Chapter 15
A natural question must inevitably be asked: 'Why did the powers not avert this war?' It is a fundamental question in any discussion of the origins of war and is especially relevant in the context of the twentieth century when it is often assumed that the Great Powers have the ability to restrain their political partners in matters like making war. In 1904 there were indeed many and varied efforts at apaisement — the maintenance of peace. There was no serious suggestion of convening an international conference or of using some international medium. There were, however, efforts at mediation; the 'good offices' of friendly powers were offered. These were in general favoured by Russia and rejected by Japan. But consultations about a formula which would be acceptable to both sides did take place.
Various alternative formulae were devised by France, Britain and the United States and were put forward by a sort of post-box technique by which they were first put to one side and then to the other. They failed partly because of opposition from Japan but also because they were started too late. They were less than successful also because it proved impossible to arrange for a wide enough coalition of powers to support these international initiatives and exert the necessary influence to prevent war breaking out. The motives of the powers were varied. Certainly the European countries wanted to avoid direct involvement in this war at all costs. So their efforts, though to some extent motivated by a desire for international peace-keeping, were also motivated by self-interest. But in the last resort countries like Germany and Britain found it to be as advantageous to them to stay on the sidelines as it would have been to take serious steps to prevent the war.
Although Japan, as this chapter will show, was opposed to all suggestions of mediation, she was very sensitive about international reactions to her if she ultimately declared war. She wanted to avoid antagonizing powers which favoured the territorial integrity of Korea and China and to confine the war to Russia and Japan. It was necessary for her to find out foreign reactions, both official and unofficial. Komura, therefore, addressed his ministers in London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, Vienna and Washington early in January:
A clear conception of popular sentiments in Europe and America as well as the disposition of the great Powers are [sic] necessary for the Government to form correct judgement of the situation. You are accordingly desired to exert your best effort in keeping me fully and timely [sic] informed of the general tone of public opinion and any indications of the attitude of the Govt, to which you are accredited. If you think money necessary to accomplish the above end, reasonable sum will be allowed on your application.1
The enquiry did not elicit any precise information which greatly influenced Japan's ultimate decision for war. But the replies did suggest that newspapers in London and Washington in general supported Japan's standpoint, while those in Berlin were non-committal. Thus Minister Inoue in Berlin reported that he did not find the leaders in the German press to be of a nature opposed to Japan.2 But rumours were flying about thick and fast; and the Japanese, who were anxious to get world opinion on their side, were fully stretched in scotching those which reflected badly on them.
Among these were rumours about mediation between Russia and Japan. The Tokyo cabinet had already decided on the line that it would take and informed Britain and the other powers accordingly: 'Russia, if she asks for mediation, does so only to gain time in order to consolidate her position in the east. Consequently mediation, if it were now to be arranged, would result in advantage to Russia.'3 The Japanese accordingly pleaded that the actions of the Russians indicated their manifest desire to pursue a policy of procrastination so as to give them time to complete their warlike preparations; mediation would serve no purpose other than to gain time for Russia. Britain saw the logic of this argument and did not press for mediation by the outside powers.
The Powers and the Coming Conflict
In the atmosphere of rumour and foreboding, it is necessary to examine how the powers individually regarded the prospect of war between Russia and Japan. Britain did not think that the Manchurian issue was serious enough for her to intervene. That did not mean that there was not a real risk that she would be drawn in, since it was widely expected that Japan would suffer serious losses if war came. Hence Britain had to have a contingency plan, providing for her ultimate involvement in the struggle. This might suggest that Britain would do her damnedest to prevent the war. But the result of such a course might have been to make Britain unpopular with Japan and to divert Russia's energies to the frontiers of India. It was there that Britain had been involved in a seemingly endless series of incidents with Russia over Afghanistan, Tibet and Persia. With the Orenburg—Tashkent railway due to be completed late in 1903, the prospect for future disputes between British India and Russia was very great.
