Hotspur and his party had entered Chester without resistance, and indeed were apparently greeted with enthusiasm by its leading citizens. Hotspur’s first actions were to call the men of Cheshire to arms, and to issue a proclamation calculated to win their support. He promised that within three days they would be joined by King Richard in person and an army under the Earl of Northumberland. This was not a pretence that could for long be maintained, and it may be doubted how many of Richard’s former leading supporters actually believed in it. But in the short term, it certainly brought the Cheshiremen, especially the veteran archers of King Richard’s Guard, flocking to Hotspur’s banner. To one chronicler, whose awe of them is clear from his words, they were: ‘mystery men meddlers of wrongs who played with poleaxes and the points of swords’.
Of the 122 known rebels who joined Hotspur, ninety-five came from Cheshire, Shropshire or just across the border into Wales. The rising seems to have begun in the Hundred of Bucklow, possibly because Hotspur entered the county in that area, crossing the River Mersey to the south of Manchester. Bucklow was the home of two of Richard’s leading supporters, John Legh of Bowden and Thomas Holford, both watch commanders in the Cheshire Guard. A key figure in bringing out support for Hotspur was Sir John Massey of Tatton. He had served with the Black Prince and John of Gaunt in Spain, and had taken part in Richard’s ill-fated expedition to Ireland. Massey had not been involved in the earlier conspiracies following Richard’s deposition, and seemed to have come to terms with the new regime, but now took up arms, along with his sons, Thomas and Richard. The ties of kinship and military service were shown as Sir William Leigh of Baguley, a colleague of Massey in the local administration, also joined the rebels. They had served together in Ireland and were certainly among the first to join Hotspur.
Peter Dutton, who had been Constable of Chirk Castle under Richard, and had served in Ireland, also joined. Another committed rebel was Peter Warburton, who, in 1400, had left the army in Wales without permission, and Robert Toft of Toft Hall south of Knutsford, a close associate of Legh and Holford.
John Kynaston of Dunham Massey also had extensive interests in North Wales, and was closely associated with the Glyn Dwr Revolt from its outset. Kynaston was linked with another principal rebel, John Done of Utkington, the Forester of Delamere, who had had contact with Hotspur as early as 1400. In 1403 he raised the tenants of the Lestrange estates at Ellesmere in Shropshire, with the assistance of Richard Deenbourgh, Rector of Llanymynech, an interesting example of the influence local pro-Ricardian clergy had in raising support for the rebellion. Done may have been one of Hotspur’s contacts with Glyn Dwr, and certainly was his chief organizer in the border areas of North Shropshire.
The Macclesfield Hundred of Cheshire produced two leading rebels: Sir Robert Legh of Alder and Sir Lawrence Fitton of Gawsworth. Legh had been retained by Richard, and made Constable of Oswestry. Despite the beheading in 1400 of his half-brother, Peter Legh, Sir Robert had appeared reconciled to the new regime. Fitton had served in Richard’s ill-fated Irish expedition of 1399. It is unclear what motivated Legh and Fitton to join Hotspur. Both had apparently prospered under the new regime. It may be that with most of their neighbours joining the rebellion, they felt pressured into supporting them. In general, it seems that the degree of recruitment was greatest close to Hotspur’s route to Chester, and at this distance of time it is unclear how far threats or other forms of coercion played a part.
In Northwich Hundred there were two prominent supporters of Hotspur, Sir Richard Venables of Kinderton and Sir Richard Vernon of Shipford. The fact that both were later to be executed for their part in the rebellion may suggest they were among its more prominent leaders, or they may simply have been unlucky enough to be made examples of. Both men had been retained by Richard, and had served in Ireland, but there is no evidence of their being opposed to the new regime before the 1403 rebellion. They did, however, have some connections with Robert Bostock, a captain in King Richard’s Guard, who may have been the leading recruiter for Hotspur in Northwich Hundred. Another rebel, Sir Thomas Grosvenor of Hulme, was the father-in-law of Sir Richard Vernon.
