Chapter 6
The Yamagata ministry which had presided with caution over the Boxer emergency was replaced on 19 October by Yamagata's rival, the experienced Marquis Itō. Some wanted Itō himself to assume the portfolio of foreign minister, while others wanted him to appoint Hara. The genro, Matsukata, suggested Katō Takaaki for this office, because of their Mitsubishi connection. Certainly Katō was not unqualified because of his service as minister to Britain from 1895 onwards. Moreover, he had made a success of his diplomacy in London, which was then the major diplomatic capital in the world in Japanese eyes. But, at forty years of age, he was young; he lacked diplomatic experience at the Tokyo end; and he had also been consistent in taking a moderately anti-Russian line. This need not have been important in itself; but his appointment was something of a paradox because Itō was renowned for his soft line towards Russia and for seeking detente with her. This led Kato into inevitable disagreements with the prime minister.
Itō became prime minister as president of the newly-founded Rikken Seiyukai. Indeed it was probably to give the new party a baptism of fire that Yamagata, who was fundamentally opposed to political parties, suddenly resigned on 26 September and recommended that Ito should be invited to form a cabinet. It was therefore a time of great political excitement. From December through to March the Diet was in session; and the battles between the parties kept up the political temperature.
Another factor in the charged atmosphere of the day was the creation of new and often right-wing political groupings. In January 1901 the Kokuryūkai (or Amur river society) was set up and in February the Sanshi club. More significant for the time being was the formation of the Kokumin Dōmeikai on 24 September with Prince Konoe Atsumaro, scion of the Fujiwara clan, as president. Konoe was an unusual political phenomenon in Japan, a person of aristocratic origins, who was president of the House of Peers, head of Gakushūin College, and the head of the second family of the realm next to the emperor, but who espoused radical causes and opposed the clan-based establishment. He was a believer in cementing good relations with Asia and especially China. In June 1898 he had founded the Tō-A Dōbunkai, of which he became the active president. This was to become one of the main constituents of the Kokumin Dōmeikai (sometimes known as the 'Tai-Ro Kokumin Dōmeikai' - or Anti-Russian National League).1 Other constituents included political parties, journalists, professors, political associates of Konoe and the Genyōsha, a radical association which developed an interest in continental expansion. In general it stood for the preservation of the integrity of China and the protection of Korea. More specifically it was set up to prevent the Russian occupation of Manchuria and to consider how Japan could become involved in railway building and the acquisition of rights in Korea and Manchuria. Clearly it was founded as a counterpoise to Russia's occupation of Manchuria. It launched itself by a National Convention in October and followed up with speaking tours around the country. In essence the Dōmeikai was a super-party, linking many of the opposition groups of diverse hues. Early in the new year, differences developed between the factions in the lobby and from April onwards its activities were greatly reduced. It lingered on till 27 April 1902 when it was disbanded after the Chinese and Russians signed a treaty for the evacuation of Russian troops from Manchuria.
Although it was short-lived, the Dōmeikai was unquestionably significant. With its wide range of constituents it created quite a stir and focused the attention of the people on the Manchurian and Korean issues. Both directly and indirectly it put pressure on the government. As we shall see, its effect was to give comfort to those in the cabinet who were more militant against Russia. Having said that, it would be hard to trace any direct link between Dōmeikai actions and government policies. Indirectly it criticized the Itō ministry at a time when it faced widespread opposition in the Lower House.
No one was more worried by these activities than Minister Izvolskn. He interpreted them as maligning his country but also as spoiling his own diplomatic initiatives. The Dōmeikai maligned his country by dwelling on Russia's acquisitive motives in Manchuria but also by saying that Russia could never be satisfied with an independent Korea over the border but would in due course want to acquire that also. In short, Russia's activities in Manchuria posed a danger to Korea. It spoilt his diplomatic initiatives in the sense that Izvolskii wanted to turn a blind eye to Manchuria and to focus his diplomacy on a scheme for neutralizing Korea.2 The Dōmeikai condemned the government for lack of resolution at the end of the Boxer crisis and was by no means prepared to turn a blind eye to Manchuria or to accept a neutralization scheme for Korea, which in its view must inevitably lead to a deterioration in Japan's existing position there. Indeed the Dōmeikai in its propaganda was inclined to dwell on the old Dōbunkai idea of Japan's civilizing mission in China and Korea.
