Chapter 1
Our study must start with the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95. The areas which come into contention between Russia and Japan and lead ultimately to the Russo-Japanese war — Korea, Manchuria and northeastern China — were the battlefields of this war. While the war was fought between China and Japan, it attracted the close attention of the powers of Europe and in some cases affected their interests. It is therefore necessary to write of the campaigns of this war, the peacemaking and its consequences, even though this can be done only briefly.
The Sino-Japanese war grew out of a dispute in Korea, which had traditionally been a tributary kingdom of China. In 1894 there had been serious civil disturbances in Korea, largely between the reformers supported by Japan and the more traditional court supported by China. When the Chinese reinforced their garrison in the peninsula by sending an expeditionary force, the cabinet of Marquis Ito Hirobumi, with the army chief of staff and his deputy present, decided on 2 June to augment its own garrison there. Three days later a general headquarters (Daihon'ei), the instrument for coordination between the commands of the army and navy, was set up, a sure indication that war was approaching. On 25 July encounters began with a naval battle in which Japan attacked a Chinese convoy carrying troops to Korea and sank the Kowshing, a British transport vessel under charter to the Chinese. Japan had won command of the seas and was able to send her troop transports to Korea freely. On 23 July Japanese troops entered the royal palace in Seoul and a few days later won the battle of Asan. This was followed by the official declaration of war on 1 August. The number of Chinese and Japanese troops was greatly stepped up. The Japanese pushed north and captured P'yongyang on 16 September, driving all Chinese troops out of Korea by the end of the month. Meanwhile Japan had signed with Korea an offensive and defensive alliance.
The Japanese entered Manchuria by crossing the Yalu river on 24 October. Another army group took advantage of the decisive defeat of the Chinese Peiyang squadron to stage a landing on the Liaotung peninsula itself. On 6 November it took possession of Talienwan and a fortnight later captured Port Arthur, the base of the Peiyang squadron. Meanwhile Marshal Yamagata Aritomo, commander of the 1st army, ordered his troops to move forward on Haicheng, an important strategic position, as a prelude to a crossing of the Liao river. But Prime Minister Ito in Tokyo was far from ready to contemplate Japanese troops entering Chihli province and obtained the approval of the emperor for the recall of Yamagata for the sake of recuperating from the illness from which he was then suffering.1 Yamagata had shown himself inclined to follow a line independent of Tokyo. By this action, the prime minister prevented the army from pursuing any intention it may have had to march on Peking. When Yamagata returned to imperial headquarters at Hiroshima on 17 December, he presented a memorandum setting out the options open to the Japanese army and recommending that the army should be landed on the Shantung peninsula where conditions would be less severe than those it was suffering in Manchuria.2
While Yamagata had to resign his command, his policy recommendations were adopted. The Shantung peninsula was attacked in mid-January; and Weihaiwei fell to the Japanese after a naval battle on 12 February. Meanwhile in Manchuria the 1st and 2nd armies joined up and captured Liaoyang, Niuchuang and the port of Yingkow (6 March). Units crossed the Liao river two days later with tough fighting. It was another of Japan's objectives to obtain from China the island of Taiwan. In preparation for this, Japanese forces occupied the neighbouring Pescadores islands late in March and stayed there, awaiting the invasion of Taiwan.
By the spring the Japanese army and navy were in effective charge of a remarkably wide area of east Asia. The army commanders like Yamagata were heroes of the successful campaign which was popular with the people at large. Yet Japan's resources and manpower were strained and her commitments were dangerously dispersed.
Peace-Making at Shimonoseki
The Chinese announced that they were sending Japan a peace delegation on 5 January 1895. The powers were genuinely anxious for the return of peace, partly out of sympathy for China, and partly out of their own self-interest. In order to overcome the uncertainty about the post-war far east, the Russians in particular wanted to learn Japan's peace terms.
On 27 January the Japanese leaders held an imperial conference (gozen kaigi) at the imperial headquarters in Hiroshima. In a lengthy report to the throne, Ito set out his strategy thus: 'If we are to announce our peace terms, we cannot be sure that it will not encourage interference from outside powers. That is almost inevitable but we cannot predict what form it will take or give assurances to prevent it.'3 The conference was reconciled to the inevitability of outside intervention without being quite sure from which quarter it would come. In the Hiroshima prefectural office on 1 February the Japanese met the Chinese peace delegates but found they did not possess sufficient plenipotentiary powers. Negotiations failed and the Chinese returned from Nagasaki to Shanghai on 12 February. In order to limit the degree of foreign involvement, the Japanese decided that the next talks should be held at Shimonoseki, a small port-town in west Japan not too far from Hiroshima, the Imperial Headquarters for the war period.
