Chapter 9:
Operation Cobra and the failure of Hausser’s Mortain attack.
As Montgomery’s armoured divisions were feeling the power of I SS Panzer Corps’ Panthers and Tigers east of Caen, the US Army was in the process of launching an offensive that would eventually destroy the German armies in Normandy.
The fighting in the western half of Normandy was very different in nature from the open fields and villages around Caen. The constricted bocage terrain consisted of small fields lined by thick hedges and earthworks, as well as large areas of marshland that were impassable to tanks. It was a defender’s paradise, so Rommel predominately deployed infantry divisions to contain the Americans.
A plethora of sunken roads, small woods and villages meant there was no room to manoeuvre large formations of tanks. The US Army quickly became bogged down in a series of small-scale engagements against dogged and expert German resistance. The so-called “Battle of the Hedgerows’ would cost the Americans tens of thousands of casualties for little ground gained.
Like the British and Canadian armies in Normandy, the US Army contained a scattering of veterans from North Africa and Italy. Although the bulk of its troops in Normandy were well trained, they had no combat experience. During June and into July 1944, the German defenders of the Seventh Army under Paul Hausser managed to inflict a steady stream of casualties on the “green” US Army units sent against them. Hausser’s veteran units, such as II Parachute Corps and the 352nd Infantry Division, made Lieutenant-General Omar Bradley’s First US Army pay for every inch of terrain it captured. In a series of disjointed divisional offensives, the Americans suffered some 50,000 casualties and hardly dented the German front. The two US Army divisions that took the town of St Lô in mid-July lost a combined total of 5000 casualties in bitter, house-to- house fighting. One division lost an incredible 150 percent of its officers and 100 percent of its soldiers in six weeks of action. US divisions maintained their combat power by constant infusions of so-called “battlefield replacements”, which did nothing for their unit cohesion, or the overall quality of their fighting expertise.
Overwhelming firepower
It took the Americans a long time to master the terrain and their enemy. Their equipment, such as the Sherman tank, proved under-gunned and under-armoured compared to German Panthers and Tigers. One thing the Americans possessed in overwhelming quantities was firepower in the shape of heavy artillery and airpower. They unleashed it regularly against Hausser’s troops and eventually the cunning Waffen-SS general was unable to compensate for the overwhelming material superiority enjoyed by the Americans. No matter how many GIs Hausser’s troops killed, there always seemed to be two or three to take their place. By 24 July, the veteran Panzer Lehr Division, for example, could only put some 3000 men in the field and a few dozen tanks. Since the end of June only a trickle of German reinforcements had reached Normandy to replace the 100,000 casualties sustained by Rommel’s armies in the month after D-Day. The German front was approaching breaking point, and Hausser was running out of reserves to plug the gaps.
The threat to Caen meant that the front facing the British attracted the bulk of Rommel’s panzer reserves, and Hausser could not call on his beloved I or II SS Panzer Corps to help him in the West. In mid-June only one Waffen-SS division could be spared to counter the US Army’s attempt to link its two bridgeheads, Omaha and Utah. Delayed by air attack, the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division Götz von Berlichingen arrived at the Normandy front just as the US Army was about to link up its bridgeheads at Carentan. In a furious counterattack against the US 101st Airborne Division, led by the 42 StuG IIIs of its panzer battalion, the 17th SS Division lost some 450 casualties. The panzergrenadiers came to within 500m (547yd) of the town until a counterattack drove them back. The division then joined forces with the veteran 6th Parachute Regiment to block the advance of two US corps for nearly a month in vicious, close-quarter combat. Relations between the two units were strained at first, after Waffen-SS officers attempted to try the commander of the parachute unit for treason at a field court martial. His “crime” was that he had ordered a retreat.
