CHAPTER EIGHT

Rollback and Chinese Intervention in Korea

MacArthur's leadership

The development of the Korean War between July and November 1950 was largely dominated by General Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur restored confidence to the UN forces in the early part of this period, helped to stabilise the defence line in the Pusan redoubt before the dramatic events following the Inchon landing on 15 September and controlled the drive northwards, which culminated in the confrontation on the Yalu river, marking the decisive entry of China into the Korean conflict. The final phase of MacArthur's distinguished career remains extremely controversial because of the growing differences of opinion between the general and his superiors in Washington. The acrimony associated with his eventual dismissal by President Truman has obscured certain of the issues and the behaviour of the principals. MacArthur's supporters maintained that he had been made a scapegoat for the vacillation and timidity of Truman and the joint chiefs of staff. MacArthur's critics contended that he had pursued his own strategy with scant concern for constitutional proprierties. The allegations on both sides were exaggerated but each contained some validity. Part of the problem resulted from MacArthur's having too many commitments and responsibilities: he was simultaneously SCAP in Japan, commander-in-chief of American forces, and commander-in-chief of UN forces. He enjoyed immense prestige and power after many years of military service, concluding with his political role in Japan after 1945. Senior army officers had served under him and usually regarded him with awe. Politicians respected or feared him and were reluctant to challenge his authority.

MacArthur had freedom of manoeuvre denied most commanders and he exploited that freedom for all it was worth. However, it was not simply a matter of MacArthur manipulating instructions and situations to his advantage; Truman and the joint chiefs often failed to provide instructions that were explicit enough and avoided ambiguity. The decision-makers in Washington on a number of occasions refrained from defining the objectives of policy clearly or emphatically because they were undecided themselves on crucial aspects. MacArthur stated to the Senate hearing on his dismissal, in May 1951, that, 'No more subordinate soldier has ever worn the American uniform than himself.'¹ There is ample evidence contradicting this sentiment but equally on various occasions MacArthur was permitted the freedom to interpret orders in the direction he desired. A series of incidents occurred between August 1950 and March 1951 in which MacArthur acted independently and some of his actions were disavowed. Only in April 1951 did Truman act vigorously and courageously to resolve the problem. MacArthur had considerable achievements to his credit in his handling of events between July and the beginning of October 1950 but he sadly squandered these by the extent of his miscalculations in late October and November 1950. The members of MacArthur's 'court' - his circle of close advisers - must bear much responsibility for the extent of the errors made, particularly over the likelihood of China entering into the war. His two principal aides were Generals Courtney Whitney and Charles Willoughby. They had served with MacArthur for many years and saw their functions as to protect the great commander from those who would waste his time or upset him. They were rivals in the customary bureaucratic jockeying surrounding a powerful figure whether in politics, the armed forces or business.² John J. Muccio, who saw much of MacArthur at this time, thought he possessed a great brain but had reached an age where he was no longer fully conversant with all significant aspects of the situation.³

1. Military Situation in the Far East and ... Relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Hearings of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee, US Senate, part 1, p. 27, 3 May 1951, statement by MacArthur. Throughout his testimony MacArthur reiterated his acceptance of the President's authority and his respect for the constitution.

2. John J. Muccio believed MacArthur was hemmed in by the rivalry of Whitney and Willoughby and that they prevented him receiving the intelligence he needed: see Muccio Oral History, p. 71, interview between Muccio and Jerry N. Hess, 10 and 17 Feb. 1971, Truman Library.

3. Ibid., p. 72.

Before discussing further the vital political questions from July to November 1950, it is necessary to summarise briefly the rapidly fluctuating military fortunes of the two sides (see Map 3). The North Korean forces advanced relentlessly during July until, in the last ten days of the month, they were threatening the south-eastern part of the peninsula, which included the important city of Taegu and the ports of Pusan and Masan. The UN command was represented by three American divisions; in addition, there were five South Korean divisions. The first American troops to be sent to Korea were thrust from the comparative luxury of life in Japan to the rigours of a Korean campaign for which they were ill-prepared physically and psychologically. The immediate prospect was grim with the danger of the UN being forced out of Korea before American reinforcements could arrive. MacArthur was faced with a profound challenge, but to one of his vast experience the setbacks in Korea, serious as they were, could not compare with the Japanese onslaught he had been confronted with in 1942. The adversity he had suffered during the early stages in the Pacific War brought a sense of perspective and an appreciation of the ingredients required in organising the restoration of discipline and leadership. MacArthur's task was to stabilise the front and prepare the ground for the counter-attack. The vital moment came with his brilliantly conceived and implemented landing at Inchon on 15 September. The operation was an appreciable gamble and the joint chiefs were doubtful of its wisdom. MacArthur was supremely confident that the Inchon landing would succeed and would allow him to seize the initiative and to retain it. He was correct: the operation was a devastating achievement and sapped the morale of the North Koreans. The tables were turned and the UN forces steadily and then swiftly advanced north. By early October the UN forces on the eastern front had advanced beyond the 38th parallel (see Map 4). Nothing could stop MacArthur's men short of the intervention of China or the Soviet Union.

As regards his UN role, MacArthur enjoyed extensive freedom; he submitted reports to Washington, where decisions were reached as to which should be submitted to the UN Secretary-General, Trygve Lie. The fact that the United States completely dominated the UN command facilitated MacArthur's activities. There were compelling political reasons for including or cajoling the member states of the UN to send forces to Korea. The Truman administration emphasised that the Korean conflict directly involved the world organisation for peace in repelling aggression. The argument could only be sustained convincingly if a number of countries participated under the UN flag. Hence the pressure applied by Truman and Acheson. Offers came but in limited numbers and with no guarantee that these could reach Korea rapidly. Britain offered naval assistance at the beginning of the war and this was promptly accepted by Truman, although Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and the joint chiefs were less enthusiastic.⁴ The Attlee government did not wish to commit British troops to Korea initially because British defences were fully stretched in Europe, Malaya and Hong Kong.⁵ The Cabinet decided on 4 July that while it fully endorsed the American response in Korea, problems would be caused by the dispatch of troops; there was concern at the extent of the American commitment to Taiwan and possible implications for Britain and the UN.⁶ It was made abundantly clear to Sir Oliver Franks, the ambassador in Washington, that continued refusal to provide troops would harm Anglo-American relations. Attlee brought the subject to the Defence Committee, which recommended to the Cabinet that, notwithstanding the arguments on British commitments elsewhere, British land forces should be sent in order to consolidate Anglo-American friendship and to placate American public opinion.⁷

4. David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (London, 1964), pp. 24—5, and Robert O'Neill, Australia in the Korean War, 1950-53, vol. 1, Strategy and Diplomacy (Canberra, 1981), pp. 50-2.

5. Minutes of staff conference chaired by Emanuel Shinwell, Minister of Defence, 10 July 1950, COS(50), 101(1), Defe 4/33. Shinwell welcomed evidence that 'the Korean affair was not distracting American attention from the vital European theatre'.

6. British Cabinet conclusions, 4 July 1950, 42(5)3, Cab. 128/8.

7. Ibid., 25 July 1950, 50(59)3.

By 8 August Britain, New Zealand, the Netherlands, France and Canada had offered various combinations of naval and air assistance; military help had been promised by Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Turkey and Taiwan (refused in the latter case for political reasons), and air assistance had been promised by South Africa, Belgium and Greece.⁸ India offered an army hospital unit. Talks were proceeding with France, the Philippines and Pakistan regarding the possibility of sending troops. Ultimately fifteen nations in addition to the United States contributed armed assistance with a further five contributing medical units.⁹ Sufficient credibility in the UN role was barely established in terms of the number of countries involved but this was no more than a veneer on the overwhelming American contribution. MacArthur did not care much about his responsibility to the UN; he regarded himself as an American commander fighting an American role in a war between the United States and international communism.

8. FRUS 1950 (7), p. 545, memorandum by Merchant to Rusk, 8 Aug. 1950.

9. See Appendix for list of countries and casualties.

Relevance of Taiwan

In terras of his military accomplishments between July and October 1950 MacArthur proved outstanding. He was a growing source of anxiety to Washington in the political sphere, however, and the first significant example concerned Taiwan during July and August 1950. MacArthur felt passionately that Taiwan must be denied to the Chinese communists for strategic and ideological reasons. He was well aware of political developments in Taiwan and was favourably disposed to Chiang Kai-shek. Truman and Acheson had been captivated in part by the strategic arguments for the importance of Taiwan but they were firmly opposed to a warm relationship with Chiang Kai-shek. They were contemplating the neutralisation of Taiwan, not an alliance with the decrepit Kuomintang, which they despised. MacArthur discerned the opportunity for cementing an American-Taiwanese understanding and worked to advance this aim. Chiang Kai-shek also appreciated the opportunity and offered to send some of his troops to Korea, despite the fact that a Chinese communist invasion of Taiwan was threatened imminendy. It was a straightforward political ploy and treated accordingly in Washington; the offer was declined. MacArthur was prepared to contemplate utilising Chiang's forces through encouraging Chiang to launch an attack on the Chinese mainland, which would drive China from possible interest in assisting North Korea; Truman wrote to Acheson on 18 July that he had just read a message from MacArthur dated 16 July 'which has very dangerous implications.'¹⁰ Truman asked Acheson to discuss the matter with the Secretary of Defense 'and instruct General MacArthur that an attack by the Chinese Nationalist Government on the Mainland will be considered an unfriendly act'.¹¹ American diplomats in Taiwan reported resentment in the Kuomintang government at the American refusal to accept troops for Korea and at the cavalier way in which Taiwan had been treated by the United States in the previous month.¹²

10. Letter from Truman to Acheson, 18 July 1950, selected records relating to the Korean War, folder 1, 'Neutralisation of Formosa', box 6, Truman Papers, Truman Library.