On 20 March the first meeting took place between the Chinese plenipotentiaries, Li Hung-chang and Li Ching-fong, and their Japanese counterparts, Itō and Mutsu Munemitsu, the foreign minister. After four days of negotiation Li Hung-chang, on his way back from the conference to his ship, was seriously injured by a Japanese, and the Japanese leaders agreed to grant a ceasefire, which was concluded on 30 March, and offered an armistice for twenty-one days, that is, till 20 April.4
On 17 April, just before the armistice was due to lapse, China accepted the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Under article II China was to cede to Japan the Island of Formosa together with all islands appertaining or belonging thereto; and the Pescadores Group. For our purposes it is more important to consider the details of the cession of Chinese territory demanded by Japan:
The southern portion of the Province of Feng-tien within the following boundaries: The line of demarcation begins at the mouth of the River Yalu and ascends that stream to the mouth of the River An-ping; from thence the line runs to Fen Huang; from thence to Haicheng, from thence to Ying Kow, forming a line which describes the southern portion of the territory. The places above named are included in the ceded territory. When the line reaches the River Liao at Ying Kow it follows the course of that stream to its mouth where it terminates. The mid-channel of the River Liao shall be taken as the line of demarcation. This cession also includes all Islands appertaining or belonging to the Province of Feng-tien situated in the eastern portion of the Bay of Liaotung and in the northern part of the Yellow Sea.5
As map 2 shows, this represented a substantial territory from about 80 miles up the Yalu river in the east westward to Yingkow at the mouth of the Liao river. With this as the northern limit, it contained a significant part of the Liaotung peninsula and included all islands belonging to the province. The territory included Lushun (Port Arthur), the base for China's Northern (Peiyang) fleet. It should be pointed out that this was to be handed over not as a lease but as an outright cession; that this was the territory which the Japanese armies occupied at the time; and that it did not represent the maximum aspirations of the Japanese at the outset of the negotiations. It was an area of great strategic interest, both because its ports were ice-free during winter and because it was the natural gateway to Manchuria. But it was also in an extended sense the gateway to Peking.
From early in March, China's diplomats who were resisting concessions in the only way they knew, had been making representations against the Japanese terms by leaking them and seeking the support of those opposed to Japan. It stands to reason that the versions that they circulated tended to be the initial bargaining positions of Japan. The Japanese government was forced by these tactics to communicate its own versions of the terms, initially to Russia, the United States and Britain and later to France and Germany. During weeks of imprecise parleys and rumours, a grouping of powers took shape, including Russia, Germany and France but excluding Britain, the United States and Italy. In this development Russia appears to have been the ringleader, Germany the enthusiastic supporter and France the independent-minded and reluctant follower.
Japan had been aware of the possibility of outside intervention throughout the war and certainly from early in the negotiating process. Although she could not be sure in advance which of China's friends —and most of the world's powers seemed to fall in that category — would take part, she had to make contingency plans for such an emergency. Gradually it emerged that Russia, France and Germany were planning to urge her to renounce the possession of the Liaotung peninsula on the ground that it would be a constant menace to the capital of China. It was doubtful whether the three could fight Japan on land in the short run; but they could by assembling their combined naval strength cut off Japan's land armies in Manchuria. Japan, already overstretched as the result of her war efforts over six months, did not dare to risk challenging any joint move which was in contemplation. Her position was parlous enough for her to take steps in advance to forestall, if at all possible, the threatened intervention.
Strangely Japan, as part of her tactics for preventing the intervention which her leaders expected, had tried to probe Russia's intentions. On 14 February Foreign Minister Mutsu had met Russia's representative in Tokyo, M. A. Khitrovo, and confided to him, on the assumption that intervention would be by Britain and could best be prevented by gaining the trust of the Russians, that Japan would not include among her peace terms the cession of Chinese territory. Khitrovo replied that intervention by any of the powers would depend on what territory Japan wanted, Russia having no objection to Japan's taking Taiwan. After Mutsu had given an assurance that Japan had no intention of injuring any of Russia's interests, Khitrovo was prompted to say that Russia would not object unless Japan destroyed Korean independence.6 The Japanese appear to have attached too much importance to these casual and probably unauthorised remarks.
