By the winter of 1402 the apparently amicable relationship between King Henry and the Percys was breaking down. It does not necessarily follow that the latter were yet set on the course of rebellion, but dissatisfaction with the monarch they had played such a major part in installing on the throne was clearly growing. One factor to consider when attempting to discover at what point the Percys decided to stake their all on overthrowing Henry is the resources available to them. With the bulk of their estates closely grouped in the north of England, the Percys could, in the short-term, muster greater strength more quickly than could other English magnates or even the king. This should have meant that, in the event of a Percy insurrection, they would initially have overwhelming military strength available. But when they eventually rebelled in 1403 this would not be the case – suggesting they had not been planning open rebellion for any considerable time.
It may have been early in 1403 that Percy contacts were renewed with Owain Glyn Dwr and with Sir Edmund Mortimer, but this time on a much more secretive basis. The go-between may have been John Morys, a Denbigh man who was a confidential servant to Thomas Percy, Earl of Worcester, and who was certainly with Glyn Dwr in the following October. If so, this is the first clear indication that Worcester had turned against the new regime. Indeed, Worcester would be regarded by some contemporaries as being ‘the instigator of all the troubles’.
On Henry’s accession, Thomas Percy had been confirmed as Earl of Worcester and Admiral of England, with the handsome annual annuity of 700 marks. He had continued to be an active member of the King’s Council and a leading diplomat. He also had considerable power and influence in South Wales. So why, if the Percys had not been provoked into action by the undoubted rebuffs they had suffered at the end of 1402, did they actually rebel more than six months later?
By 1402 Henry’s policy of appointing personal retainers rather than men of national standing to important governmental positions was beginning to cause considerable discontent among the traditional ruling magnates. Thomas Percy was replaced as Steward of the Household, while the Percys’ main northern rival, Richard Neville, was created Earl of Westmoreland.
Westmoreland’s powers were steadily expanded in the following months. He replaced Hotspur as Keeper of Roxburgh. More significantly one of his supporters replaced Thomas Percy as Steward.
In the opening months of 1403, the rivalry between the Percys and Ralph Neville was deepening. There had been disputes regarding payment for those of Neville’s retainers who had fought at Homildon Hill, and there had been clashes regarding the prisoners still held by the Percys. Henry, however, still appears to have had no suspicion of serious Percy disaffection. In March 1403 he presented the earl and his son with what, from one aspect, appeared a generous offer, but which would in reality turn out to be a poisoned chalice.
The Scottish defeat at Homildon Hill seemed to have opened the opportunity for an English counterstroke, and on 2 March the king informed the Percys that the whole of the Douglas lands in Southern Scotland, as far as, and including, Galloway, were theirs – provided, of course, that they could conquer them. It appeared – in the short term at least – that Henry had come down in favour of the Percys over the House of Neville. In fact, rather than a favour, his action may have been intended as a device to keep his restive Northern allies occupied.
In Wales, too, operations were under way. On 3 March Prince Henry, at the age of 16 regarded as ready to assume a command in the field, was appointed the king’s deputy in Wales, with powers to summon the levies of the border counties. More immediately, however, a force of 1,100 men-at-arms and 3,800 archers was mustered at Chester. These were, apparently, professional soldiers and Henry was joined by Thomas Percy, Earl of Worcester, in the role of adviser and mentor. Glyn Dwr himself was reported to be active in the Hope area, only a few miles from Chester.
It was not until May that Prince Henry, clearly eager to prove his ability in the field, began his campaigning. Early in May he rode southwest out of Chester, in a raid designed to sting Glyn Dwr himself.
On 15 May, back in Shrewsbury, the Prince reported his success to his father:
We have among other matters been lately informed that Owen de Glyndowdry [sic] has assembled his forces and those of other rebels adhering to him in great numbers; purposing to commit inroads and in case any resistance be made to him by the English, to come to battle with them, or so he vaunted to his people.
Wherefore we took our force and marched to a place of the said Oweyn [sic], well built, which was his principal mansion, called Sycarth, where we thought we should have found him if he had any inclination to fight in the manner he had said, but on our arrival there we found nobody; and therefore caused the whole place to be burned and several other houses near it belonging to his tenants. We then marched straight to his other place of Glendowery to seek for him there and we caused a fine lodge in his park to be destroyed by fire and laid waste all the country around. We there halted for the night and certain of our people sallied forth into the country and took a gentleman of the neighbourhood who was one of the said Oweyn’s chief captains. This person offered five hundred pounds for his ransom to preserve his life and to be allowed two weeks for the raising of this sum; but this offer was not accepted and he received death, as did several of his companions who were taken the same day.
We then proceeded to the commote of Ederynion in Merionethshire and there laid waste a fine and populous country; thence we went to Powys, and there being want of provender in Wales for horses we made our people carry oats with them and pursued our march.
