11

Relations with Vichy and Spain

Unity with France — American and Canadian Contacts with Vichy — Difficulties of General de Gaulle — My Broadcast to the French People, October 21 — Its Lasting Effect — Need to Insist upon Essentials — The Toulon Fleet — President Roosevelt’s Intervention — Admiralty Anxieties — Correspondence with the President, November — A Firm Policy About the French Battleships — Telegram to General de Gaulle — Pétain’s Assurances to the President — Britain and Spain — Sir Samuel Hoare Appointed Ambassador — General Franco’s Policy — Dangers of Spanish Hostility — Algeciras Bay and the Neutral Ground — Artful Diplomacy of the Spanish Government Towards Hitler — Franco’s Dilatory Tactics — Suñer’s Mission — Ribbentrop’s Visit to Rome, September 19 — Increasing Spanish Claims — Hitler and Mussolini at the Brenner Pass, October 4 — Hitler and Franco at Hendaye, October 23 — Hitler and Pétain at Montoire, October 24 — Collaboration Against Britain — My Personal Views, November 14 — Pétain Breaks with Laval — Hitler’s Disappointment with Spain — Franco’s Duplicity and Ingratitude Both to Hitler and Mussolini — My Telegram to Sir Samuel Hoare — And to the President.

IN SPITE OF THE ARMISTICE and Oran and the ending of our diplomatic relations with Vichy, I never ceased to feel a unity with France. People who have not been subjected to the personal stresses which fell upon prominent Frenchmen in the awful ruin of their country should be careful in their judgments of individuals. It is beyond the scope of this story to enter the maze of French politics. But I felt sure that the French nation would do its best for the common cause according to the facts presented to it. When they were told that their only salvation lay in following the advice of the illustrious Marshal Pétain, and that England, which had given them so little help, would soon be conquered or give in, very little choice was offered to the masses. But I was sure they wanted us to win, and that nothing would give them more joy than to see us continue the struggle with vigour. It was our first duty to give loyal support to General de Gaulle in his valiant constancy. On August 7, I signed a military agreement with him which dealt with practical needs. His stirring addresses were made known to France and the world by the British broadcasts. The sentence of death which the Pétain Government passed upon him glorified his name. We did everything in our power to aid him and magnify his movement.

At the same time it was necessary to keep in touch not only with France, but even with Vichy. I therefore always tried to make the best of them. I was very glad when at the end of the year the United States sent an Ambassador to Vichy of so much influence and character as Admiral Leahy, who was himself so close to the President. I repeatedly encouraged Mr. Mackenzie King to keep his representative, the skilful and accomplished M. Dupuy, at Vichy. Here at least was a window upon a courtyard to which we had no other access. On July 25, I sent a Minute to the Foreign Secretary in which I said:

I want to promote a kind of collusive conspiracy in the Vichy Government whereby certain members of that Government, perhaps with the consent of those who remain, will levant to North Africa in order to make a better bargain for France from the North African shore and from a position of independence. For this purpose I would use both food and other inducements, as well as the obvious arguments.

It was in this spirit that I was to receive in October a certain M. Rougier, who represented himself as acting on the personal instructions of Marshal Pétain. This was not because I or my colleagues had any respect for Marshal Pétain, but only because no road that led to France should be incontinently barred. Our consistent policy was to make the Vichy Government and its members feel that, so far as we were concerned, it was never too late to mend. Whatever had happened in the past, France was our comrade in tribulation, and nothing but actual war between us should prevent her being our partner in victory.

This mood was hard upon de Gaulle, who had risked all and kept the flag flying, but whose handful of followers outside France could never claim to be an effective alternative French Government. Nevertheless, we did our utmost to increase his influence, authority, and power. He for his part naturally resented any kind of truck on our part with Vichy, and thought we ought to be exclusively loyal to him. He also felt it to be essential to his position before the French people that he should maintain a proud and haughty demeanour towards “perfidious Albion,” although an exile dependent upon our protection and dwelling in our midst. He had to be rude to the British to prove to French eyes that he was not a British puppet. He certainly carried out this policy with perseverance. He even one day explained this technique to me, and I fully comprehended the extraordinary difficulties of his problem. I always admired his massive strength.

* * * * *

On October 21, I made an appeal by radio to the French people. I took great pains to prepare this short address, as it had to be given in French. I was not satisfied with the literal translation at first provided, which did not give the spirit of what I could say in English and could feel in French, but M. Dejean, one of the Free French Staff in London, made a far better rendering, which I rehearsed several times and delivered from the basement of the Annexe, amid the crashes of an air raid.

Frenchmen!

For more than thirty years in peace and war I have marched with you, and I am marching still along the same road. To-night I speak to you at your firesides wherever you may be, or whatever your fortunes are. I repeat the prayer around the louis d’or, “Dieu protége la France.” Here at home in England, under the fire of the Boche, we do not forget the ties and links that unite us to France, and we are persevering steadfastly and in good heart in the cause of European freedom and fair dealing for the common people of all countries, for which, with you, we drew the sword. When good people get into trouble because they are attacked and heavily smitten by the vile and wicked, they must be very careful not to get at loggerheads with one another. The common enemy is always trying to bring this about, and, of course, in bad luck a lot of things happen which play into the enemy’s hands. We must just make the best of things as they come along.