Ten days later the Russian minister passed over a message from his government, asking Japan to declare that it would recognize Korean independence as a prelude to peace. Mutsu had no hesitation in recognizing the independence of Korea and drew the conclusion that this was all that Russia cared about. Certainly there was a breakdown in communication and understanding between Russia and Japan at this time. At a meeting of the Special Committee at St Petersburg on 11 April, Lobanov, the foreign minister, presented a preparatory paper which argued:
Among the Japanese peace terms is undoubtedly the occupation of the peninsula where Port Arthur is situated. This is objectionable, being a permanent threat to Peking and also Korea, whose independence the Japanese are supposed to have guaranteed. Such an occupation would also be very undesirable from the standpoint of Russian interests. But, if we were to ask Japan to give up this condition, what should we do if she turns down our request? Would we have to resort to force and would we be able to enlist the assistance of some other powers?7
During discussion at the meeting, the members were divided but, swayed by the arguments of Finance Minister Witte, ultimately concluded that their interests were sufficiently affected for them to resist by force in the last resort. It was decided:
to advise Japan in a friendly way not to proceed with the occupation of the southern part of Manchuria which would interfere with our interests and offer a permanent threat to peace in the far east; and if Japan refuses outright to accept this advice, to declare to Japan that we reserved complete freedom of action and would act in accordance with our interests.8
The foreign ministry was to use this resolution as the basis of an official approach to other governments in Europe, though unofficial soundings had, of course, been proceeding at a frenzied pace during the previous ten days. Lobanov put the special committee's resolution before the tsar on 15 April and obtained his approval after a meeting of Witte, Lobanov, War Minister Vannovskii and Grand Duke Aleksei. This was a strong and determined line of policy and, though the possibility of a Russo-Japanese war was discussed, it was rather cursorily dismissed.9 The proceedings do not show that it was the railway question which was the motive for Russia's action.
The Russians like the rest of the world had not expected that the war would be such a walk-over for the Japanese. Their approach was initially diplomatic and conciliatory. When in the autumn the Chinese army and navy had been trounced, Russia's posture changed. There were signs of her building up her far eastern squadron and her infantry units in Vladivostok. The value of this port as a base was enhanced by the use of ice-breaking plant so that it was not sealed off entirely by ice during the severe winter months. The Russian approach continued to be conciliatory into the spring of 1895. Inner military circles in Russia had doubts about their land forces in particular but seemed to be more confident about the effectiveness of the combined squadrons of Russia and France in east Asian waters — there was no mention of Germany. Despite their doubts, they were concerned about Japan's successful military action in taking Port Arthur and in concluding a treaty of alliance with Korea. It looked as if their own objectives in the area were being forestalled. There was of course an element of uncertainty about whether the Russians were amassing their naval strength in Chinese and Japanese coastal waters for war or merely for deterrent purposes.10
Despite the debate about Russia's true intentions, there was a considerable weight of evidence that she meant business. The Japanese, whose intelligence-gathering was devoted to this problem, clearly thought so. The Japanese estimate of Russia's strength in the area at the critical date, 23 April, was as follows:
All Russian warships in Japanese ports were placed on the alert to set sail on 24 hours' notice. Each ship kept its boilers fed day and night and crews were confined to their vessels as if to indicate that hostilities were anticipated at any moment. In Vladivostok, men of all classes were called to the colours as the reserves were summoned for active duty. Fifty thousand active and reserve-duty men were mustered under the command of the governor-general of Eastern Siberia, and preparations are said to have been made to send them into battle on a moment's notice.11
Three-Power Intervention
The ministers for Russia, France and Germany appeared at the foreign ministry on 23 April and presented their joint friendly advice. The notes took exception to the article of the Shimonoseki treaty dealing with the possession of the Liaotung peninsula which would be 'a constant menace' to the capital of China and to a lasting peace in the extreme east and asked Japan to renounce the definitive possession of the peninsula. It was Vice-minister Hayashi who was in charge of the ministry in Tokyo and had to receive the notes. This was because Prime Minister Itō was in Hiroshima after the conference to attend the emperor, while Foreign Minister Mutsu was at Maiko near Kobe because of illness.
