12
October–November, 1940
Mussolini’s Decision to Attack Greece — His Letter to Hitler of October 19 — The Florence Conference — The Italian Invasion of Greece, October 28, 1940 — Reinforcement of Admiral Cunningham’s Fleet — The Arrival of the “Illustrious” — Our Obligations — Importance of Crete — Telegrams to Mr. Eden — Air Support for Greece — Minute to Chief of the Air Staff, November 2, 1940 — Wavell-Wilson Plans for an Offensive in Libya — Secrecy Causes Misunderstanding — Further Telegrams to Mr. Eden — Greek Need for the Cretan Division — Mr. Eden’s Latest Telegrams — His Return — He Unfolds “Operation Compass” — General Agreement — War Cabinet Approves — The Fleet Air Arm Attack the Italian Fleet — Gallant Exploit at Taranto — Half the Italian Fleet Disabled for Six Months — Naval Dispositions — My Desire for an Amphibious Feature in “Compass” — My Telegram to Wavell of November 26 — Policy Towards Turkey — An Improved Situation — Shortcomings at Suda Bay — Death of Mr. Chamberlain — A Tribute to His Memory.
A FRESH, though not entirely unexpected outrage by Mussolini, with baffling problems and far-reaching consequences to all our harassed affairs, now broke upon the Mediterranean scene.
The Duce took the final decision to attack Greece on October 15, 1940. That morning a meeting of the Italian war leaders was held in the Palazzo Venezia. He opened the proceedings in the following words:
The object of this meeting is to define the course of action – in general terms – which I have decided to initiate against Greece. In the first instance this action will have aims of both a maritime and territorial character. The territorial aims will be based on the possession of the whole coast of Southern Albania … and the Ionian islands – Zante, Cephalonia, and Corfu – and the occupation of Salonika. When we have attained these objectives, we shall have improved our position vis-à-vis England in the Mediterranean. In the second instance … the complete occupation of Greece, in order to put her out of action and to assure that in all circumstances she will remain in our politico-economic sphere.
Having thus defined the question, I have laid down the date – which in my opinion must not be postponed even for an hour – and that is for the 26th of this month. This is an action which I have matured at length for months, before our entry into the war and before the beginning of the conflict…. I would add that I foresee no complications in the north. Yugoslavia has every interest to keep quiet…. I also exclude complications from the side of Turkey, particularly since Germany has established herself in Rumania and since Bulgaria has increased her strength. The latter can play a part in our game, and I shall take the necessary steps so as not to miss the present unique opportunity for achieving her aspirations in Macedonia and for an outlet to the sea….1
On October 19, Mussolini wrote to Hitler telling him of the decision to which he had come. Hitler was then on his journey to Hendaye and Montoire. The letter (the text of which has not come to light) seems to have followed him round. When it finally reached him, he at once proposed to Mussolini a meeting to discuss the general political situation in Europe. This meeting took place in Florence on October 28. That morning the Italian attack on Greece had begun.
It seems, however, that Hitler did not choose to make an issue of the Greek adventure. He said politely that Germany was in accord with the Italian action in Greece, and then proceeded to tell the tale of his meetings with Franco and Pétain. There can be no doubt that he did not like what had been done by his associate. A few weeks later, after the Italian attack was checked, he wrote to Mussolini in his letter of November 20: “When I asked you to receive me at Florence I began the journey with the hope of being able to expound my views before the threatened action against Greece had been taken, about which I had heard only in general terms.” In the main, however, he accepted the decision of his ally.
* * * * *
Before dawn on October 28, the Italian Minister in Athens presented an ultimatum to General Metaxas, the Premier of Greece. Mussolini demanded that the whole of Greece should be opened to Italian troops. At the same time the Italian army in Albania invaded Greece at various points. The Greek Government, whose forces were by no means unready on the frontier, rejected the ultimatum. They also invoked the guarantee given by Mr. Chamberlain on April 13, 1939. This we were bound to honour. By the advice of the War Cabinet, and from his own heart, His Majesty replied to the King of the Hellenes: “Your cause is our cause; we shall be fighting against a common foe.” I responded to the appeal of General Metaxas: “We will give you all the help in our power. We will fight a common foe and we will share a united victory.” This undertaking was during a long story made good.