Here in London, which Herr Hitler says he will reduce to ashes, and which his aeroplanes are now bombarding, our people are bearing up unflinchingly. Our air force has more than held its own. We are waiting for the long-promised invasion. So are the fishes. But, of course, this for us is only the beginning. Now in 1940, in spite of occasional losses, we have, as ever, command of the seas. In 1941 we shall have the command of the air. Remember what that means. Herr Hitler with his tanks and other mechanical weapons, and also by Fifth Column intrigue with traitors, has managed to subjugate for the time being most of the finest races in Europe, and his little Italian accomplice is trotting along hopefully and hungrily, but rather wearily and very timidly, at his side. They both wish to carve up France and her Empire as if it were a fowl: to one a leg, to another a wing or perhaps part of the breast. Not only the French Empire will be devoured by these two ugly customers, but Alsace-Lorraine will go once again under the German yoke, and Nice, Savoy and Corsica – Napoleon’s Corsica – will be torn from the fair realm of France. But Herr Hitler is not thinking only of stealing other people’s territories, or flinging gobbets of them to his little confederate. I tell you truly what you must believe when I say this evil man, this monstrous abortion of hatred and defeat, is resolved on nothing less than the complete wiping out of the French nation, and the disintegration of its whole life and future. By all kinds of sly and savage means, he is plotting and working to quench for ever the fountain of characteristic French culture and of French inspiration to the world. All Europe, if he has his way, will be reduced to one uniform Bocheland, to be exploited, pillaged, and bullied by his Nazi gangsters. You will excuse my speaking frankly because this is not a time to mince words. It is not defeat that France will now be made to suffer at German hands, but the doom of complete obliteration. Army, Navy, Air Force, religion, law, language, culture, institutions, literature, history, tradition, all are to be effaced by the brute strength of a triumphant army and the scientific low-cunning of a ruthless Police Force.

Frenchmen – re-arm your spirits before it is too late. Remember how Napoleon said before one of his battles: “These same Prussians who are so boastful to-day were three to one at Jena, and six to one at Montmirail.” Never will I believe that the soul of France is dead! Never will I believe that her place amongst the greatest nations of the world has been lost for ever! All these schemes and crimes of Herr Hitler’s are bringing upon him and upon all who belong to his system a retribution which many of us will live to see. The story is not yet finished, but it will not be so long. We are on his track, and so are our friends across the Atlantic Ocean, and your friends across the Atlantic Ocean. If he cannot destroy us, we will surely destroy him and all his gang, and all their works. Therefore have hope and faith, for all will come right.

Now what is it we British ask of you in this present hard and bitter time? What we ask at this moment in our struggle to win the victory which we will share with you, is that if you cannot help us, at least you will not hinder us. Presently you will be able to weight the arm that strikes for you, and you ought to do so. But even now we believe that Frenchmen wherever they may be, feel their hearts warm and a proud blood tingle in their veins when we have some success in the air or on the sea, or presently – for that will come – upon the land.

Remember, we shall never stop, never weary, and never give in, and that our whole people and Empire have vowed themselves to the task of cleansing Europe from the Nazi pestilence and saving the world from the new Dark Ages. Do not imagine, as the German-controlled wireless tells you, that we English seek to take your ships and colonies. We seek to beat the life and soul out of Hitler and Hitlerism. That alone, that all the time, that to the end. We do not covet anything from any nation except their respect. Those Frenchmen who are in the French Empire, and those who are in so-called Unoccupied France, may see their way from time to time to useful action. I will not go into details. Hostile ears are listening. As for those, to whom English hearts go out in full, because they see them under the sharp discipline, oppression, and spying of the Hun – as to those Frenchmen in the occupied regions, to them I say, when they think of the future let them remember the words which Gambetta, that great Frenchman, uttered after 1870 about the future of France and what was to come: “Think of it always: speak of it never.”

Good night, then. Sleep to gather strength for the morning. For the morning will come. Brightly will it shine on the brave and true, kindly upon all who suffer for the cause, glorious upon the tombs of heroes. Thus will shine the dawn. Vive la France! Long live also the forward march of the common people in all the lands towards their just and true inheritance, and towards the broader and fuller age.

There is no doubt that this appeal went home to the hearts of millions of Frenchmen, and to this day I am reminded of it by men and women of all classes in France, who always treat me with the utmost kindness in spite of the hard things I had to do – sometimes to them – for our common salvation.

