Chapter 9
Attitudes and actions were moulded by the exciting new development: the approaching completion of the Chinese Eastern railway. As we saw, the new Russian minister to Peking had travelled from Russia by rail in September 1901 to take up his post. He had reached Niuchuangfrom St Petersburg in fifteen days and, after transferring to the Peking-Hsinmintung line, had arrived at his destination in twenty-one days. This was a trial run for a rather special passenger. The construction teams had been forced to open certain parts of the track, even before their work was completed. The railway therefore opened in part for passenger express traffic, and in part for slow traffic, intended for freight, for the military and for government needs. The railway had been conceived of from its origins as a carrier of goods in transit from ports on the Pacific Ocean to Russia and the reverse. The sooner the commercial viability of the Chinese Eastern route could be tested, the better from Witte's point of view.
Quite apart from the teething troubles of the new railway, there were the financial problems. The construction costs had soared well beyond the original estimates. The actual construction with the teams making the long journey by sea to Vladivostok and Port Arthur, the heavy expenses for security purposes during the Boxer troubles and the interest payments were a major anxiety for Finance Minister Witte. It was for this reason that the desperate remedy of opening the line, even at the cost of interfering with some of the construction work, was adopted. The railway enterprises were a major drain on Witte's budgets. One of the jobs which absorbed much of the time in the British embassy around this time was the study of these budgets in order to see how Witte masked the large losses which the world thought he was incurring on these railway gambles. By adroitness, he did conceal the main problems in such a way that when the Chinese Eastern opened on 1 July 1903, there was a general mood of excitement and achievement in Russia.1
In the case of the much vaster Trans-Siberian route also, the railway was not really open until the summer of 1903 except for the carrying of special passengers. Even then there were considerable shortcomings. Some of the tunnels were not workable; the railway workshops were not completed; and work on the improvement of the single track still remained to be done. Needless to say, the greatest shortcoming was around Lake Baikal. It was decided that work on the track around the lake would have to be deferred till 1905 at the earliest. This meant that the whole Trans-Siberian system was subject to the vicissitudes of the weather there, especially during the winter period. During 1902 the ferry broke down and disrupted the system for a fortnight.2 To sum up, the Siberian railway was a spectacular Russian achievement, which had been accomplished at great speed in inhospitable climatic conditions. It had great consequences for Manchuria and for Russian policy throughout the east. But there were still many rough edges to be smoothed; and many of these raised in Russia the hotly disputed aspect of cost. Then there was the greatest of all question-marks: would the railway perform well in an emergency, say for the mobilization and movement of troops in a war? Probably Russia had no advance plan for transporting her armies, it being left to the improvising genius of the Russian people to achieve this.
The railways encouraged the Russian leaders to travel and see for themselves. As the narrative unfolds, we find that Witte went east along the tracks; that Kuropatkin conducted an elaborate inspection of the east; and that Bezobrazov, whose role is described below, paid several visits to Manchuria and Korea. The consequence was that some of those who had a role to play in decision-making in the run-up to the war knew the terrain and the political situation for which they were prescribing.
Russo-Chinese Convention
For reasons of communication and finance, Manchuria was an important and ever-present problem for the Russian leaders. They wanted a permanent settlement, which could not be with the Tartar generals but must be concluded with the Peking authorities. They genuinely wanted evacuation of their garrisoning troops because it was very expensive to maintain an army of occupation and Russia's financial situation was a constant source of worry for Witte. Moreover they wanted to concentrate on the main enterprise, the running of both the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern railways on profitable lines, and spend less time in diplomatic bickering.
Thinking back to the palmy days which she thought had existed after 1895, Russia again wanted to be popular with China and had a hankering after her former role as protector. She regarded Manchuria as exclusively the problem of Russia and China and was furious that China insisted on dragging other powers into the Manchurian negotiations by leakages. In other words, the Chinese no longer looked to Russia as a friend and wanted to set one barbarian off against another, while Russia mistakenly believed that she could win back Chinese goodwill.