* * * * *
Although we were still heavily outnumbered on paper by the Italian Fleet, marked improvements had been made in our Mediterranean strength. During September the Valiant, the armoured-deck aircraft-carrier Illustrious, and two A.A. cruisers had come safely through the Mediterranean to join Admiral Cunningham at Alexandria. Hitherto his ships had always been observed and usually bombed by the greatly superior Italian Air Force. The Illustrious, with her modern fighters and latest radar equipment, by striking down patrols and assailants gave a new secrecy to the movements of our Fleet. This advantage was timely. Apart from a few air squadrons, a British mission and perhaps some token troops, we had nothing to give; and even these trifles were a painful subtraction from ardent projects already lighting in the Libyan theatre. One salient strategic fact leaped out upon us – CRETE! The Italians must not have it. We must get it first – and at once. It was fortunate that at this moment Mr. Eden was in the Middle East, and that I thus had a Ministerial colleague on the spot with whom to deal. He was about to return home after his conference with General Smuts at Khartoum. I telegraphed to him:
29.X.40.
I recognise importance of your conference with Smuts, but hope first Wavell, and thereafter you, will return at earliest to Cairo.
We here are all convinced an effort should be made to establish ourselves in Crete, and that risks should be run for this valuable prize. You will have seen the Service telegrams on this subject.
|
Prime Minister to Mr. Eden [at Khartoum]. |
29.X.40. |
It seems of prime importance to hold the best airfield possible and a naval fuelling base at Suda Bay. Successful defence of Crete is invaluable aid to defence of Egypt. Loss of Crete to [the] Italians [would be a] grievous aggravation [of] all Mediterranean difficulties. So great a prize is worth the risk, and almost equal to [a] successful offensive in Libya. Pray, after an examination of whole problem with Wavell and Smuts, do not hesitate to make proposals for action on large scale at expense of other sectors, and ask for any further aid you require from here, including aircraft and anti-aircraft [batteries]. We are studying how to meet your need. Consider your return to Cairo indispensable.
At the invitation of the Greek Government, Suda Bay, the best harbour in Crete, was occupied by our forces two days later.
|
Prime Minister to C.I.G.S. |
30.X.40. |
What steps are we taking to get news from the Greek front? Have we observers there? What is our attaché there doing?
Why do you not send one of your generals from Egypt at the head of a military mission to be at the headquarters of the Greek field army? Let them go and see the fighting and give us some close-up information about the relative merits of the two armies. I expect to have a good wire every day or so, telling us exactly what is happening, as far as the Greeks will allow it.
|
Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee. |
30.X.40. |
There is no objection to two battalions going to Freetown, pending their relief by the West African Brigade, after which they can go on to Egypt. They are not to leave England until it is agreed that the West African Brigade is to go to West Africa.
Both Crete and Malta come before Freetown in A.A. guns, and I cannot approve of this diversion at the present time. Neither can I agree to the diversion of a fighter squadron [for Freetown] at this stage. The Navy is responsible for preventing any sea-borne expedition attacking our West African colonies. As to the air attack, if the French bomb Freetown or Bathurst, we will bomb Vichy. I do not think this will happen.
|
Prime Minister to Air Vice-Marshal Longmore.2 |
1.XI.40. |
[In dispatching a Blenheim squadron to Greece] you have taken a very bold and wise decision. I hope to reinforce you as soon as possible.
|
Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.A.S. and for C.O.S. Committee. |
1.XI.40. |
I should propose to make immediate arrangements to send four additional heavy bomber squadrons (including the one already sent to Malta) to the Middle East at once, and also four Hurricane fighter squadrons. Let me see plans for this movement. I should like to have a report on this today.
|
Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee. |
1.XI.40. |
Mr. Eden has asked for ten thousand rifles for the Middle East. Can we not supply these out of the American packet, or is there any small parcel of rifles anywhere in the world to be picked up?
|
Prime Minister to C.A.S. |
2.XI.40. |
1. I had in mind that the four bomber squadrons would fly to Crete or Greece via Malta. The personnel and ground stores would have to be carried through by cruiser. It is essential to have these squadrons operating at the earliest from bases in Greek territory upon the Italian Fleet at Taranto, and generally against Southern For so vital an operation of war the Navy would have to make special exertions, and you should not assume that a ship will not be forthcoming, at any rate for such ground personnel, stores, etc., as are necessary to come into action at this very critical time. I see more difficulty in the vehicles, but perhaps some could come from Egypt, and the rest be improvised.