* * * * *

Indeed it was necessary to insist upon essentials. We could not relax the blockade of Europe, and particularly of France, while they remained under Hitler’s domination. Although from time to time to meet American wishes we allowed a few specified ships with medical stores to pass into Unoccupied France, we did not hesitate to stop and search all other ships seeking or coming out of French ports. Whatever Vichy might do for good or ill, we would not abandon de Gaulle or discourage accessions to his growing colonial domain. Above all we would not allow any portion of the French Fleet,’ now immobilised in French colonial harbours, to return to France. There were times when the Admiralty were deeply concerned lest France should declare war and thus add to their many cares. I always believed that once we had proved our resolve and ability to fight on indefinitely the spirit of the French people would never allow the Vichy Government to take so unnatural a step. Indeed, there was by now a strong enthusiasm and comradeship for Britain, and French hopes grew as the months passed. This was recognised even by M. Laval when he presently became Foreign Minister to Marshal Pétain.

As the autumn drew into winter I was concerned with the danger of the two great French battleships attempting to make their way back to Toulon, where they could be completed. President Roosevelt’s envoy, Admiral Leahy, had established intimate relations with Marshal Pétain. It was to Roosevelt, therefore, that I turned, and not in vain.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.

20.X.40.

We hear rumours from various sources that the Vichy Government are preparing their ships and colonial troops to aid the Germans against us. I do not myself believe these reports, but if the French Fleet at Toulon were turned over to Germany, it would be a very heavy blow. It would certainly be a wise precaution, Mr. President, if you would speak in the strongest terms to the French Ambassador emphasising the disapprobation with which the United States would view such a betrayal of the cause of democracy and freedom. They will pay great heed in Vichy to such a warning.

You will have seen what very heavy losses we have suffered in the northwestern approaches to our last two convoys.¹ This is due to our shortage of destroyers in the gap period I mentioned to you. Thank God your fifty are now coming along, and some will soon be in action. We ought to be much better off by the end of the year, as we have a lot of our own anti-U-boat vessels completing, but naturally we are passing through an anxious and critical period, with so many small craft having to guard against invasion in the Narrow Waters, and with the very great naval effort we are making in the Mediterranean, and the immense amount of convoy work.

The President in consequence sent a very severe personal message to the Pétain Government about the Toulon Fleet. “The fact,” he said, “that a Government is a prisoner of war of another Power does not justify such a prisoner in serving its conqueror in operations against its former ally.” He reminded the Marshal of the solemn assurances he had received that the French Fleet would not be surrendered. If the French Government attempted to permit the Germans to use the French Fleet in hostile operations against the British Fleet, such action would constitute a flagrant and deliberate breach of faith with the United States Government. Any agreement of that character would most definitely wreck the traditional friendship between the French and American peoples. It would create a wave of bitter indignation against France in American public opinion and would permanently end all American aid to the French people. If France pursued such a policy the United States could make no effort when the proper time came to secure for France the retention of her oversea possessions.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.

26.X.40.

Your cable with terms of splendid warning you gave the French crossed mine to you about a suggested message to Pétain. Most grateful for what you have already done, but everything still in balance. Foreign Office tell me they have cabled you our latest information of German terms, which Pétain is said to be resisting. In this connection the surrender of bases on the African shores for air or U-boats would be just as bad as surrender of ships. In particular Atlantic bases in bad hands would be a menace to you and a grievous embarrassment to us. I hope, therefore, you will make it clear to the French that your argument about ships applies also to the betrayal of bases.

In spite of the invasion threats and air attacks of the last five months, we have maintained a continuous flow of reinforcements round the Cape to Middle East, as well as sending modern aircraft and major units of the Fleet. I do not think the invasion danger is yet at an end, but we are now augmenting our eastern transferences. The strain is very great in both theatres, and all contributions will be thankfully received.

At this time the Admiralty were so deeply concerned about the dangers of a rupture with Vichy that they were inclined to underrate the disadvantages of letting the two French battleships return to Toulon. On this I gave directions.

Prime Minister to First Lord and First Sea Lord. (From the train.)

2.XI.40.

After the defection of France it was considered vital not to allow the Jean Bart and the Richelieu to fall into enemy hands, or to reach harbours where they could be completed. For this purpose you attacked the Richelieu and claimed to have disabled her to a very large extent. The Jean Bart is in an unfinished state, and neither ship can be fitted for action in the African harbours on the Atlantic, where they now lie. It is our decided policy not to allow these ships to pass into bad hands. I was therefore surprised to hear the First Sea Lord demur to the idea that the Jean Bart should be prevented from returning to Toulon, and argue in the sense that she might safely be allowed to do so. Toulon has always been judged by us to be an enemy-controlled harbour. It was for this reason that the most extreme efforts were made, unhappily without success, to prevent the Strasbourg reaching Toulon. I cannot reconcile this action with the apparent readiness to allow the Jean Bart to proceed there.

The Admiralty is held responsible for preventing the return of either of these two ships to French ports on the Atlantic, or to the Mediterranean, where they could be repaired and completed at Toulon, and then at any time betrayed to the Germans or captured by them.

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary. (From the train.)

2.XI.40.