Britain hoped desperately that she would not be involved in the conflict. Her decision in favour of neutrality was not intended to be mere rhetoric to mask her true feelings. The fact was that Britain, having entered into an alliance with Japan and being in the middle of negotiations with France for an entente, could still not afford to turn her back on France's ally, Russia. Foreign Secretary Lansdowne had consequently initiated talks in 1903 with the Russian ambassador in London, Count Benckendorff, for a settlement of outstanding questions by patching up traditional areas of disagreement in central and southern Asia. On 1 January 1904 he formulated for the cabinet some heads of agreement which might serve as a basis of discussion with the Russians.4 This was not seen as being disloyal to the Japanese alliance at a time of crisis for Japan, any more than Japan's approaches to Russia were regarded as inconsistent with it. The crisis that developed in the east had the effect of removing this particular overture to Russia to a back burner. But some sort of rapprochement with Russia remained an aspiration in London, even if there was plenty of distrust about Russia's motives and methods. With Britain proceeding with negotiations with France, it was clearly inopportune that relations between her and France's ally, Russia, should deteriorate too much.
The British government considered how to avoid being implicated in the event of war. When Britain heard that Komura had found the Russian redraft of 12 December to be unsatisfactory and presented four amendments and when she learnt that the Japanese cabinet had begun to pass through an emergency military budget, the British cabinet became worried. This led to much activity over Christmas, when the members were widely dispersed and had therefore to communicate with each other in writing. It took in Balfour, Lansdowne, Selborne and Austen Chamberlain and various Committee of Imperial Defence bodies. There had already been detailed discussions of a preparatory nature in the Foreign Office. Significant here is the personal view of Lansdowne and presumably therefore of his Foreign Office subordinates:
I should like HMG to try its hand as a mediator, or at all events as a friendly counsellor, rather than wait until it can appear on the scene in the role of a 'deliverer'.
I doubt whether her [Japan's] diplomacy is very adroit and I think we ought to help her if we can to get out of the impasse in which she finds herself. The most promising exit would be found in an arrangement under which Russia might enter into an engagement not with Japan alone but with all Powers having Treaty rights.5
His colleagues could not be persuaded to adopt this view, which weakened Lansdowne's role in the crisis. Secondly it was proposed by Lansdowne in the knowledge that Japan did not approve of the course he was urging. But this was not the reason for his colleagues' reservations. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Selborne, asked the question: 'Cannot you use France to put pressure on Russia? France must dread war more than we do. I would put forward France or the United States as mediators and not ourselves.'6 There is, however, no evidence that Britain urged France or the United States to take a special role as mediator. After Britain took a conscious decision not to mediate, she left things to take their own course.
The other Open Door power which might have had a role in mediation was the United States. More than the European powers she had interests in both Korea and Manchuria. Her new minister in Tokyo, Lloyd Griscom, certainly developed a rapport with the Japanese. Washington, while it was developing a concern for things Japanese, took the view that Japan should be left to decide on her own vital interests for herself and to protect them in her own special way. But when there was a proposal on 9 May 1903 for joint action on the part of Open Door powers, the United States asked to be excused.7
France was more ready to be of diplomatic service. She was deeply involved in Russian exploits, both as investor in some of them and as political partner. In both respects she was not anxious to see a war in east Asia. Théophile Delcassé, her foreign minister (1899-1906), was a shrewd, calculating and energetic statesman of fifty. He was conscious of a deterioration in the state of the Franco-Russian alliance and wondered whether it was possible to breathe new life into it by direct French mediation with Japan and, more important, to cash in on improving Anglo-French relations by getting Britain to exert some leverage with her ally, Japan. Having an optimistic frame of mind, Delcasse thought it was possible. Encouraged by Russia, he set about soundings with the great enthusiasm of which he was capable. But Delcassé, like Russia herself, seems to have underestimated Japan's determination for war and may have left his intervention too late for any hope of success because he had little sense of urgency.