2. The fighters are, of course, more difficult, but I should hope that they could fly from a carrier to Malta, as was done last time. If necessary, the Furious would have to help the Ark Royal. Could they fly from Malta to an aerodrome in Greece? If not, could they fly on to a carrier to refuel, and thence to Greece? In the case of the fighters the same arrangements would have to be made about stores, ground personnel, etc., as with the bombers.
|
Prime Minister to Mr. Eden [at G.H.Q., Middle East]. |
2.XI.40. |
Greek situation must be held to dominate others now. We are well aware of our slender resources. Aid to Greece must be attentively studied lest whole Turkish position is lost through proof that England never tries to keep her guarantees. I invite you to stay in Cairo for at least another week while these questions are being studied and we make sure we have done our best from both ends. Meanwhile, another thirty thousand men are reaching you by November 15, which must affect local situation in Egypt.
During Mr. Eden’s earlier conferences and talks with General Wavell and also with General Wilson, he posed the question, What action was intended if the Italian offensive did not develop? He was told in extreme secrecy that a plan was being made to attack the Italians in the Western Desert instead of waiting for them to open their offensive against Mersa Matruh. Neither he nor Wavell imparted these ideas to me or to the Chiefs of Staff. General Wavell begged the Secretary of State for War not to send any telegram on this subject, but to tell us verbally about it when he got home. Thus for some weeks we remained without knowledge of the way their minds were moving. It is clear from my message of October 26 that any forestalling operation on a large scale in the Western Desert would command my keen support. We were all, however, until Mr. Eden’s return left under the impression that Wavell and Wilson were still wedded to the defensive battle at Mersa Matruh, and would wait there until they were attacked. The only action they seemed to contemplate in this extremely serious crisis was to send a battalion or so to Crete, a few air squadrons to Greece, and make some minor diversions against the Dodecanese and a small though desirable offensive in the Soudan. This seemed by no means good enough employment for the very large forces with which, at great risk, exertion, and cost, we had furnished them.
Our correspondence during this period was thus on both sides based upon misunderstanding. Wavell and the Secretary of State thought that for the sake of giving ineffectual aid to Greece we were pressing them to dissipate the forces they were gathering for an offensive in the Western Desert. We, on the other hand, not crediting them with offensive intentions, objected to their standing idle or trifling at such a crucial moment. In fact, as will presently be seen, we were all agreed. On November 1, indeed, Mr. Eden telegraphed cryptically:
We cannot from Middle East forces send sufficient air or land reinforcements to have any decisive influence upon course of fighting in Greece. To send such forces from here, or to divert reinforcements now on their way or approved, would imperil our whole position in the Middle East and jeopardise plans for an offensive operation now being laid in more than one theatre.3 After much painful effort and at the cost of grave risks we have, so far as our land forces are concerned, now built up a reasonably adequate defensive 3 force here. We should presently be in a position to undertake certain offensive operations which if successful may have far-reaching effects on the course of the war as a whole. It would surely be bad strategy to allow ourselves to be diverted from this task, and unwise to employ our forces in fragments in a theatre of war where they cannot be decisive…. The best way in which we can help Greece is by striking at Italy, and we can do that most effectively from areas where our strength has been developed and where our plans are laid. I am anxious to put before you in detail at the earliest date the dispositions and plans which have been worked out here, and propose … to return home by the shortest route, leaving on the 3d.
This telegram crossed one from me to him at Khartoum which afterwards had to be repeated back to Cairo, whither he had repaired.
|
Prime Minister to Mr. Eden [at G.H.Q., Middle East]. |
3.XI.40. |
Gravity and consequence of Greek situation compels your presence in Cairo. However unjust it may be, collapse of Greece without any effort by us will have deadly effect on Turkey and on future of war. Greeks probably as good as Italians, and Germans not yet on the spot. Establishment of fuelling base and airfield in Crete to be steadily developed into permanent war fortresses [is] indispensable. This is being done. But surely effort must be made to aid Greece directly, even if only with token forces. Quite understand how everyone with you is fixed on idea of set-piece battle at Mersa Matruh. For that very reason it is unlikely to occur. Enemy will await completion pipeline and development of larger forces than are now concentrated. Your difficulties in attacking across the desert obvious, but if you have no major offensive of your own in Libya possible during next two months, then you should run risks to stimulate Greek resistance. Over seventy thousand men sent to Middle East Command since June and thirty thousand reaching you before November 15, fifty-three thousand by end of the year. Armoured regiments have started in big convoy yesterday. Cannot therefore believe that various minor offensives of which you speak, plus major defence at Mersa Matruh, will outvalue need of effective action in Greece.