Mutsu, well-known as a political strategist, argued from his sick-bed against the idea of an international conference which had been favoured by his colleagues. He was influenced in his thinking by the experience of the Congress of Berlin where (in his interpretation) powers who had acted as 'honest brokers' had also managed to take some of the pickings for themselves, and feared that this might be repeated in 1895. Since his colleagues accepted the logic of Mutsu's pleading, there was no choice but to accept certain of the recommendations of the three powers and look around for allies to support Japan against the Dreibund, the name which was given to the three-power partnership. At the same time Japan was determined not to let China escape scot-free and insisted on China proceeding with the ratification of the Shimonoseki treaty.12
The recommendations for a climb-down were taken from Maiko to Kyoto whither the cabinet's leading members had by this time moved. Their decision, duly ratified by the emperor, led to the announcement on 1 May that Japan agreed to renounce her possession of the Fengtien (Liaotung) peninsula, except for the region of Kinchow (Chinchow). This offer amounted to a willingness to return about seven-eighths of the peninsula and to retain only one-eighth, including the city of Port Arthur (Lushun), and was a considerable reduction of the strong strategic position she had obtained by the treaty. On the other hand, there was no doubt that Port Arthur was more valuable to her than the rest of the peninsula because of its good anchorage and its service in the past as the base for China's Peiyang fleet.
Whether Japan really hoped that the three powers would accept less than a complete evacuation is hard to tell. Mutsu's Kenkenroku suggests that it was a tactical move made without great hope of success.13 In response, the three partners made military-naval preparations. Russia called reservists to the colours in the Trans-Baikal region and took similar steps in Vladivostok that were menacing. The three notified Japan that her compromise formula for the retention of Port Arthur and its environs only was unacceptable to them. The Japanese leaders held a crisis meeting in a Kyoto hotel on 4 May. They knew through intelligence of the joint naval activities of the three powers and had to bear in mind the advice of their naval experts who said that Japan might lose command of the Tsushima straits, thus suffering the separation of her armies on the continent from their home islands, and might suffer the bombardment of her coasts, while her own squadrons were mainly concentrated far away in the neighbourhood of the Pescadores. On Mutsu's recommendation, therefore, it was decided to tell the powers that Japan would renounce the whole of Liaotung, without being too specific about the terms for its return, the idea being that, while Japan would make concessions to the three powers, she would not make concessions to China. Japan's message was passed over to the representatives of the three powers in Tokyo on 5 May and accepted without delay.14
Ratifications were exchanged between Itō Miyoji, the Japanese plenipotentiary, and Wu Ting-fang, his Chinese counterpart, at Chefoo on 8 May in the presence of a Russian squadron. With this out of the way, the Japanese politicians turned to the problem of informing their people of the humiliation which they had suffered. A rescript in which the emperor notified his acceptance of the return of Liaotung was drawn up on 10 May and published in the official gazette (Kanpō) three days later. It was then carried in the newspapers.
Behind the scenes in Japan the weak response of the cabinet was resented and attacked. There was opposition from the soldiers and officers at the front and Yamagata had to be sent to cool things down on 7 May. Influential members of the Taigai Ḱōha (strong foreign policy group) called for a tough line when they met the prime minister in Kyoto. In the press Japan's weakness was condemned as a national humiliation which came on top of exaggerated praise for Japan's remarkable military victories. The prominent publicist, Tokutomi Soho, pressed for the taking of Liaotung peninsula for security reasons, though he was much more anxious for Taiwan. He regarded the island as essential for Japan's expansion, whereas Manchuria was important as a shield against Russia: 'it is the fundamental principle of Japanese expansionism to defend the north and develop in the south'.15
Even among the advocates of fighting on, there was an awareness of the financial cost that would face Japan. The war which had lasted for just over six months had entailed expenditure which was double that of the pre-war budget. Most of the emergency expenditure had been financed by an issue of public bonds. If the Treaty of Shimonoseki came into being, Japan would at least be able to obtain an indemnity from China to defray her costs; but until the treaty was ratified the position was uncertain. So there were financial constraints on continuing the fighting.
In the end the need to withdraw exposed the shortcomings of the Japanese defence services. Japan's emotions had gone full cycle: from cool determination before taking on the Chinese in war; through euphoria over victories in all aspects of the war combined with concealment of reverses; to a sense of humiliation that she could not withstand pressure from the three world bullies. This led to a popular mood of determination to lie low and make sure by preparedness that this weakness would not be manifested again.