I do not know how imminent the movement of the Jean Bart may be. I have informed the Admiralty that they are responsible for stopping her from entering the Mediterranean. It would seem, therefore, very important that you should give a clear warning to Vichy that the ship in question will be stopped, and if necessary sunk, if she attempts to go either to a German-controlled port in the Atlantic, or to a Mediterranean port which may at any time fall into German hands. My private office in London is sending you a copy of the Minute I have sent to the First Lord and the First Sea Lord.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.

10.XI.40.

1. We have been much disturbed by reports of intention of French Government to bring Jean Bart and Richelieu to Mediterranean for completion. It is difficult to exaggerate [the] potential danger if this were to happen, and so open the way for these ships to fall under German control. We should feel bound to do our best to prevent it.

2. We conveyed a warning to French Government through Ambassador at Madrid a few days ago, on the following lines: “Such a step would greatly increase the temptation to the Germans and Italians to seize the French Fleet. We doubt, not the good faith of the French Government, but their physical ability to implement their assurances that they will not let the Fleet fall into enemy hands. We particularly wish to avoid any clash between British and French naval forces, and therefore hope that if they had thought of moving the ships they will now refrain from doing so.”

3. As we said to French Government, we should not question good faith of assurances, but even if we accept assurances we can feel no security that they will in fact be able to maintain them once the ships are in French ports in the power or reach of the enemy, and I must confess that the desire of French Government to bring these ships back, if this turns out to be well-founded, seems to me to give cause for some suspicion.

4. It would be most helpful if you felt able to give a further warning at Vichy on this matter, for if things went wrong it might well prove of extreme danger for us both.

* * * * *

I kept in close touch with General de Gaulle.

Prime Minister to General de Gaulle (Libreville.)

10.XI.40.

I feel most anxious for consultation with you. Situation between France and Britain has changed remarkably since you left. A very strong feeling has grown throughout France in our favour, as it is seen that we cannot be conquered and that war will go on. We know Vichy Government is deeply alarmed by the very stern pressure administered to them by United States. On the other hand, Laval and revengeful Darlan are trying to force French declaration of war against us and rejoice in provoking minor naval incidents. We have hopes of Weygand in Africa, and no one must underrate advantage that would follow if he were rallied. We are trying to arrive at some modus vivendi with Vichy which will minimise the risk of incidents and will enable favourable forces in France to develop. We have told them plainly that, if they bomb Gibraltar or take other aggressive action, we shall bomb Vichy, and pursue the Vichy Government wherever it chooses to go. So far we have had no response. You will see how important it is that you should be here. I therefore hope you will be able to tidy up at Libreville and come home as soon as possible. Let me know your plans.

On November 13, the President replied to my message of the 10th about the possible transfer of the Jean Bart and Richelieu to the Mediterranean for completion. He had immediately instructed the American Chargé d’Affaires at Vichy to obtain a confirmation or denial of this report and to point out that it was of vital interest to the Government of the United States that these vessels should remain in stations where they would not be exposed to control or seizure by a Power which might employ them to ends in conflict with the interests of the United States in the future of the French Fleet. Any such step on the part of France would inevitably seriously prejudice Franco-American relations. He also offered to buy the ships from the French Government if they would sell them.

The President also informed me that Pétain had stated to the American Chargé d’Affaires that the most solemn assurances had been given by him that the French Fleet, including the two battleships, would never fall into the hands of Germany. The Marshal said he had given those assurances to the United States Government, to the British Government, and even to me personally.

Again I reiterate them [he said]. These ships will be used to defend the possessions and territories of France. Unless we are attacked by the British, they will never be used against England. Even if I wanted to, I cannot sell those ships. It is impossible under the terms of the armistice, and even if it were possible it would never be permitted by the Germans. France is under Germany’s heel and impotent. I would gladly sell them, if I were free, on condition that they be returned to us after the war, and save them for France in this way. I must repeat I have neither the right nor the possibility of selling them under present circumstances.

Marshal Pétain had made this statement with great seriousness, but with no sign of either surprise or resentment at the suggestion. President Roosevelt had further instructed the Chargé d’Affaires to inform Marshal Pétain that the American offer remained open both about these vessels as well as about any others in the French Navy.

On November 23, the President sent me further reassurances. Marshal Pétain had stated categorically that he would keep the vessels now at Dakar and Casablanca where they were, and that if there was any change in this plan he would give the President previous notice.

* * * * *

The attitude of Spain was of even more consequence to us than that of Vichy, with which it was so closely linked. Spain had much to give and even more to take away. We had been neutral in the sanguinary Spanish Civil War. General Franco owed little or nothing to us, but much – perhaps life itself – to the Axis Powers. Hitler and Mussolini had come to his aid. He disliked and feared Hitler. He liked and did not fear Mussolini. At the beginning of the World War, Spain had declared, and since then strictly observed, neutrality. A fertile and needful trade flowed between our two countries, and the iron ore from Biscayan ports was important for our munitions. But now in May the “Twilight War” was over. The might of Nazi Germany was proved. The French front was broken. The Allied armies of the North were in peril. It was at this moment that I had gladly offered to a former colleague, displaced by the Ministerial changes, a new sphere of responsibility, for which his gifts and temperament were suited. On May 17 Sir Samuel Hoare had been appointed Ambassador to Spain, and certainly I believe that no one could have carried out better this wearing, delicate, and cardinal five years’ mission. Thus we were very well represented at Madrid, not only by the Ambassador and by the Counsellor of the Embassy, Mr. Arthur Yencken,² but also by the Naval Attaché, Captain Hillgarth, who had retired from the Navy and lived in Majorca, but now returned to duty equipped with profound knowledge of Spanish affairs.

