ibid., pp. 312-13, Kirk to Acheson, 7 July 1950.

77. Ibid., pp. 313-14, British embassy to State Department, 6 July 1950.

The American embassy in Moscow believed that Russian ideas should be explored: the return of the North Koreans beyond the 38th parallel was fundamental and the United States could express the wish that all-Korea elections should be held, supervised by the UN.⁷⁸ Charles Bohlen's assessment was that Stalin faced a difficult choice now that American forces were fully committed in Korea. Once American power became effective the North Koreans would be forced to retreat and the issue of the 38th parallel would become a live one. Stalin would either have to allow American troops to cross the 38th parallel and thus tolerate an American presence close to Vladivostok and within easy bombing range of Khabarovsk, or reoccupy North Korea with Soviet forces. It was unlikely that he would follow the latter course because it would increase the danger of direct Soviet conflict against the United States; in addition, the psychological repercussions in Asia would be undesirable. Stalin might be prepared to compromise through allowing a partial retreat with acceptance of the status quo ante. This would involve the retirement ofNorth Korean forces and the departure of American forces; the latter would be unacceptable to the USA. What was all-important was the speed of the United States military response in Korea.⁷⁹

78. Ibid., pp. 315—16, Kirk to Acheson, 6 July 1950.

79. Ibid., pp. 325-7, memorandum by Bohlen, 7 July 1950.

Acheson was cool in his reaction. The possibility of the Russians trying to sow dissent had to be borne in mind and it would not be wise to appear over-anxious or zealous. Acheson told the British that Sir David Kelly could pursue his discussions with Gromyko with the aim of securing a North Korean acceptance of the Security Council's resolution of 25 June. This would be without prejudice to the commitment of the UN to the peaceful unification of Korea on lines laid down by the UN General Assembly.⁸⁰ Ernest Bevin had been reflecting on Anglo-American relations in the light of Korea and decided to explain his views frankly to Acheson on 7 July. A written account of what he said was handed to the Secretary of State by Sir Oliver Franks the following afternoon. Bevin saw Taiwan and Chinese representation at the UN as stumbling-blocks, which should be removed. Over Korea the United States enjoyed the full support of world opinion, which could not be said of Taiwan. A number of countries, including India, believed that Taiwan should be taken over by the Chinese communist government eventually. In Bevin's opinion it was not sensible to mudclle the clear-cut issue of aggression in Korea with the dubious matter of Taiwan. It would be best to play down the parts of President Truman's statement of 27 June referring to questions other than Korea. The Soviet attitude compelled consideration of the future of the Korean peninsula. It was possible that the Russians were endeavouring to exploit the existing divergences in Anglo-American policies to China; it was also possible that the Russians were hoping for a negative western approach on joint discussions. Another problem was that restoration of the status quo in Korea might simply result in a development such as had occurred in Czechoslovakia.⁸¹