No one will thank us for sitting tight in Egypt with ever-growing forces while Greek situation and all that hangs on it is cast away. Loss of Athens far greater injury than Kenya and Khartoum, but no necessity for such a price to be paid. Read carefully Palairet’s (our minister in Athens) telegrams. New emergencies must be met in war as they come, and local views must not subjugate main issue. No one expected Italy so late in the year would attack Greece. Greece, resisting vigorously with reasonable aid from Egypt and England, might check invaders. I am trying to send substantial bomber and fighter reinforcements to Crete and Greece, flying from England, with stores by cruiser. If this proves feasible details will be cabled tomorrow or Monday. Trust you will grasp situation firmly, abandoning negative and passive policies and seizing opportunity which has come into our hands. “Safety first” is the road to ruin in war, even if you had the safety, which you have not. Send me your proposals earliest, or say you have none to make.
And again:
4.XI.40.
We are sending you air reinforcements, arriving as fully explained in accompanying message from Chiefs of Staff. Send at once to Greece one Gladiator squadron and two more Blenheim squadrons, three in all. If necessary send a second battalion to Crete. Agreeably with arrival of our air reinforcements aforesaid and at earliest send one more Gladiator squadron. Anti-aircraft guns for airfields in Greece should precede arrival of squadrons.
It was proposed at this time to ask the Greeks to keep their Cretan division in the island. I therefore minuted:
|
Prime Minister to C.I.G.S. |
6.XI.40. |
It will be difficult to deny the Greeks the use of this Cretan division. If that be so, we shall certainly have to put more troops on the island. It is important that there should be a certain number of troops, and that it should be thought by the enemy that we are landing considerable numbers. The area to be watched is very extensive, and the consequences of a counter-attack would be most disastrous.
Pray let me know your views.
|
Prime Minister to C.I.G.S. |
7.XI.40. |
We shall render poor service to Greece if in consequence of our using Crete for our own purposes we deny them the use of two-thirds of their Fifth Division. The defence of Crete depends on the Navy, but nevertheless there must be a certain deterrent force of troops on shore. I doubt if the two battalions of British and the three remaining Greek battalions will be sufficient. I am much obliged to you for telegraphing as I asked to General Wavell. He must provide in meal or in malt:
(1) Three or four thousand additional British troops and a dozen guns. These need not be fully equipped or mobile.
(2) He must do this from forces which he will not be using in the possibly impending battle.
(3) We must tell the Greeks we release [for service with their main army] the six battalions and the artillery of the Fifth Greek Division.
Every effort should be made to rush arms or equipment to enable a reserve division of Greeks to be formed in Crete. Rifles and machine guns are quite sufficient in this case. To keep a Greek division out of the battle on the Epirus front would be very bad, and to lose Crete because we had not sufficient bulk of forces there would be a crime.
It was time Mr. Eden should come home to report to us as he earnestly desired. The following telegrams are self-explanatory:
|
Mr. Eden to Prime Minister. |
3.XI.40. |
All strongly of the opinion I should return home as rapidly as possible in order to put whole position as seen from here before you. Earnestly hope you will agree to this. Propose to leave tomorrow morning. Perfectly prepared to fly back here if required after I have seen you, but am convinced that this meeting between us is most urgent. It is impossible to explain position and plans fully by telegram.
Please reply urgently.
Assent was given, and the Secretary of State began his journey. The following points were made in his simultaneous telegrams to me:
Conference [in Cairo] discussed situation in Crete. Admiral Cunningham emphasised the value of possession of Crete to us as a means of securing Eastern Mediterranean and of interfering with Italian transit traffic to North Africa. It would not, however, be possible to base fleet on Suda Bay for more than a few hours at a time at present owing to lack of anti-submarine protection.