The odd man out was Germany who had far-eastern interests and was actively promoting world policy. Her problem over acting as honest broker was that her interest was one-sided: she wanted Russia to develop her interests in Manchuria and Korea, even at the risk of a policy of adventure. The kaiser, perhaps because of his obsession with the yellow peril, was inclined to encourage Russia to restrain Japan. Such views were not necessarily shared by the German foreign ministry.8 But the end result of this split in policy-making was that Germany was likely to sit on the sidelines if war came in east Asia. The Germans were in any case not approached for mediation from either side. Nor did they volunteer any. Germany's isolated position is indicated by this extract from Holstein's letters: 'Nobody approached us with such a proposal [for acting as mediator] for it is known from former official statements that Manchuria could never become a casus belli for Germany. . . . The Russians are in a very embarrassing situation because they see they are isolated.'9
The linchpin of mediation efforts was France to whom her ally, Russia, appealed for diplomatic assistance. It must be remembered that these requests emanated from the Russian foreign ministry which (as the French knew) had lost power to deal with east Asian problems because of the decentralization that had taken place in August. Secondly, the French did not wholly approve of Russia's activities in Manchuria. This meant that Delcassé was not wholehearted in his mediation efforts and was anxious not to be trapped into arranging for mediation when only Lamsdorf was anxious for it and those more powerful in Russia dishonoured the attempt. Hence one of the motives behind his mediation effort was concern for France's investment in Russia. The editors of the French documents write that Delcassé exerted himself unceasingly to solve the conflict 'with, at certain moments, the authority, if not the title, of a veritable mediator'.10
The starting point was Lamsdorf s visit to Pans at the end of October. According to the French record, Lamsdorf asked Delcassé to speak to Lansdowne in the hope that Britain could calm down her ally. Delcasse said that Britain did not appear to want to stir up her ally but, if she were to calm down, Japan would need some assurances. On this the luckless Lamsdorf hedged, saying that he had spoken to Benckendorff who had come over to Paris for conversations with him. Delcasse, therefore, concluded that 'the powers most interested in the complications which it was possible to foresee hoped that our intervention could usefully be exercised in the interests of peace. I have reasons for thinking that from this point of view also the stay of Count Lamsdorf at Paris will not have been useless.'11
On 25 November Delcassée was asked to intervene for Russia in Peking. Some days later the Korean emperor also asked for French intervention. Buoyed up with optimism, Delcassé told the Senate in a speech on 26 December that 'the pacific dispositions of the two sides are not in question. There is no warrant for the alarmist news which has been spreading for some time now.'12 Despite this, Tokyo sent instructions to its minister to France, Motono Ichiro, who had been in Paris since 1901, that it was not really anxious for outside interference in the negotiations. By this time it was clear that the real hope was not so much for mediation as for 'good offices'; and even this was a dangerous phrase of which the Japanese were very distrustful.
Conscious of the need to win over the goodwill of the powers, Russia on 9 January 1904 tried to assist the progress of good offices by clarifying her position over Manchuria. Lamsdorf distributed a circular letter defining his policy there and guaranteeing the treaty rights of the powers. The underlying purpose of the letter was to make Manchuria an international issue and one that could legitimately be excluded from the purview of the Russo-Japanese talks. Japan turned down this approach, while Britain and the United States raised very serious doubts about it, which suggested that they had reservations about the bona fides of the Russian guarantee.13
Shortly after, on 12 January, Lamsdorf asked for the good offices of France, if possible with the approval of Britain. This last was a bold move because Russian opinion at the time was becoming very anti-British on account of Britain's assistance to Japan over cruisers. Delcassé was ready to open discussions with Motono in Paris, though Lamsdorf had asked the pregnant question: does Motono speak effectively in the name of his government? On 13 January Delcassé took the initiative tentatively to offer his services and asked Britain to bring pressure to bear on Japan.14 Interpreting this as a first step towards international mediation, Japan informed Britain that it would serve no purpose but to meet Russia's desire to gain time and by prolongation of the crisis to compel Japan perhaps 'to come to any terms dictated by Russia'.15 The hope of early Anglo-French cooperation was destroyed when Lansdowne refused to advise the Japanese to abandon their rights in Manchuria and informed Delcassé that several of their demands seemed to be reasonable. The French had held high hopes of joint approaches, perhaps because they were impressed by the speech of King Edward VII in opening parliament on 3 February when he had said: 'My Government will hasten to do all in its power to help towards a pacific solution of the question' of China and Korea.16 In the event not much materialized.
Lansdowne was under pressure from other quarters apart from France to stop the war. Thus, Sir Claude MacDonald, his minister in Tokyo, suggested on 20 January that the king should bring his private influence to bear on the tsar in the interests of peace, since the tsar appeared to be distancing himself from the war party. The suggestion was put to the king and prime minister. While Lansdowne spoke to King Edward VII about it, he made it clear that 'it would NOT be desirable that he should write'. This was an example of the practice of keeping the monarch out of politics. But the fact that it was discussed suggests that some other route for communicating with the tsar might have been contemplated.17
Nor was the general public in Britain inactive. In an initiative on 21 January an influential group of journalists, led by Sir John Gorst and W. T. Stead, who knew the Russian royal family well, called strongly for peace. They prepared petitions addressed to the Russian and Japanese emperors asking them to prevent the war. They too sought to identify Edward VII with the prevention of the war but this proposal was scotched by Lansdowne on the ground that it would not be acceptable to the Japanese who had 'on no less than four occasions expressed their decided objection to mediation'.18 When the foreign secretary none the less enquired whether Britain could help in finding a solution by ways other than mediation, the Japanese did not take him up.