What worried Izvolskii and puzzled others was the anomalous position of Prince Konoe. He held of course the official position of president of the House of Peers and yet he behaved in a most independent, not to say idiosyncratic, way by coming out against a central part of the new prime minister's position. Moreover he won a good measure of support for his arguments. Konoe was within his rights in what he did; but it was out of line with what was expected of him. Certainly his presence within this super-lobby of discordant opposition groups gave it a respectability which it would not otherwise have had.3
Under Dōmeikai influence, the policies which were being canvassed were to take a less submissive line towards Russia and, as part of this, to use the occasion of Russia's concentration in Manchuria to seek an agreement with her which would give Japan a similar predominance in Korea.
During this rough political baptism, the Seiyūkai suffered and its new president most of all. Itō, the reluctant prime minister, who had been under great stress during the formation of his cabinet, retired to his country residence at Ōiso on 28 October, soon after accepting office, on the pretext of illness, leaving Saionji as interim prime minister and relying on his juniors to carry on as best they could. For recuperation Itō went to Atami and, after a month at that resort, came back to Ōiso. He returned briefly to duty on 10 December to face the new Diet. But recurring troubles forced him to retire again to his country residence. Indeed the whole life of his ministry was affected by his bouts of illness; and it was this that convinced the leaders of Japan that they must seek younger men as prime minister in future.4
Not that there were no factors that favoured Itō's more conciliatory line. Firstly, his ministry had to face serious crises of domestic politics, especially with the local government of Tokyo city. Secondly, the Japanese expedition for the siege of Peking had been a substantial drain on finances; and it was unlikely that anything could be done by way of large military operations. Here was the classic scenario for a split in the ministry, with the prime minister and finance ministers aligned against the foreign, army and navy ministers. All in all it seems to have been hard for Itō to gain the upper hand over dissentient party members. There is probably some truth in Izvolskii's assessment that 'parliamentary events have unfortunately considerably weakened the authority of this statesman which was recently so great'.5
Korean Neutralization Negotiations
After the relief of the Peking legations, Izvolskii felt that the time was ripe for positive negotiations with Japan. He had been in Tokyo since 1900 and no one doubted that he was one of his country's top-level diplomats with a promising career ahead. He was pleasant, suave, accomplished. But he was also slightly distrusted by other members of the diplomatic body. Moreover, he does not seem to have hit it off with the Japanese as Rosen had before him. His communications with St Petersburg leave the impression that he was not really happy in Tokyo and was conscious of his inability to win the trust of the Japanese (though this was not easy for Russian diplomats at any time after 1900).6
With surprising disregard for Japan's preoccupation with Manchuria, Izvolskii concentrated his diplomacy on Korea. It was his judgement (and that of Russia) that the anti-foreign movement in China would spread into Korea and in all likelihood Russia and Japan might find it necessary to send troops to the peninsula in order to restore order. There had earlier been various exchanges of view between Izvolskii and Foreign Minister Aoki, who had left office in October, and it had been arranged that, before troops were sent to Korea, there would be conversations in order to work out the spheres within which the two countries would operate. When Katō took up office, he confirmed on his audience day on 15 November that he would abide by the arrangements of his predecessor. Happily the disturbances from China (and Manchuria) did not spread to Korea; and the need to send expeditions of troops did not arise. But, as the risk of instability in the peninsula subsided, the Japanese recognized that their security perimeter, which they had long regarded as including Korea, had become much weaker since the Russians had taken over as an occupying force beyond the Yalu.
Soon after taking office, Itō, according to Izvolskii, gave him an assurance of 'his readiness to enter into a discussion of conditions under which the neutrality of Korea might be established'. It was therefore distinctly inconvenient for the Russian minister that Itō was so often ill and out of town. The Koreans in power for the time being were thought to be in favour of some such solution. Hayashi Gonsuke from the Japanese legation there reported on the fitful talks he had been holding from the summer of 1900 onwards, though he was not personally in favour of the proposal. The Korean foreign minister also visited Japan and gained the impression that Itō was inclined towards international recognition of Korea's neutrality, while Katō and the foreign ministry were generally not.7
Izvolskii proposed the neutralization of Korea under international guarantee, that is, by Japan and Russia. But Katō, who had a firm idea that this was not St Petersburg's proposal but Izvolskii's own, insisted on seeing evidence that the Russian envoy did in fact have direct and positive instructions from his government before embarking on conversations. After a time instructions were received and discussions did take place. Katō reacted by insisting on linking Korean neutralization with Russian evacuation from Manchuria: Japan would not discuss Korea's neutrality until the Russians took steps to move their armies out of the three eastern provinces.8 It is hard to say whether this was just a method of fobbing off Izvolskii by imposing conditions which Russia was most unlikely to consider, far less to concede. But Japan had nothing to lose. From her point of view, 'neutralization' meant the sacrifice of a position in the peninsula — as it did also for Russia. But, whereas Russia was making Manchuria into a sphere of influence and was gaining overall, Japan was the only loser. It was politically undesirable in view of the actions of Kokumin Dōmeikai and others to be seen to make concessions when the situation in north-east Asia was so fluid.