80. Ibid., pp. 327-8, Acheson to Douglas, for communication to FO, 7 July 1950.

81. Ibid., pp. 329-30, message from Bevin to Franks, 7 July 1950, communicated to State Department, 8 July 1950.

Bevin's hope that Acheson would appreciate his frankness was reciprocated but Acheson's vigorous reaction was not palatable. Acheson responded on 10 July and made clear his resentment at Bevin's references to Taiwan and Communist China. Aggression in Korea represented the equivalent of German aggression in the 1930s. A strong reaction was essential to avert a repetition of the failures of the earlier decade. The Soviet Union could extricate herself from the dilemma she faced if she so wished. Russia had inspired the events in Korea and there was some evidence that China was involved in the fighting in Korea and elsewhere in Asia with serious implications for Britain in Hong Kong and Malaya. The Soviet Union had chosen to withdraw from the Security Council and this was not the responsibility of the Americans or British. On China Acheson said candidly he could see no way of reconciling the existing divergence between them. The United States could not recognise Peking because of the negative attitude shown to American nationals and interests; because China would not affirm international commitments; because she had recognised Ho Chi Minh and intervened in Indo-China; Peking was encouraging insurgents in the Philippines, Malaya, Burma and elsewhere; because China was working closely with the Soviet Union and had allowed penetration of China; because Peking did not control the whole of China; and China was currently defying the UN by supporting North Korean aggression.⁸² Acheson viewed China in classical Cold War terms and could discern the danger of dominoes toppling throughout South-East Asia and perhaps extending to India and Japan. He did not believe Chinese communist ambitions could be deflected through a temporary accommodation. Action had been taken on Taiwan to stabilise the situation and a longer-term solution would have to be worked out: this could occur through a Japanese peace treaty or through the good offices of the UN. Acheson instructed his ambassador in London to 'remind Bevin orally of grave doubts he himself expressed to me in private conversation in London as to wisdom of Britain's own China policy and ask him frankly what possible practical advantages he sees in trying to get Communist China into SC and return to SC of USSR in present situation'.⁸³ The Security Council had been able to act decisively only because of Russia's absence and a Soviet return would cause confusion. Acheson ended his instructions, 'I want you to leave him in no doubt of seriousness with which I view implications of his message and their possible effect on our whole future relationship.'⁸⁴

82. Ibid., pp. 347-51, Acheson to Douglas, lOJuly 1950, for communication to Bevin.

83. Ibid., pp. 351-2, Acheson to Douglas, 10 July 1950.

84. Ibid., p. 352.

Douglas visited Bevin in hospital on 11 July and communicated Acheson's message. Bevin was shaken by the acerbic nature of Acheson's remarks. He felt it was necessary to decide how to deal with any proposals the Soviet Union might produce and to consider the possibilities. He was vague on the advantages of having Communist China present in the Security Council. Bevin stated he had never doubted the wisdom or justice of the decision to recognise China but he had expressed doubts as to the outcome being what would be ideally wished. Douglas derived the impression Bevin had not grasped the full implications of the message, communicated on 8 July, and that possibly he had been pressured into sending it by his subordinates.⁸⁵ This was the first of the series of serious strains and tensions in Anglo-American relations during the Korean War which resulted fundamentally from British reservations about the sweeping nature of American policy-making with the tendency to overreact in unduly emotional terms. Bevin was not dissatisfied at the exchanges between Gromyko and Kelly. His private secretary wrote that Bevin had not expected more and it would be necessary now to await developments; it was best to leave the Russians to make the next initiative. Bevin

85. Ibid., Douglas to Acheson, 11 July 1950.

did not believe that Stalin wanted the situation in the Far East to develop in such a way as to cause the United States to build up tremendous forces there. It was possible that Mao Tse Tung [sic] wanted to try to involve 'Stalin in war with the United States, but he thought that Stalin would get out of this.⁸⁶

86. Minute by Barclay, 12 July 1950, FK1022/96/G, FO 371/84085.

The Soviet Union decided to return to the Security Council in August 1950, realising the foolishness of continued absence; the return was sweetened by the fact that it was the Soviet turn to chair the Security Council and the chairman's role could be used to obstruct initiatives, as proved to be the case. No significant progress in American-Soviet relations in Korea was to be achieved until the spring of 1951 when George Kennan met Jacob Malik.