To provide a panzer reserve for the German front facing the Americans, Rommel ordered the Das Reich Panzer Division to the Periers region. Its panzer regiment boasted almost 26 Panthers, 50 Panzer IVs and 36 StuG IIIs ready for action. It was in position in early July and was called forward into action on 3 July to counter a possible breakthrough by the US 30th Infantry and 3rd Armored Divisions. The terrain prevented the large-scale employment of tanks and the battle soon broke down into a series of small dogfights between individual German and American tanks. For two weeks the Das Reich troopers were locked in combat with the American GIs. Their greater battle experience and superior equipment meant they were more often than not able to get the better of the Americans, but in its first week of action, the division lost just over 1200 men and some 30 tanks or assault guns, losses it could ill-afford.
Breakout from Normandy
After a frustrating time fighting up the Cherbourg peninsular to capture the port city on 27 June, Bradley was able to turn his attention southwards during July, and began to plan for the breakout from Normandy. The idea was to open a breach and then drive southwards to Avranches, then Lieutenant-General George Patton’s Third Army would carry on the advance, swinging westwards to eventually encircle and destroy the German forces.
Chastized by his experiences to date, Bradley was determined to concentrate American firepower in a narrow sector to overwhelm the defenders. A 7000m (7655yd) section of front to the west of St Lô was selected as the target for Lieutenant-General J. Lawton Collins’ VII Corps in the appropriately named Operation Cobra. The plan called for 1500 heavy bombers, 380 medium bombers and 550 fighter-bombers to drop more than 4064 tonnes (4000 tons) of explosives on a target box that stretched 2500m (2734yd) behind the front. More than 1000 guns would join the barrage. Four fresh American divisions would then be unleashed. On paper, the plan looked unstoppable.
Operation Cobra: 24–31 July, 1944
The offensive got off to an inauspicious start on 25 July when cloud obscured part of the target and part of the bomber force dropped its deadly cargo on US troops waiting to go into the attack, killing more than 100 and wounding almost 500. The effect on the Panzer Lehr Division, positioned in the centre of the target box, was even worse, though. Almost 1000 men died, and a regiment and a whole Kampfgruppe were put out of action, along with all the division’s tanks and guns. Despite this onslaught, the survivors came out of their trenches and bunkers fighting, holding up the offensive for 48 hours. Then Bradley committed the 2nd “Hell on Wheels” Armored Division en masse. Unlike Dietrich east of Caen, Hausser had no reserves to plug the breach in his line because Bradley had ordered all his troops to stage diversionary attacks to tie down German forces along the whole of the Normandy Front. Disaster threatened.
Hausser had tried to pull Das Reich’s Panther battalion out of the line to the west to throw against the American breakthrough, but it could not disengage in time. In the end only five Panthers made it to help the Panzer Lehr, and they were soon put out of action. The breakthrough broke the cohesion of the German front. By 27 July, huge columns led by 600 American tanks were streaming south towards Avranches with nothing to stop them. German units started to crack under the stain of constant American attacks and almost six weeks of fighting without relief. The Das Reich and 17th SS Divisions managed to pull back and form a line north of Coutances on 27 July, which held the Americans at bay for a day. Then the front behind them collapsed, and the two Waffen-SS divisions and the army’s 353rd Infantry Division were soon trapped in a pocket south of Roncey. Fuel was running short and scores of tanks had to be abandoned. In the chaos, Das Reich’s commander, SS-Brigadeführer Heinz Lammerding, was wounded and then his replacement, the division’s panzer regiment commander, SS-Obersturmbannführer Christian Tychsen, was killed in action. On the night of 28/29 July, the trapped troops made a bid for freedom, cutting through the loose cordon of US troops around them. Dodging past most of the Americans, the column clashed with a US armoured regiment.
The American tanks came off worst in the encounter, and by dawn on 30 July the three units were free. In their wake they had left roads littered with abandoned tanks, trucks, guns and other debris of war. US troops rounded up 4000 prisoners in the aftermath of the German escape bid. By the end of the month, some 20,000 Germans would be in American prison camps and Patton’s tanks would be in Avranches.
The madness of Operation Luttich
In his headquarters in East Prussia, Hitler at first forbade any retreat in the face of the American onslaught. Then the Führer demanded a counterattack. Looking at the map table in Rastenburg, the solution looked simple. Eight of the nine panzer divisions in Normandy were to strike into the flank of the American incursion to cut off Patton’s tanks.