The question of 'settlements' in Manchuria was the sticking-point in the mediation talks during January. It related primarily to the Sino-American and Sino-Japanese treaties of October 1903 which had given these powers special rights of settlement in Manchuria. Japan complained that she had every right to be consulted over Manchuria and every right to insist on the opening of Mukden and Tatungkow in accordance with her new treaty. Such a claim was incompatible with Russia's conception of her own rights and was not a line likely to be fruitful for the success of mediation efforts. For Russia Manchuria was a matter under negotiation between Russia and China and a subject of bilateral interest exclusive to these two countries. Hence, when Britain tried to include Manchuria in the important round of talks she held with Russia in the autumn of 1903, the Russian ambassador asked Britain not to call for Russian evacuation from that territory: 'there were two parties in Russia, one for evacuation and the other against, and . . . the Russian Government did not know its own mind'. Lansdowne went on to stress Niuchuang where Britain had important treaty rights and a considerable trade and asked Russia to fulfil her promises as to the 'opening of other ports in Manchuria and as to the maintenance of the "open door".' Count Benckendorff stated that 'the promise to open other ports would be fulfilled, but he begged us not to press too hard'.19 It would appear that there would be no change in Russia's stance in the near future.
On 21 January Delcassé put his diplomatic reputation on the line. He informed his minister in Tokyo that various factors had led him to employ himself in assisting an accord which was so desirable and that it was his impression that accord was not 'irrealisable'. The following day he received encouragement in a message from Lamsdorf:
We are still talking only at Paris, there are no more negotiations except there; in order to avoid any misunderstanding I have stopped corresponding with Port Arthur, as with Tokyo. It is therefore indispensable for me to know if M. Delcassé would not think it fitting to elicit on the part of the Tokyo cabinet instructions putting M. Motono in a position to let him know the intentions of the Japanese government.20
These are strange sentiments for Lamsdorf to express. He seems to be saying that there is so little trust between Japan and Russia that talks are not likely to be fruitful between them and that he has little trust also in Russia's own officials in the area. He is hoping that Delcassé's influence may assist in the opening of negotiations in Paris; since Russia's final terms had not yet been passed to Japan, the logic of this is hard to grasp. At all events he was determined to implicate the French and call on their support in the Russian emergency.
If the French mediation were to succeed, a critical factor must be the nature of Russia's last terms and the speed with which her reply was sent to Tokyo. On both these points the Russians let down their ally. They did not consult Delcassé over their last note to the Japanese; nor did they speed up its delivery. Had there been signs of concessions, it might have aided the task of the conciliator. It might also have brought in Britain. Certainly it was one of Delcassé's desiderata that there should be an Anglo-French common front, Britain putting pressure on Japan and France on Russia. But Lamsdorfs approach to Delcassé, though it was humble and desperate enough, did not specify on what points Russia might be willing to make concessions. The French foreign minister, therefore, had no bargaining hand and, when he approached Britain, Lansdowne had to say that the Russian position had not changed in any obvious way; in his view, only substantial Russian concessions could pull Japan back from the brink. This is why Britain gave Delcassé the cold shoulder and why the latter had to let the French initiative lapse.21
Eleventh-Hour Efforts
While Count Lamsdorf was preparing his final draft, he was launching a diplomatic offensive in Europe by approaching all sources of help and mediation. On 26 January Benckendorff asked Lansdowne directly 'if he could suggest any means by which Russia could satisfy Japan's desire for a pledge that she would respect Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria without the insertion of such a provision in the Treaty which would be a blow to her amour propre'. The foreign secretary replied that he feared he had no suggestion to make except an engagement to all the powers which apparently Benckendorff did not like any better.22 On the following day Paul Cambon, the French ambassador, told Lansdowne that it would be extremely difficult for Russia to negotiate with Japan over recognition of Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria. Russia had always held that this was a subject reserved for herself and China. Could the other powers not bring about some amicable solution? Lansdowne replied that Japan would require a bilateral arrangement of some sort over Manchuria and would not be content with a unilateral declaration. Thus, Britain defended Japan's position and would not resort to putting pressure on her. When Lansdowne saw Minister Hayashi the next day, he told him of the diplomatic activity which had been taking place and mentioned that, if Japan had had second thoughts over the question of mediation, he felt it could be arranged. Though he put this in the most tentative way, Hayashi turned it down most positively, saying that it was just a formula for further delay which Japan could not tolerate.23