Russia, who had been in the van of the protesters, was the country which incurred most of the sullen resentment. It was Russia, whose naval strength in these waters was relatively well-known to the Japanese, that was regarded as the true menace rather than France and Germany who were unknown factors. The Russian squadron was in and out of Japanese treaty ports during the winter months; and the Japanese naval authorities concluded — probably rightly — that their own fleet was too dispersed in the Yellow Sea and, more especially, around Taiwan to cope with the expected challenge from Russia. They could not safely take into account that there was an element of bluff in the Russian challenge. So the Japanese capitulated, concentrating on maintaining their gains in Korea and setting out on an expansion of armaments. It would be wrong to imagine that the Japanese leadership had already resolved on a war of revenge with Russia ultimately; but it would be equally true that Japan in 1895 regarded Russia as the major obstacle on her path.16
The intervention of the three powers under the leadership of Russia was by no means at an end. There followed a long period of negotiation which lasted for six months and was supposed to be confined to Japanese and Chinese delegates. In reality, however, the Russians and their partners were breathing down the necks of the Chinese plenipotentiaries throughout the talks, so determined were they to secure an advantageous settlement over the return of Liaotung. Eventually the supplementary convention was signed on 8 November whereby within three months of China paying a supplementary indemnity of 30,000,000 taels the Japanese troops would evacuate Liaotung for Weihaiwei. China paid this amount (about £5 million) in London and Japanese forces were evacuated by 25 December. During the talks, the Japanese appear to have had uppermost in their minds the need to prevent the building of foreign railways in south Manchuria. To this end, Japan had inserted in the early drafts a clause to exclude any alienation of the Fengtien peninsula to another country. But Li Hung-chang was negotiating with the diplomats of the three powers prompting and prodding him. In declining to include any such guarantee in the treaty, the Chinese statesman admitted that the three governments did not like it and claimed that Russia took special umbrage because it implied that she was harbouring some sinister design. He promised to cover the issue by a diplomatic note. But this also was vetoed by the three powers. And Japan did not take up the cudgels with the Dreibund.
Opinion in Japan was furious with the government for failing to obtain a non-alienation agreement for Liaotung, either in the treaty or outside it. Military men and professors foresaw that only some non-alienation undertaking by China would prevent Russian ambitions in the future. Of course the government was not unaware of this possibility. Thus, Li Hung-chang was asked during the negotiating session on 4 November whether China had already given Russia permission to build her railways across Chinese territory and had sent her representatives to Liaotung to this end. Li denied both points. But strong suspicions remained.17
The three-power intervention which continued to affect Sino-Japanese affairs throughout 1895 created a new balance of forces in east Asia. While China would continue to be indebted to the three powers for saving her from her fate, Japan was likely to be in the opposition camp. Her leaders thought it had been a straightforward example of self-interested interference, backed by military threats, but recognized that Russia was already a force in north-east Asia — and one with which they were not inclined to enter into a dispute at this stage.18
Russia takes Compensation
After the crises of 1895 Russia improved her position in Manchuria and Korea, both by deliberation and by accident. She had not taken the lead in the Dreibund for disinterested reasons; and it was widely expected that she would take compensation. Having further assisted China by guaranteeing the loan wherewith to pay the first instalment of the indemnity to Japan, she felt herself to be entitled to state her price. There was moreover an atmosphere of expansion around the Russian capital at the end of 1895. The twelve months of court mourning following Alexander III's death were coming to an end; and the young tsar's coronation in Moscow was approaching as the ice of winter made way for a season more suited to elaborate royal ceremonial.