To the likes of Hausser and the commanders of the divisions given the dubious honour of participating in Operation Luttich, the whole thing was total madness. All their units were seriously understrength, short of ammunition and fuel. For example, most of the panzer units would be disengaged from the Caen Front, where Montgomery’s troops were also strongly pressing forward. Then they were expected to move almost 100km (62 miles) under constant Allied air attack to their concentration area, before massing for the assault. One veteran army divisional commander refused to participate in this crazy enterprise, and was sacked for his efforts.
The aftermath of the 20 July Bomb Plot against Hitler was still being felt in the ranks of the German forces in Normandy. When scores of army officers in France were arrested and executed for their part in the plot, rumours spread that they had been sabotaging the war effort. Mistrust grew between ardent Nazis and anyone who did not seem to show the necessary level of enthusiasm for continuing the struggle. So when senior officers, including Waffen-SS veterans such as Hausser, Dietrich and Bittrich, heard of the Führer’s attack plans they were dismayed, but had to be careful about public criticism of it. They went along with it because there was no alternative. Disobedience of the Führer was not an option at this time. Hitler was determined that the attack would go ahead, and he even took the planning out of the hands of his now mistrusted field commanders. A senior officer was dispatched from the Führer’s headquarters with the detailed plan for Operation Luttich, even down to routes of march and artillery fire plans. Hausser and his commanders were given little choice in the matter. It was a case of take it, or leave it.
Not surprisingly morale among the attackers, even in the ranks of the once ultra-loyal Waffen-SS, was at rock bottom. Operation Luttich was viewed as a total suicide mission.
The balance of forces looked terrible. In total the Germans could muster only 750 operational tanks left in Normandy at the end of July, out of a total of 2200 sent to the front during June and July. The combined British and American armies had landed more than 6000 tanks in France since D-Day.
General of Panzer Troops Hans von Funck’s XLVII Panzer Corps’ headquarters was given command of the attack, which Hitler said was only to begin when all the eight panzer divisions were in place. By 6 August the size of the American breach was getting totally out of control. Thousands of American tanks and vehicles were pushing through Avranches. British tanks continued to push through their breach at Vire, tying down II SS Panzer Corps and preventing it from joining Operation Luttich. Even through he had only been able to gather together four of his expected eight panzer divisions, and hardly any of the promised Luftwaffe fighters were ready, Hausser decided it was now or never. He ordered Operation Luttich to go ahead on 7 August.
At hand were the 2nd, 116th and Panzer Lehr Divisions, as well as part of the Leibstandarte and Das Reich, which were reinforced with the remnants of the 17th SS Division. All told, Funck had a paltry 185 tanks to turn the tide of the war in Germany’s favour.
Allied air supremacy was now such a problem for the Germans that Hausser ordered the attack to begin under the cover of darkness at 02:00 hours on 7 August. Surprise was to be of the essence; accordingly, there was no preparatory bombardment. Hitler’s micro-management of the planning for the attack meant all the key documents had been delivered by hand to the German commanders in France. This had the unintentional spin-off of ensuring that the British ULTRA code-breaking operation was not able to pick up any German radio traffic about the impending attack. Unaware of the coming onslaught, Bradley had only stationed the tired and understrength US 30th Infantry Division to guard the town of Mortain, which was the first objective of Operation Luttich. It had no warning of the impending attack.
Waffen-SS participation in the Mortain counterattack, as Operation Luttich is now known, centred around three main units. SS-Standartenführer Otto Baum commanded a Kampfgruppe made up from the Das Reich and 17th SS Divisions. Its objective was Mortain itself. The Leibstandarte was thrown into the battle piecemeal because of delays in moving the division from the Caen Front along congested roads and under incessant Allied air attack. Only a single panzer battalion with 43 Panthers and seven Panzer IVs, along with the Leibstandarte’s reconnaissance unit and an armoured halftrack-mounted panzergrenadier battalion, arrived in time to go with the first attack wave. The rest of the division was several hours’ march behind.