11. Ibid.

12. Strong (Taipei) to Acheson, 21 July 1950, ibid.

Chiang was anticipating that the Korean struggle would be transformed into a third world war in which eventually all elements hostile to communism would be welcomed by the United States. The impression was conveyed in Taipei that the Kuomintang would not be sorry to see the United States defeated in Korea, as this would be poetic justice after the harsh criticisms expressed by the Truman administration of Chiang's regime. Indeed some Americans in Taiwan were wondering who was the real enemy - the United States government or the Chinese communists.¹³ The Kuomintang authorities suppressed any dissent, whether from native Taiwanese or refugees from the mainland, with a firm hand. The atmosphere in Taiwan was one of apprehension and suspicion but the underlying feeling was that the worst was over in the sense that the Americans would not permit an invasion by the communists.¹⁴ A significant proportion of the Kuomintang soldiers were ill, suffering from malaria, dysentery and malnutrition. The death rate was high and the army was short of medicine. The assessment of the American representative in Taipei was that in spite of poor health and detestation of Chiang Kai-shek, the officers and men would defend Taiwan because their dislike of the communists on the mainland now outweighed their dislike for their own leaders.¹⁵ Strong reported further on 29 July that Chiang had resorted to the old tactic of seeking to play off MacArthur against Washington and the diplomats in Taipei: he recommended that a tough attitude should be pursued towards Chiang and that American policy-making should be properly coordinated to prevent Chiang's intrigues from achieving anything.¹⁶ Strong ended pessimistically that previous reports indicating the Kuomintang as likely to hold Taiwan if attacked still held good.¹⁷ Chiang moved sedulously by his long-accustomed methods to strengthen his control over the regime, and to preclude the contingency of a coup he advanced the position of his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, and Chen Cheng at the expense of the ' CC' clique.¹⁸

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Strong to Acheson, 29 July 1950, ibid.

16. Strong to Acheson, 29 July 1950, second message, ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Strong to Acheson, 30 July 1950, ibid.

MacArthur determined to visit Taiwan personally to assess matters and to inject more confidence in Chiang's government. The State Department did not wish him to go, realising the political perils in so doing. The Defense Department felt less strongly. On 30 July authorisation was sent for MacArthur or one of his officers to visit Taiwan; the message stated, in ambiguous phraseology, that policy issues relating to Taiwan were currently being discussed between State and Defense pending the receipt of new instructions. MacArthur could send a senior officer on 31 July and go later himself. Alternatively, if MacArthur believed it essential to go himself, he could do so.¹⁹ Estimates had been made of the Chinese communist capability of mounting an attack and it was calculated that they could convey 200,000 armed troops from the mainland to Taiwan. The communists were deened capable of taking Taiwan without excessive difficulty unless the United States intervened.²⁰ MacArthur seized his opportunity and departed for Taiwan at once to be greeted effusively by Chiang. MacArthur ignored American diplomats in Taipei and they were left in ignorance of many of the issues discussed on his trip.²¹ He gave undertakings that aircraft would be supplied to Taiwan and arranged for runways to be lengthened to accommodate jet planes. T ruman was unaware of the undertakings given by MacArthur.²² Upon his return to Tokyo MacArthur reported on his two-day visit (31 July- 1 August). There had been a valuable exchange of views with Chiang; the Kuomintang was anxious to cooperate with the United States. Chiang was in effective command of the government. MacArthur recommended that direct liaison between his command and Taipei should be established and that critical shortages of materials should be rectified. He had agreed with Chiang that the Far East Command Liaison Group should be established with Taiwan under his authority; this would examine the requirements of the Kuomintang forces. He had authorised periodic sweeps of the Seventh Fleet between Taiwan and the mainland, periodic reconnaissance flights over coastal areas of China, and familiarisation flights of small groups of American aviators.²³ Rumours quickly circulated that MacArthur had conducted talks of deep political significance and that he had acted independently of Washington. MacArthur issued an angry statement on 10 August denouncing critics of his visit and hoping the American people would not be misled by the 'sly insinuations' regarding his exchanges with Chiang.²⁴ He denied having discussed any political matters in Taipei. Answering questions during the Senate investigation in May 1951, he confirmed his strongly held opinion of Taiwan's value:

19. Department of Army to MacArthur, 30 July 1950, RG9, box 43, JCS File, MacArthur Papers, MacArthur Memorial.

20. Department of Army to MacArthur, 29 July, ibid.

21. Strong to Acheson, 3 Aug. 1950, selected records relating to the Korean War, folder 1, box 6, Truman Papers, Truman Library.

22. Ibid.

23. MacArthur to Department of the Army, 7 Aug. 1950, RG9, box 43, JCS outgoing File, MacArthur Papers, MacArthur Memorial.

24. MacArthur to Department of the Army, 10 Aug. 1950, RG6, box 8, Formosa File, MacArthur Papers, MacArthur Memorial.

I believe if you lost Formosa you lose the key to our littoral line of defense and encompass Truk. I believe the Philippines and Japan would be untenable from our military point of view. Formosa cannot be taken by Red China as long as the United States maintains control of the sea and or the air ...

I believe that from our standpoint we practically lose the Pacific Ocean if we give up or lose Formosa.²⁵

25. Military Situation in the Far East, vol. 1, pp. 52-3.

When asked by Senator Estes Kefauver (Democrat, Tennessee) for his opinion of Chiang Kai-shek, MacArthur replied:

I believe that to the average Asiatic Chiang Kai-shek stands out as the great symbol against communism. I believe that everyone opposed to communism has a sense of respect for the generalissimo in the Far East. Those that are inclined toward communism oppose him completely and absolutely, but he does stand as a symbol of an invincible determination to resist communism.²⁶

26. Ibid., p. 111.

MacArthur was not one to be discouraged by criticism. Soon after his controversial visit to Taiwan he dispatched a bold message to the American Veterans convention, meeting in Chicago, reiterating the value of Taiwan and the need to resist communism and pouring scorn on those who dissented from his views.²⁷ The message appeared in the press immediately and caused a furore in Washington. Dean Acheson was outraged at the general's trampling over delicate policy areas and in directions not desired by the President and himself. Truman, already alerted to MacArthur's independent actions, instructed Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson to order MacArthur to withdraw the message. Johnson prevaricated and was reluctant to comply. Truman therefore personally wrote the message to MacArthur and told Johnson to send it.²⁸ It simply and clearly instructed the general to withdraw the statement, since it contained views not in harmony with the policy of the administration.²⁹ The veterans had printed the message but agreed to cancel it, assuring MacArthur that they were with him 'to a man'.³⁰ There was no doubt that the administration was committed to preventing the Chinese communists from capturing Taiwan but Truman, Acheson and Dulles were contemplating neutralisation for the island, perhaps with the inhabitants deciding on their future through a plebiscite organised by the UN.³¹ The President was irate at MacArthur's attitude but believed the general had to be supported in Korea at such a critical juncture.

27. MacArthur to Clyde A. Lewis, C.-in-C., Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, 20 Aug. 1950, RG6, box 8, MacArthur Papers, MacArthur Memorial.

28. Johnson to MacArthur, 26 Aug. 1950, ibid.

29. For Acheson's view of the problems involved in dealing with MacArthur, see Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (London, 1970), pp. 422, 518fT.

30. Lewis to MacArthur, 27 Aug. 1950, RG6, box 8, MacArthur Papers, Formosa File, MacArthur Memorial.

31. FRUS1950 (6), pp. 347-51, memorandum from Howe to Armstrong, 31 May 1950, enclosing extract from draft memorandum by Rusk, 30 May 1950.

Crossing the 38th parallel

In the political sphere the vital issue under consideration between July and September 1950 was whether or not UN forces should cross the 38th parallel, and, if so, what would be the fate of North Korea. At the beginning of the war the question had largely been put to one side, given the military exigencies, and on the part of many there was a vague understanding that the aim was to restore the status quo ante through driving the North Koreans beyond the 38th parallel. Cogent arguments could be found for advancing beyond the parallel and for not doing so. There could be no lasting solution of the Korean problem while the peninsula was divided into two states. The policy of the UN since 1947—48 had been to accomplish a unified Korea on the basis of freely arranged elections under UN auspices. The UN was indeed committed by past decisions and was in dispute with North Korea because of the refusal to permit UN supervision of the elections north of the 38th parallel. On the other hand, an attempt to unify Korea by force directed by the UN contained many dangers. Syngman Rhee could safely be relied on to cause maximum difficulty, since he had made no secret of his ambition to lead a unified Korea and only wanted the UN to function so long as it suited him. Major question marks surrounded the responses of the Soviet Union and China. Russia could argue she had a residual right to assist North Korea or to reoccupy the area. China might intervene, since the disappearance of a communist state in Korea would threaten her frontiers. A sober examination of the situation and problems should have dictated caution once the parallel had been reached: the consequences of Russia or China entering the war were obviously extremely grave and a gamble ending in such an outcome should not have been risked. Predominant opinion in American and British policy-making circles supported crossing the parallel, but with more serious doubts in Britain, which were soon to be accentuated.

Within the American bureaucracy basic disagreement existed between the main hawkish elements in the State Department led by John M. Allison and Dean Rusk, and the Policy Planning Staff, now headed by Paul Nitze but still deeply influenced by the views ofNitze's predecessor, George Kennan. Allison had argued strongly for crossing the parallel from earlyjuly onwards.³² To his mind the North Koreans had fallen into a trap of their own creation and the opportunity to unite Korea through the creation of an anti-communist state should be taken. The Policy Planning Staff favoured an agreement by North Korea to withdraw north of the parallel, to be followed by a negotiated settlement. Allison vehemently denounced such a response as craven:

32. FRUS 1950 (7), p. 272, memorandum by Allison, 1 July 1950.

The aggressor would apparently be consulted on equal or nearly equal terms and the real aggressor, the Soviet Union, would presumably go unpunished in any way whatsoever. The aggressor would be informed that all he had to fear from aggression was being compelled to start over again.