He does not consider Italian attempt to take Crete is to be anticipated in the near future, nor unless and until Greece is overrun. He and Wavell have concerted arrangements for sending at once to Crete a part of the reinforcements referred to in my telegram of November 1. Admiral Cunningham does not consider it is necessary to keep any large British military garrison in Crete, and is convinced that once the Cretans are organised, one battalion, together with anti-aircraft defences, would suffice. We then discussed the general question of help to Greece. As we said on September 22, “any assistance we may be able to give to Greece cannot be given until German-Italian threat to Egypt is finally liquidated, the security of Egypt being vital to our strategy and incidentally to the future of Greece.” …
Chief cry for help is for air reinforcements. Number 30 Blenheim Squadron left today for Athens. Longmore again emphasised his extreme reluctance to add any more squadrons to the Greek commitment in present conditions. He feels that to do so would lead to a large wastage of his aircraft from Italian attack whilst the aircraft are on Greek or Cretan aerodromes unprepared with protecting pens, adequate ground anti-aircraft defence, and other precautions of such nature, which are difficult to improvise at short notice….In general all Commanders-in-Chief were strongly of the opinion that the defence of Egypt is of paramount importance to our whole position in the Middle East. They consider that from the strategical point of view the security of Egypt is the most urgent commitment, and must take precedence of attempts to prevent Greece being overrun. It is also essential if we are to retain the support of Turkey….
He added in my private cipher the following:
5.XI.40.
Although reinforcements ordered in Chiefs of Staffs’ telegrams involve additional risks in Western Desert and probably increased casualties, these risks must be faced in view of political commitments to aid Greece. Withdrawal, though it will hamper arrangements made in Western Desert, will not entirely dislocate them. But any increase in commitment or attempt to hasten rate of despatch to Greece beyond that now laid down will mean serious risk to our position in Egypt. Uncertain factor still remains date by which air reinforcements, particularly fighters, arrive in Egypt to replace those sent to Greece. Experience hitherto shows that previous forecasts have not been fulfilled and time-table is sadly behind. Now feel that there is nothing further I can do here, and propose leave tomorrow morning by air.
* * * * *
The Secretary of State for War got back home on November 8, and came that evening after the usual raid had begun to see me in my temporary underground abode in Piccadilly. He brought with him the carefully guarded secret which I wished I had known earlier. Nevertheless, no harm had been done. Mr. Eden unfolded in considerable detail to a select circle, including the C.I.G.S. and General Ismay, the offensive plan which General Wavell and General Wilson had conceived and prepared. No longer were we to await in our fortified lines at Mersa Matruh an Italian assault, for which defensive battle such long and artful preparations had been made. On the contrary, within a month or so we were ourselves to attack. The operation was to be called “Compass.”
As will be seen from the map, Marshal Graziani’s Italian army, then above eighty thousand strong, which had crossed the Egyptian frontier, was spread over a fifty-mile front in a series of fortified camps, which were separated by wide distances and not mutually supporting, and with no depth in the system. Between the enemy’s right flank at Sofafi and his next camp at Nibeiwa there was a gap of over twenty miles. The plan was to make an offensive spring through this gap, and, turning towards the sea, attack Nibeiwa camp and the Tummar group of camps in succession from the west – that is to say, from the rear. Meanwhile, both the Sofafi camps and the camp at Meiktila, on the coast, were to be contained by light forces. For this purpose there were to be employed the 7th Armoured Division, the 4th Indian Division, now complete, and the 16th British Infantry Brigade, together with a composite force from the garrison of Mersa Matruh. This plan involved a serious risk, but also offered a glittering prize. The risk lay in the launching of all our best troops into the heart of the enemy’s position by a move of seventy miles on two successive nights over the open desert, and with the peril of being observed and attacked from the air during the intervening day. Besides this, the food and petrol had to be nicely calculated, and if the time-scale went wrong the consequences must be grave.
The prize was worthy of the hazard. The arrival of our vanguard on the sea at Buq Buq or thereabouts would cut the communications of three-quarters of Marshal Graziani’s army. Attacked by surprise from the rear, they might well be forced as a result of vigorous fighting into mass surrenders. In this case the Italian front would be irretrievably broken. With all their best troops captured or destroyed, no force would be left capable of withstanding a further onslaught, nor could any organised retreat be made to Tripoli along the hundreds of miles of coastal road.
Here, then, was the deadly secret which the Generals had talked over with their Secretary of State for War. This was what they had not wished to telegraph. We were all delighted. I purred like six cats. Here was something worth doing. It was decided there and then, subject to the agreement of the Chiefs of Staff and the War Cabinet, to give immediate sanction and all possible support to this splendid enterprise, and that it should take first place in all our thoughts and have, amid so many other competing needs, first claim upon our strained resources.