At first the German attack went well. Das Reich stormed into Mortain, scattering surprised American units out of its path. Its panzer regiment pushed past the town and headed 5km (3.1 miles) westwards. The division’s reconnaissance battalion secured its left flank, moving 4km (2.5 miles) south of the town, which was soon the scene of fierce fighting between American infantry and Waffen-SS panzergrenadiers. The 17th SS Division’s reconnaissance battalion hit the town from the front and Das Reich’s Der Führer Panzergrenadier Regiment swept in from the north. A battalion of American infantry were surrounded on the crucial Hill 317 on the eastern edge of the town. To the west of Mortain, the US 120th Infantry Regiment fought desperate rearguard actions, which they hoped would buy time until daylight and the arrival of air support.
Surprise at le Mesnil-Tôve
North of Mortain, the advance units of the Leibstandarte were assigned to the 2nd Panzer Division. SS-Sturmbannführer Gustav Knittel’s reconnaissance troops raced ahead of the tank force, spreading confusion in the American ranks. They surprised a US column near le Mesnil-Tôve and captured a large quantity of trucks and antitank guns, before pressing on a further 3km (1.8 miles) faced by little opposition. By late morning, however, strong American road-blocks were in place and Knittel’s men had to pull back to defend le Mesnil-Tôve.
Just before dawn, the Leibstandarte’s tanks and panzergrenadier battalion began their attack on the strongly held village of St Barthélemy, after a 45-minute artillery barrage. While 30 Panzer IVs and infantry of the 2nd Panzer were tasked with taking the northern half of the village, the Leibstandarte was to take the southern section.
Heavy fog hung over the battlefield, making it impossible for the German tanks to engage the defenders in the village at long range, so a combined tank-infantry assault was ordered to storm the American positions. By 11:30 hours the German tanks were on the far side of the village, but small groups of Americans were still holding out in cellars and bunkers. It was early afternoon before the Germans had cleared the village, and they captured almost 400 Americans in the process. The delay gave Bradley time to regroup and bring up reserves to contain the German attack. The US general still needed another day before he could be in a position to counterattack, so he turned to the Allied air forces to contain the German tank columns. By early afternoon the fog that had covered the Mortain region was finally lifting, at last exposing Funck’s troops to devastating aerial attack.
Just after 12:15 hours on 7 August, the first of 271 RAF Typhoon fighters took off from forward airstrips in Normandy, their target the huge German tank and vehicle columns around Mortain. The Luftwaffe was nowhere to be seen. It took the RAF fighters 45 minutes to appear over the battlefield and they started to circle, looking for targets. For the next nine hours, the RAF squadrons maintained a constant presence over the battlefield. At any one time, there were never less than 22 aircraft overhead.
Swooping Typhoons
The German attack stalled as the Typhoons swooped to rocket and machine-gun any tanks or trucks they could find. Waffen-SS men dived for shelter and tried to drive their vehicles under cover, but it was to no avail. All afternoon the German columns were relentlessly attacked from the air. There was no prospect of any kind of advance. Columns of Leibstandarte tanks and trucks heading towards the battlefield were also caught in the air onslaught, further blunting the momentum of the German attack. One column was held up for several hours when an Allied fighter crashed on the lead German tank, blocking the road ahead. The RAF pilots claimed 84 tanks destroyed, 35 probably destroyed and 21 damaged, with another 112 vehicles hit. This was perhaps an exaggeration, but when the Germans pulled out of the sector a few days later, they left behind 43 Panthers, 10 Panzer IVs, 23 armoured halftracks, 8 armoured cars and 46 other vehicles. This was the first time ever in the history of warfare that airpower by itself had halted a ground force.
As darkness fell, the Germans tried to reorganize their battered forces and bring up more reserves. The continued resistance of the trapped Americans on Hill 317 outside Mortain thwarted Das Reich’s attempt to advance forward throughout the night and the following day.