The North Korean regime is a creature of the Soviet Union set up in defiance of the will of the majority of the Korean people and in deliberate violation of three Resolutions passed in the General Assembly.³³

33. Ibid., p. 459, memorandum by Allison to Nitze, 24 July 1950. Allison was director of the Office of North-East Asian Affairs and Nitze was director Df the Policy Planning Staff.

Allison held there was serious danger of the South Korean people losing confidence in the United States unless a firm policy was followed. Furthermore it had to be understood that the communists were aiming to control Japan and that conquering Korea was the prelude to this development. Under no circumstances could the fall of Japan to communism be permitted. Allison acknowledged the possibility of war against the Soviet Union or China or both but he believed this had to be accepted:

We should recognise that there is a grave danger of conflict with the USSR and the Chinese Communists whatever we do from now on - but I fail to see what advantage we gain by a compromise with clear moral principles and a shirking of our duty to make clear once and for all that aggression does not pay - that he who violates the decent opinions of mankind must take the consequences and that he who takes the sword will perish by the sword.³⁴

34. Ibid., p. 461.

The indications in late July and early August were that Russia and China were playing a watching game. The Soviet Union returned to the UN Security Council; Jacob Malik assumed the chair and worked to frustrate American intentions to strengthen the role of the UN in Korea. Acrimonious, tedious and repetitive propaganda exchanges between Malik and Warren Austin, the American delegate, occurred through August.³⁵ Russia was deeply committed to the North Korean cause but showed no inclination whatever to intervene directly in Korea. Soviet publications printed statements by Kim II Sung, reports from Tass correspondents exposing odious American imperialism, and reproduced indignant motions from numerous 'peace bodies' condemning American aggression in Korea.³⁶ The Chinese response was similarly one of strong verbal condemnation of American actions. Chou En-lai's first response to the war had been a bitter denunciation of President Truman's statement of 27 June, but it is interesting that the strongest expression of opinion concerned Truman's references to Taiwan rather than Korea.³⁷ The British charge d'affaires in Peking, John Hutchison, reported on 26 July that there were rumours of the dispatch of Chinese arms to the Manchurian-Korean frontier and that 'volunteers' might be recruited from an international brigade to serve in Korea, but there was no solid evidence that the Chinese government was supporting North Korea with arms, men or supplies: he added his familiar plaintive qualification that his sources of information were extremely limited.³⁸ The official indications in Peking were that China had no intention of intervening in Korea. The weekly World Culture answered the question of whether the Soviet Union and China should participate in the Korean War:

35. See United Nations Security Council Official Records, Fifth Tear, 1950, no. 22, 1 Aug. 1950, pp. 12-21; no. 23, 2 Aug., pp. 14-19; no. 24, 3 Aug., pp. 1-10, 13-19; no. 25, 4 Aug., pp. 1-17; no. 26, 8 Aug., pp. 8-21; no. 27, 10 Aug., pp. 3-15; no. 28, 11 Aug., pp. 1-4, 11-20; no. 29, 14 Aug., pp. 14—16; no. 30, 17 Aug., pp. 16-19; no. 31, 22 Aug., pp. 1-16, 26-35; no. 32, 25 Aug., pp. 1-9; no. 33, 29 Aug., pp. 1-8.

36. See Soviet Monitor, 19 July 1950, where a fervent appeal was printed from Kim II Sung, urging the South Koreans to overthrow the American presence, and ibid., 25 July 1950, printing Tass reports on the military successes of the North Korean army and the corruption of the South Korean regime in July 1950.

37. See A. S. Whiting, China Crosses the Talu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York, 1960), pp. 54—8, for a discussion of Chinese attitudes in July 1950. For an assessment based on evidence made available recently, see Shu Guang Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Lawrence, Kan., 1995), pp. 55-73.

38. Peking to FO, 26 July 1950, FK1022/247, FO 371/84093.

China also had adopted the principles of non-intervention in Korea's domestic affairs ... the Soviet Union, each new democratic state, and all peace loving peoples in the world sympathise with Korean people's liberation movement but that does not imply that they should intervene with arms.³⁹

39. Ibid.

Hutchison regarded the official line as very clear and this had been confirmed from another source, a junior member of the CCP.

The CIA reviewed the desirability of a military conquest of North Korea in a memorandum dated 18 August. In balanced manner it pointed out that such a course could have definite advantages but that grave risks were also entailed. Military success could not be guaranteed because the United States could count only on limited assistance from the members of the UN and the danger existed of China or Russia deciding to take military action in Korea. A further complication was the unpopular nature of Syngman Rhee's regime: to re-establish this and to extend its authority to the whole of Korea would be difficult, if not impossible. There could be permanent tension on the Korean borders even though Korea was unified, which might connote a permanent UN commitment.⁴⁰ George Kennan was about to leave the State Department at the end of August to take up an academic position, having become disillusioned by life in the bureaucracy.⁴¹ He had fully supported the original decision to oppose North Korean aggression but experienced growing doubts as to where American policy was leading. In a memorandum dated 21 August Kennan observed that no clear, realistic policy had been devised in Korea and sections of public opinion in the United States were creating an emotional, moralistic situation, which contained the risk of real conflict with the Russians. The defects with policy as he saw them were that MacArthur possessed undue power and was not controlled effectively by Washington; policy towards China was involving conflict with other Asian states and with the British Commonwealth, the outcome being the strengthening rather than weakening of links between Peking and Moscow; the American intention to leave troops in Japan on a basis to be authorised by a Japanese peace treaty was undermining future relations with the Japanese people; and the attainment of an agreement with Russia over Korea had been rendered far more difficult than it need otherwise be.⁴² The aim should be to liquidate involvement on the Asian mainland speedily and on the most satisfactory terms possible. The long-term interests of the United States did not necessitate the existence of an anti-communist Korean regime throughout the Korean peninsula. It would be feasible to tolerate a Korea nominally independent but in practice responsive to Soviet influence, assuming this transition was accomplished gradually and not too emphatically, and provided the situation in Japan was stable. He summed up his approach:

40. FRUS 1950 (7), pp. 600-3, memorandum prepared by CIA, 18 Aug. 1950.

41. See G. F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (London, 1968), pp. 426-7, 466, for Kennan's. developing dissatisfaction with what could be achieved in the State Department.

42. FRUS 1950 (7), pp. 623-4, memorandum by Kennan, 21 Aug. 1950.

It is beyond our capabilities to keep Korea permanently out of the Soviet orbit. The Koreans cannot really maintain their own independence in the face of both Russia and Japanese pressures. From the standpoint of our own interests it is preferable that Japan should dominate Korea than that Russia should do so. But Japan at the moment is too weak to compete. We must hope that with the revival of her normal strength and prestige, Japan will regain her influence there. But the interval will probably be too long to be bridged over successfully by the expedients we have employed in the past or now have in contemplation. A period of Russian domination, while undesirable, is preferable to continued involvement in that unhappy area, as long as the means chosen to assert Soviet influence are not, as was the case with those resorted to in June of this year, ones calculated to throw panic and terror into other Asian peoples and thus to achieve for the Kremlin important successes, going far beyond the Korean area. But it is important that the nominal independence of Korea be preserved for it provides a flexible vehicle through which Japanese influence may someday gradually replace Soviet influence without creating undue international repercussions.⁴³

43. Ibid., p. 625.

Kennan urged an attempt be made to foster genuine diplomatic contact with the Soviet Union, on the precedent of the Malik-Jessup talks in 1949. The premises would be American agreement to neutralisation and demilitarisation ofjapan but with Japan possessing a strong police force, while Russia would accept an end to the Korean War, including withdrawal of North Korean and American forces; a period of effective UN control over Korea would ensue for a minimum of one to two years. Taiwan should be handled with a plebiscite organised by the UN. Kennan's ideas were stimulating and there was much to be said to them. He looked rather too coldly at Korea, however, given the fact that American soldiers were dying in Korea at that moment as a consequence of what was believed to be Soviet-inspired aggression; it was unrealistic to talk of coming to accept a Korea susceptible to Soviet influence. The neutralisation ofjapan, although advocated by MacArthur in former years, was not practicable now. Kennan's message that emotionalism should be controlled and diminished and that the obsession with the Soviet menace be put in perspective was entirely correct. However, as he recognised himself, it was unlikely to be achieved in the inflamed political atmosphere promoted by certain sections of the Republican Party for ulterior reasons.⁴⁴

44. Ibid., p. 628.

In September 1950 talks were planned between American, British and French foreign ministers. Preliminary consideration was given to the topics by representatives of the three countries in a meeting held in Washington on 30 August. The Americans recognised that a decisive watershed was approaching when decisions must be reached over crossing the 38th parallel and of determining the likely reaction of the Russians and Chinese to this development. The provisional American thinking was that the situation be closely monitored according to military achievements, that if the Soviet Union reoccupied North Korea, then UN forces should not cross the parallel pending further consideration in the Security Council; that UN forces should stay in South Korea for some time to come; and that the UN must not simply restore the Rhee government, which had displayed weakness and corruption. It was necessary to work out a carefully devised policy and allow existing passions to cool. The British attitude was that they concurred in the main in the American position but with differences of emphasis. It was important not to disguise the strong feelings aroused by the initial North Korean attack and equally important to carry Asian members of the UN in support of the policies to be decided. An early statement of UN aims was required. Rhee's regime had proved so unsatisfactory that a claim by the ROK to exercise sovereignty over North Korea could not be entertained. A possible solution could be found through holding free elections at the earliest date practicable to be authorised through a UN resolution. This would not commit the UN necessarily to crossing the 38th parallel: this decision could be taken at a later date. It was essential to commit the UN to the creation of a unified, genuinely democratic Korea.⁴⁵ Britain doubted whether crossing the parallel could be justified under the terms of the resolution of 27 June, since this was designed to repel the attack of South Korea. The Soviet Union was not likely to provoke a major war but might decide to reoccupy North Korea. The British believed that UNCOK, as constituted, was not a satisfactory body, and should be replaced by a new one representing particularly the Asian nations. The new commission would announce the decision to hold elections and arrange for UN forces to enter North Korea to supervise them. The elections should go forward in the liberated parts of Korea regardless of whether it was possible to hold them north of the 38th parallel.⁴⁶

45. Ibid., pp. 667-71, US delegation minutes, preliminary conversations for September foreign ministers meeting, 30 Aug. 1950.