In due course these proposals were brought before the War Cabinet. I was ready to state the case or have it stated. But when my colleagues learned that the Generals on the spot and the Chiefs of Staff were in full agreement with me and Mr. Eden, they declared that they did not wish to know the details of the plan, that the fewer who knew them the better, and that they whole-heartedly approved the general policy of the offensive. This was the attitude which the War Cabinet adopted on several important occasions, and I record it here that it may be a model, should similar dangers and difficulties arise in future times.
* * * * *
The Italian Fleet had not reacted in any way against our occupation of Crete, but Admiral Cunningham had for some time been anxious to strike a blow at them with his now augmented naval air forces as they lay in their main base at Taranto. The attack was delivered on November 11 as the climax of a well-concerted series of operations, during which Malta received troops, and further naval reinforcements, including the battleship Barham, two cruisers, and three destroyers, reached Alexandria. Taranto lies in the heel of Italy three hundred and twenty miles from Malta. Its magnificent harbour was heavily defended against all modern forms of attack. The arrival at Malta of some fast reconnaissance machines enabled us to discern our prey. The British plan was to fly two waves of aircraft from the Illustrious, the first of twelve and the second of nine, of which eleven were to carry torpedoes, and the rest either bombs or flares. The Illustrious released her aircraft shortly after dark from a point about a hundred and seventy miles from Taranto. For an hour the battle raged amid fire and destruction among the Italian ships. Despite the heavy flak, only two of our aircraft were shot down. The rest flew safely back to the Illustrious.
By this single stroke the balance of naval power in the Mediterranean was decisively altered. The air photographs showed that three battleships, one of them the new Littorio, had been torpedoed, and in addition one cruiser was reported hit and much damage inflicted on the dockyard. Half the Italian battle fleet was disabled for at least six months, and the Fleet Air Arm could rejoice at having seized by their gallant exploit one of the rare opportunities presented to them.
An ironic touch is imparted to this event by the fact that on this very day the Italian Air Force at the express wish of Mussolini had taken part in the air attack on Great Britain. An Italian bomber force, escorted by about sixty fighters attempted to bomb Allied convoys in the Medway. They were intercepted by our fighters, eight bombers and five fighters being shot down. This was their first and last intervention in our domestic affairs. They might have found better employment defending their fleet at Taranto.
* * * * *
I kept the President well informed:
|
Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. |
16.X1.40. |
I am sure you will have been pleased about Taranto. The three uninjured Italian battleships have quitted Taranto today, which perhaps means they are withdrawing to Trieste.
And again:
|
Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt. |
21.XI.40. |
You may be interested to receive the following naval notes on the action at Taranto which I have asked the Admiralty to prepare:
1. This attack had been in Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean’s mind for some time; he had intended to carry it out on October 21 (Trafalgar Day), when the moon was suitable, but a slight mishap to Illustrious led to a postponement. During his cruise in the Central Mediterranean on October 31 and November 1, it was again considered, but the moon did not serve and it was thought an attack with parachute flares would be less effective. Success in such an attack was believed to depend on state of moon, weather, an undetected approach by the Fleet, and good reconnaissance. The latter was provided by flying-boats and a Glenn Martin squadron working from Malta. On the night of November 11/12, all the above conditions were met. Unfavourable weather in the Gulf of Taranto prevented a repetition on 12th/13th.
2. Duplex pistols were used, and probably contributed to the success of the torpedo attack.
3. The Greek Ambassador at Angora reported on November 11 that Italian Fleet was concentrating at Taranto in preparation for an attack on Corfu. Reconnaissance on November 13 shows that undamaged battleships and eight-inch-gun cruisers have left Taranto – presumably owing to the attack on 11th/12th.
* * * * *
I now addressed General Wavell.
|
Prime Minister to General Wavell. |
14.XI.40. |
Chiefs of Staff, Service Ministers, and I have examined general situation in the light of recent events. Italian check on Greek front; British naval success against battle fleet at Taranto; poor showing Italian airmen have made over here; encouraging reports received of low morale in Italy; Gallabat; your own experiences by contacts in Western Desert; above all, the general political situation, make it very desirable to undertake operation of which you spoke to Secretary of State for War.