More fog in the morning of 8 August provided the reinforced Leibstandarte with the opportunity to move forward towards Juvigny and Bellefontaine in strength. Now Bradley’s reserves were in place and the Leibstandarte’s panzers ran into sustained antitank gunfire and were stopped in their tracks. American tanks went on the offensive against the 2nd Panzer, forcing Knittel’s depleted reconnaissance troops out of le Mesnil-Tôve by the evening.
Not all the Leibstandarte Division was able to get through to join the attack, and a strong Kampfgruppe had to be diverted northwards to seal an American incursion south of Vire which threatened the right flank of the attacking units.
Operation Lüttich: 7–8 August, 1944
American air and artillery fire now began to rain down on the German units around Mortain, again stalling any idea of pressing home the attack towards Avranches. It was no longer a case of pushing forwards, but holding out against overwhelming odds. Throughout 9 and 10 August, increasing numbers of American tanks were pressing forward against the Waffen-SS lines. The German Panthers destroyed many Shermans in this unequal struggle.
Just as it was becoming clear that Operation Luttich was running out of steam, Hitler insisted on ordering more units to reinforce the attack. II SS Panzer Corps was ordered to pull out of the line southwest of Caen, where it was fighting Montgomery’s Operation Bluecoat to a halt, in spite of protests from its commander, Willi Bittrich, to be sent westwards to reinforce Funck’s doomed enterprise. The Frundsberg Division eventually managed to break free from the front near Vire and moved into position on the left of Das Reich during the night of 7/8 August. Heavy air attacks prevented it attacking towards Berenton until the morning of 9 August, when a grand total of 12 panzers were launched forward and four were quickly knocked out. Further British tank attacks north of Vire meant that the Hohenstaufen Division had to remain there to contain this breakthrough and could not be sent to join the Mortain Offensive.
Hausser had ordered that all attempts to continue the attack on Avranches should stop on the afternoon of 11 August, and soon afterwards began preparing plans for a withdrawal to a more defensible line to the east. Now the Waffen-SS units were desperately short of fuel because of the incessant air attacks, and many tanks and other vehicles had to be abandoned. Two days later, the Leibstandarte reported having only 14 Panzer IVs, 7 Panthers and 8 StuG IIIs operational. Das Reich was in an even worse condition, with only five Panzer IVs, three Panthers and eight StuG IIIs in the line.
In his eastern Prussian bunker, the Führer was furious at the failure of the attack and wanted a scapegoat. He ordered Funck sacked on 11 August. The following day, US tanks broke through Das Reich’s lines and relieved the trapped GIs on Hill 317. Of the 700 who had been surrounded five days earlier, only 400 were still fit for action. The US Army, backed by RAF Typhoons, had taken on the élite of the Waffen-SS and stopped it in its tracks. The contribution of airpower in stopping the Mortain attack should not be underestimated.
For the Mortain operation the Luftwaffe centralized its few fighter resources and attempted to intervene over the battlefield, but Allied air superiority ensured that German aircraft were shot down as soon as they took off, and not one Luftwaffe aircraft appeared over the battlefield. As mentioned above, the weather was at first poor, but as it improved Typhoons swarmed over the area. There were so many that some got in each other’s way, and several midair collisions resulted. On the first day Typhoons flew a total of 294 sorties over the battlefield.
One notable incident was the battle between 245 Squadron and the 1st SS Panzer Division on the road near St Barthélemy. Their first attacks sprayed the tanks and transports with rocket and cannon fire, then the Typhoons broke off as they exhausted their ammunition and rockets, returning again to their airstrip to refuel and rearm. So intensive were the sortie rates that 245 Squadron afterwards referred to 7 August as “The Day of the Typhoon”.
German commanders were shocked at the magnitude of the Allied air attacks at Mortain, which would be repeated later around Falaise. Major-General Rudolf-Christoph Freiherr von Gersdorff, the chief of staff of the German Seventh Army, subsequently agreed that the continuation of the counterattack towards Avranches was a mistake. Contributing to the German failure was the overemphasis of attacking north, between Mortain and Vire, rather than farther south. The failure of the offensive set the stage for the next and even greater disaster to befall German arms in France: the Battle of the Falaise Pocket.