There were grounds for some scepticism about Izvolskii's authorization. He had not lost the confidence of the tsar or his sponsor, the Dowager Empress Marie; but he was not thought to be on good terms with the ministry or to have the sympathy of the bureaucrats. This had been known to the Japanese since Komura had represented them at the Russian capital.9 In the autumn things were not easy for Izvolskii at the Russian end. Not only were members of the tsar's inner cabinet in the Crimea so that, as one foreign diplomat observed, 'we are practically at present without a responsible government at St Petersburg'10 but also, as we have already seen, the tsar was badly incapacitated. The empress was suffering from typhoid fever; and the emperor, who frequently reflected his wife's moods, had lost his stamina. The rumour had it that 'General Friedricks, the Minister of the Household, is the only one who has any access to the Emperor during his illness and M. Witte says that under no circumstances will he leave Livadia as long as any of the other three Ministers (War, Foreign Affairs, and Home) remain there.'11 The consequence of this was that, with all the problems of the far east mounting up and waiting for a decision, Lamsdorf was unable to see the tsar for a month at a stretch. There was therefore a distinct lack of a clear policy line; and the result was to leave the decision-making to the men on the frontier, either the military-naval men in Manchuria or the diplomats who were all inclined to take advantage. It is probably true that the tsar with the advice of his ministers recognized this and was genuinely afraid of leaving so many decisions to others.
On 7 January Izvolskii asked Kato for his views on the Russian neutralization proposals. Kato reserved his judgement and finally replied through the new Japanese minister to St Petersburg, Chinda, that Japan could not take up the programme for neutralization of Korea until after the withdrawal of the Russian army from Manchuria. In communicating this to Izvolskii subsequently, Kato admitted that the existing arrangement between the two countries through the Nishi—Rosen agreement of 1898 was satisfactory to the Japanese.12 Nothing further was heard of the proposal for the present.
Izvolskii was insulted by Kato's tactics. By replying through the Japanese minister to Russia, Katō had by-passed him. He was quick to complain to his diplomatic colleagues that he had lost face with his government. The probability is that Izvolskii had less authority to make his neutralization proposals than he liked to think. The relations between Kato and Izvolskii continued to be very strained.13 Yet Izvolskii reported the Japanese position fairly enough. In the middle of February he analysed the Japanese standpoint thus:
Japan is willing to risk facing what is an established fact, namely that Russia has appreciably increased her sphere of influence, and this explains the Japanese government's frantic attempts to prepare the way beforehand so as to reap suitable rewards. I have already had occasion to point out that the only place where Japan can look for such rewards is in Korea, for every acquisition at the expense of China is very unpopular here and contrary to the spirit of the latest Japanese policy. When in its last communication the Japanese government asserts that the last Russo-Japanese agreement with regard to Korea remains in force ... this only proves that it considers it immature and contrary to its interests to bind itself by entering into a new agreement in this matter until the fate of Manchuria has been finally decided.14
Manchurian Negotiations
Korea was a separate problem, though it had its connections with the chaos in China. The problems of China proper were being ironed out by the 'allies', that is, those who had taken part in the allied expeditionary force at what (for want of a better name) might be called 'the Peking conference'. It was the assumption of those attending that they were together dealing with the aftermath of the Boxer disturbances wherever they occurred, that is, the so-called 'collective approach'. Among the most active sponsors of the collective approach was France who was most hard-working in the preparation of drafts for dealing with the problems of punishment, indemnity and the treatment of the Chinese court. Russia refused on principle to allow the subject of Manchuria to appear on the agenda of the Peking conference: it was, she argued, a bilateral issue between herself and China and no other power had the right to a voice in its solution. This was an example of the 'individual approach'. The Chinese, of course, did not share the Russian interpretation on this point. The majority of China's leaders were hoping to play off Russia against the powers and the powers against Russia; and this tactic could best be employed at a conference. But neither China nor the powers were able to bring the issue of Manchuria before the Peking conference.15
In the search for a bilateral solution, the Chinese were divided. Li Hung-chang was ready to compromise with Russia though he was anxious — and optimistic — about acquiring Manchuria again. The Yangtse viceroys were less ready to compromise and were already approaching the seaward powers — Britain, the United States and Japan — for aid against the Russians. On the Russian side too there were divisions. In the Crimea Kuropatkin, Witte and Lamsdorf laid down the guidelines for Russian government control of Manchuria. Kuropatkin drew up the substance and Witte only amended it in order to ensure that his own railway empire was not squeezed out when Manchuria became an army preserve. The guidelines were eventually approved by the tsar on 17 December.