The pattern of recruitment on the march would continue. When Hotspur eventually marched south into Shropshire via the Eddisbury Hundred of Cheshire, he was joined by two former captains of Richard’s Guard, John Done of Utkington and Thomas Beeston. Their influence alone was enough to ensure large numbers of recruits from Eddisbury Hundred, including many of Richard’s Guard. Sir Richard Winnington, another Irish veteran, also took up arms, bringing to Hotspur’s banner his relatives, John Beeston of Tiverton and John Winnington, who had been a royal archer in 1397. Arthur Davenport of Calverley was another former retainer of Richard, while another, Richard Bromley of Baddington, had raised archers for Henry’s Scottish campaign of 1400, and now did the same for Hotspur.
Perhaps surprisingly, there is little evidence of intensive recruiting in the town of Chester itself. The names of only two Chester rebels, Thomas Allen and Robert Goldsmith, are known. Allen seems to have acted as go-between for Hotspur and the Earl of Worcester in the days immediately prior to the rising, and after the rebellion gave surety for the behaviour of John Ambell, Hotspur’s chaplain.
In Broxton Hundred, nearly all the known rebels were from the south-eastern corner of the district, which lay directly on Hotspur’s line of march. One was Richard Cholmondeley, a former watch commander in Richard’s Guard, who had not been involved in the previous plots against the new regime. He brought with him two neighbours, Thomas Huxley and Hugh Bickerton. Another rebel, John Aldersley, had previously served under Thomas Beeston. John Knight of Clutton and Daniel Bickerley had been involved in the 1400 rebellion. The most important rebel in this area was Sir Hugh Browe, a veteran soldier with service in France and Ireland and against the Welsh rebels. His son Robert rose with him.
Recruits also came in from across the Welsh border. John Healey was a former deputy constable of Flint Castle, and Daffydd ap Bletchyn ap Ithel, who only a month previously had been appointed as one of the defenders of the commote of Coleshill against the Welsh rebels. There were also the parsons of Dodleston, Pulford, Hanckley and Hawarden.
Possibly because Hotspur himself didn’t recruit there, there were fewer volunteers from the Cheshire Hundred of Wirral. However, they included several prominent local figures, among them Sir William Stanley and Sir John Poole with various relatives and dependants. Both Stanley and Poole had hitherto appeared reconciled to the events of 1399; both had taken part in the Scottish expedition of 1400, and perhaps significantly, may have been with Hotspur at Homildon Hill, for both had Scottish prisoners in their custody. They may also have served with Hotspur in Wales. Poole had been governor of Caernarvon and Beaumaris Castles, and was a leading figure in the English war effort.
It is unclear how far dissatisfaction with the course of the war against Glyn Dwr may have influenced the rebels. Though Cheshire itself had suffered little material damage so far, some of the rebels’ trading operations in Wales will undoubtedly have suffered, and there may have been resentment on the edicts against trading with the Welsh, issued by Henry, although these were widely flouted.
Previous military contacts with Hotspur were undoubtedly a major factor. Of the leading rebels, Sir Richard Winnington, Browe, Poole, and Sir William Stanley had all served with him in North Wales, though John Hulgrave, a Ricardian who had also served with Hotspur, chose to remain loyal to the new regime.
Only around 100 named rebels are known for 1403, compared with 139 for 1400. In fact, the rebellion was considerably more widespread in 1403, suggesting that, with the exigencies of the Welsh war in mind, Henry’s government chose to overlook many of those who joined Hotspur. Of the known rebels, twenty-five had been retainers of Richard, along with the sons of a number of others. Around a quarter of Richard’s known retainers joined Hotspur, which might suggest that the great majority remained quiet. However, figures are too incomplete to be confident of this. In Broxton Hundred, for example, a number of those known to have been in arms in 1400 did not join the 1403 rebellion. It was the case, of course, that rebels who had been pardoned in 1400 had much more to lose by rebelling again. And proximity to Prince Henry and the forces at Shrewsbury may have served to make some cautious. Contributions from some areas, for example Wirral, may have been lessened by the short duration of the campaign.
The summons sent out by Hotspur called for a rendezvous of his supporters at the key road junction of Sandiway on 12 July. We can imagine each of the prominent rebels mustering their retainers and tenants, the more prudent sending a son to lead them rather than taking up arms themselves. Although claims were initially made that King Richard would join the rebel army at Sandiway, this pretence could not be kept up for long, and Hotspur was forced to amend his proclamation to one in support of reform of the government, and a rather lukewarm support for the claim to the throne of the Earl of March.