46. Ibid., pp. 670—1.

British references to Asian states and the need to mollify them resulted from the strength of feeling in India over the Korean conflict and the belief that India must be persuaded to support UN policy. The Attlee government's awareness of India's significance is explicable through the decision to grant India independence in 1947, a decision of which Attlee was justifiably proud. Attlee had close connections with India extending back to his membership of the Simon Commission in the late 1920s. Ernest Bevin was not as committed to India but wished to have Commonwealth support for Korean initiatives. Jawaharlal Nehru dominated Indian affairs and took a close interest in world affairs. Nehru believed the voice of the emergent nations must be heard and respected. He was critical of the United States because of the refusal to recognise Peking and because he believed the Truman administration viewed the world in too simplistic a way: in private he doubted the competence of Truman and Acheson.⁴⁷ Nehru sent a message to Attlee on 21 July, stressing the Asian perspective and the dangers of an inflexible, unsubtle handling of Korea by the United States.⁴⁸ The British feeling was that Nehru's advocacy of greater care and skill was warranted and that his opinions were ' moderate and sensible '.⁴⁹ American officials did not comprehend Nehru's reservations and his failure to condemn communism unequivocally.

47. See CIA memorandum by Hillenkoetter, 'Observations of Pandit Nehru on international affairs with particular reference to India's relations with the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union', 20 Dec. 1949, PSF files, box 249, folder CIA Intelligence, Truman Papers, Truman Library. The original source of the information is not indicated. Nehru's views were stated thus: 'Nehru's impression of President Truman was that of a man placed in a role far superior to his capacities. Equally mediocre was his view of Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Nehru had a very unfavourable impression of the Department of State, which he described as uncertain, confused, superficial, too much inclined to improvisations and at the same time pretentious and arrogant.'

48. Message from Nehru to Attlee, 21 July 1950, FK1022/281/G, FO 371/89095.

49. Letter from Strang to Franks, 10 Aug. 1950, ibid.

The swift Indian recognition of the Chinese communist government led to greater warmth in their relations, notwithstanding areas of tension, such as Chinese policy towards Tibet. This enhanced the opportunities for the effervescent Indian ambassador in Peking, K. M. Panikkar. Panikkar was assessed by British diplomats earlier in 1950 as capable, lively and dynamic but not always consistent or wholly reliable. Panikkar's reports on the evolution of Chinese thinking on Korea assumed particular significance in September to November 1950, since there were no diplomatic relations between Peking and Washington and the British charge d'affaires was effectively regarded as an outcast by the top Chinese leaders.⁵⁰ Panikkar's reports of his conversations with Chou En-lai and others were promptly conveyed to the British and American governments by the head of the Indian Ministry of External Relations, under Nehru, Sir Girja Bajpai. The British Foreign Office was closely interested in Panikkar's observations, although it believed he had to be viewed with some caution owing to his mercurial qualities. The State Department was more critical, suspecting him of undue sympathy for the Peking government. In September Panikkar's reports indicated that China was unlikely to intervene in Korea. On 20 September the American ambassador in New Delhi was notified of a meeting between Panikkar and Chou En-lai in which the latter had underlined the peaceful intentions of his government. China was not especially interested in Korea in Panikkar's opinion. Chinese interest in Korea had been more intense earlier on but had slackened in the previous two weeks. Panikkar's report was paraphrased by Bajpai in the words:

50. See Peking to FO, 23 May 1950, for the views of Hutchison with minutes by A. A. E. Franklin, 26 May 1950, and Esler Dening, 30 May 1950, FC1909/8, FO 371/83558. See also notes from Commonwealth Relations Office to FO, 27 Oct. 1950, for a 'Biographical note and personality sketch ofPannikar [sic] Indian ambassador to China', FC 1909/13, ibid.

In the circumstances direct participation of China in Korean fighting seems beyond range of possibility unless of course a world war starts as a result of UN forces passing beyond the 38th parallel and Soviet Union deciding directly to intervene. I am satisfied that China by herself will not interfere in the conflict and try to pull other chestnuts out of the fire.⁵¹

51. FRUS 1950 (7), p. 742, Henderson to Acheson, 20 Sept. 1950.

Panikkar believed that the success of the Inchon landing had confirmed Chinese scepticism over Soviet policy in Korea.⁵² For the moment there seemed to be adequate confirmation of the improbability of Chinese intervention.

52. Ibid., p. 743, Henderson to Acheson, 20 Sept. 1950.

In Washington the debates over the wisdom of crossing the 38th parallel continued in September. The joint chiefs of staff, after consultation with MacArthur, and before the Inchon operation occurred, recommended that military action should be taken north of the parallel and this should be coordinated by South Korean forces on the assumption that the heart of the North Korean army would have been defeated south of the parallel. They were agreed that occupation of Korea by UN forces should be restricted to the chief cities south of the parallel and that this occupation should be terminated as soon as possible. MacArthur and Rhee had agreed that the ROK government should be re-established in Seoul and that Rhee would call a general election to fill vacant seats in the Korean assembly, which would be followed by the establishment of a single government for the whole of Korea.⁵³ Further consideration was given in the State Department to gathering support in the UN for a new resolution to provide for elections and a new commission to replace UNCOK. John Foster Dulles was critical of the belief that elections could be held in future throughout Korea. He did not think the UN forces would ever occupy the extreme northern provinces bordering on Vladivostok and Port Arthur and it would be foolish to commit the UN to an unattainable objective. As for India's attitude, Dulles was tempted to take the Indians at face value and tell them Korea was an Asiatic problem and they could decide on a suitable solution: forcing the Indians to accept responsibility would be the best way of educating them to the realities of world problems.⁵⁴ In general Dulles recommended an approach of allowing others to take the initiative for a time. Dean Acheson partially agreed but maintained, contrary to Dulles's view, that there was effective coordination between political and military objectives in Korea: if the United States was lucky and neither the Soviet Union nor China intervened in North Korea, MacArthur could implement political decisions. Dulles agreed that a UN resolution must be framed with unification in mind because this was consistent with the UN presence in Korea. He warned presciently of the perils:

53. Ibid., pp. 707-8, memorandum by joint chiefs of staff, 7 Sept. 1950.

54. Ibid., p. 746, minutes of fourth meeting of US delegation to UN General Assembly, 21 Sept. 1950.

He [Dulles] went on to say that from our overall strategic position, we should not commit ourselves to a war deep in Asia against the Chinese Communists and the Soviets.⁵⁵

55. Ibid., p. 747.

The great success of the Inchon landing now brought about a mood of euphoria in Washington and in this atmosphere the decision to cross the 38th parallel was taken. The draft prepared for MacArthur by the joint chiefs on 26 September stated that he should ascertain carefully whether there was a Chinese or Russian threat to the UN operations, in which case the position must be reported at once to Washington. MacArthur's military objective was the destruction of North Korean forces and he could conduct military, naval and air operations north of the 38th parallel. This was on the basis that there was no major involvement in Korea by Chinese or Russian forces. MacArthur's men were not to cross the Manchurian or Soviet borders with Korea under any circumstances and non-Korean ground forces were not to be used in the north-east provinces, on the Soviet border or along the Manchurian border. Air or naval action was not to be taken against Manchuria or Soviet territory.⁵⁶ General George Marshall had by this time replaced Louis Johnson as Secretary of Defense; Johnson was dismissed by Truman because of his persistent bickering with Acheson and his opposition to various aspects of policy. Marshall was in poor health and only accepted office again as a result of the Korean situation and his own potent sense of duty. He was vastly experienced and widely respected - except by Senator McCarthy and some of his supporters — and a definite source of stability to the administration. However, Marshall had been out of office since the end of 1948 and was not conversant with the tortuous development of policy. In particular, he was not familiar with the differences of opinion that had already arisen between Washington and MacArthur. Marshall did not become fully aware of the difficulties until he read through past papers at the end of March and beginning of April 1951 and reached the conclusion that President Truman was wholly justified in recalling- MacArthur. Marshall sent an unfortunately worded instruction to MacArthur on 29 September:

56. Ibid., pp. 781-2, Webb to US mission at UN, 27 Sept. 1950.

We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of 38th parallel. Announcement above referred to may precipitate embarrassment in UN where evident desire is not be confronted with necessity of a vote on passage of 38th parallel, rather to find you have found it militarily necessary to do so.⁵⁷

57. Ibid., p. 826, Marshall to MacArthur, 29 Sept. 1950.

MacArthur later claimed this allowed him to operate as he thought best in pursuing activities north of the 38th parallel. Marshall's instruction was too vague and injudicious.