But Russia could not make even a partial withdrawal without obtaining guarantees. The first negotiations had lapsed in the international crisis of April 1901. But, as soon as the Peking protocol was concluded between China and the powers in September, the Russians resumed the negotiations with a fresh draft which in due course leaked out from the Tsungli Yamen. Japan, Britain and the United States were as active in the spring as they had been in the autumn in opposing the settlement which the Russians were (in their eyes) imposing on China.
Li Hung-chang's successor at the Wai Wu Pu, as the Tsungli Yamen had become, was Prince Ching. Ching (I-kuang) was a Manchu prince; Manchuria was his homeland; he was surrounded by Manchu lobbies and regarded himself as an instrument of the Manchu dynasty. Unlike Li, he was not able to look at the Russian occupation of Manchuria as something of academic interest or merely a debating point. He was bolder in resisting the Russians, though he was in the last resort weak and unable to hold out against pressure. The Japanese regarded him as a 'nonentity' but this judgement may have been influenced by the fact that he did not often accept their advice. It was Ching who at the end of 1901 passed the new Russian drafts to Japan and the other powers.
The instructions given to Lessar were to get China to agree to a convention with the Russo-Chinese bank. Witte's idea was that the bank, a subsidiary of the Russian Ministry of Finance, should be granted fresh financial concessions in Manchuria, while a separate convention — a sort of quid pro quo — would provide for Russian forces to evacuate the three provinces. Negotiations for the first were broken off by the Chinese on account of Japanese and American protests in February 1902. When Prince Ching returned his counterdraft on 15 February, he asked for the Russian evacuation to be undertaken within twelve months rather than the eighteen months mentioned in the Russian draft.3 The Russian choice of dates had reflected the expected date of operation of the railway and the immense climatic difficulties which made the evacuation of troops from remote areas where communications were poor a nightmare. Russia wanted to ensure that the pull-out of troops did not imply a pull-out of interests. Eventually the Russians conceded on this point; and the Japanese urged China's leaders to settle without delay on the existing terms which were probably the best available. On 8 April the Chinese signed the evacuation agreement from which the salient terms are given:
· II. The Russian Government, provided that no disturbances arise and that the action of other Powers should not prevent it, to withdraw gradually all its forces from within the limits of Manchuria:
·
a. within six months from the signature of the Agreement to clear the south-western portion of the Province of Mukden up to the River Liao-che of Russian troops, and to hand the railways over to China
b. within further six months to clear the remainder of the Province of Mukden and the Province of Kirin of Imperial troops
c. within the six months following to remove the remaining Imperial Russian troops from the Province of Hei-lung-chiang.
· IV. The Russian Government agrees to restore to the owners the Railway Shanhaikwan-Newchwang-Sinminting which since the end of September 1900 has been occupied and guarded by Russian troops. In view of this, the Chinese Government binds itself:
1. In case protection of the a.m. line should be necessary, that obligation shall fall exclusively on the Chinese Government which shall not invite other Powers to participate in its protection, construction or working nor allow other Powers to occupy the territory evacuated by the Russians;
2. The completion and working of the a.m. line shall be conducted in strict accordance with the Agreement between Russia and England of 16 April 1899, and the Agreement with the private Corporation respecting the loan for the construction of the line. And furthermore the Corporation shall observe its obligations not to enter into possession of or in any way to administer the Shanhaikwan-Newchwang-Sinminting line.
Clause II included Witte's suggestion for a let-out clause (in italics), which would give Russia grounds for keeping her troops in Manchuria. Clause IV gave evidence of Russia's distrust of the British syndicate involved in the Niuchuang line. Moreover Minister Lessar handed over separately from the convention a note stipulating that the 'surrender' of the civil government of Niuchuang into the hands of a Chinese administration would take place only after the withdrawal thence of foreign forces and landing parties and the restoration to the Chinese of the then internationally administered city of Tientsin.4
Japan — and Britain for that matter — hailed the Manchurian agreement as a triumph for the alliance or for the Open Door powers. At long last Russia's resolve had been worn down and she had become desperate to settle the Manchurian occupation by evacuation of her troops. The new treaty was described as 'reassuring'.