General Franco’s policy throughout the war was entirely selfish and cold-blooded. He thought only of Spain and Spanish interests. Gratitude to Hitler and Mussolini for their help never entered his head. Nor, on the other hand, did he bear any grudge to England for the hostility of our Left-Wing parties. This narrow-minded tyrant only thought about keeping his blood-drained people out of another war. They had had enough of war. A million men had been slaughtered by their brothers’ hands. Poverty, high prices, and hard times froze the stony peninsula. No more war for Spain and no more war for Franco! Such were the commonplace sentiments with which he viewed and met the awful convulsion which now shook the world.

His Majesty’s Government was quite content with this unheroic outlook. All we wanted was the neutrality of Spain. We wanted to trade with Spain. We wanted her ports to be denied to German and Italian submarines. We wanted not only an unmolested Gibraltar, but the use of the anchorage of Algeciras for our ships and the use of the ground which joins the Rock to the mainland for our ever-expanding air base. On these facilities depended in large measure our access to the Mediterranean. Nothing was easier than for the Spaniards to mount or allow to be mounted a dozen heavy guns in the hills behind Algeciras. They had a right to do so at any time, and, once mounted, they could at any moment be fired, and our naval and air bases would become unusable. The Rock might once again stand a long siege, but it would be only a rock. Spain held the key to all British enterprises in the Mediterranean, and never in the darkest hours did she turn the lock against us. So great was the danger that for nearly two years we kept constantly at a few days’ notice an expedition of over five thousand men and their ships, ready to seize the Canary Islands, by which we could maintain air and sea control over the U-boats, and contact with Australasia round the Cape, if ever the harbour of Gibraltar were denied to us by the Spaniards.

There was another very simple manner in which the Franco Government could have struck us this destructive blow. They could have allowed Hitler’s troops to traverse the Peninsula, besiege and take Gibraltar for them, and meanwhile themselves occupy Morocco and French North Africa. This became a deep anxiety after the French Armistice, when on June 27, 1940, the Germans reached the Spanish frontier in force, and proposed fraternal ceremonial parades in San Sebastian and in towns beyond the Pyrenees. Some German troops actually entered Spain. However, as the Duke of Wellington wrote in April, 1820 ³:

There is no country in Europe in the affairs of which foreigners can interfere with so little advantage as Spain. There is no country in which foreigners are so much disliked, and even despised, and whose manners and habits are so little congenial with those of other nations in Europe.

Now, a hundred and twenty years later, the Spaniards, reeling and quivering under the self-inflicted mutilations of the civil war, were even less sociable. They did not wish to have foreign armies marching about their country. Even if they were Nazi and Fascist in their ideology, these morose people would rather have the foreigners’ room than their company. Franco shared these feelings to the full, and in a most crafty manner he managed to give effect to them. We could admire his astuteness, especially as it was helpful to us.

* * * * *

Like everyone else, the Spanish Government was staggered by the sudden downfall of France and the expected collapse or destruction of Britain. Lots of people all over the world had reconciled themselves to the idea of the “New Order in Europe,” the “Herrenvolk,” and all that. Franco therefore indicated in June that he was prepared to join the victors and share in the distribution of the spoils. Partly from appetite, and partly also from prudence, he made it clear that Spain had large claims. But at this moment Hitler did not feel the need of allies. He, like Franco, expected that in a few weeks or even days general hostilities would cease and England would be suing for terms. He therefore showed little interest in the gestures of active solidarity from Madrid.

By August the scene had changed. It was certain that Britain would fight on and probable that the war would be lengthy. With the contemptuous British rejection of his “Peace Offer” of July 19, Hitler sought allies, and to whom should he turn but to the dictator he had helped and who had so lately offered to join him? But Franco also had a different outlook arising from the same causes. On August 8, the German Ambassador in Madrid informed Berlin that the Caudillo still held the same view, but that he had certain requests to make. First, the assurance that Gibraltar, French Morocco, and part of Algeria, including Oran, should be given to Spain, together with various expansions of territory in the Spanish African colonies. Adequate military and economic assistance would also be necessary, because Spain had only enough grain for eight months. Finally, Franco felt that the intervention of Spain should not take place until after the German landing in England, “in order to avoid too premature an entry into the war, and thus a duration which would be unbearable to Spain and in certain conditions a fountain of danger for the régime.” At the same time Franco wrote to Mussolini recapitulating Spanish claims and asking for his support. Mussolini replied on August 25 by urging the Caudillo “not to cut himself off from the history of Europe.” Hitler was embarrassed by the size of the Spanish claims, some of which would embroil him anew with Vichy. The taking of Oran from France would almost certainly lead to the setting-up of a hostile French Government in North Africa. He balanced the issue.