China decides to intervene

The Soviet Union and China each observed developments with growing concern and then alarm, as events unfolded between July and September. Evidence obtained from Chinese and Russian sources enables us to arrive at a better understanding of the trends in policy-making in Moscow and Peking, although areas of obscurity remain, particularly on the Russian side. Stalin was disturbed at the collapse of the premises upon which he had encouraged Kim II Sung to move — support for the DPRK from within the RC)K was appreciably less than Kim promised and the speed of American reaction meant that a limited crisis in Korea had become a serious international crisis in which the UN was committed to securing the defeat of North Korea. Stalin had no intention of intervening directly but recognised that covert Soviet support for Kim was essential and action by China might be necessary, depending on the success of UN operations. Stalin authorised the dispatch of supplies and aid for North Korea.⁵⁸ Mao Tse-tung believed that China would have to intervene in Korea, once it became clear that Kim II Sung's gamble had failed to achieve a rapid victory. He was convinced that American imperialism represented a grave threat to the PRC: this applied to Taiwan, following Truman's statement of 27 June, and to Manchuria. Mao held that the United States had launched 'an invasion of Asia'.⁵⁹ The first moves pointing to Chinese action were made early in July but there were considerable divisions among the Chinese leaders.⁶⁰ Some felt that domestic political and economic problems were so urgent that it would be dangerous to intervene. In addition, the United States was so powerful that Chinese resources would be diverted to a struggle which would be more sensibly averted at this time. Interestingly, one of the principal opponents of intervention was Lin Piao, later, during the cultural revolution of the 1960s, an advocate of militant action. Lin regarded military intervention as too dangerous and he declined the offer of commanding the Chinese 'volunteers'. He did so on grounds of poor health and, indeed, Lin underwent medical treatment in the Soviet Union.⁶¹ Mao advocated action vehementiy but he recognised the need for a certain caution: he informed Stalin that it was impossible for China to declare war on the UN and that Chinese troops must be termed 'volunteers'.⁶² Contingency planning proceeded in Peking during August. After the Inchon landing. Kim unsurprisingly reversed his previous approach and now begged Mao to intervene.⁶³ Gone was the confident protestation of May when Kim told Mao he had no need for Chinese help. Such was the shock within the DPRK, once North Korean troops were forced to retreat, that critics of Kim within the regime apparently requested support from Mao for overthrowing Kim. However, Mao responded that the situation was so grave that Kim should be retained.⁶⁴

58. Kathryn Weathersby, Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives, Gold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars (Washington DC, 1993), pp. 25-8.

59. S. N. Goncharov, J. W. Lewis and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War (Stanford, Calif., 1994), p. 157.

60. Ibid., pp. 160-1, 166-7.

61. Ibid., pp. 166-7, 180.

62. Ibid., p. 178.

63. Ibid., p. 175.

64. Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York, 1994), p. 162.

A crucial meeting of the CCP Politburo occurred on 2 October 1950. A majority of the members and a number of senior military men voiced anxiety at the prospect of Chinese action. The most vociferous included Chou En-lai and Lin Piao.⁶⁵ Mao emphasised his conclusion that action was imperative and he was supported by Peng Teh-huai, a prominent general (and subsequently to be a courageous critic of Mao during and after the Lushan plenum in 1959). Peng agreed to command the Chinese Volunteers', following Lin Piao's refusal. It was essential to exchange views with Stalin: Mao wanted a promise of Soviet air action to support the Chinese army. Chou En-lai departed for Moscow where the skilful Chou was outmanoeuvred by an even more astute tactician.⁶⁶ Stalin urged China to act, stressing the American threat to Chinese interests in Manchuria. Stalin approved limited action by Soviet aircraft but on condition that they must remain clearly to the north of the Korean frontier.⁶⁷ He ordered the dispatch of advanced MIGs to assist the North Koreans and Chinese. Soviet air action developed markedly in 1950-51. Soviet pilots wore Chinese uniforms and were told not to speak Russian when communicating during air operations. However, the exigencies of aerial combat meant that it was impracticable for them to avoid using Russian and this explained the deduction drawn by American intelligence that covert Soviet action on a significant scale was in progress. This was admitted by former pilots interviewed during the making of the Thames Television series on the Korean War, shown on British and American stations in the summer or autumn of 1988. The end of the Cold War has led to abundant confirmation of Soviet air action.⁶⁸ However, Stalin would not permit open Soviet intervention in Korea and thus reneged on a vital undertaking he had given to Chou En-lai during their meeting in October. Mao was deeply offended at Stalin's refusal to confirm his promise: Sino-Soviet relations became strained in consequence, but the tension could not be allowed to go too far, given the urgent necessity of preventing rollback from expelling communism from Korea.

65. Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Uncertain Partners, p. 180. See also Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism, pp. 74-107.

66. Ibid., p. 189.

67. Ibid., pp. 199-200.

68. Anthony Farrar-Hockley, Official History: The British Part in the Korean War, vol. 2, An Honourable Discharge (London, 1995), p. 325, and Weathersby, Soviet Aims, pp. 27-8.

Therefore, Stalin achieved his aims of averting direct action by the Soviet Union, securing vital Chinese military action to save Kim II Sung's regime, and, simultaneously, involving Chinese and American forces in fighting one another, thus preventing a possible Sino-American rapprochement in the near to medium term. This demonstrates the resilience of Stalin in recovering from the failure of the strategy he had encouraged from April to June 1950.

In American and British policy-making bodies the most perceptive warning of the consequences of pushing north beyond the 38th parallel came from the British chiefs of staff. It is fascinating to reflect that, contrary to the public image, defence chiefs are frequently reluctant to support courses of action that will precipitate wider conflict and entail the acceptance of greater commitments. At the beginning of the Korean War the American joint chiefs of staffhad been most reluctant to send ground forces to Korea. The British chiefs of staff appreciated the dangers inherent in the development of the Korean operation better than their counterparts in Washington or the British Foreign Office. This is attributable principally to the acumen of the Chief of the Air Staff, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor. During the first nine months of the war Slessor made cogent observations on the trend of American policy and the confusion within it. Admiral Lord Fraser, the First Sea Lord, agreed with Slessor but expressed himself less trenchantly. Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, vacillated but came down in support of Slessor. The latter drafted a memorandum on 14 September for his colleagues in which he wrote that reports from Air Vice-Marshal Bouchier, attached to MacArthur's headquarters, strengthened his feeling that the Americans were unclear as to what their aims were in Korea. Slessor feared that victory in rescuing South Korea paradoxically could result in ' extended and indefinite commitments and even in the worst case, involve serious risks of a clash with Russia and Communist China'.⁶⁹ Politically the UN's action in Korea was intended to achieve an independent, unified and democratic Korea, although Slessor was sceptical as to how far any Korean regime must meet the criterion of 'democratic' and how any state could be with the Soviet Union and China on the borders.

69. 'Policy following an enemy defeat in S. Korea', note by Slessor, 14 Sept. 1950, appendix to confidential annexe, chiefs of staff minutes, COS(50) 142(8), Defe 4/36.

It was clear that neither the United States nor Britain wished to be committed to retaining large forces in Korea for an indefinite period. Europe was the priority and it would be dangerous to be diverted to East Asia. No doubt some forces would have to be kept in Korea at the end of the war to obviate a future attack and to ensure the situation was no worse than it had been on 23 June 1950. There was little point in sending UN forces north of the 38th parallel, with the possible exception of South Korean troops. Slessor could see no logic in accepting the responsibilities inherent in the occupation of North Korea. Such an occupation would involve contentious political decisions on the future of North Korea, and an appreciable increase in the forces required in North Korea to preserve order and guard against a Chinese or Russian attack. Slessor proposed that a resolution be put to the UN General Assembly calling for national elections in Korea supervised by the UN; North Korea should be instructed to send representatives to Seoul to meet the Truce Commission; a new UN commission should subsequently supervise the elections and would have to enter North Korea for this purpose, possibly accompanied by South Korean troops; no other UN troops should enter North Korea; if the North Korean government refused to cooperate, the UN should accept the position rather than coerce North Korea; South Korea must be transformed into a more attractive state through improved political, economic and social standards:

Synghman [sic] Rhee and co. must not have a free hand to misgovern the place as they did before; land reforms etc. should be enforced and the UN Commission will have to remain in S. Korea for a long time.⁷⁰

70. Ibid.

Slessor believed that the UN could be proud of having defeated clear aggression and of restoring the status quo ante: if the latter could not be improved upon, owing to the obduracy of the North Koreans, so be it.

When the chiefs of staff met on 20 September Slessor advanced his analysis persuasively. Fraser stated that the UN forces should move as far north as was necessary to prevent the North Koreans organising a further attack.⁷¹ Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder, usually present in Washington for coordinating purposes, agreed with Slessor and was worried at the economic devastation of Korea. Slim concurred and thought the UN forces should not cross the parallel. The committee was unanimous as to the great desirability of reducing commitments in Korea as soon as practicable so as to concentrate on the most vital areas. General MacArthur must be told unambiguously what to do 'Unless instructions were issued to General MacArthur there was a grave danger of forces being moved forward into North Korea without the implications of such action having been fully studied. One result of such action might be to provoke the Russians or Chinese Communists to invade North Korea.'⁷² The chiefs of staff returned to the subject at three successive meetings in early October with a representative of the Foreign Office present. On 3 October Slim argued that if it was decided to occupy the whole of Korea, the UN command would need only to possess enough forces to combat guerrilla activity in the whole area. If the UN forces stopped at the 38th parallel, it would be necessary to meet the guerrilla menace and a possible renewed conventional attack from North Korea. Lord Fraser again adopted the line that action north of the parallel should be determined by the situation at the time of the advance and that MacArthur's forces should advance no more than was essential. Slessor reiterated most convincingly the views expressed in his earlier memorandum.⁷³

71. Chiefs of staff minutes, 20 Sept. 1950, ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Chiefs of staff minutes, confidential annexe, 3 Oct. 1950, COS(50)160(2),Defe 4/36.