But the negative can also be argued: it was not so much the threat of the Anglo-Japanese alliance as the persistence of China that was rewarded; there was no guarantee that evacuation of troops would be followed by an open door. Indeed the eighteen-month interval allowed to the Russians would enable them to take steps to close the door against foreigners of whatever nationality. Even the troop withdrawal was by no means straightforward since Witte had successfully included the condition that 'if disturbances should occur, the troops might be kept on'. In any case, though the troops might be removed, there was provision for civil guards or railway guards to replace them and these were intended to be veterans. Almost as soon as the treaty was signed, there was dissatisfaction in Russia and a call for extensive amendments had to be made. Because of the safeguard clause the foreign ministry accepted that the treaty was negotiable and could be altered or augmented. Kuropatkin insisted, for example, in August that the Chinese should be asked to promise not to use Japanese military instructors in Manchuria.5
On another front, Witte made himself active in seeking arrangements not with the central Chinese government but with the provincial ones in Manchuria where the real power lay. The Russo-Chinese Bank, the instrument for Witte's planning, tried through its agents to obtain concessions of various kinds. Though Pokotilov, its Peking manager, was active, the scheme ran into problems from the Chinese and from Russian officials themselves who were often resentful of Witte's activities and of the Bank in particular. By the end of 1902 the Bank had achieved only modest successes, causing some to question whether it was the best agency for Russian expansion.6
Manchurian Evacuation
Japan and the other powers had played a part in the formulation of the Russo-Chinese treaty, though Lamsdorf of course would have denied this. Now that the treaty was accomplished, it was left to China and these interfering outsiders to monitor Russia's phased withdrawal. This task was performed with differing degrees of commitment by Japan, the United States and Britain - the so-called Open Door powers in Manchuria.
It is doubtful whether the Russians ever seriously thought of fulfilling the three stages to the letter. Since their withdrawal was conditional on no disturbances arising and banditry was endemic in the area, they had a valid excuse for not observing the treaty too strictly. But, quite apart from that, Witte was to admit in 1904, when he was no longer the tsar's minister and was to a degree in the huff, that there had never been any serious intention of carrying out the evacuation treaty.7 A close British observer of the scene disputed whether the Russian empire regarded itself as committed to long-term treaty commitments of this sort. He wrote: 'When inconvenient to Russia she simply cancels [agreements]; because, as she says, can you expect to bind the will of our great Emperor or to criticize his actions? The Empire is above the law as well as morality, and I am sure this most estimable Monarch here thinks so.'8 In any case, the enforcement of the treaty lay not in the hands of St Petersburg but in those of the frontiersmen, that is, the army and the railway bosses in Manchuria; and this was always the kind of situation which Lamsdorf and even Witte found it hardest to control. W. J. Oudendyk, the Dutch diplomat, and Dr G. E. Morrison of The Times visited Manchuria in the autumn of 1902. Their ears heard from the Russian officials on the spot that they were preparing to withdraw though their eyes did not suggest that there was much substance in such promises. At the same time, these travellers observed that the Russian occupation was a military one, superficial and still far from affecting the economy deeply. Further it was not really punitive and undertook much progressive, humanitarian work. Indeed, Morrison wrote an article for his newspaper on the 'Results of the Occupation' along these lines.9
During 1902 China was approached by the Open Door powers, then recognized to be Britain, the United States and Japan. Following the settlement of outstanding political questions by the Peking protocol, they sought to negotiate a commercial settlement. Britain led the way by sending Sir James Mackay to Shanghai to conduct the negotiations ending with the Anglo-Chinese commercial treaty of 5 September 1902. This allowed the Chinese an increase in customs duty in return for assurances governing the abolition of likin, and the introduction of a national coinage. Since Japan did not favour the increase in customs duty which this allowed, she followed suit by opening her own negotiations. The treaty that resulted a year later (of which more will be said anon) emphasized — in case emphasis was needed — that Japan regarded Manchuria as part of China and as a part where she would stand up for her treaty rights and commercial privileges.