Hotspur, whose gamble had paid off to the extent of providing him with significant Cheshire support, had now to decide on his next move. His only other followers were the small band who had accompanied him from the north, which included his squires, Thomas Knayton and Roger Salwayn, the keeper of Carlisle Castle gaol, William Felour, a handful of supporters from Lancashire and the Earl of Douglas and his twenty Scottish knights.
At some point, providing significant additional military muscle for his army, Thomas Percy, Earl of Worcester, defected from the force with Prince Henry at Shrewsbury, bringing with him some 200 men- at-arms and 800 archers – almost half the prince’s force.
This is a mysterious episode, of which we know tantalizingly little. It may be that Worcester had hoped to bring over the entire Shrewsbury force, discontented as it was because of pay arrears. He may even have hoped to secure Shrewsbury itself and take the prince into custody. If such was the plan, it clearly misfired, and Hotspur had to decide on his next move. Ruled out from the start was any possibility of moving back across the Midlands to link with any forces being raised by his father. Such a march, through areas where little support was to be expected, would also take him squarely onto the path of King Henry, moving north towards the Scottish border. Much more promising was a rapid march south. The initial objective was Shrewsbury. It may have been hoped that the weakened garrison might yet defect, or at least yield or retreat without attempting to hold the town. Possession of Shrewsbury would give Hotspur a recruiting centre adjacent to the presumably sympathetic Mortimer estates of the mid-Wales Marches, and might be expected to provide additional military supplies.
Less clear is whether, as frequently asserted, Hotspur hoped to link with Glyn Dwr. It is unclear how far Hotspur had co-ordinated his plan and strategy with those of the Welsh leader. There had certainly been some contact between them over recent weeks, with William Lloyd and John Kynaston acting as go-betweens. There is, however, no evidence to support Hardynge’s claim that Hotspur hoped to join forces with Glyn Dwr on the banks of the Severn.
In early July, as we have seen, Glyn Dwr was operating in southwest Wales. This would still have allowed him time to rendezvous with Hotspur in the vicinity of Shrewsbury if such had been the intention. The available evidence suggests either that the operations of Hotspur and the main Welsh forces were in fact unconnected, or that Glyn Dwr’s intention was to occupy and draw off English forces in South Wales and prevent them from reinforcing Prince Henry or the king. And although the Welsh troops were better equipped than sometimes suggested, the results of most of their engagements in open battle with English forces suggests they were poorly prepared to encounter them in a set piece battle.
So there is no clear evidence as to whether Glyn Dwr was expected to join Hotspur in the later stages of the campaign. Certainly it is unlikely that Percy intended to face the king in battle until he had all available troops at his disposal. It is probable that the plan was for the Earl of Northumberland – leaving the original Northern army to guard the Scottish border – to raise the Percy tenants in Yorkshire, with other sympathizers, and then move south. King Henry, it was probably hoped, would either have continued to march north (so making it possible to trap him between the Percys, father and son) or would fall back on London, in the vicinity of which a decisive battle of the campaign could be fought.
King Henry reached Nottingham on the evening of 12 July. It was evidently here that he received what, at this point, was little more than a rumour of Hotspur’s revolt. His reaction was to alter the direction of his march, moving westwards and spending the next two days at Derby, where he could block any move by Hotspur to march northeast towards his father in Yorkshire. On the 17th, at Lichfield, Henry at last received firm information on events in Cheshire, and sent an urgent message to his council in London:
the king encloses a letter drafted with the advice of the lords, knights and esquires at present in his company, to be sent to the archbishop of Canterbury, all the prelates and the lords temporal, to tell them of his plans, and let the council not fail in this. Henry Percy has risen against the king, calling him ‘Henry of Lancaster’. And has proclaimed that Richard is still alive. The king wants all members of the council wherever they may be to hasten to him, except the treasurer, who is to remain behind and raise all the loans he can.
It is not clear how many troops the king initially had with him, though details of an army he had under his command in April 1405 may provide a rough indication. On that occasion he had a personal retinue of 144 men-at-arms and 720 archers. With him also were the retinues of a number of the nobility. A document in the Exchequer of 17 July lists payments to a force totalling four barons, twenty knights, 476 esquires and 2,500 archers. This probably refers to the expedition against the Welsh of the previous autumn, but is another indication of the likely size of the army that Henry had with him initially. Another reference credits him with 2,500 archers in July 1403.
