The opposing armies involved in the struggle for the throne during the first decade of the fifteenth century had common characteristics and marked differences. We will look at each in turn, starting with the English armies of Henry IV.
The English Army
There were significant differences between English armies that fought in France (for example) and those that campaigned on mainland Britain. For several hundred years, the mainstay of armies raised for service within the royal dominions in Britain had been the militia. The militia, or posse comitatus, theoretically made the entire male population between the ages of 15 and 60 liable for service. Their liability, however, was only for campaigning within the royal domains. English kings tended to claim that these included Wales and Scotland, although this was sometimes disputed by local communities, which had the responsibility of mustering, arming, equipping, and maintaining for forty days the levies they were ordered to raise. After this time, responsibility for their upkeep theoretically rested with the crown, though in practice – particularly when the cash-strapped King Henry was involved – such funding did not always materialize. It was also one reason for the short duration of his campaigns, because of his desire to discharge the militia before such upkeep became necessary.
There was a recognized system for raising the militia. The crown would select which counties were to be summoned: in the case of the Shrewsbury campaign and the operations against Glyn Dwr, these were normally the Midlands counties. Each county had a number of Commissioners of Array – most often local knights. The king would send them and the sheriff a quota of the total number of men he expected their county to provide. The commissioners in turn would give each local community the number of men required from them, and responsibility for raising these would lie with the village constables and local justices of the peace or gentry.
It was a system with considerable potential for corruption and evasion. No community was eager to part with the most able-bodied and economically useful of its members, for an unknown period of time, with the possibility that they might never return at all. So there was a tendency to attempt to unload undesirables, the less fit, or even passing strangers. In theory the commissioners were to hold ‘musters’ to check on the quality of men presented, before despatching them to the stipulated rendezvous by a required date. But the commissioners themselves were liable to come under local pressure and their readiness to comply might also be affected by the current popularity of the regime. Desertion was also a significant factor and it has been calculated that, on average, only between a half and two-thirds of those summoned would actually appear.
The standard of equipment and the training of the militia also varied widely. In some areas, such as Cheshire with its long-standing military tradition, militiamen were generally of good quality. In other less martial areas, the standard was much lower.
Each individual was supposed to be armed and equipped to a required standard based on his economic position in the community. The requirement might vary from hauberk, sword, knife and horse for a better-off man down to a sword and a knife for the poorest. Bows were to be carried whenever possible.
Again, the percentage of archers and their level of experience varied considerably. Throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries government decrees were issued banning the playing of ‘idle games’ such as quoits and football, and stipulating that all those liable for service with the militia should practice archery at the butts on Sundays and holy days. But how regularly and conscientiously this was observed is impossible to say. In general, the militia of the northern counties seems to have included a higher proportion of archers than those elsewhere.
By the start of the fifteenth century increasing use was being made of the ‘indenture’ or contract system, whereby an individual magnate or captain would agree to provide the king with a stipulated number of troops for an agreed period in return for payment. This system was supposed to be used in all overseas campaigns and was increasingly adopted at home. So in practice, a typical English army might consist of a mixture of household troops of the king and his magnates (usually professional soldiers), a number of indentured companies, and a varying number of militia.
There is some uncertainty as to how these elements were actually organized. There is no evidence that individual retinues were combined in any further way, and it seems probable that each of the three main divisions of an army – the ‘vaward’, main battle and rear – comprised a large number of smaller units and retinues, making command and control somewhat problematical.
Discipline also varied and was generally difficult to impose, especially when serving in areas close to home, as militiamen might easily desert and seek concealment in their local community. There were penalties for theft and unauthorized looting, and for molestation of women and desecration of churches. But, particularly in the Welsh campaigns, destruction of buildings and resources by burning was a recognized part of English strategy, and, even if commanders had been inclined to exempt those they viewed as rebels from the excesses of their men, in practice this would have been difficult.
Many men were attracted to war. In the case of knights and nobles the motivation was chivalry and military glory. But that said, all ranks went to war hoping for booty or other material gain. King Henry’s wars provided little opportunity for this. Wales was a poor country and once a ‘scorched earth’ strategy had been carried out, there was little left worth taking.
As the enemy – in the case of the Welsh and various English opponents – were regarded as rebels and liable to punishment for treason, there was also no hope of financial gain through the payment of ransoms. The king was also at times reluctant to ransom his own men captured by the Welsh, partly on the grounds that he was unwilling to do anything to finance Glyn Dwr’s war effort. This, of course, did nothing to foster enthusiasm.
One of the major difficulties that hindered Henry’s war effort was supplying his troops. Huge quantities of food, for both horses and men, were needed. For Henry’s brief campaigns, the sheriffs of the counties that provided men also had to provide their upkeep, and in emergencies like the Percy rebellion of 1403, it may be assumed that the ‘tally’ system was used, whereby supplies were in effect requisitioned, in return for a tally that, in theory, could be redeemed with the royal exchequer at a later date.
In the later stages of the rebellion the prolonged siege operations required to regain the castles of Aberystwyth and Harlech made a more organized system of supply necessary. Merchants in Bristol and elsewhere were contracted to provide the soldiers with supplies, which were transported by sea.
The Scottish Army
There were a number of differences between the Scottish army at Homildon Hill and its English opponents. The bulk of the Scottish were feudal levies, raised in much the same way, and on similar terms. On the whole they were less well-equipped than their English counterparts.
Although the Scots had some archers, they were fewer in number and apparently less well trained than the English. The bulk of the Scottish levies were armed with long spears varying in length from 12-18 feet and, usually, a sword. Defensive armour normally comprised a ‘jack’ and bascinet-style helmet. Scottish knights and men-at-arms were armed and equipped in similar style to their English counterparts but were significantly fewer in number.
The bulk of Scottish troops were mounted, making them highly mobile. An early fourteenth-century writer, Jean le Bel wrote that:
When they cross the border they advance sixty to seventy miles in a day and night, which would seem astonishing to anyone ignorant of their customs. The explanation is that, on their expeditions into England, they all come on horseback, except the irregulars who follow on foot. The knights and squires are mounted on fine, strong horses and the commoners on small ponies. Because they have to pass over the wild hills of Northumberland, they bring no baggage carts.
Scottish spearmen usually operated in densely packed bodies, several ranks deep, known as ‘schiltrons’, which, although fairly manoeuvrable, provided easy targets for archers.
The Welsh Armies
A couple of centuries earlier, Welsh forces had been noted for their use of spearmen, probably similar to those employed by the Scots. By the time of the Glyn Dwr revolt, however, after many years forming part of the English forces in France, Welsh soldiers were mostly armed and equipped in the same fashion. And Glyn Dwr’s forces included a significant number of archers.
The Welsh laboured under similar disadvantages to the Scots so far as men-at-arms were concerned. Although Welsh gentry such as Glyn Dwr himself were armed and equipped in the same way as English contemporaries they formed proportionately a much smaller part of the Welsh forces.
Many of Glyn Dwr’s men were peasant levies, equipped with whatever weapons were available – mainly spears and swords with little protective armour, except sometimes a helmet and ‘jack’. They were evidently poorly trained and ill-disciplined, and were unable to face English men-at-arms in open combat.