Rumours abounded that Russia would ask for railway concessions in China. On 5 December the Russko-Kitaiskii (Russo-Chinese) Bank was set up in the Russian embassy in Paris by its French subscribers.19 Almost immediately there was talk of Russia seeking means of shortening the existing Trans-Siberian route as planned by pushing the line through the north of Manchuria, a proposal which had the support of Sergei Witte as finance minister. But the view did not go unchallenged. Count Kapnist, speaking for the foreign ministry, deplored the idea of placing so great a length of track in someone else's territory, a hostage to fortune in an unstable land. Others like the governor of the Amur region criticized it because it would weaken the railway as an instrument of colonization. He claimed, rightly as it would appear, that to build the line through Chinese territory would not assist colonization or military consolidation along the Amur river. As any Russification of Manchuria could not be contemplated in the short term, a line around the Amur river which would be under Russian control would be preferable from a military point of view. As this demonstrates, the idea of a Trans-Manchurian railway was not without its critics. But the cards were stacked in favour of Witte's views. Nicholas gave his assent. The minister in Peking was instructed to introduce the proposal to the reluctant Chinese.20
A critical point in our story is how the Russians obtained special rights in Manchuria, due largely to the attendance of Li Hung-chang at the coronation of Emperor Nicholas II. Li, though out of favour in China since the Japanese war whose disasters were held to be his fault, was the emissary favoured by Russia. He was appointed on 16 February 1896 and reached Moscow on 30 April. Before Li's arrival, the Russian minister at Peking, Count Cassini, gave the Chinese some proposals for a 'Trans-Manchurian railway', arguing forcefully that it would help Russia to protect China against possible trouble with Japan. But the Yamen would not concede the point and stressed that it would not allow any concessions to any of the powers.
Li had discussions with Lobanov and, more especially, with Witte over the twin issues of Manchurian railways and a treaty of protection for China. Although anxious for a protective alliance, Li was not easily convinced over the railway and, knowing the extent of opposition to it in Peking, was by no means a 'push-over' in discussions with the Russians. But eventually Russian determination won the day and the terms of a draft convention were communicated to China on 16 May. Telegrams sped to Peking where special precautions were taken for them to be deciphered at the highest level in order to prevent leaks for which the Chinese bureaucracy was renowned. On 3 June Li attached his seal to the secret agreement while he was in Moscow with Lobanov and Witte. It was to last for fifteen years and to cover the following points: mutual assistance in the event of Japanese aggression; no separate peace with the enemy without joint agreement in advance: the use of Chinese ports by Russian warships in emergencies; the construction by Russia of a railway through Heilungkiang and Kirin to Vladivostok, the line to be used by Russia in transporting troops and supplies. The ratification of this agreement was to depend on the signing of a railway contract in implementation of the last of these items.
For three months after Li's departure from Russia, there were heated debates in Peking over participation in the Russo-Chinese Bank, to which the railway concessions would be given. Russia's further intention to build a line from the Trans-Manchurian to some port on the Yellow Sea was also mooted; but it was lost in the debate over whether the new line should be built on the Chinese or the broad Russian gauge. The Chinese could not afford to hold out; and the two agreements for the bank and the railway were completed. Ratification of the alliance followed on 28 September.21
After visits to Berlin, Paris, London and Washington where he was accorded the status of an international statesman, Li reached Tientsin again on 3 October. What would his future be? Some like the empress dowager respected his resilience; others like the emperor blamed him for China's failure in war. What seems clear is that France and Russia exerted themselves on Li's behalf. Li seemed to be Russia's man; and Russia wanted him to stay at his post so as to have someone in high places. This was not the balanced response which the Yamen favoured but there was no one of equal stature or ability to march Li. In October, therefore, an edict was issued, appointing Li to the Yamen, where he immediately assumed the leadership.22
The lact that the Li-Lobanov treaty was secret and not properly disclosed till 1922 led to infinite speculation in the years that followed. Li's conversations were more far-reaching than the treaty itself. And, of course, Lobanov died just as Li was leaving the Russian capital. The fact that a secret convention was in existence created all sorts of doubts on the part of those who were worried about Sino-Russian relations, notably the country which was the 'contemplated enemy', Japan. This was of course a common enough experience in a generation of secret treaties. But a great deal of Russophobia in Japan focused on these various treaties where it was widely believed that China was thereafter Russia's puppet.
Moreover there were real doubts about how widely the text of these secret treaties was known and understood in China herself. Speaking of the 'Li-Lobanov treaty', a later Russian minister observed that it was 'a treaty of which neither Prince Ching nor the Empress-Dowager nor the Grand Council knew anything'.23 Certainly there had not been adequate consultation between Li in Russia and those in Peking over the nature of his discussions. When some years later the Russians insisted on the setting up of a Chinese customs house at Dalny, they pointed out that the 1896 agreements laid down that the customs there would be under exclusively Russian management. One of the senior Maritime Customs officials wrote in despair: 'The way seems blocked at every turn by some secret treaty with Russia, of which no one, not even the highest officials of the [Chinese] empire, has any knowledge. I wonder if this agreement received Imperial sanction.'24 Certainly the vagueness and secrecy allowed Russia leverage to capitalize on the rights she had acquired.