It is unlikely that Germany will leave her flagging ally unsupported indefinitely. Consequently, it seems that now is the time to take risks and strike the Italians by land, sea, and air. You should act accordingly in concert with other Commanders-in-Chief.
|
Prime Minister to General Wavell. |
26.XI.40. |
News from every quarter must have impressed on you the importance of Compass in relation to whole Middle East position, including Balkans and Turkey, to French attitude in North Africa, to Spanish attitude, now trembling on the brink, to Italy, in grievous straits, and generally to the whole war. Without being over-sanguine, I cannot repress strong feelings of confidence and hope, and feel convinced risks inseparable from great deeds are fully justified.
2. Have asked Admiralty to inquire about part assigned to Fleet. If success is achieved, presume you have plans for exploiting it to the full. I am having a Staff study made of possibilities open to us, if all goes well, for moving fighting troops and also reserve forward by sea in long hops along the coast, and setting-up new supply bases to which pursuing armoured vehicles and units might resort. Without wishing to be informed on details, I should like to be assured that all this has been weighed, explored, and as far as possible prepared.
It seems difficult to believe that Hitler will not be forced to come to the rescue of his partner, and obviously German plans may be far advanced for a drive through Bulgaria at Salonika. From several quarters we have reports in that Germans do not approve of Mussolini’s adventure, and that they are inclined to let him pay the price himself. This makes me all the more suspicious that something bad is banking up ready to be let off soon. Every day’s delay is in our favour. It might be that Compass would in itself determine action of Yugoslavia and Turkey, and anyhow, in event of success, we should be able to give Turkey far greater assurances of early support than it has been in our power to do so far. One may indeed see possibility of centre of gravity in Middle East shifting suddenly from Egypt to the Balkans, and from Cairo to Constantinople. You are no doubt preparing your mind for this, and a Staff study is being made here.
As we told you the other day, we shall stand by you and Wilson in any well-conceived action irrespective of result, because no one can guarantee success in war, but only deserve it.
Tell Longmore that I much admire his calling-in of the southern squadrons and accepting the risk of punishment there. If all is well Furious and her outfit should reach Takoradi tomorrow. This should make amends for all the feathers we have had to pull out of him for Greece, where the part played by R.A.F. in Greek victories has been of immense military and political consequence. All good wishes to you both, and to the Admiral, who is doing so splendidly. I rejoice that he should feel Suda Bay “an inestimable benefit.”
|
Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary. |
26.XI.40. |
I suggest the following to our Ambassador in Turkey:
We have placed before you the various arguments for and against Turkish intervention which have occurred to the Staff officers who have reported upon the matter, but we do not wish to leave you in any doubt of what our own opinion and your instructions are. We want Turkey to come into the war as soon as possible. We are not pressing her to take any special steps to help the Greeks, except to make it clear to Bulgaria that any move by Germany through Bulgaria to attack Greece, or any hostile movement by Bulgaria against Greece, will be followed by immediate Turkish declaration of war. We should like Turkey and Yugoslavia now to consult together so as, if possible, to have a joint warning ready to offer Bulgaria and Germany at the first sign of a German movement towards Bulgaria. In the event of German troops traversing Bulgaria with or without Bulgarian assistance, it is vital that Turkey should fight there and then. If she does not, she will find herself left absolutely alone, the Balkans will have been eaten up one by one, and it will be beyond our power to help her. You may mention that by the summer of 1941 we hope to have at least fifteen divisions operating in the Middle East, and by the end of the year nearly twenty-five. We do not doubt our ability to defeat Italy in Africa.
6 P.M. The Chiefs of Staffs are in general agreement with the above.
|
Prime Minister to First Lord, First Sea Lord, and General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee. C.A.S. to see. |
30.XI.40. |
Furious should return home at once, and carry another load of aircraft and pilots as reinforcement for the Middle East. Every effort should be made to put off her refit till after she has carried this force. C.A.S. should say what composition of force is best.
|
Prime Minister to General Ismay. |
1.XII.40. |
Exactly what have we got and done at Suda Bay [Crete] – i.e., troops, A.A. guns, coast defence guns, lights, wireless, R.D.F., nets, mines, preparation of aerodromes, etc.?
I hope to be assured that many hundreds of Cretans are working at strengthening the defences and lengthening and improving the aerodromes.
|
General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee. |
1.XII.40. |
The continued retreat of the Italians in Albania, and the reports which we have received today of difficulties of feeding and watering their forces in the Libyan Desert, together with other reports of aircraft being moved back to Tripoli to be safer from our attacks, combined with safe arrival at Takoradi of thirty-three Hurricanes with first-class pilots, all constitute new facts entitling us to take a more confident view of the situation, which should be communicated to General Wavell.