But action had to be held over until the return of the tsar's court to the capital in January. The inside story suggests that there were intense disagreements between the decision-makers in St Petersburg. Kuropatkin and Witte, the ministers most closely involved in Manchuria — and in a sense rivals in that quarter — wanted to proceed with some form of treaty with China which would affirm and possibly consolidate the gains made by Russia in the Tseng—Alekseyev agreement, that is, the local arrangement which was never ratified by either central government. Lamsdorf, who was less involved but had to bear in mind the strong storm of indignation to which the abortive Tseng—Alekseyev treaty had given rise abroad, feared a repetition of this external interference. He therefore advised that the terms should be modified from the harsh conditions which his two partners were inclined to impose. He further argued that it might not be very worth while to negotiate with a Chinese government which was so weak and with a court which was in exile, and contended that Chinese statesmen thought of inconvenient western treaties as mere scraps of paper which had to be evaded. But the main ministers could not wait and met Lamsdorf only to the extent of modifying their demands.16 Their main change was to ask for further economic concessions in Manchuria instead of an indemnity, though they did agree not to stick out for the right to run the Manchurian customs, thus avoiding a clash with the powers.
After a great deal of final polishing, the Russian draft was ready. Witte's draft had been altered several times and Lamsdorf had worked on it, obtaining the approval of his colleagues on 8 February. By the time that it was passed over on 20 February to Yang Ju, the Chinese minister at St Petersburg, it was in greatly modified form. Since Lamsdorf had the final hand in it, it was likely to stand scrutiny if and when the terms of the note were leaked to the powers. Almost immediately the diplomats in Peking (excepting those of France and Belgium) protested over any individual settlement between China and Russia.17
It was one thing for the powers to protest to China, quite another for them to protest to Russia. Li Hung-chang who had to deal with the Russian ultimatum, remarked that the western countries would not stand up to Russia but 'only wag their tongues at us'.18 There were no promises of armed support so he recommended the court to yield. But the Yangtse viceroys wanted to mobilize world opinion against Russia in the name of the Open Door, that is, by promising the United States, Britain, Germany, etc. equal commercial rights in Manchuria. Open Door countries like Japan and Britain did try to obtain information direct from Russia. But after several attempts in March, all they received was the statement that there was no reason in international law why Russia should reveal the treaty before it was concluded.
A notable absentee from criticism of Russia was Germany. On 14 March her chancellor took the opportunity to state that the Anglo-German agreement concluded in October 1900 was not considered by Germany to apply to Manchuria. Thus, Germany was not proposing to challenge Russia's draft treaty. This was a great disappointment to Japan who had specially adhered to that treaty under the strict understanding that it did apply to Manchuria. Katō was furious. Until this time, he said, the German charge d'affaires in Tokyo had boasted of the protests which his country had been making in Peking over Manchuria; but after this he suddenly made a complete volte-face. taking the line that Manchuria was nothing to the Germans, though it meant much to Japan. Not sympathetic to Germany by nature, Kato drew the conclusion that the Germans were merely trying to get Japan involved in fighting Russia over Manchuria. The Japan Times, often the instrument for the views of the foreign ministry, denounced the German statement but conceded eventually that European powers had few interests in Manchuria and could not be expected to oppose Russia, but that Japan was in a different position, having life-and-death interests there.19
Our especial concern is with the reaction of the Japanese government. Hitherto it had been cautious, only sending troops to China when invited, and withdrawing the bulk of them when the crisis was over. Now the ministers were divided over their attitudes to Russia. Prime Minister Ito told the Belgian minister in February:
Russia has considerable interests in Manchuria, and it is legitimate for her to protect them. During last year's troubles, she was the only one to send troops and maintain order in this part of China. She thereby helped the other Powers, limiting the area where their troops had to intervene. If she continues to maintain order in North China without hindering the commercial development of other nations, Japan will be able to safeguard her interests, in spite of the presence of military forces.20
This was a remarkably broad-minded view to take and was out of line with Kokumin Dōmeikai propaganda. There are suggestions that it was not representative of the government's attitude. There is evidence that the Japanese minister in Peking, by this time Komura, was the first to protest to China against signing the draft Russian treaty. The implication is that Japan was prepared to take a strong line regardless of the actions of other powers. In short, Japan was prepared to take a lead over Manchurian affairs in advance of other world powers.