Meanwhile the days were passing. During September Great Britain seemed to be holding her own against the German air offensive. The transfer of the fifty American destroyers made a profound impression throughout Europe, and to Spain it seemed that the United States was moving nearer to the war. Franco and his Spaniards, therefore, pursued the policy of raising and defining their claims and making it clear that these must be agreed in advance. Supplies also must be provided, particularly a number of fifteen-inch howitzers for the Spanish batteries facing Gibraltar. All the while they paid the Germans in small coin. All the Spanish newspapers were Anglophobe. German agents were allowed to flaunt themselves all over Madrid. As the Spanish Foreign Minister, Beigbeder, was suspected of lack of enthusiasm for Germany, a special envoy, Serrano Suñer, head of the Falange, was sent on a formal visit to Berlin to smooth things over and preserve a sense of comradeship. Hitler harangued him at length, dwelling on the Spanish prejudices against the United States. The war, he suggested, might well turn into a war of continents – America against Europe. The islands off West Africa must be made secure. Later in the day Ribbentrop asked for a military base for Germany in the Canaries. Suñer, the pro-German and Falangist, refused even to discuss this, but dwelt incessantly upon Spanish needs for modern weapons and food and petrol, and for the satisfaction of her territorial demands at the expense of France. All this was necessary before Spain could realise her hopes of entering the war.

Ribbentrop went to Rome on September 19 to report and confer. He said that the Fuehrer thought the British attitude was “dictated by desperation, and also a complete failure to understand realities, as well as the hope of interventions by the Russians and the Americans.” Mussolini observed that “the United States are for all practical purposes at the side of England.” The sale of the fifty destroyers proved this. He advised an alliance with Japan to paralyse American action. “Although the American Navy can be considered large in the quantitative sense, it must be regarded as a dilettante organisation like the British Army….” The Duce continued:

There remains the problem of Yugoslavia and Greece. Italy has half a million men on the Yugoslav frontier, and two hundred thousand on the Greek frontier. The Greeks represent for Italy what the Norwegians represented for Germany before the action of April. It is necessary for us to proceed with the liquidation of Greece, all the more so as when our land forces will have advanced into Egypt, the English Fleet will not be able to remain at Alexandria, and will seek refuge in Greek ports.

At this point they both agreed that the principal object was to defeat England. The only question was, how? “Either the war,” said Mussolini, “will finish before the spring or be protracted into next year.” The second alternative now seemed to him the more probable, and the Spanish card must be played in the most effective way. Ribbentrop affirmed that a declaration of war by Spain following upon the alliance with Japan would be a new and formidable blow for England. But Suñer had not fixed any date.

* * * * *

While the Spaniards became less ardent and more acquisitive, Hitler felt an increased desire for their help. As early as August 15, General Jodl had pointed out that there were other means besides direct invasion by which England could be defeated, namely, prolonged air warfare, the stepping-up of U-boat warfare, the capture of Egypt and the capture of Gibraltar. Hitler was strongly in favour of the assault on Gibraltar. But the Spanish terms were too high, and also by the end of September, other ideas stirred his mind. On September 27, the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan was signed in Berlin. This opened wider fields.

* * * * *

The Fuehrer now decided to throw his personal influence into the scale. On October 4, he met Mussolini at the Brenner Pass. He spoke of the high demands and dilatory procedure of the Spanish Government. He feared that to give Spain what she asked would have two immediate consequences: an English occupation of the Spanish bases in the Canaries and the adhesion of the French Empire in North Africa to de Gaulle’s movement. This, he said, would force the Axis seriously to extend their own sphere of operations. On the other hand, he did not exclude the possibility of having the French armed forces on his side in a European campaign against Great Britain. Mussolini dilated on his plans for the conquest of Egypt. Hitler offered him special units for this attack. Mussolini did not think he needed them, at least before the final phase. On the Russian question Hitler remarked, “it is necessary to realise that my distrust of Stalin is equalled by his distrust of me.” In any case, Molotov was coming in a short time to Berlin, and it would be the Fuehrer’s task to direct Russian dynamism towards India.

On October 23, Hitler went all the way to the Franco-Spanish frontier at Hendaye to meet the Spanish dictator. Here the Spaniards, instead of being flattered by his condescension, demanded, according to Hitler’s account to Mussolini, “objectives absolutely out of proportion to their strength.” Spain demanded rectifications of the Pyrenees frontier, the cession of French Catalonia (French territory, once historically linked with Spain, but actually north of the Pyrenees), of Algeria from Oran to Cape Blanco, and virtually the whole of Morocco. The conversations, conducted through interpreters, lasted nine hours. They produced only a vague protocol and an arrangement for military conversations. “Rather than go through it again,” Hitler told Mussolini later at Florence, “I would prefer to have three or four of my teeth out.” ⁴