On 4 October the committee discussed a telegram from Bouchier indicating the operations MacArthur intended to pursue north of the parallel. Fraser said the UN would be accused of aggression if its forces advanced beyond the parallel; there was apparently no military necessity to cross the parallel because it would take three to four months for the North Koreans to re-equip themselves. Advancing beyond the parallel would most likely lead to an extension of the war and a more critical attitude might be adopted by India and other countries in South-East Asia.⁷⁴ Slim agreed with Fraser but provided a muddled response. He recognised that the Chinese were so frightened of American intentions that they might intervene. Equally the Americans could not be intimidated by China. The South Koreans should be allowed to cross the parallel but there was no need for UN troops to do so, at least in the next ten to fourteen days. The North Koreans should be given the opportunity to surrender in which case the UN forces would stay south of the parallel. If the North Koreans proved obdurate, MacArthur's forces could proceed north. An offer to discuss matters could be made to Peking. Slessor was absent and his deputy emphasised the parallel should only be crossed if unavoidable to conclude military operations.⁷⁵ The Foreign Office's representative commented on the opposition building up in the UN to any operations north of the parallel; the Foreign Secretary wished to invite Chinese communist representatives to the UN General Assembly in New York and was urging this upon the United States. The information at the disposal of the Foreign Office pointed to military columns being in the process of moving from Manchuria into North Korea.⁷⁶

74. Chiefs of staff minutes, confidential annexe, 4 Oct. 1950, COS(50)161(1), ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

In Tokyo Alvary Gascoigne, head of the liaison mission, saw MacArthur on the evening of 3 October. The general dismissed Chou En-lai's warning to Panikkar as 'pure bluff'.⁷⁷ If the Chinese had been serious, they would not have issued a warning in this manner. MacArthur was extremely complacent about any threat from China or the Soviet Union, which remained true down to the massive Chinese onslaught in late November:

77. Tokyo to FO, 3 Oct. 1950, FK1022/373/G, FO 371/84099.

In any case MacArthur claimed he had plenty of troops [to deal] adequately with the Chinese and even with the Russians if they should prove so foolish as to enter the arena at this stage. The Chinese, he said, had neither troops nor equipment nor air power to take him on - if the Chinese had come in three weeks ago it might have been another matter. ...

If the Chinese came in, MacArthur would immediately unleash his air force against towns in Manchuria and North China including Peking - he knew Chou must know that, and must realise his (MacArthur's) vastly greater potential in the air, on the ground, and on the sea. Chou's statement to Pannikar [sic] was just blackmail.⁷⁸

78. Ibid.

The British embassy in Washington reported on 4 October that, contrary to the impression conveyed by Dean Rusk a short time before, MacArthur's instructions were opaque and dealt largely with surrender terms to be conveyed to North Korea.⁷⁹ The alarm felt by the chiefs of staff hardened and their fears were conveyed to Clement Attlee and Emanuel Shinwell, the Minister of Defence, who were attending the Labour Party conference in Margate. Intelligence reports had reached London via Burma to the effect that China would definitely intervene if the UN forces traversed the 38th parallel. Sir Roger Makins communicated Ernest Bevin's anxiety. Lord Fraser firmly stated the views of the chiefs of staff that the dangers implicit in moving into North Korea were not worth the risks involved: as the Americans were determined to go ahead, a further appeal should be made by the UN to Pyongyang. If China intervened, great care should be exercised not to exacerbate problems by such actions as bombing cities in Manchuria.⁸⁰

79. Washington to FO, 4 Oct. 1950, FK1022/389, ibid.

80. Chiefs of staff minutes, confidential annexe, 5 Oct. 1950, COS(50) 162(1), ibid.

British apprehension was conveyed to Washington on 6 October and again on 12 October.⁸¹ Bevin stressed the importance of acting with discretion to consolidate the military successes and of not adopting a bellicose approach to China. Meanwhile a resolution of the UN General Assembly, approved on 7 October, established a new commission to replace UNCOK with a membership comprising Australia, Chile, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and Turkey. This was known as the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK). The terms of reference were to take over from UNCOK, to pursue the UN's aim of a unified, independent and democratic government for the whole of Korea; to exercise responsibilities in handling relief and rehabilitation on a basis to be decided; that an interim committee be formed pending the new commission's arrival in Korea; and requiring it to submit regular reports to the General Assembly.⁸² China issued an official statement on 10 October in reply to the UN resolution. The latter was described as 'entirely illegal' and contrary to the views of the majority of the world's population.⁸³ The resolution was seen in Peking as authorising the advance of American forces with the aim of expanding the war in Korea. The aspects urging rehabilitation and democracy were dismissed as a facade to cover aggression. The United States had manipulated the vote in the UN and this did not represent a genuine free expression of opinion - 'For instance, the vote of the Chiang Kai-shek brigands is simply a ghostly mockery.'⁸⁴ The population of the countries supporting the resolution was estimated at 660 million as against 722 million in the five countries opposing it, headed by the Soviet Union. With the addition of the seven abstentions and a reserved vote, a total figure of 1,196 million was arrived at. Therefore the Americans and their supporters represented a minority of the UN. Emphasis was placed on the Asian dimension: India was very critical of American policy and other Asian nations deprecated American dominance. China desired a peaceful solution in Korea but this could only be attained on the lines advocated by the Soviet Union. The climax was a denunciation of hostile American actions affecting Chinese territory and people and a warning that China would soon act:

81. FRUS 1950 (7), pp. 893-7, memorandum by Rusk, 6 Oct. 1950, and pp. 930-2, memorandum by Jessup, 12 Oct. 1950, enclosing message from Bevin to Franks, 11 Oct. 1950.

82. Ibid., pp. 904—6, resolution adopted by UN General Assembly, 7 Oct. 1950.

83. Peking to FO, 12 Oct. 1950, enclosing statement issued on 10 Oct., FK1022/430, FO 371/84101.

84. Ibid.

The American war of invasion in Korea had been a serious menace to the security of China from its very start. The American invading forces in Korea have on several occasions violated the territorial air of China and strafed and bombed Chinese people and have violated the rights of a Chinese merchantman to sail the high seas and conducted forced search. Its attempts to enlarge the war in the east are known to everybody.

Now the American forces are attempting to cross the 38th parallel on a large scale, the Chinese people cannot stand by idle with regard to such a serious situation created by the invasion of Korea by the United States and its accomplice: countries and to the dangerous trend towards extending war.⁸⁵

85. Ibid.

It was possible to regard the Chinese words as blustering rhetoric not likely to lead to concrete action. This was MacArthur's view and the attitude of many in Washington. In London there was a more sober attitude and a growing feeling that the Chinese might mean what they had stated.

Truman meets MacArthur

President Truman decided at the beginning of October to fly to the western Pacific to meet General MacArthur. Much controversy had surrounded the motives for the President's mission. Was it attributable to doubts entertained at the White House regarding MacArthur's strategy? Was it due to Truman's wish to seize the headlines in the press and assist beleaguered Democrats in the forthcoming November elections? Was it all a cunning Machiavellian ploy to outmanoeuvre MacArthur and put the blame on his shoulders for any setbacks that might occur? Truman and MacArthur had not met; amazingly MacArthur had not visited the United States since 1938. Truman had wanted him to return in 1948 for discussions on the future of Japan but MacArthur maintained he was too busy. MacArthur did not wish to meet Truman, for he always believed in keeping Washington personnel at a distance and this included the President. Truman's decision to travel so far to meet a general, no matter how distinguished, outraged some Americans including Dean Acheson: the Secretary of State regularly visited Europe but never travelled to Tokyo, believing it best to avoid the court of the American 'emperor' in Tokyo. Truman was a shrewd politician and obtained what he wanted from the meeting. John J. Muccio travelled on the same plane as MacArthur to Wake island and has testified to the general's ire at having to leave his responsibilities in Tokyo even for a brief period, in order to see the President.⁸⁶

86. Muccio Oral History, pp. 80, 84, and Ambassador Muccio's reiteration to the author, 15 Mar. 1982.

Part of the controversy over the encounter surrounds the notes taken surreptitiously by Vernice Anderson, Philip Jessup's secretary. MacArthur was to state subsequently that he had been unaware that notes were being taken, and his followers raged at the dishonesty of Truman in having the words of their hero somewhat embarrassingly recorded for posterity. MacArthur must have been naive if he believed that no record would be made of such an important meeting. Vernice Anderson has stated that she took notes by accident, being present in an adjoining room to the one where the meeting was taking place; as she could hear the proceedings, she automatically started taking notes, since Philip Jessup always liked full records to be kept during his frequent travels. Her notes while full were not verbatim and she denied General Courtney Whitney's allegation that she lurked in the background and peeped through a keyhole.⁸⁷ As Miss Anderson points out, notes were taken by several of those present at the meeting and used in the record produced. Those present, in addition to Truman and MacArthur, were Admiral Radford, General Bradley, Ambassador Muccio, Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Ambassador Jessup, Assistant Secretary Rusk, Harriman, Colonels Hamblen and Matthews plus General Whitney.⁸⁸

87. Vernice Anderson Oral History, pp. 46—7, 52, 55, interview between Anderson and Jerry N. Hess, 1971, copy in Truman Library.

88. FRUS 1950 (7), pp. 948-60, for the record compiled by General Bradley on the basis of notes taken by various of those present.