Russia Ascendant in Korea
In 1896 there was an unexpected upset in the strong position which Japan had gained in Korea. For the duration of the Sino-Japanese war, Korea had been under the protection of Japanese troops by a treaty of alliance signed at Seoul on 26 August 1894. Although the independence of Korea was recognized by both parties to the treaty of Shimonoseki, Japan in practice acquired paramount influence there after the war. She was opposed by an anti-Japanese faction which enjoyed the favour of the queen. In October 1895 Queen Min was brutally murdered; and a Japanese minister was implicated in the plot. After legal proceedings Japanese officials were acquitted. Meanwhile the king lived out a precarious existence in his own palace, swayed by conflicting Japanese and Russian parties. In February of the following year Russia landed at Chemulpo a force of marines which marched on Seoul and led to a coup d'état. With the seals of office, the king fled from the palace to take refuge in the Russian legation. Partly this was due to the congenial personality of the senior Russian representative, Karl Weber (Waeber), who had been in Korea since 1885 and had cultivated the goodwill of the Korean court, especially the deceased queen. Partly it was due to the Russians appearing to be less interfering in the faction-ridden court than the Japanese. As hosts to the king, the Russians naturally became an important force in Korean politics. There could not be any doubt that the king's was an anti-Japanese move. From the protection of the Russian legation, he dismissed pro-Japanese officials, replaced some Japanese, including military instructors, and passed down punishments on Japanese for misdemeanours. He also gave privileges to Russian businessmen and took steps to appoint Russian advisers.
These events ended the period of Japanese ascendancy and left the Russians triumphant. Not unnaturally the Japanese wanted the king to return to his palace from this partisan environment. But such was the latter's accumulated suspicion of Japan that he wished to stay on under Russian protection indefinitely. Anxious to steer clear of too great involvement in domestic disputes and avoid a clash with Japan, Russia professed that she wanted to be rid of the king but had to leave the decision to his free will. Whatever their public professions, the Russians knew they held a trump card.25
Alter this blow Japan sent the trustworthy diplomat, Komura Jutaro, to Korea as minister. His mandate was to call for a return to complete independence in Korea as had been prescribed in the treaty of Shimonoseki. His discussions with Minister Weber turned on the separation of the various military forces in the peninsula and especially on the withdrawal of Japanese and Russian troops (apart from the legation guards). The Seoul protocol that resulted, sometimes referred to as 'the Weber—Komura agreement', was drawn up by the diplomats on the spot with a view to assisting a more senior mission to Russia which was to be conducted by General Yamagata Aritomo. For some time Japan had wanted to send a leading statesman to Russia to negotiate at the highest level. Now an opportunity was offered by the celebrations for the coronation of Tsar Nicholas II. The Weber—Komura agreement was completed on 14 May just as Yamagata reached Russia after being feted in the United States and in European capitals.26
On 26 May Yamagata had his first discussions with Foreign Minister Lobanov-Rostovskii in which there was some measure of agreement to the terms drafted by Japan. When the statesmen discussed dividing the peninsula into a Russian zone to the north and a Japanese zone to the south, they apparently looked at each other and smiled. At their next meeting Lobanov announced that Russia had agreed to train the personal bodyguard of the Korean king who was afraid of the Japanese and would only return to his palace if he had a Russian guard. For a while the Japanese plenipotentiary thought that it would be wiser to defer the treaty but Lobanov made a minor modification and this led to the initialling of the Yamagata—Lobanov protocol on 28 May. The terms, which spoke of Korean independence and the need for reform, were anodyne enough. But there were two clauses which were kept secret, dealing with the arrangements for keeping equal numbers of troops in the peninsula. The open clauses together with the Weber—Komura agreement were published in 1898. The new protocol seemed to recognize equal rights for both Russia and Japan in the peninsula.