Following the circulation of a lengthy historical note prepared by Kato, the Manchurian problem was before the Japanese ministers for almost a week from 14 March. Finally on the 20th Japan urged China not to agree to Russia's demands; and on the 25th Chinda, the minister to St Petersburg, gave Lamsdorf Japan's tactful protest which urged on Russia improvement of the existing draft treaty. The Russian however stuck to his line that this was purely a matter between Russia and China and declined to accept the protest note. Kato then proposed to his colleagues that Japan should reply that this attitude was totally unacceptable. But the prime minister would not agree, saying that it would be dangerous to pick a fight with Russia over this and too early to take up such a strong position. So the Japanese cabinet confined itself to telling Russia that it could regretfully not agree with Lamsdorfs statement.21
The fever pitch which the Manchurian issue had reached has to be seen against the background of the Itō government's troubles with the Diet. The government had asked for an increase in taxes because funds were required urgently inter alia for maintaining Japan's forces in China. On 25 February the Upper House (kizokuin) failed to pass the tax bill which had earlier been approved by the House of Representatives. The cabinet therefore suspended the Upper House, first for ten, then for a further five, days. Meanwhile ferocious lobbying went on in which most of the genro were drafted in to support the budget; Yamagata, Saigō, Inoue and Matsukata joined the fray by persuading their political supporters. Eventually the emperor was forced to intervene by issuing an imperial proclamation (shochoku) to the members of the Upper House, instructing them to pass the budget on 12 March. Four days later they complied through their president, Prince Konoe. It was a desperate move for Itō to call the emperor into the political arena in this way; and the Lower House condemned the government for it. A motion of censure against the government was defeated by a very narrow margin. The immediate storm had passed; but Ito had unquestionably lost some of the authority which he had had in former times.
In his report, the Russian minister took the view that the closure of the Diet session would relieve the government and save it from having to answer delicate questions about foreign policy until it reopened in the autumn. He admitted quite generously that the Itō government 'had succeeded in preserving a fairly mild tone in all its answers and generally in keeping the agitation in the Diet on the Manchurian issue within bounds. The agitation will, however, continue in the form of newspaper articles, addresses to meetings etc. and it may yet cause the cabinet some difficulty.'22
On 5 April Lamsdorf was able to announce in an official communiqué that Russia gave up her demands, withdrew the terms under negotiation and intended to stay on in Manchuria for the time being. China had not kept the deadline for negotiation by enlisting the support of others. It left Russia with no choice but to cancel the talks. What had Russia to lose? With the railway coming close to completion, time was on her side; she could afford to wait. True, international protests were a nuisance. But she had been internationally unpopular before and there seemed to be no pressing reason for withdrawing from the territory merely because a world-wide campaign of complaint had been organized against her.
Russia's decision to break off the talks with China could not in the circumstances be recorded as a victory for those like Japan and Britain who had tried to lodge formal protests. Indeed, the protests had been received in a most cordial and inoffensive spirit. In the case of Britain, Lamsdorf had argued that his final terms had been 'quite innocuous' and had seemed to suggest that the objectionable articles should be attributed to 'the machinations of Russians like Prince Uchtomsky (Uktomskii) and other rabid politicians of the forward school in China, into whose wine Lamsdorf and finally the emperor have been putting as much water as they can'.23 Presumably one of the reasons for representing the Russian approach as sweet reasonableness was to divide the opposition. In particular, it was in Russia's interest to divide Japan and Britain, the only two of the Open Door powers who were likely to take positive action, and ensure that the two did not act together over Manchuria. On the British side, this was the time for a special mission led by the Duke of Abercorn to announce to the Russian emperor the accession of Edward VII. The tsar had gone out of his way to show the mission his enthusiasm for the most friendly relations with Britain. On 18 April Ambassador Scott reported that Lamsdorfs remarks struck him 'as a decided attempt at an overture or the renewal of the attempt to come to an understanding about China, prompted by the Emperor's sincere wish in that direction ... It is also very likely that they are not a little alarmed here about the feeling in Japan and the possibility of our entering into any engagements to support her in active resistance to Russia.'24 Lansdowne replied that he would not reject an overture; but none came.