The discussion was of a discursive nature and covered various aspects of the campaign. MacArthur stated that he had full support from Washington and had no complaints. Truman asked him for his assessment of the likelihood of Chinese or Russian intervention. MacArthur thought there was little chance of either intervening. The Chinese had 300,000 men in Manchuria of which approximately one-third were distributed along the Yalu river. The Chinese were hampered by the absence of an air force. American air superiority was such that the Chinese would be massacred if they advanced towards Pyongyang. The Russians were in a different category, for they possessed a reasonably efficient air force with excellent pilots equipped with modern planes. The Russians could put 1,000 planes in the air with between 200 and 300 more from the Soviet fleet. MacArthur was nevertheless confident of American superiority in the air. He stated there were no Russian ground troops immediately available for North Korea and it would take six weeks to transfer a division by which time winter would have arrived. In reply to another question from Truman, MacArthur urged the conclusion of ajapanese peace treaty: the Soviet Union and China should be invited and if they declined, the treaty should be concluded without them.⁸⁹ Truman inquired about the feasibility of negotiating a Pacific pact analogous to NATO. MacArthur thought this would be 'tremendous' but very difficult to achieve because of the lack of homogeneity in the Pacific.⁹⁰ On Taiwan Truman said he had spoken fully to MacArthur in private and they were entirely in agreement. MacArthur agreed with Bradley that the calibre of troops provided by some of the UN states in Korea was bad. He wished to remove non-Korean forces from Korea as soon as he could once the military operations had been successfully terminated.⁹¹

89. Ibid., p. 954.

90. Ibid., p. 956.

91. Ibid., pp. 958-9.

Truman had a lengthy private discussion with MacArthur of which no record has apparently been kept. Truman did draft a few notes in his own hand five weeks afterwards in which he wrote that MacArthur had apologised for his message to the Veterans in August and hoped it had not embarrassed the President. MacArthur told him he had no political ambitions as regards the Republican presidential nomination in 1952 and that the politicians had made a 'chimp' of him in 1948.⁹² MacArthur regarded the meeting as a waste of time and evidently wondered what Truman's motive had been. It is most likely that the President's visit was occasioned by his wish to hear MacArthur commit himself on the state of the war and particularly on the contingency of Chinese or Russian intervention: should matters become difficult, MacArthur's statement could be released to the press just as Truman did later authorise the record being leaked to a journalist, Tony Leviero.⁹³ A further motive was probably to gain some favourable publicity for the congressional elections but little was accomplished here when the results were known: the Republicans made significant gains at Democratic expense.

92. Notes by Truman on Wake Island meeting, 25 Nov. 1950, PSF files, 'Longhand Notes' file, 1945-1955, box 263, Truman Papers, Truman Library.

93. R. J. Donovan, Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1949-1953 (London, 1982), p. 369.

A new war

It became clear in the second half of October that China was intervening in the Korean War; the extent of Chinese activity was uncertain, however, and it was a subject for speculation as to whether China was engaging in an extension of diplomatic blackmail or whether China intended this as the first phase of action which would be followed if necessary by a second, devastating phase. MacArthur ignored the limited forms of Chinese action and pressed ahead determined to end the campaign on a glorious note of triumph as quickly as he could. This is best illustrated by examining a map (see Map 4). On 5 October the UN forces in western Korea were still south of the 38th parallel but in eastern Korea the UN troops had advanced well beyond the parallel, above the port of Kansong. By 19 October they were on the outskirts of Pyongyang in the west while in the east they had taken the port of Hungnam and were moving towards Iwon. The advance was then far more rapid in the west so that Chosan, near the Yalu, was reached on 26 October. In the east progress was slower and Hyesanjin (on the Yalu) and Chongjin on the Soviet border were reached by 24 November.

Chinese intervention in Korea was initially unobtrusive and then increased appreciably. The first signs of the Chinese presence appeared in early October but it was not until the last ten days of the month that confirmation of significant numbers was obtained. Just as Truman maintained that the UN was implementing police action rather than waging war in Korea, so the Chinese government maintained that Chinese troops in Korea were 'volunteers'. It was not the concept of volunteers as recalled from the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), however; many of the Chinese who fought in Korea had been in the Kuomintang armies until 1948 and a significant proportion refused to return to China after serving as POWs. The use of the term 'volunteers' was designed to minimise the international complications and to obviate a formal declaration of war.⁹⁴ On 24 October MacArthur ended restrictions on the use of UN troops in North Korea and instructed his ground commanders to proceed, utilising all personnel, until the northern borders of Korea were reached. He defended his action when queried from Washington on the basis of military necessity because the South Korean troops were incapable of dealing with the situation on their own. The joint chiefs of staff asked whether this was compatible with the directive of 27 September and MacArthur contended that his action was reconcilable with the terms of General Marshall's telegram of 29 September.⁹⁵ On 25 October ROK forces clashed with appreciable numbers of Chinese troops at Onjong; the second regiment of the sixth division was effectively eliminated in bitter fighting on 25—26 October. Four other ROK regiments were defeated in the same region shortly afterwards.

94. For an account of Chinese policy, see Chen, China's Road, pp. 158—209.

95. FRUS 1950 (7), pp. 995-6, editorial note.

On 27 October information received from Hong Kong indicated that a Chinese observation group was in Korea; apparently there were two divisions of Chinese troops in Korea and those captured claimed to be in the North Korean army. It was thought that China did not intend to dispatch large numbers to Korea.⁹⁶ Two days later it emerged that five prisoners identified as Chinese had been captured in the area of the Eighth Army and a further two prisoners in the area of the X Corps. All wore full or partial North Korean uniforms. There was no indication of sizeable numbers of Chinese troops.⁹⁷ The CIA believed a total of between 15,000 and 20,000 Chinese troops was operating in task force units while the parent units stayed in Manchuria. Soviet-type jet aircraft were reported to be in the Antung-Sinunju area. The Chinese aim, according to the CIA, was to create a cordon sanitaire south of the Yalu river in order to guarantee the security of the Manchurian border from UN forces and to protect the flow of electric power from the important Suiho hydroelectric system serving the vital industrial base in Manchuria. Subsequently it was discovered that six Chinese armies comprising eighteen divisions had moved into Korea during the month of October with a nominal strength of 180,000.⁹⁸

96. Ibid., pp. 1003-4, Wilkinson (consul-general, Hong Kong) to Acheson, 27 Oct. 1950.

97. Ibid., pp. 1013-14, Drumright to Acheson, 29 Oct. 1950.

98. Ibid., pp. 1025-6, memorandum by Bedell Smith to Truman, 1 Nov. 1950. For a discussion of Chinese military intervention, see J. F. Schnabel and R.J. Watson, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs and National Policy, vol. 3 (Wilmington, Del, 1979), pp. 277-87.

A Chinese declaration was issued on 4 November warning that the security of China was threatened by the actions of the imperialists, led by the United States. Aggressive measures adversely affecting the Chinese people were recalled, including deaths and injuries to Chinese nationals with the destruction of property. Previous Chinese warnings had been ignored, the 38th parallel had been crossed, and large numbers of UN troops were advancing towards the Yalu and Tumen rivers, thus threatening China's north-eastern border. The close relationship between China and North Korea was stated more clearly than before and the gravity with which Peking viewed the position was conveyed:

Just as with the Japanese imperialists in the past, the main objective of United States aggression on Korea is not Korea itself, but China. History shows us that the existence of the Korean People's Republic and its fall and the security or danger of China are closely intertwined. Theone cannot be safeguarded without the other. It is not only a moral duty that the people of China should support the Korean people's war against America, but it is closely related to the direct interest of all the Chinese people and is determined by the necessity of self defence. To save our neighbour, to save ourselves, to defend our fatherland, we must support the people of Korea.

Throughout the country the Chinese people are enthusiastically volunteering to resist American aggression, aid Korea, protect their homes and defend their country.⁹⁹

99. FO to New York (for British delegation to UN), 7 Nov. 1950, enclosing Chinese statement, 4 Nov., FK1023/92, FO 371/84113.

Chou En-lai's statement that the Chinese people would not submit to foreign aggression or to their neighbours being invaded was quoted together with a reiteration of the Chinese wish to see the Korean struggle ended by agreement. Such an outcome could not be secured, given American policy, and China was left with no choice:

Thus we have been forced to realise that if lovers of peace in the world desire to have peace, they must use positive action to resist atrocities and halt aggression. It is only resistance that can possibly teach the imperialists a lesson and settle in a just way the question of independence and liberation in Korea and other areas according to the will of the people. .. .¹⁰⁰

100. Ibid.

The Peking People's Daily on 13 November published an interminable editorial, comparing Japanese and American imperialism and their effects on East Asia since 1868. The essence of the belligerence displayed by the United States was attributed to the crisis faced by world capitalism as a consequence of the Second World War. A dramatic advance had been registered in the sharp decline of capitalism with the emergence of many 'people's democracies' headed by the Soviet Union. The 'tycoons of American capitalism' had sought to escape the crisis confronting them through the pursuance of aggressive policies.¹⁰¹ The role of the Soviet Union was harder to determine and the old argument as to whether Peking and Moscow functioned as one or as rivals resurfaced. The Times adopted the view in a leader published on 10 November that there were significant divergences between China and Russia and these should be exploited rather than consolidated.¹⁰² The British Foreign Office dissented in the form of minutes by G. G. Buzzard and A. A. E. Franklin: the Soviet Union and China worked closely together and it was futile to seek differences between them:¹⁰³ John Hutchison, the charge d'affaires in Peking, believed that the recent Chinese statements should be accepted as wholly genuine but Buzzard drew attention to the high propaganda content in all communist statements.¹⁰⁴