Yamagata's reception in Russia had been rather muted. Nor were his negotiations wholly successful. Perhaps Japan had been over-optimistic in hoping to cash in on the generosity of spirit which was assumed to exist in Russia at the time of the coronation. But Lobanovand the other Russian officials showed little sign of being accommodating to the Japanese. On two particular points, Yamagata did not succeed. First, he failed to secure the return of the Korean king to his palace. True, the Russians said that they were not detaining him and wanted him to leave their legation. But the fact remains that it was of great advantage to Russia to have such an honoured guest. For the remainder of his time in Russian protection, he offered Russia many concessions including the grant of forest rights for twenty years on the Korean side of the Yalu and Tumen rivers as well as mining concessions on the coast of Tumenking and other privileges on Dagelet island. Eventually it took a vigorous move by anti-Russian Koreans themselves to induce the king to return to his palace on 20 February 1897, after a year's absence.27
Second, there was Japan 's disappointment over the Russian military advisers. The Japanese government protested against the employment of so many Russian military instructors but was told that Russia had promised to provide these advisers prior to the negotiations and was bound by that promise. Thus during July 1897 three Russian officers and ten non-commissioned officers arrived in Korea to train her soldiers for three years. While a picture of reciprocity and equal rights was presented by the letter of the Yamagata—Lobanov protocol, that spirit was violated in practice. Russia continued to have the predominant voice. So the balance of power which Yamagata had sought eluded him. The 'pushy' Aleksei de Speyer who was appointed to Seoul as charge (1896-97), was quick to secure one-sided privileges for Russia. In return for the undertaking to employ only Russian advisers, Russia promised to recognize the Korean king as emperor. She then secured the appointment of Kir Alekseyevich Alekseyev as chief commissioner of Korean customs in place of the British national, John McLeavy Brown, who, however, refused to resign. Meanwhile there were manoeuvres for the opening of a Russo-Korean bank. In November Korea's finances were placed under Russian control. So the work of expansionist officials on the spot undid the earlier protocols and placed Russia in a strong position of ascendancy.28
References and Notes
1. Fujimura Michio, Nisshin sensō, pp. 129-31.
2. R. F. Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, p. 163.
3. Itō to emperor, 27 Jan. 1895 in Nihon Gaikō Bunsho (hereafterNGB), vol. 28.
4. I. H. Nish, 'The Three-power intervention of 1895', pp. 208-11.
5. Nihon Gaikō Nempyō narabi ni Shūyō Bunsho, vol. 1, pp. 165-7 (hereafter NGNB).
6. Mutsu Munemitsu, Kenkenroku:, pp. 136-7.
7. Lobanov paper of 6 April 1895 in Krasnyi Arkhiv ('Pervye shagi russkogo imperializma na Dalnem Vostoke, 1888-1903'), 52 (1932), pp. 74-5.
8. Ibid, pp. 78-83.
9. Ibid, p. 78.
10. Mutsu Munemitsu, op. cit., pp. 136-7.
11. A. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, p. 244.
12. Mutsu Munemitsu, op. cit., p. 217: Japan was 'to continue standing firm against the Chinese'.
13. Ibid, pp. 215-17.
14. Ibid., pp. 218-20.
15. For similar views from the Taigai kōha, and the views of the new political parties, see Mutsu Munemitsu, op. cit., pp. 145-6.
16. Russia appears to have recognized this, see Rostunov, Istoriya Russko-Iaponskoi Voiny, pp. 38-9.
17. Kajima Marinosuke, The Diplomacy of Japan, vol. 1, pp. 379-81.
18. Professor Fujimura in the sub-title of his standard history of the Sino-Japanese war, Nisshin Sensō, describes it as a turning-point in the modern history of east Asia.
19. R. Quested, The Russo-Chinese Bank, pp. 1-4.
20. The so-called 'Cassini Convention' between China and Russia was reported by the Shanghai correspondent of The Times on 8 Dec, 1896.
21. Rostunov, op. cit., pp. 38-9. The agreement between China and the Russo-Chinese Bank, concluded at Berlin on 8 Sept. 1896 is found in O. K. Smirnova (ed.) Sbornik dokumentov po istorii SSSR: Period imperializma, pp. 126-9.
22. J. K. Fairbank el al. (eds), The I.G. in Peking, vol. 2, nos. 1036-40.
23. Ernest M. Satow, Korea and Manchuria between Russia and Japan, p. 193. 21 Mar. 1903.
24. A. Hippisley (Shanghai) to Rockhill, 30 Jan. 1903, in Rockhill papers.
25. Kajima, vol. 1, pp. 425-31.
26. NGNB, vol. 1, pp. 174-5.
27. Hackett, op. cit., p. 174; Kajima, vol. 1, pp. 448-50.
28. G. A. Lensen, Balance of Intrigue, vol. 1, pp. 676—9.