Early in February Count Lamsdorf himself invited both Britain and France to help in bringing about a peaceful outcome. Lansdowne was willing enough to help but felt that Russia was holding things up with her reply. Delcassé, taking a more optimistic line, was unsuccessful in his overtures with Motono in Paris, London and Tokyo. But he continued to be enthusiastic for peace until the last moment. Through the Russian ambassador, who was well known and well liked in Paris, and Motono who was renowned for his fluency in French, Delcassé kept open communication in some form between two essentially shy negotiators, Russia and Japan,24
The Russians took up their cause as actively in London as in Paris. While Anglo-French mediation never took root, there was some hope that Britain individually could, like France, contribute something to a continuation of peace. This was based on the assumption in St Petersburg that Japan looked on Britain as a patron and would accept Britain's advice, if it was offered. The assumption was a complete illusion. But it was in that context that the Russian ambassador, who was popular in British government circles, came to report that Japan had broken off further negotiations and that his country had reciprocated by withdrawing her minister from Tokyo. Despite the rupture of relations, he — and evidently Lamsdorf also — thought that there was still scope for a diplomatic solution. In his view the problem of Korea could be easily settled; but Russia refused to make a treaty with Japan over Manchuria, though she was prepared to make a declaration to all powers, recognizing the integrity of China in Manchuria. Lansdowne's judgement was that this would not be adequate since Japan wanted a treaty commitment. Benckendorff then asked whether he could suggest 'any form in which such an engagement might be embodied other than a treaty between Russia and Japan'. Lansdowne suggested (as he had done previously) a treaty between Russia and China recognizing the sovereignty of China in Manchuria and guaranteed by the powers. Benckendorffs response was to ask whether, if Russia agreed to this, Britain would recommend Japan to accept it. The matter had to be referred to the British cabinet which decided that it was impossible for Britain to intervene. Not to be put off, Benckendorff again asked for endeavours to be made by the powers; but Lansdowne said that events in east Asia had already made intervention by a third power very difficult. In conclusion, Benckendorf claimed to be speaking with some authority from St Petersburg.25 Although we have no way of checking this, it is possible that Lamsdorf was still hoping for a peaceful way out.
These eleventh-hour efforts find no place in Japanese thinking. The Japanese foreign ministry had already closed its file on Russo-Japanese negotiations some days earlier. It is tragic that the Russians did not know or chose to ignore the determination of the Japanese that war was the only course left open to them. The last-minute talks were in my view genuine but evidence of Russia's blindness and misjudgement.
Could the powers have resorted to tougher measures to prevent the war? Since the diplomatic initiatives of an international kind were too weak and flabby to carry weight, could they have starved the belligerents of funds or weapons or arms in order to make war difficult to fight? In particular, could France have prevented Russia from fighting and Britain prevented Japan from fighting by (say) applying economic or financial sanctions?
These are hypothetical questions to which it is not possible to give a satisfactory answer. But the answer is probably 'No' in each case. France could not have stopped Russia fighting because she was unable to bring much influence to bear on the Russian military party with whom the decision of peace or war really rested. She did not give Russia advance funds which might make the waging of war easy. But she did not, after the war began, observe 'strict neutrality' as rigidly as one might expect. So that she did give the Russian fleet on the way to the far east (for example) the facilities of Djibouti in the Red Sea. She was therefore a neutral benevolent to Russia. But the Russians viewed things differently and felt that France had been an ineffective mediator before war broke out and should have gone beyond 'strict neutrality' when hostilities began.
Similarly Britain could not have stopped Japan because it would have involved too much loss of face after five months' unproductive diplomacy for the Tokyo cabinet not to have gone to war. Prime Minister Balfour would not restrain Japan in case it enabled the Japanese government 'to transfer their welldeserved unpopularity to us'. 'While I would avoid giving any advice to Japan which would enable her to say hereafter that we had got her into war, I would not put pressure upon her of any kind to abate her demands.'26 Britain also would make no commitment over finance on the ground that it was morally an act of war against Russia to do so. As against that, the London cabinet had shown its pro-Japanese stance by the financial aid it had given to purchase the Chilean cruisers. Britain was therefore a neutral benevolent to Japan.27
Influencing the Belligerents?