Japan’s Resistance Defused
How close had Japan been to war? It is hard for the historian to say. He can more easily answer the question: how did it appear to contemporaries? First we should quote Katō's remark to MacDonald at the height of the crisis on 21 March: Japan had quite given up all idea of offering China any material assistance in opposing the demands of Russia but had decided to warn her of the consequences of signing any such agreement as was contemplated.25
But it did not necessarily appear so to outside observers. d'Anethan, writing in late March, took the view: 'I do not say that war is imminent, but it is far from improbable.' The Belgian minister attributed this to the army and navy who were seeking to persuade the government to take a firmer attitude towards Russia: within the cabinet the ministers of war and navy pushed for energetic action and were controlled with difficulty by Ito and Katō; the military element were pushing for an aggressive policy and had the country behind them and demagogues like Count Ōkuma were asking the government to deal a decisive blow to Russia in Manchuria or lose all prestige in China.26
Similar were the views of the diplomatic body, and most importantly of Izvolskii. He reported that:
the most dangerous and hot-headed member of the cabinet is Naval Minister Admiral Yamamoto; ... the navy is in almost full fighting order and is already distributed among the south-western ports lying nearest to the area of possible hostilities. With the arrival of the last battleship but one ordered from England, Japan's programme of naval armament can be regarded as almost completed ... The War Ministry has not made any special preparations and would require one year to come to a state of readiness.27
The opinion of his active military and naval attachés was that war was an unlikely possibility, though Izvolskii was clearly much alarmed at the strength of anti-Russian feeling which was almost universal in Japan. He was inclined to predict that Japan's immediate aim was 'a break with Russia' and she would only be satisfied with an unconditional withdrawal from the Manchurian area. Izvolskii's pessimism was not accepted by the ministers; but his assessment of the intensity of Japanese popular feeling may not have been too wide of the mark.
Some of the conjectures of d'Anethan and Izvolskii cannot be substantiated. We now know something of the opinions in senior military-naval quarters in Japan. Thus at a meeting on 1 April Yamamoto, the navy minister who is spoken of by Izvolskii as being the most extreme, supported Itō's cautious line and took pains to pacify Katō, while Kodama, the war minister, remained neutral.28 Kodama may in this have been reflecting the attitude of the more senior and influential general, Field Marshal Yamagata. Although we do not know Yamagata's advice at the crisis of April Fool's day, we do have his seminal memorandum which was eventually completed on 24 April. He there argued that 'relations between Japan and Russia have not yet suffered a major upset but sooner or later a serious collision is inevitable ... If we are to prevent war, we must secure the help of other powers to arrest Russia's southward advance.'29 He seems to imply that Japan was not strong enough militarily to take on Russia and must for the present adopt a cautious stance, his 'shinchoron', (doctrine of circumspection). So the army was relatively restrained. Moreover the matter was fully and officially discussed. Thus the matter went to the cabinet and was referred to the supreme military council (gensuifu) where it was discussed by Prince Komatsu, Marshal Yamagata, Admirals Saitō and Itō under the personal chairmanship of the emperor. The subject went again to the cabinet who instructed the foreign minister to make a second - milk and water - protest to the Russians. By the time this was done on 8 April, the Sino-Russian parleys were at an end; and the polite protest was fruitless.