Meanwhile Japan was developing her stake in the Three Eastern provinces. The number of immigrants may have been small. By December 1903 there were only 2,806 Japanese residents who stayed mainly in the ports, engaged as workmen, shopkeepers and small businessmen. But the Japanese controlled most of the seaborne trade through Niuchuang and were worried about the future prospects it had in comparison with the rival port of Dalny which Witte was determined to build up and which benefited from the direct link with the Chinese Eastern railway. So long as Russian troops occupied the south of Manchuria, there was little practical likelihood of the Open Door being fully observed and a distinct possibility of privileges being given to Russians. Hence the Japanese added their voice to the Chinese in calling for speedy Russian evacuation from Manchuria.
The first stage of evacuation of land west of the Liao river was satisfactorily concluded by October 1902. This excluded Niuchuang, a place where the powers enjoyed treaty rights and were especially vigilant, it being the junction between the Chinese Eastern and Chinese Northern Extension railways. To show that they were not prepared to lose their privileges without protest, Britain, Japan and the United States again sent gunboats to Niuchuang for the winter. In response the Russians tried to establish their own customs house and post office at the port.
Witte in the Far East
Diplomatically the year 1902 came to an uneventful end in Russia. Due to the tsarina's miscarriage, there was an unusual calm at court which announced that it would stay on until Christmas at its Crimean retreat, the Italian Renaissance palace at Livadia about a mile from Yalta, and remain in strict seclusion. Lamsdorf, who had to be in attendance on the tsar in October, had used the pretext of his approaching trip to cancel regular audiences at St Petersburg before he set off. This led to considerable dislocation of normal diplomacy in the last quarter of the year. One diplomat wrote that after the foreign minister's departure 'there will only be a kind of living letterbox at the Foreign Office for our communications, as Count Lamsdorf will continue to transact all business of the Department from Yalta until near Christmas'.10
It is relevant to our study to note that, with the death of Home Minister D. S. Sipiagin by assassination in April 1902, Witte had received a severe setback. A most formidable attack on the finance minister's power was directed against the expenditure on the Siberian and other railways in which there seemed to have been great unaccountable losses while the indisputable domestic needs of Russia herself had been neglected. This had given rise to widespread discontent. Whereas Sipiagin had been a great friend of Witte and had submitted to what he accepted as Witte's superior statesmanship, his successor, V. K. Plehve, would not accept second place. Within the tsarist autocracy the minister of the interior had to be a dominant force in the emperor's councils. The system which Witte had painstakingly moulded had altered this tradition and concentrated power in the hands of the finance ministry, dangerous as that could be during the ill-understood industrialization process. It became clear that, once Plehve had found his feet, Witte's power would be seriously challenged.11
In August 1902 the tsar asked Witte to make a tour of inspection to Manchuria. He spent about two months mainly in Harbin but with side-trips to Dalny, Port Arthur and Niuchuang (15 October). He seems to have been engaged in dealing with practical problems, relating to railway building and operation. On his return he presented an extensive report which, among other things, expressed the view that withdrawal from Manchuria was essential because Russia had problems enough in colonizing Siberia and that evacuation was the only way of overcoming international opposition and domestic hostility towards Russia's actions. Concerned about the security of his railway — and his investment — at the hands of marauding bandits, he felt that a reinforcement (to 25,000) of the railway guards by whom he had been impressed would guarantee adequate safety.12 Like most of Witte's writings the report was bold, opinionated and boastful. It took a strong line though it recognized that many views were possible on the subject of the evacuation of Manchuria. This aspect was not one which found favour with the tsar and his court. The whole thrust of Witte's argument in the report was in defence of his own view in the past. For the future he emphasized the necessity for the railway guards to occupy all the principal cities of Manchuria including Kirin.