In the Russo-Japanese war, as in many other wars before and after, there is frequently heard the glib comment that Russia and Japan were 'egged on' by others to go to war. First, let us consider the evidence for Japan being goaded to action by others. Spring-Rice, reflecting a common view in Russia, Germany and Europe generally, and trying to explain why Japan dared to fight, wrote that 'she was egged on by England and America'.28 This was a view to be seen in Novoye Vremya and widely held of course in Russian government circles at the time. It has been taken to heart by a generation of historians. Erich Brandenburg wrote in 1923 of the Russo-Japanese war: 'England's vaunted love of peace was not great enough to induce her statesmen to prevent wars in the course of which they might expect considerable advantages for their own country without any risk to themselves'.29 This view was shared by the Soviet historian, Romanov, who spoke of Japan as being Britain's infantryman. Such a view was also shared by the Soviet expert on this period, A. L. Galperin, and a later generation of historians.30
Now there is no doubt that there were advantages to Britain in having Russia tied down in Manchuria — and doubtless in having Japan tied down in Manchuria also. Balfour admitted as much in the note quoted above. But it has to be borne in mind that there was a distinct possibility of Russia moving to Afghanistan and discomfiting Britain in India if Russia were defeated in east Asia. This was not in Britain's best interest because the defence of India was in fact one of the Balfour government's major anxieties — and perhaps even an exaggerated one. It suited Britain better to have Russia anchored in Manchuria where Britain had indeed recognized her standing (so far as railways were concerned) in 1899. If this is accepted, it would have been lunacy to egg on Japan to fight.
Because of Britain's preoccupation with Russia, the degree of commitment towards Japan is less than might be thought. Komura had to ask for an indication of Britain's views on 27 December 'in case we are obliged to take more decisive action',31 and to request financial assistance or an undertaking thereof. In fact the British cabinet had in the week before Christmas had an exchange of views on these points which are described in my earlier study and are only summarized here. So far as the Russian terms were concerned, the British felt that the Japanese 'must be content with the best they can get as to Korea — the Korean clauses, barring that as to the neutral zone, are upon the whole not unsatisfactory'.32 Perhaps because of this, the members of the inner cabinet, though they were divided over the issue of mediation, decided to take no initiative to prevent war. So far as involvement in the war was concerned, the cabinet view may be summed up thus:
1. Britain should try to avoid becoming involved over Manchuria and Korea, which were not part of Britain's traditional interests.
2. Since the alliance with Japan required of Britain only neutrality, Britain should follow a policy of strict neutrality;
3. Britain would not make a loan, nor give a guarantee for a loan, nor enter into a private arrangement between the two governments about the nature of future financial assistance.33
This may appear to be a tough and calculating attitude towards her Japanese ally. But bear in mind that the British cabinet was under the strong influence of Balfour's pessimism. 'If Japan goes to war', he had written, 'who is going to lay long odds that we are not at loggerheads with Russia within six months?' And again 'if by any unfortunate chance we get dragged in, we shall require every shilling for ourselves'.34 All in all, Britain neither egged on nor discouraged the Japanese.
There was a pragmatic British attitude towards her obligations under the Japanese alliance. But there was pragmatism also in Japan's response. She quite understood that the war was not likely to come within the purview of the alliance but asked: what kind of assistance could Britain give outside the scope of the alliance? Lansdowne was not forthcoming and insisted that he had to consult the prime minister.
Although Britain was tight-fisted and vigilant, the fact was that Russia could not and would not accept Britain's lack of commitment to the cause of Japan. Since this was a period of secret diplomacy, Russia had always presumed that there was more to the Anglo-Japanese alliance than met the eye. It was widely believed that Japan could not fight without explicit offers of British support. Russia's suspicions of the alliance were fed by intelligence received from agents in Japan. They had been told by Alekseyev in May 1903 about 'information that had come to hand from our Japanese secret agents' in code. It was to the effect that Komura's plan for an approach to Russia had been authorized by the highest leaders — as was indeed true — and was about to be put before Britain: Japan must first find out the extent of Britain's willingness to assist Japan in the event of a rupture of her relations with Russia; as soon as the will of the British government was known, Japan could make approaches to the governments of Russia and China.35 Since the Japanese in due course did approach Russia, it seemed to be the fulfilment of the project and to indicate that they had obtained prior undertakings of support from Britain. As we know, this was not so. Japan went ahead without expressions of support. But Captain Rusin, the naval attaché at the Tokyo legation, was able to substantiate the earlier intelligence. And so by the outbreak of war, Russians were generally convinced that Britain was aiding the Japanese.