While the Japanese military felt themselves unready to resist by force Russia's activities in Manchuria which they so much detested, the Russian military were taking a line which did not entirely accord with Lamsdorf's. In response to the complaints of the powers, Lamsdorf had been firm but deceptively ingratiating. The language of the Russian military was different. After the finance ministry's monopoly over the railways collapsed in 1900, a new role was thrust on Kuropatkin, the war minister, who seems to have oscillated a good deal in his attitude. He had started off by hailing the Boxer disturbances as a great opportunity for Russia, but he was not insensitive to world opinion. No one was more involved with military operations in Manchuria itself than Admiral Alekseyev, by this time with a mandate running from the Liaotung peninsula throughout the south and centre of Manchuria. His attitude is best revealed in a private letter he wrote to Kuropatkin:
The protest of the powers against our intention to hold on to Manchuria must be seen as complaining against an accomplished fact, which should have been clear to them for some time past. In our agreement with China for building the Chinese Eastern railway, they should have marked our right to defend it with the means which most suited our purpose. Whether this was to be by troops or guards was an internal matter of a strategic and technical nature to which they could not reasonably object.30
Alekseyev went on to urge Kuropatkin to stick it out, not to withdraw the Russian troops and to ignore the protests of outside powers who would soon lose interest. Perhaps Japan, with her considerable stake in Manchurian trade based on Niuchuang, was most likely to persist but she could be bought off by offering her an agreement which would give her what she wanted in Korea, while Russia obtained full freedom of action in Manchuria.
One factor which served to defuse the situation was the precipitate resignation of the Itō ministry. It arose out of the disagreement between Finance Minister Watanabe Kunio and the cabinet over the public debt, which developed around the end of March. Itō eventually resigned on the ground of cabinet disunity on 2 May, Watanabe being the only member who refused to resign. The succession was offered to the only genro who had never been prime minister, Inoue Kaoru; but he declined. General Katsura, the war minister in the retiring cabinet, was recommended for the post. After the assistance of his patron, Yamagata, Katsura managed to form a cabinet with the navy's cooperation and announced it on 2 June after a month-long political crisis.
The post of foreign minister was given to Komura Jūtarō on the understanding that he would not leave his present post at Peking until the peace treaty between the allies and China was signed. For the time being the berth was filled by Sone Arasuke, who was the finance minister. But he avoided all initiatives on the ground that things should be left for Komura's arrival. In due course the Peking protocol was signed on 7 September and Komura was able to leave for Tokyo. He already knew much about the problems of Manchuria and Korea. In these intervening months, Japan was finding her feet with a new and inexperienced ministry while Russia was glad to have re-established the status quo in Manchuria. Even the pessimistic Izvolskii was able to report that the relationship had been restored to a happy equilibrium.31
Komura returned from Peking on 19 September but in unorthodox fashion. He had left the Chinese capital on 9 September and embarked on the cruiser Chitose at Taku, sailing with her across to Chefoo. Without informing Tokyo, he visited Korea, landing at Chemulpo and Masampo, and had an audience with the Korean emperor and his officials. He had been minister in Korea in 1895-96 and knew the ministers there well. He had taken the opportunity of first-hand observation of an area which was in his view vital to Japan's security and a major impediment to good relations with Russia.32
Komura returned to a lame duck ministry which had endured four months of interregnum under Sone, who had been fully employed at the ministry of finance. He took over as foreign minister on 21 September at the age of forty-seven. He was well known for his strong-mindedness, not to say obstinacy, and was to some extent a committed man. While still in Peking, he had been consulted by the Katsura government about the approach being made to Britain and had given his approval. Moreover he had worked hard with W. W. Rockhill, the American plenipotentiary at the Peking Conference, and Sir Ernest Satow against the Russians at the conference. Though this had not endeared him to the Russians, he gave the impression in Tokyo of beginning his ministry with an open mind.
On 11 October Izvolskii conveyed the impression of his first meeting with Komura who was still inclined to keep his options open. He thought the new foreign minister, who had seen service in St Petersburg, was not a Japanese who had a leaning towards any particular European country; he seemed quite sincere in his desire for a rapprochement with Russia. He formed the impression that Komura was already informed of the negotiations on which Lessar, the new Russian minister in Peking, and Li Hung-chang were embarked and possibly had an inkling of the terms. Komura, it was thought, would not make a positive move until he had examined the terms and seen that they were in accord with the evacuation announcement.33
There were probably no victors in the Russo-Japanese brinkmanship of the spring of 1901. Russia came out with dignity vis-à-vis China without reducing her terms of withdrawal. She came out, however, with a tarnished image vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Her mishandling of the situation had caused an international hullaballoo, in the face of which Lamsdorf had appeared to act shiftily. There seemed to be no concordance between the military policy and the St Petersburg line. So most concluded that Russia was following a dual diplomacy. The crisis was not an unmitigated disaster for China. Her leaders saw that most of the world was opposed to the Russian military protectorate over part of their territory and knew that they could rely on this recurring if later terms were equally unsatisfactory. They still had the skill to play off one barbarian against the other. But the Russian armies were still there. So China still had to negotiate in the future and could only hope that her foreign supporters would secure for her better terms.