The report reached the tsar during his extended vacation in the Crimea. He convened a meeting of Witte, Kuropatkin, Lamsdorf and Plehve to discuss the situation in Manchuria. There seems to have been unanimous agreement that Manchuria should in the future be annexed to Russia and made dependent upon her. The conclusion was on the whole evasive on the main issues and considerably less forthcoming than Witte himself. This implied that the finance minister's views had not found favour with his colleagues.
That the emperor himself was less than satisfied with them seems clear from the fact that A. M. Bezobrazov, who had been staying at Livadia, was despatched to Manchuria on a personal errand from the tsar at the end of November with a substantial subvention from the Treasury. Romanov thinks that Witte avoided dismissal by a hair's breadth on 1 January 1903 by agreeing to this.13 This was the first major sign of imperial favour for Bezobrazov, the entrepreneur whose views on Russian enterprises in Manchuria and Korea came into the ascendant at this time as Witte's fortunes declined. He will feature increasingly among the decision-makers in 1903.
When the court returned to St Petersburg for the Russian new year, Lamsdorf convened a conference of diplomats at the ministry on 24 January 1903. Lessar from Peking was at home for medical treatment; Pavlov, the minister from Seoul, was already on leave; and Roman Rosen, who was on his way back to Japan on appointment as Izvolskii's replacement at Tokyo, also attended. The diplomats and Lamsdorf maintained the view that the evacuation agreement with China should be honoured but held that the implementation of the next phase might be delayed until China accepted fresh conditions, drawn up by Lessar. Korea was brought up in the context of Witte's proposal for an immediate agreement with Japan even if it entailed conceding Korea to her. But all three diplomats felt that such a price was too high.14
This was a preliminary to the special conference on 7 February where the four who had taken part in the earlier meeting were joined by the ministers chiefly involved, Witte, Kuropatkin and Admiral Tyrtov. They eventually accepted Witte's suggestion that some agreement with Japan would be desirable, and that the most pressing need was for some decision on a clearly defined policy toward Korea, and for 'complete unanimity' in the standpoints taken by all ministries, their local representatives and agents. It was further accepted that it would be best if Russia were to wait for Japan to reopen the negotiations even on the unfavourable terms set out in the note of 4 August. There was general support for talks with the Japanese, even if there was to be delay. One dissenting voice was that of Kuropatkin who found no solution other than to absorb northern Manchuria, that is, all of Heilungkiang province and most of Kirin province, while southern Manchuria might be given up. In the end, the result was that Lessar's terms were accepted. The second phase of the evacuation was to be delayed (according to Kuropatkin) until better climatic conditions since winter was difficult for troop movements.15 While unanimity was expressed, there were wide gaps between the views of the various ministers and diplomats. Romanov is justified in writing: 'A refurbished programme for the "imperial" policy was put together that buttressed the outward unity of the "cabinet" but did not settle a single one of the questions set for discussions. Imperial diplomacy made a decision that irrevocably committed it to a course of delays, remaining for the most part inexplicable.'16
Preconditions for Evacuation
It took an extraordinary time for these terms to be communicated to the Chinese. The St Petersburg conference had approved them early in February and the tsar endorsed them without delay. They were then sent to Grigorii Antonovich Planson, who had been despatched to deputize for the ailing Lessar and was a protege of the Grand Duke Alexis, Alekseyev and the war party. Planson returned his modified version on 26 March. Lamsdorf gave him the go-ahead on 15 April. The charge presented the seven demands to Prince Ching on 18 April as follows:
1. No free port to be opened or consulate of other powers to be established in the district evacuated;
2. No nationals other than Russians to be employed in the north;
3. Same arrangements as regards administration as during the occupation;
4. Niuchuang customs revenue to be paid into the Russo-Chinese Bank;
5. Niuchuang sanitary regulations to be managed by the Russians;
6. Russia to have the right to use Chinese telegraph poles in Manchuria for Russian wires;
7. No portion of the Three Eastern provinces to be ever alienated to any foreign power.
It would appear that Planson had presented the demands in very strong language and with suggestions of more authority than he in fact possessed. Japan urged China to refuse and, when enquiries were made in Russia, Lamsdorf rebutted them by saying that any delay in carrying out the evacuation was due to the natural necessity for obtaining assurances that China was fulfilling her obligations 'which could be better ascertained by the Russian minister who was about to return to Peking, than by a Secretary temporarily in charge of the Legation'. Lamsdorf seemed to be hinting that Planson did not have his full confidence and that matters should rest till Lessar in whom he did have full confidence returned from Europe.17 Planson, who had been diplomatic secretary to Alekseyev in Port Arthur before acting at Peking in Lessar's absence, reflected the more forceful approach of the men on the spot rather than the cautious line of St Petersburg.
The big question was whether in the light of this the Russians would withdraw in April in accordance with their treaty obligations. They were due to withdraw troops from the province of Mukden east of the Liao river and from the whole of Kirin. While there were of course logistic difficulties in undertaking the evacuation in these areas, they were not insuperable. It should have been possible to evacuate in March-April when the ground was still frozen. Later in April the thaw would set in; and tracks would be passable only with difficulty. Dust storms from the Gobi desert were commonly a great problem from March onwards. But the districts in question were remote from the Gobi and were probably little affected by dust. It would seem that the reasons for Russian hesitation and inconsistency were political rather than geographical and climatic. While the three leaders who dominated Russia's policy-making in the east — Witte, Kuropatkin and Lamsdorf — agreed to move their troops out of Mukden province, they were not agreeable, or at least unanimous, to move out of Kirin to the north.
The practical outcome was an extraordinary one. It was reported that Russian troops evacuated Niuchuang barracks on 8 April and Mukden a few days before. But instead of leaving these areas they reoccupied them. In Mukden the number of Russian troops was reduced to a hundred, who acted as guards at the Commissaire, the consulate and the Russo-Chinese bank. There were another forty troops attached to the railway outside Mukden. Barracks for railway guards were being built with accommodation for a large number but they were proceeding very slowly. Some put the failure of the Russians to fulfil the treaty down to an incident on the Yalu river side of the province between Russians and Japanese. Others explained it by the need to force the Chinese to accept supplementary terms for Niuchuang.18 In the railway zone outside the immediate area of Mukden, Liaoyang, forty miles to the south, was still held in force. In the rest of Mukden and Kirin provinces there were few foreign observers; and it is very hard to make an accurate estimate of the percentage of troops who retired from their positions at this time. The explanation could be that most of the local commanders felt that the evacuation convention had been badly drawn up and needed redefinition. They may also have shared the view of Kuropatkin that it was the duty of the army to ensure the security of the trunkline of the Chinese Eastern railway from Manchouli to Nikolsk-Ussuri and that this could only be done by holding a cordon sanitaire to the south. This might run from the junction of the Nonni and Sungari rivers to the Pacific ocean at the Tumen river and might take in Kirin city and Changchun.
It was in Niuchuang, which should have been evacuated in the first phase in October 1902, where most reluctance was observed on Russia's part. The Russian administration claimed that it was willing to retire but that the obstacle was the need for the sanitary control of the port and town in the interest of the foreign community. As a precondition for evacuation the Russians wanted to establish a sanitary board, consisting of Russian and Chinese officials. The Chinese, however, appealed to other powers who saw in this a device for Russia to retain influence in the port and also a means of imposing vexatious sanitary requirements which could possibly impose difficulties on shipping, other than Russian. The Russians claimed that the danger of infection being imported into Manchuria and thence into Russia along the railways was very great. They would not give up the administration of the town until the Chinese agreed to the setting up of a sanitary board. For the present the town continued under the administration of Consul Grosse.