The enormous advantage of being able, once an enemy is on the run, to pull supplies and fighting troops forward eighty miles in a night by sea, and bring fresh troops up to the advance guard, is very rarely offered in war. General Wavell’s reply to my telegram does not seem to take any account of this, and, considering how much we have ourselves at stake, I do not think we should be doing our duty if we did not furnish him with the results of our Staff study. It is a crime to have amphibious power and leave it unused. Therefore, I wish the study, if favourable, to be telegraphed. It must, however, be ready by the 3d at latest.
I add the following general observation: The fact that we now have established ourselves at Suda Bay entitles us to feel much easier about Malta. While the Fleet is or may be at Suda, it will be most unlikely that any large landing will be attempted at Malta, which we have already reinforced by tanks and guns from Middle East…. The possession of Suda Bay has made an enormous change in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The story of Suda Bay is sad. The tragedy was not reached until 1941. I believe I had as much direct control over the conduct of the war as any public man had in any country at this time. The knowledge I possessed, the fidelity and active aid of the War Cabinet, the loyalty of all my colleagues, the ever-growing efficiency of our war machine, all enabled an intense focusing of constitutional authority to be achieved. Yet how far short was the action taken by the Middle East Command of what was ordered and what we all desired! In order to appreciate the limitations of human action, it must be remembered how much was going on in every direction at the same time. Nevertheless, it remains astonishing to me that we should have failed to make Suda Bay the amphibious citadel of which all Crete was the fortress. Everything was understood and agreed, and much was done; but all was half-scale effort. We were presently to pay heavily for our shortcomings.
* * * * *
The Italian invasion of Greece from Albania was another heavy rebuff to Mussolini. The first assault was repulsed with heavy loss, and the Greeks immediately counter-attacked. In the northern (Macedonian) sector the Greeks advanced into Albania, capturing Koritza on November 22. In the central sector of the northern Pindus an Italian Alpini division was annihilated. In the coastal zone, where the Italians had at first succeeded in making deep penetrations, they hastily retreated from the Kalamas River. The Greek army, under General Papagos, showed superior skill in mountain warfare, out-manoeuvring and outflanking their enemy. By the end of the year their prowess had forced the Italians thirty miles behind the Albanian frontier along the whole front. For several months twenty-seven Italian divisions were pinned in Albania by sixteen Greek divisions. The remarkable Greek resistance did much to hearten the other Balkan countries and Mussolini’s prestige sank low.
* * * * *
On November 9, Mr. Neville Chamberlain died at his country home in Hampshire. I had obtained the King’s permission to have him supplied with the Cabinet papers, and until a few days before the end he followed our affairs with keenness, interest, and tenacity. He met the approach of death with a steady eye. I think he died with the comfort of knowing that his country had at least turned the corner.
As soon as the House met on November 12, I paid a tribute to his character and career:
At the lychgate we may all pass our own conduct and our own judgments under a searching review. It is not given to human beings, happily for them, for otherwise life would be intolerable, to foresee or to predict to any large extent the unfolding course of events. In one phase men seem to have been right, in another they seem to have been wrong. Then again, a few years later, when the perspective of time has lengthened, all stands in a different setting. There is a new proportion. There is another scale of values. History with its flickering lamp stumbles along the trail of the past, trying to reconstruct its scenes, to revive its echoes, and kindle with pale gleams the passion of former days. What is the worth of all this? The only guide to a man is his conscience; the only shield to his memory is the rectitude and sincerity of his actions. It is very imprudent to walk through life without this shield, because we are so often mocked by the failure of our hopes and the upsetting of our calculations; but with this shield, however the Fates may play, we march always in the ranks of honour.
Whatever else history may or may not say about these terrible, tremendous years, we can be sure that Neville Chamberlain acted with perfect sincerity according to his lights and strove to the utmost of his capacity and authority, which were powerful, to save the world from the awful, devastating struggle in which we are now engaged…. Herr Hitler protests with frantic words and gestures that he has only desired peace. What do these ravings and outpourings count before the silence of Neville Chamberlain’s tomb? Long, hard, and hazardous years lie before us, but at least we enter upon them united and with clean hearts….
He was, like his father and his brother Austen before him, a famous Member of the House of Commons, and we here assembled this morning, members of all parties, without a single exception, feel that we do ourselves and our country honour in saluting the memory of one whom Disraeli would have called “an English worthy.”