101. Peking to FO, 13 Nov. 1950, FK1023/100, FO 371/84114.

102. The Times, 10 Nov. 1950.

103. FO minutes by Buzzard, 10 Nov. and Franklin, 13 Nov. 1950, FK1023/82, FO 371/84113.

104. Peking to FO, 7 Nov. 1950, with minutes by Buzzard, 8 Nov. 1950, FK 1023/102, FO 371/84114.

British fears over the danger of conducting bombing operations in the vicinity of the Yalu were conveyed to Washington. The joint chiefs of staff instructed MacArthur on 6 November to defer plans for bombing targets within 5 miles (8 km) of the Manchurian border and requested an explanation as to why MacArthur had ordered the bombing of Yalu river bridges.¹⁰⁵ MacArthur's attention was drawn to the promise to consult Britain before pursuing bombing raids in sensitive areas. The situation was visibly deteriorating and in retrospect it is surprising that more strenuous efforts were not made in Washington to avert the collision with China. Aerial reconnaissance on 8 November revealed large numbers of Chinese vehicles crossing the Yalu; approximately 700 vehicles were involved.¹⁰⁶ John Paton Davies of the Policy Planning Staff had already urged the war be localised and that China must be kept out of it: he feared the approach of a third world war if his advice was disregarded.¹⁰⁷ The planning adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Emmerson, examined the possible use of the atomic bomb against China and recommended that it should be used only as a last resort; from a practical viewpoint he believed that China offered few suitable targets because of her scattered cities, low level of industrialisation, and immensity. The peculiar horror of atomic warfare meant that the impact on world public opinion was a major consideration.¹⁰⁸ The CIA estimated on 8 November that Chinese military strength in Manchuria totalled approximately 700,000, of which at least 200,000 comprised regular field forces; the Chinese would not have acted without prior agreement with Moscow and the intervention might even be directed by the Russians.¹⁰⁹ Britain had for some weeks contemplated halting MacArthur's advance and the creation of a demilitarised zone. MacArthur did not take kindly to interference with the completion of his operations and argued strongly for continuing without hesitation. He castigated the reported British plan as redolent of appeasement and in keeping with British behaviour at Munich in 1938. MacArthur brushed aside the accumulating evidence of Chinese intentions:

105. FRUS 1950 (7), pp. 1057-8, joint chiefs of staff to MacArthur, 6 Nov. 1950.

106. Ibid., p. 1095, Drumright to Acheson, 8 Nov. 1950.

107. Ibid., p. 1083, draft memorandum by Davies, 7 Nov. 1950.

108. Ibid., pp. 1098-1100, memorandum by Emmerson, 8 Nov. 1950.

109. Ibid., pp. 1101-6, memorandum by CIA, 8 Nov. 1950.

To give up any portion of North Korea to the aggression of the Chinese Communists would he the greatest defeat of the free world in recent times. Indeed to yield to so immoral a proposition would bankrupt our leadership and influence in Asia and render untenable our position both politically and militarily.¹¹⁰

110. Ibid., pp. 1107-10, MacArthur to joint chiefs of staff, 9 Nov. 1950.

Ernest Bevin formally proposed the establishment of a demilitarised zone on 13 November. He thought an appropriate resolution for the UN should be devised, declaring such a zone to exist on a line extending roughly from Hungnam in the east to Chogju in the west to the Manchurian—Siberian-Korean frontier. The zone would be created as a temporary arrangement and the past commitments of the UN would be reiterated. Admittedly there would be considerable difficulty in deciding administrative arrangements for the zone but an attempt should be made to reach agreement with the North Korean government with the latter laying down its arms and accepting a temporary administration under UN authority.¹¹¹ Tentative efforts were made by the State Department to sound out the Chinese through the Swedish ambassador in Peking.¹¹² President Truman made conciliatory remarks at a press conference on 16 November and stressed that he had no desire for conflict with China.¹¹³

111. Ibid., pp. 1138-40, British embassy to State Department, 13 Nov. 1950.

112. Ibid., pp. 1141-2, memorandum by Rusk, 13 Nov. 1950.

113. Ibid., p. 1161, editorial note.

The obstacle was the adamant attitude of General MacArthur and the inability of the administration in Washington to curb him. MacArthur pressed ahead oblivious of the nemesis that was so soon to overtake him. He was confident of complete success and contemptuous of China and the Soviet Union. MacArthur's own intelligence was defective and this has been explained on the grounds of General Willoughby's innate belief that the Chinese were inferior.¹¹⁴ MacArthur's view was that the Chinese would only intervene to a limited extent: Bouchier, the British defence representative attached to his staff, informed London on 13 November that the Chinese contribution to North Korea totalled about 90,000 of which probably 50,000 had advanced on the two fronts and had engaged the UN forces. Bouchier tended to echo MacArthur's opinions and described the military position as satisfactory and 'much more hopeful than is probably presented in other parts of the world'.¹¹⁵

114. Muccio Oral History, p. 73, where Muccio commented that Willoughby disliked the Chinese and showed disdain for their capabilities. This arose from his brief acquaintance with China many years before. For comments on Willoughby's role, see William Manchester, American Caesar (London, 1979), pp. 608, 613.

115. Bouchier to chiefs of staff, 13 Nov. 1950, FK1015/296/G, FO 371/84072.

The failure of Washington to act led Bevin to decide on a direct approach to the Chinese government through Hutchison in Peking. Difficulties existed in applying this approach, for senior Chinese leaders had refrained from contacting the British embassy. Bevin decided not to propose a demilitarised zone formally but that if an opportunity arose when Hutchison spoke to a Chinese representative, it could be mentioned informally.¹¹⁶ Hutchison saw the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, Chang Han-fu, on 23 November and handed him a message, stressing its urgency. Hutchison then spoke, as instructed, in a personal capacity. He referred to the dangerous implications of the current crisis and the manifest fears in Peking that Chinese territory was about to be attacked. The most sensible method of removing Chinese apprehension was to establish a demilitarised zone on the Korean side of the frontier. Chang inquired as to what precisely was meant by a demilitarised zone and how order would be maintained. Hutchison defined the zone as a kind of 'cushion'; further thought would have to be given to the administration of the zone but the local North Korean authorities could perhaps accept responsibility.¹¹⁷ The United States opposed putting forward the proposal officially owing to doubts over North Korea's attitude and the suspicions that it could stimulate communist recalcitrance.¹¹⁸ The anxieties of members of the UN were considered at a high level in Washington, including Dean Acheson and the joint chiefs of staff; it was decided to inform MacArthur of the concern but not to change his mission in a radical way. MacArthur was informed that support had been voiced for the demilitarised zone; the consensus in Washington was that action should be pursued immediately to agree with other governments on plans to achieve a unified Korea and to avoid expansion of the war.¹¹⁹ It was necessary to allay Chinese and Russian concern over a threat to Manchuria and Siberia.

116. FRUS1950 (7), pp. 1173-5, British embassy to State Department, enclosing message from Bevin to Franks, 17 Nov. 1950.

117. Peking to FO, 23 Nov, 1950, FK1023/150, FO 371/84117.

118. FRUS 1950 (7), pp. 1228-9, Acheson to embassy in London, 24 Nov. 1950.

119. Ibid., pp. 1222-4, Collins to MacArthur, 24 Nov. 1950.

MacArthur replied that it would be impossible to halt his offensive and any lack of resolution would have detrimental effects on morale in South Korea and encourage aggression elsewhere in the world. There had always been a possibility of Chinese intervention and this would have been more dangerous in July and August when UN forces were restricted to the Pusan area. His aims were to conclude the war speedily, return American forces to Japan and POWs to their home countries, and foster unification of Korea through the assistance of UNCURK.¹²⁰ MacArthur's forces were divided into two and he surprisingly made no effort to regroup in preparation for a Chinese attack. After decisive Chinese action in later October and early November, the Chinese refrained from advancing further, awaiting MacArthur's decision to continue or halt the UN offensive. MacArthur erroneously believed at the time he commenced his final offensive on 24 November that the enemy forces consisted of83,000 North Koreans and between 40,000 and 71,000 Chinese. In reality the opposing Chinese comprised approximately 300,000, most of whom had moved into Korea in previous weeks without being detected by American intelligence in the rugged terrain. The full impact of Chinese intervention hit MacArthur's exposed forces on 25 November, thus making mockery of his disregard for China. MacArthur communicated the transformation of the situation in graphic terms:

120. Ibid., pp. 1231—3, MacArthur to joint chiefs of staff, 25 Nov. 1950.

All hope of localization of the Korean conflict to enemy forces composed of North Korean troops with alien token elements can now be completely abandoned. The Chinese military forces are committed in North Korea in great and ever increasing strength. No pretext of minor support under the guise of voluntarism or other subterfuge now has the slightest validity. We face an entirely new war.¹²¹

121. Ibid., p. 1237, MacArthur to joint chiefs of staff, 28 Nov. 1950.

The story of the origins of the Korean War therefore ends with China's entry into the war. No hope existed of terminating the conflict quickly and the potential for dangerous escalation was manifest. After Kim II Sung's failure to secure rapid victory, it was probable that China would have intervened before too long, because Mao Tse-tung was determined to assert China's new importance and demonstrate to all - the UN, the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and North Korea — that China would act in defence of its perceived interests. The past century of humiliation and degradation was over and this should be kept in mind by China's allies in addition to her enemies. The likelihood of Chinese action was hastened by the evolution of American policy over Taiwan and by the decision of the American and British governments, endorsed by the UN General Assembly in October, that it was necessary to cross the 38th parallel and proceed north. Rollback guaranteed prompt Chinese intervention: had UN forces halted at the 38th parallel, or advanced only a limited way to the north, China would probably have intervened regardless, but the swift advance of UN forces towards the Yalu eliminated any faint chance that China would not have intervened. The Truman administration, despite its reservations over MacArthur's behaviour, was the prisoner of the general's immense prestige and kudos after Inchon. The emotional, inflamed state of American public opinion, the mordant partisan attacks on Truman and Acheson, created an atmosphere where conciliation was difficult or impossible to implement. No one in Washington wished to be accused of appeasing the 'Reds'. The events unfolded with the inexorability of a Greek tragedy.