Since Niuchuang was a treaty port, there arose also the question of customs revenue and the role (if any) of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs Organization. Despite professions to the contrary, the Russians clearly wanted to take over the Manchurian customs administration from China. In March the British-born inspector-general of the Chinese customs service, Sir Robert Hart, as a result of much Russian pressure, agreed to appoint from the ranks of the customs service itself a Russian as acting commissioner at Niuchuang. He was N. A. Konovalov. Hart wrote: 'There will be an Anglo-American-Japanese howl over this. Coming, however, from myself as a mere service movement ... and without any promise to always station a Russian there, it will be less harmful than an appointment wrested from China as a condition to rendition and perpetualized.'19
Hart's move was ineffective in ensuring the rendition of the port. The customs duty collected by the Russians was paid into the Russo-Chinese Bank. Accounts were presented to Hart and the Chinese government; but, despite the considerable balance accumulated, the Chinese were not permitted to draw on it. It was in effect reserved for Russian purposes. Since the customs duty was to a large extent levied on Japanese and, to a lesser extent, British trade and since Niuchuang was a treaty port, outside parties were hostile and resentful of the Russian regime there.
The powers thought that Hart had been innocent, not to say naïve. The Japanese doubted the wisdom of appeasement tactics towards Russia. They conjectured that Russia's acquisition of the Niuchuang customs would not be short-lived. But Hart, probably quite rightly, insisted that he was the servant of the Chinese government and had no greater powers than it. He was not under instructions from the foreign diplomats or from foreign governments and had the right to make decisions which did not appeal to them for political reasons. But the end result was that Russia had gained political and customs control of Niuchuang, from which she would not be readily dislodged.20
Some four days after presentation of the Planson demands, the Chinese gave their official rejection of these terms, refusing to discuss the matter until the evacuation of Manchuria had been completed. On 26 April, at another of the special conferences at which these matters were discussed in St Petersburg, all parties agreed to continue the occupation of northern Manchuria. Even Witte and Lamsdorf who had previously seemed to be favourable to early evacuation, now came round to the more severe views of the other ministers. But this internal decision was not conveyed to the Chinese and the world. Instead a smokescreen of conflicting views arose from the Russian ministers. Even if there was now a united front on this point, Russian policy generated a great deal of confusion.21
While the Russians were being tough towards China, they were trying to be lenient towards the powers with interests in Manchuria. In formal assurances given on 11 July they stated:
Whatever may be the result of the negotiations which are pending between Russia and China, and bear exclusively upon the protection of Russian interests of the first importance in the occupied province, [Russia has] no intention of opposing the gradual opening by China, as commercial relations develop, of some towns in Manchuria to foreign commerce, excluding, however, the right to establish 'Settlements'. This declaration does not apply to Harbin. The town in question being within the limits of the Concession for the Eastern Chinese Railway, and not unrestrictedly subject to the Chinese Government, the establishment there of foreign Consulates must therefore depend upon the consent of the Russian Government.22
This message was designed to meet the anxieties and complaints of Japan and the United States in the first place and also Britain and the other powers. But it was in vague terms and contained no guarantees as to timing.