On the way back from Hendaye, the Fuehrer summoned Marshal Pétain to meet him at Montoire, near Tours. This interview had been prepared by Laval, who two days earlier had met Ribbentrop, and to his surprise Hitler, at this very place. Hitler and Laval both hoped to rally France to the defeat of Britain. The Marshal and most of his circle were at first shocked at this. But Laval portrayed the proposed meeting in glowing terms. When asked whether Hitler had initiated the idea, or whether it had been suggested to him, Laval replied:

What do you take him for? Do you think that Hitler needs a nurse? He has his own ideas, that man. He wants to see the Marshal. Besides, he has a great respect for him. This interview between the heads of the two States will be an historic event. In any case, something very different from a luncheon at Chequers.⁵

Pétain was converted to the plan. He thought that his personal prestige might weigh with Hitler, and that it was worth while giving him the impression that France would not be unwilling to “collaborate.” At ease in the West, Hitler might turn his thoughts and armies eastward.

The meeting took place in Hitler’s armoured train, near a tunnel, on the afternoon of October 24. “I am happy,” said the Fuehrer, “to shake hands with a Frenchman who is not responsible for this war.”

Little more than shameful civilities resulted. The Marshal regretted that close relations had not been developed between France and Germany before the war. Perhaps it was not yet too late. Hitler pointed out that France had provoked the war and was defeated. But his aim now was to crush England. Before the United States could help her effectively, Britain would be occupied or else reduced to a heap of ruins. His object was to end the war as quickly as possible, for there was no business less profitable than war. All Europe would have to pay the cost, and so all Europe had the same interest. To what extent would France help? Pétain conceded the principle of collaboration, but pleaded that he could not define its limits. A procès-verbal was drawn up by which, “in accord with the Duce, the Fuehrer manifested his determination to see France occupy in the New Europe the place to which she is entitled.” The Axis Powers and France had an identical interest, in seeing the defeat of England accomplished as soon as possible. Consequently, the French Government would support, within the limits of its ability, the measures which the Axis Powers might take for defence. Questions of detail would be settled by the Armistice Commission in concert with the French delegation. The Axis Powers would undertake that at the conclusion of peace with England France would retain in Africa a colonial domain “essentially equivalent to what she possessed at the moment.”

According to the German record, Hitler was disappointed. Even Laval had begged him not to press France to make war against Britain before French opinion was duly prepared. Hitler afterwards spoke of Laval as “a dirty little democratic politico”; but he carried away a more favourable impression of Marshal Pétain. The Marshal, however, is reported to have said, when he got back to Vichy, “It will take six months to discuss this programme, and another six months to forget it.” But the infamous transaction is not forgotten yet in France.

In October I had telegraphed to our Ambassador in Madrid:

Prime Minister to Sir Samuel Hoare.

19.X.40.

We admire the way in which you are dealing with your baffling task. I hope you will manage to convey to Vichy, through the French Ambassador, two root ideas. First, that we will let bygones go and work with anyone who convinces us of his resolution to defeat the common foes. Secondly, that as we are fighting for our lives as well as for a victory which will relieve simultaneously all the captive States, we shall stop at nothing. Try to make Vichy feel what we here all take for certain, namely, that we have got Hitler beat, and though he may ravage the Continent and the war may last a long time his doom is certain. It passes my comprehension why no French leaders secede to Africa, where they would have an empire, the command of the seas, and all the frozen French gold in the United States. If this had been done at the beginning we might well have knocked out Italy by now. But surely the opportunity is the most splendid ever offered to daring men. Naturally one would not expect precise responses to such suggestions, but try to put it into their heads if you see any opening.

The various reports which we received of Montoire did not alter my general view of what our attitude towards Vichy should be. Now in November I expressed my views to my colleagues in a memorandum.

14.XI.40.

Although revenge has no part in politics, and we should always be looking forward rather than looking back, it would be a mistake to suppose that a solution of our difficulties with Vichy will be reached by a policy of mere conciliation and forgiveness. The Vichy Government is under heavy pressure from Germany, and there is nothing that they would like better than to feel a nice, soft, cosy, forgiving England on their other side. This would enable them to win minor favours from Germany at our expense, and hang on as long as possible to see how the war goes. We, on the contrary, should not hesitate, when our interests require it, to confront them with difficult and rough situations, and make them feel that we have teeth as well as Hitler.

It must be remembered that these men have committed acts of baseness on a scale which have earned them the lasting contempt of the world, and that they have done this without the slightest authority from the French people. Laval is certainly filled by the bitterest hatred of England, and is reported to have said that he would like to see us “crabouillés,” which means squashed so as to leave only a grease-spot. Undoubtedly, if he had had the power, he would have marketed the unexpected British resistance with his German masters to secure a better price for French help in finishing us off. Darlan is mortally envenomed by the injury we have done to his Fleet. Pétain has always been an anti-British defeatist, and is now a dotard. The idea that we can build on such men is vain. They may, however, be forced by rising opinion in France and by German severities to change their line in our favour. Certainly we should have contacts with them. But in order to promote such favourable tendencies we must make sure the Vichy folk are kept well ground between the upper and nether millstones of Germany and Britain. In this way they are most likely to be brought into a more serviceable mood during the short run which remains to them.