Appointment of MacArthur

Finally we revert to developments in the UN and the formal establishment of the UN Command under General MacArthur. President Truman recalled in retirement that the most difficult decision of his presidency had been the commitment of American forces to the Korean campaign.⁸⁷ Truman possessed deep reserves of courage and tenacity and lived up to his favourite slogan of' the buck stops here. He was a man of straightforward, uncomplicated outlook and saw events in Korea as a flagrant act of aggression for which the Soviet Union was responsible. Like his colleagues, Truman was conscious of the mistakes made in dealing with Hitler in the 1930s and was determined not to repeat them. He would not preside over a 'far eastern Munich'. Truman did not wish to request a congressional declaration of war, for this might be time-consuming and could handicap his freedom of manoeuvre. He carefully and stubbornly described the American role in Korea as part of a police operation under the authority of the UN. The UN was important because it meant that the United States would not be acting alone, that the principles of the UN Charter would be maintained, and that no encouragement would be given to right-wing, isolationist Republicans. The administration's decisive reaction to Korea was widely applauded in the country and there were few critics in Congress: Senator Robert A. Taft (Republican, Ohio) believed Truman should have brought the matter to Congress but there was no widespread dissatisfaction. The initial response of the American people in terms of correspondence to Truman revealed that up to and including 29 June letters ran ten to one in support of the President. More opposition was voiced in telegrams, however, where the total was 325 in support, 225 against with 125 classified as miscellaneous.⁸⁸ Truman held that General MacArthur should be appointed as the UN commander in Korea, since the United States would be contributing the vast majority of the UN forces and MacArthur was the greatest living American soldier with extensive experience of East Asia and the western Pacific. Truman was aware of MacArthur's tendency to act independendy and of his political ambitions but believed these dangers could be controlled. There was indeed an added political bonus in having a right-wing Republican in command of the UN forces in Korea - so long, that is, as the appointment did not have a boomerang effect. MacArthur realised the immensity of the challenge but was confident he would succeed, given sufficient resources and freedom of action. What could be a more fitting climax for his military career than defeating communist aggression and perhaps rolling back communism out of Korea altogether? Furthermore, what could be a more appropriate way of launching a final attempt to secure the Republican presidential nomination in 1952?

87. Film shown in the Truman Library in which the former President answered questions from school students on his career as President and the difficult decisions he had been faced with.

88. Memorandum by Hopkins for Ross, 29 June 1950, official file 471-B, box 1305, Truman Papers, Truman Library.

John Foster Dulles exhibited little enthusiasm at MacArthur's proposed appointment. He wrote to Acheson on 7 July that he assumed the general would be designated for the post. Given the extreme gravity of the world situation, the necessity of preventing the Korean War becoming a world war and of preserving the support of the other members of the Security Council, and other aspects drawn to the attention of Truman and Acheson previously:

... I suggest that the President might want to emphasise by personal message: to General MacArthur the delicate nature of the responsibilities which he will now be carrying, not only on behalf of the United States but on behalf of the United Nations, and the importance of instructing his staff to comply scrupulously with political and military limitations and instructions which may be sent, the reasons for which may not always be immediately apparent, but which will often have behind them political considerations of gravity.⁸⁹

89. FRUS 1950 (7), p. 328, memorandum from Dulles to Acheson, 7 July 1950.

MacArthur was not susceptible to hints or indeed to outright orders of which he disapproved and presidential authority could only be exercised over him with difficulty. Ultimately a confrontation with the White House was inevitable and there is little surprise at Truman's decision to dismiss MacArthur in April 1951, although respect for the President's courage is engendered. The UN Security Council carried a resolution on 7 July by seven votes to nil with three abstentions (Egypt, India and Yugoslavia) and one member absent (Soviet Union) welcoming support for the previous motions of 25 and 27 June recommending all members to supply military forces and other assistance; requesting the United States to appoint the commander of such forces, and to furnish the Security Council with reports on developments.⁹⁰ Truman at once announced MacArthur's appointment, which was in addition to his existing appointments as SCAP and as commander-in-chief of United States forces in Korea. MacArthur responded with a fulsome message to Truman, thanking him most warmly for the confidence shown in him and promising complete loyalty to the President.⁹¹

90. Ibid., p. 329, resolution adopted by UN Secretary Council, 7 July 1950.

91. MacArthur to Truman, 11 July 1950, FECOM, general files, folder 4, RG6, box 8, MacArthur Papers, MacArthur Memorial.

Thus the events set in motion by Kim II Sung's ardent wish to unify his country led to a situation whereby the UN was at war in Korea in a conflict of singularly unpredictable political and military character. Kim II Sung and the Soviet Union had gambled on swift success with reluctant American acquiescence in the outcome. Instead the UN had endorsed the principle of containment in Korea, of no North Korean advance beyond the 38th parallel. What was not clear in July 1950 was whether the UN would proceed to endorse the principle of rolling back communism and of unifying the peninsula in accordance with UN policy as approved by the General Assembly in December 1948.