The exact status of Planson's demands to China was a matter of dispute at the time and has been a matter of mystification to historians ever since. Planson asked for no new ports or towns in Manchuria to be opened to foreign commerce and apparently told the Chinese that, if assurances were given along these lines, the Russian military party would be appeased and evacuation would be carried out without difficulty. When further enquiries and protests were made by diplomats in St Petersburg, Lamsdorf gave the most positive assurances that no 'demands' whatever had been formulated by the Russian government and presented to China. It is hard to accept these statements as being more than half-truths. The Japanese ambassador in Washington after discussion at the State Department expressed the opinion that 'Russian diplomats are devoid of authority in their action although it remains to be seen how far the Russian Government support it when they succeed', and that the present Planson demands were only 'tentative measures to test how far other Powers will act'. Japan reluctantly took the view that the inexperienced Planson was not acting under instructions from his home government. But Lamsdorfs pronouncements had been as bewildering as had been his statements in 1901.23
Embarrassed by the storm of international protest, Lamsdorf went further and described Planson privately as stupid. He informed the powers that the matter would be held in abeyance until Lessar, the minister to Peking, returned to his post from sick leave in Russia. It was expected that, as Lessar was a Lamsdorf supporter and an experienced diplomat, he would adopt a less obtrusive style. In the event the approach to China was delayed until September because Lessar was involved in other policy-making meetings after his return to the Chinese capital. He was moreover awaiting death from an incurable disease.24 Russia's intentions about evacuation remained a mystery to the outside world all this time. Shrouded in the mists of mystery, the Russian troops stayed on in Manchuria.
References and Notes
1. The last rail was laid in Manchuria on 3 Nov. 1901, ten years after the start of the railway project.
2. H. Tupper, To the Great Ocean, pp. 228-30. Claud Russel, 2nd secretary at the British legation at Peking (1902-4), recounted his experiences: 'Anyone can go to Irkutsk but after that there is complete disorganisation. The Passport from the Ministry of Interior was condemned as valueless by the Commandant at the Manchurian frontier. The journey took me 35 days from Moscow to Pekin — so I did not save much on the sea journey. There is a great deal of sleeping on the floor and very little washing — the last 14 days I did not get any clothes off. I cannot recommend the route as things are.' Russel to Scott, 10 Feb. 1902, Scott Papers 52,302.
3. B. A. Romanov, Russia in Manchuria, pp. 243-4.
4. Ibid., p. 246.
5. Hardinge to Lansdowne, 30 June 1904, Hardinge Papers 46.
6. R. Quested, The Russo-Chinese Bank, Birmingham 1977, pp. 57-60.
7. BD, vol. 2, no. 281.
8. S. Gwynn(ed.), The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, vol. 2, p. 377; S. Iu. Witte, Vospominaniya, vol. 1, pp. 335-6
9. The Times, 22 Oct. 1902; W. J. Oudendyk, Ways and By-ways in Diplomacy, p. 124; Lo Hui-min (ed.), The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison, vol. 1, pp. 196-7.
10. Scott to Lansdowne, 2 Oct. 1902, Scott Papers 52,304.
11. B. A. Romanov, Rossiya v Manchzhurii, pp. 369-70; A. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, p. 196.
12. Romanov, Rossiya, pp. 379, 412-14.
13. Romanov, Russia in Manchuria, p. 281.
14. Krasnyi Arkhiv, 52 (1932), pp. 110-11.
15. Ibid., pp. 111-24.
16. Romanov, Russia in Manchuria, p. 291.
17. 'Planson' is the Russian version of Georges A. de Plançon de Rigny, generally known in Peking as 'de Plançon'. He served as diplomatic secretary to Alekseyev in Port Arthur before coming to Peking in Lessar's absence and afterwards. See J. K. Fairbank et al. (eds), The I. G. in Peking, vol. 2, no. 1257.
18. Ibid., no. 1277.
19. Ibid., no. 1275.
20. Konovalov continued as acting commissioner at Niuchuang until July 1904, just before the Japanese attack on the port.
21. Malozemoff, op. cit., pp. 205-7.
22. Lansdowne to Scott, 11 July 1903, FO 46/564.
23. NGB 36/1, nos. 128, 150.
24. Fairbank et al., op. cit., vol. 2, no. 1302.