It was also something of a turning-point for the Japanese. They had been the focal point of the international opposition. Lamsdorf had taken the view that, if Russia took over Manchuria, there would be no resistance offered. It was typical of his Eurocentric views that he could not conceive of opposition being offered except by a great (that is, a European) power. So he was surprised when Japan resisted so stoutly. The Russian reaction was generally one of astonishment that she should embark on such a reckless course as to challenge Russia. Certainly it was a new experience for Japan. But the fact was that Manchuria and Korea were part of the national cause. In ventilating it, the government was reflecting popular sentiment. Professor Tsunoda writes of it as a 'coming of age'. She had not flinched at taking the lead but, having exposed herself, she had acted circumspectly.34
References and Notes
1. Marius Jansen, 'Konoe Atsumaro' in A. Iriye (ed.), The Chinese and the Japanese, pp. 107-23.
2. 'Nakanune Russko-Iaponskoi Voiny' in Krasnyi Arkhiv, 63 (1934), 3-54. Translated in Chinese Social and Political Science Review as 'On the Eve of the Russo-Japanese War' in vols 18-19 (1934-36). (Hereafter referred to as 'Eve of War'.)
3. Jansen, op. cit., p. 109.
4. Kōshaku Itō Hirobumi-den, vol. 3, Tokyo 1943, pp. 480-8.
5. Izvolskii to Lamsdorf, 14 Mar. 1901, 'Eve of War', p. 587.
6 d'Anethan Dispatches, pp. 154-5.
7 Tsunoda Jun, Manshū Mondai to Kokubō Hoshin, pp. 38-44.
8 Katō, vol. 1, pp. 434-7; NGB 34, no. 174.
9 Japan, Foreign Ministry, Komura Gaikōshi, vol. 1, p. 149.
10 Scott to Sanderson, 13 Dec, 1900, in Scott Papers 52,304.
11 Scott to Lansdowne, 29 Nov. 1900, in Scott Papers 52,304.
12 Chinda to Lamsdorf, 22 Jan. 1901, 'Eve of War', pp. 574-5.
13 MacDonald to Lansdowne, 21 Mar. 1901, FO 46/539.
14 Izvolskii to Lamsdorf, 22 Feb. 1901, 'Eve of War', p. 582.
15 I. H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp. 111-16.
16 A. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, pp. 156-60.
17 The whole document, consisting of 14 articles, is in B. A. Romanov, Russia in Manchuria, pp. 297-9.
18 M. H. Hunt, Frontier Defence and the Open Door, pp. 18-19.
19 Nish, op. cit., pp. 104-11.
20 d'Anethan Dispatches, p. 146.
21 Tsunoda Jun, op. cit., pp. 61-4.
22 Izvolskii to Lamsdorf, 14 Mar. 1901, 'Eve of War', p. 591.
23 Scott to Lansdowne, 4 Apr. 1901, Scott Papers, 52,304.
24 Scott to Lansdowne, 18 Apr. 1901, Scott Papers 52,304; W. L. Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902, New York 1951, pp. 741-2.
25 MacDonald to Lansdowne, 21 Mar. 1901, FO 46/539.
26 d'Anethan Dispatches, pp. 148-50.
27 Izvolskii to Lamsdorf, 5 Apr. 1901, 'Eve of War', pp. 130-1.
28 Japan, Navy Ministry, Yamamoto Gombei to Kaigun gives no indication of Yamamoto as being anxious for war or conflict with Russia.
29 Yamagata, 'Tōyō Dōmeiron', Yamagata-den, vol. 3, pp. 494-6.
30 G. A. Lensen, The Russo-Chinese War, pp. 253-4.
31 Izvolskii to Lamsdorf, 30 July 1901, 'Eve of War', p. 139.
32 Komura Gaikōshi, vol. 1, p. 200.
33 Izvolskii to Lamsdorf, 7 Aug. and 10 Oct. 1901, 'Eve of War', pp. 240-1.
34 Tsunoda, op. cit., pp. 71f.