Was Japan egged on by the United States? Certainly an important role was being played by Lloyd Griscom, the young American minister in Tokyo, who was trying to justify his rise to top rank in the service by the energies he was showing in the crisis. He seems to have risen to a place of confidence in the minds of Japanese ministers equal perhaps to that of the British minister. Griscom reflected the thinking of his master and knew that his key was to offer the Japanese Washington's support. There is not much evidence from either the Japanese or the American side that he committed great indiscretions which encouraged the Japanese to declare war. But the Japanese were of course cultivating foreign opinion and had financial motives, if no other, for staying close to the United States.36
Was Russia egged on by France? There is precious little substance in this. France had two clear objectives: to prevent the war if possible; to keep clear of the war, if not. Her attempt to prevent the war exposed what Frenchmen already knew, that she was not able to control the activities of the autocratic government of St Petersburg, only to exert occasional influence. She was herself anxious to persuade Russia to make concessions for the sake of peace; and Russia was unwilling to consider this to the extent required. Hence, when war came, France entered into the entente with Britain, with whose standpoint in the crisis of 1903-4 she had a lot in common. As soon as this came into being, there was talk of some agreement being reached between Britain and Russia. The truth of the matter seems to be that France did not carry enough weight with Russia through her alliance to induce her to start or to stop a war. In the circumstances of the start of a war, a country has to assess its own national interest.
The capacity of one power to influence the course of action of another varies in accordance with the degree of the supplicant's dependence on the first. Russia had traditionally been dependent on French loans for the running of the state. France could have used her financial power if Russia, in anticipation of war breaking out, had applied to France for a war loan. So far as we know, this did not take place. The reasons for this are various. The Russian leaders do not seem to have been expecting an early war. Secondly, Russia was without a finance minister. After Witte's dismissal, Pleske had been appointed but he was no sooner in office than he fell critically ill and gave up in November. Interim arrangements were made; but no new appointment emerged until Kokovtsov was chosen as the new minister in February 1904. It is true that Kokovtsov then called the French bankers to St Petersburg to discuss a war loan. But nothing of a serious kind was done before war broke out.37 One feels that, if Witte had still been at the helm, more decisive approaches to France would have been made. On the French side also, there were grounds for hastening slowly over any financial approach. French lenders were disillusioned and annoyed at the uses to which previous loans had been put; they wanted railways to be built from the capital to Russia's western frontier, not through Asia to the Pacific coast. So Nelidov, the Russian ambassador in Paris, was not hopeful of securing a loan on the French money market and opposed such initiatives. Behind the bankers the newspapers were deeply hostile to Russia, so much so that, when war started, it was necessary for Russia to spend considerable sums to curry the favour of the French newspaper editors.38 For these various reasons Russia did not come to the French as a financial supplicant early in 1904. The consequence was that France could not play her financial cards.
France, like Britain, had little enthusiasm for assisting the Russians. If anything, Franco-Russian relations in the months before the war were worse than Anglo-Japanese relations. Delcassé might act as go-between in the Russian interest but there was little popular will to assist the Russians.
None of the powers had much success in restraining the two belligerents. Whether by fraternal advice or by suggestion, the outside powers had little impact on the negotiations. The six months of Russo-Japanese talks were not marked by any great movement in the positions on the two sides. There were really very few negotiating concessions on Russia's part, even in her final terms (which were not delivered to Japan till 7 February). Nor was there any success from any procedures of mediation, largely because of the hostility of Japan. Nor is it clear that the powers could have been more successful in keeping the peace if they had employed stronger tactics like the threat of sanctions or embargoes. The fact was that they did not use them. The internal pressures in Russia and Japan were so great that no major breakthrough seemed to be likely. In these circumstances there was not much scope for outside influences.
Britain and France had to look at the east Asian problem in the context of their global interests. For both of them, the far east was an important, but middle-ranking, zone of concern. Like France, Britain had to maintain a delicate balance between her various interests. Lansdowne is quoted as saying:
From the very first our political interest had been to prevent the war which would not only expose us to great dangers and loss in Asia itself, but would seriously imperil our good understanding with France which is the most popular event in modern times in England. . . . As a result [of war breaking out], we all but lost our agreement with France; but it would have been worse if we had broken our word, on which the value of any agreement [like the Japanese alliance] depended.39
Delcassé would probably have seen the situation in similar terms. For him as for Lansdowne, Russo-Japanese tension in Manchuria was only part of a multi-dimensional picture. For them it was well-nigh insoluble.