* * * * *

Marshal Pétain became increasingly resentful of Laval’s prodding him along the road which would lead to war with Britain and German occupation of the North African Colonies. On December 13, Laval arrived at Vichy with the proposal that Pétain should come to Paris to be present at the ceremonial transfer of the ashes of Napoleon’s son, the Duke of Reichstadt (“L’Aiglon”), to the Invalides. This was Hitler’s flowery idea of a solemn consecration of the entente reached at Montoire.

Pétain was not, however, attracted by a parade where the victor of Verdun would be exhibited on French soil with German guards of honour before the tomb of the Emperor Napoleon. He was, moreover, both wearied and fearful of Laval’s methods and aims. Members of Pétain’s staff, therefore, arranged the arrest of Laval. Energetic German intervention procured his release, but Pétain refused to accept him back as Minister. Laval retired in wrath to German-occupied Paris. I was glad that M. Flandin took his place as Foreign Minister. These events marked a change at Vichy. It seemed that the limits of collaboration had at last been reached. There were at this moment hopes of better French relations with Britain and of more sympathetic understanding for Vichy from the United States.

* * * * *

It is convenient to carry the Spanish story forward at this point. Franco, now convinced of a long war and of the Spanish abhorrence of any more war, and by no means sure of a German victory, used every device of exasperating delay and exorbitant demands. He was by this time so sure of Suñer that on October 18 he made him Foreign Minister, representing the removal of Beigbeder as a proof of his devotion to the Axis. In November, Suñer was summoned to Berchtes-gaden, and Hitler expressed his impatience with Spain’s delay in coming into the war. By now the Battle of Britain had been lost by the German Air Force. Italy was already involved in Greece and in North Africa. Serrano Suñer did not respond as was wished. He dwelt lengthily instead upon the economic difficulties of the Peninsula. Three weeks later, Admiral Canaris, Chief of the German Secret Service, was sent to Madrid to arrange the details of Spain’s entry into the war. He suggested that the German troops should pass the Spanish frontier on January 10, in preparation for an attack on Gibraltar on January 30. The Admiral was surprised when Franco told him that it was impossible for Spain to enter the war on the date mentioned. It seemed that the Caudillo feared the loss of Atlantic islands and Spanish colonies to the British Navy. He also emphasised the lack of food and the inability of Spain to stand a protracted war. As the German landing in England seemed indefinitely postponed, Franco introduced a new condition. He would not move, at any rate, until Suez was in Axis hands, since not till then would he feel sure that Spain would not be involved in long-drawn-out hostilities.

On February 6, 1941, Hitler wrote a letter to Franco, appealing in strong and urgent terms that he should play the man without further delay. Franco replied, expressing his undying loyalty. He urged that preparations for the attack on Gibraltar should be continued with renewed vigour. As another new point he declared that only Spanish troops with German equipment must be used for this enterprise. Even if all this was arranged, Spain could not enter the war for economic reasons. Ribbentrop thereupon reported to the Fuehrer that Franco had no intention of making war. Hitler was scandalised, but, being now set upon the invasion of Russia, he did not perhaps like the idea of trying Napoleon’s other unsuccessful enterprise, the invasion of Spain, at the same time. Considerable Spanish forces were now gathered along the Pyrenees, and he felt it was wiser to stick to his method with nations, “One by One.” Thus by subtlety and trickery and blandishments of all kinds Franco succeeded in tiding things over and keeping Spain out of the war, to the inestimable advantage of Britain when she was all alone.

We could not count upon this at the time, and I urged the President to do all in his power to help forward the policy of conciliation.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.

23.XI.40.

Our accounts show that situation in Spain is deteriorating and that the Peninsula is not far from starvation point. An offer by you of food month by month so long as they keep out of the war might be decisive. Small things do not count now, and this is a time for very plain talk to them. The occupation by Germany of both sides of the Straits would be a grievous addition to our naval strain, already severe. The Germans would soon have batteries working by radar [i.e., they could aim in the darkness], which would close the Straits both by night and day. With a major campaign developing in the Eastern Mediterranean and the need to reinforce and supply our armies there all round the Cape, we could not contemplate any military action on the mainland at or near the Straits. The Rock of Gibraltar will stand a long siege, but what is the good of that if we cannot use the harbour or pass the Straits? Once in Morocco, the Germans will work southward, and U-boats and aircraft will soon be operating freely from Casablanca and Dakar. I need not, Mr. President, enlarge upon the trouble this will cause to us, or the approach of trouble to the Western Hemisphere. We must gain as much time as possible.

This great danger had in fact passed away, and, though we did not know it, it passed forever. It is fashionable at the present time to dwell on the vices of General Franco, and I am, therefore, glad to place on record this testimony to the duplicity and ingratitude of his dealings with Hitler and Mussolini. I shall presently record even greater services which these evil qualities in General Franco rendered to the Allied cause.