The sheriffs of the Midland counties were ordered to call out the militia and march to join the king with all haste. There is some indication that Henry initially considered falling back towards London, in order to link with forces coming from that direction. But in the rather small land area of England, an insurrection could quickly grow out of control if unchecked, and the king had now been joined by that experienced soldier, George Dunbar, Earl of March, who had slipped away from the forces besieging Cocklaw, probably on realizing that Hotspur had left. The rebellion gave Dunbar the unrivalled opportunity to place his expertise at the king’s disposal, probably with the hope of regaining his estates on the Scottish border as a result of a Percy defeat. He urged Henry to march west and confront Hotspur before the rebellion could spread or the Earl of Northumberland reinforce his son.
Hotspur, meanwhile, had ordered a general rendezvous on 17 July at Sandiway, a strategically important crossroads on the edge of Delamere Forest and convenient rallying point for supporters from all parts of Cheshire. Word was put out that King Richard himself would join them there, and large numbers made their way to the rendezvous in the expectation of seeing the deposed monarch. When Richard failed to materialize there was evidently some dismay, with many people attempting to return home. Some of those later captured by the royalist forces would claim they had been forcibly pressed into the rebel ranks.
Hotspur attempted to raise enthusiasm by issuing a proclamation, in which he told of his regret for the part he had played in placing Henry on the throne. The king had broken many promises sworn on oath, and had murdered King Richard. Therefore, Hotspur now intended to overthrow him and replace him with the lawful heir to Richard, Edmund, Earl of March. It is unlikely that many of his supporters were particularly inspired by this, or by the promises of governmental reform that Hotspur made. He admitted irritation that so many of those assembled still proclaimed their loyalty to their ‘Good King Richard’, though some would later proclaim Hotspur himself as king.
The rebel forces did not remain at Sandiway for long. Not only was it necessary to maintain the impetus of the rebellion, but it was also important to give lukewarm recruits no opportunity to desert. Hotspur probably began his march south into Shropshire next day.
The rebel objective was Shrewsbury. Here was the only substantial royalist force in the Marches, with Prince Henry himself. If the prince could be neutralized, or abandoned the town, both it and the munitions stored there would fall into rebel hands, and such a success would in all probability bring in recruits from the Mortimer estates to the south, as well as putting the rebels into closer contact with Glyn Dwr.
Hotspur was undoubtedly encouraged by knowledge of the planned defection of his uncle, Thomas Percy, Earl of Worcester. The exact timing and circumstances of this remain unclear. With so many of his troops recruited in Cheshire, Prince Henry could be far from certain of their loyalty, and Worcester took full advantage of this. At some point, most probably as Hotspur – marching via Broxton, Whitchurch and Wem – approached Shrewsbury, Worcester defected to join his nephew, bringing with him the invaluable reinforcement of 800 of the archers from the prince’s force at Shrewsbury. If he had made any attempt to secure the town or the prince, as may have been his original intention, he failed, and around 1,200 men remained loyal to Prince Henry, and with the townspeople, prepared to defend Shrewsbury.
The rebels apparently approached the town from the north late on 19 July and some fighting took place, either that day or early on the 20th, during which some of the suburbs were burnt. But though Prince Henry remained defiant, he was outnumbered and doubtless anxiously awaiting the arrival of his father, the king.
King Henry was at Lichfield on 19 July, mustering his reinforcements. His troops must all have been mounted, for he covered the 32 miles to the vicinity of Shrewsbury by late on the 20th.
Shrewsbury was situated in a naturally strong defensive position, surrounded on three sides by a loop of the River Severn, its only landward entrance being the neck of land at the northern end of the town. The king appears to have sent a detachment of his army to reinforce Prince Henry, while his main force remained to the east of the town, eventually crossing the Severn at Uffington and spending the night around Haughmond Abbey, to the north-east of Shrewsbury.
Hotspur had been wrong-footed by Henry’s move, and late on the 20th pulled his army back for the night to the village of Berwick, about 4 miles north-west of Shrewsbury. His intentions are debatable. He may have been considering crossing the Severn at nearby Shelton Ford, with the idea of continuing southwards to join either Mortimer or Glyn Dwr. Alternatively, he may have been planning to withdraw north towards Chester, following the road through Wem. But, given the likely effects of retreat on the morale of his army, Hotspur may always have intended to fight next day.