References and Notes
1. NGB 37/1, no. 16.
2. NGB 37/1, no. 38.
3. Katsura-den, vol. 2, p. 194.
4. Lansdowne, heads of agreement, 1 Jan. 1904, Cabinet papers 1.4.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. NGNB, vol. 1, pp. 149-50.
8. Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914, xix(1), Berlin 1922, 5-6; 89.
9. N. Rich and M. H. Fisher (eds), Holstein Papers, iv, nos. 818-20.
10. DDF, 2nd series, vol. 3, p. vii, editors' preface: 'Would an entente with Britain risk disturbing Russia? The Franco-Russian alliance remains, according to Delcassé's phrase, the cornerstone of France's foreign policy. But the alliance in practice raises delicate problems: Russia's action in Manchuria provokes the protests of Britain, the United States and especially Japan. France is preoccupied with this situation but cannot exercise a moderating influence at Petersburg because Foreign Minister Lamsdorf is eliminated from the direction of far eastern affairs.'
11. Ibid., vol. 4, nos. 45 and 80.
12. Ibid. no. 147.
13. Ibid., no. 163; BD, vol. 2, nos. 274-6.
14. Delcassé, asked if he had a New Year resolution, said that he wanted to prevent a war between Russia and Japan. BD, vol. 2, nos. 265-8.
15. NGB 37/1, no. 59.
16. NGB 37/1, no. 112; BD, vol. 2, nos. 278-80.
17. MacDonald to Lansdowne, 24 Jan. 1904, FO 800/134.
18. Another apostle of mediation was Ambassador Scott, who wrote 'if we could only muzzle the European press for a short time, and induce the players to show their cards to impartial and friendly bystanders, a way could easily be found to avoid a resort to the arbitrament of war'. (Scott to Sanderson, 6 Jan. 1904, Scott Papers, 52,304.)
19. BD, vol. 4, no. 181(b).
20. DDF, 2nd series, vol. 4, no. 207. It has to be remembered that Delcassé was only reflecting the optimism that prevailed in St Petersburg about a peaceful outcome. See talks between Boutiron and Spring-Rice, 25 Jan. (Scott Papers 52,302).
21. French opinion was favourable to Russia and distrustful of Japan: there was a great fear that Fukien and Taiwan might become bases for attacks on Indochina. See Suematsu Kench5,'Japan and France' in The Risen Sun (London, 1905), pp. 298ff.
22. Lansdowne to MacDonald, 29 Jan. 1904, FO 46/576.
23. Holstein Papers, iv, no. 820.
24. BD, vol. 2, no. 285.
25. Ibid., no. 295.
26. Balfour to Lansdowne, 22 Dec. 1903, Cabinet Papers 1/4/43.
27. I. H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp. 270-3.
28. Spring-Rice to Satow, 24 Mar. 1904, Satow Papers, 9/15.
29. E. Brandenburg, From Bismarck to the World War, London 1926, p. 149.
30. A. L. Galperin, Anglo-Iaponskii Soiuz, p. 243.
31. NGB 36/1, no. 51; BD, vol. 2, no. 265.
32. Lansdowne to Balfour, 22 Dec. 1903, Papers of A. J. Balfour, Add. MSS 49,728, British Library, London.
33. The diplomats were also divided. Ambassador Scott wrote as late as 21 Jan.: 'I really hope that the tide has now turned and that peace is secured for the present .... If all turns out as [Plehve] confidently expects, Lamsdorf has at last got the better of the swashbucklers, titled concession-hunters and company promoters who have had a good deal to say to putting the Emperor into the desperate dilemma in which he has got himself.' Scott to T. H. Sanderson, 21 Jan. 1904.
34. Nish, op. cit., p. 276.
35. B. A. Romanov, Russia in Manchuria, p. 459, fn. 169, 24 May 1903.
36. L. C. Griscom, Diplomatically Speaking, ch. 19.
37. Romanov, op. cit., pp. 324-5.
38. Ibid., p. 340.
39. Spring-Rice to Roosevelt, 1905, in Spring-Rice Papers 9/4.