This raid, while demonstrating Prince Henry’s ruthless approach to war – he would later in his career comment that ‘War without fire is like sausages without mustard’ – had been largely symbolic. Glyn Dwr was now playing for much higher stakes than the restoration of his original estates, which he was probably surprised had been spared for so long.
Stationed now in Shrewsbury, Prince Henry soon faced problems. A fortnight after his raid, he was writing to the king:
our soldiers desire to know if they will be paid for the third month of the present quarter and tell us that they will not wait here, unless they are soon paid their wages according to their indentures. We pray you very dearly that you will order our payment for the said month or otherwise let us know and take order promptly for the safety of these marches. For the rebels hear every day if we are paid, and they know well without payment we cannot continue and they strive to raise all the forces of North Wales and South Wales to over-ride and destroy the march and the counties adjoining thereto; and there is no resistance here, so that they can well accomplish their malice; and when our men shall have retreated from us, it is necessary that we should by all means retreat into England, there to be disgraced forever.
At present we have very great expenses, and have made all the pawning we may of our little jewels to defray them, for too our castles of Aberystwyth and Harlech are besieged and have been for a long time and we must rescue and provision them within ten days and besides defend the March around us with our third body against the entry of the rebels.
It would appear that the two castles were, for the moment, saved either by the despatch of heavily escorted supplies overland, or by sea.
But Glyn Dwr was actively preparing what would be a major summer campaign. In June he was reported to be once again active in the Radnor area, while King Henry ordered the levies of Shropshire, Worcester, Gloucester and Hereford to be ready to take the field against the Welsh. But once again he was effectively crippled by lack of funds.
Meanwhile, pressure on the king from the Percys was mounting. In May the Earl of Northumberland wrote to the king’s council to point out that the Scots had until 1 August to relieve Ormiston Castle, and that he lacked the money to field a force to meet them. On the other hand, although the Percys made complaints regarding the alleged lack of financial assistance from the king, they must have been well-informed of the parlous state of royal finances. The letter sent by Northumberland on 24 May to the royal council asked for the payment of £20,000 by 24 June. It was not a particularly aggressive communication, and it seems that the intent was to use the money to hire more English troops to oppose the Scots. At the same time pleas for support were sent to a large number of English magnates. It may well have been the replies to these that the Percy chronicler, John Hardynge, later claimed to have seen at Warkworth Castle, and which he wrongly interpreted as being promises to support a Percy uprising against King Henry.
The Percy aim was to achieve complete political and territorial domination of the north of England, together with full command of the Scottish border. In this latter aim they had suffered a reverse when Hotspur lost control of Roxburgh to the Nevilles. They were also certainly angered by the king’s rejection of their proposed conciliatory approach to Glyn Dwr. Apart from plunging the crown into the expense of prolonged conflict in Wales, this also drew off troops the Percys hoped would reinforce them on the Scottish border. Both this and Henry’s refusal to ransom Mortimer demonstrated that he was acting increasingly independently from the Percys, who almost certainly had thought – when they in effect installed Henry – that at least so far as their own dynastic interests were concerned, he would prove a reliable instrument.
On the other hand, with mounting difficulties facing him on all sides, the king had every reason to remain on good terms with the Percys, and to keep them occupied in order to lessen the possibility of their interfering in matters outside their own immediate concerns. It was probably for these reasons that, on 2 March, the Percys were granted all the lands belonging to the Earl of Douglas. In theory this committed the English crown to supporting the Percys’ claims in Scotland, as well as their right to act independently in enterprises aimed at their own aggrandizement. Incidentally, and tacitly, by this action Henry also abandoned his demand that Douglas be handed over to him. And if the Percys succeeded in making their award good, then the Nevilles would be totally eclipsed, and George Dunbar, Scottish Earl of March, left with a reduced amount of territory islanded in Percy land. In fact, the king seemed to have given in totally to Percy demands.
The Percys must have realized the problems that came with Henry’s ‘grant’, but neither were they willing to pass up such an opportunity to extend their power and influence in the north compared with that of the Nevilles. So, as soon as the campaigning season opened, Hotspur, with the Percy levies of Northumberland, and accompanied by George Dunbar, Earl of March, advanced north. Dunbar evidently hoped to recover his own lands, but the first target of the invaders was a small fortress known as the Tower of Cocklaw, whose owner declined to surrender.
It appears that Hotspur and Dunbar were ill-prepared for siege warfare, for they made little impression on the defiant Scottish garrison. A six-week truce was agreed. If by the end of August, they had not been relieved, the garrison of Cocklaw would surrender.
It appears that the Percys were hoping in this way to force the Scots to put an army in the field, against which they might repeat their success at Homildon Hill. In the meantime their financial difficulties grew steadily more acute.
It has been claimed that Cocklaw was not put under serious siege, and the Percys’ action was designed to force the Scots into a ‘truce’, either to release the Percys’ own forces or as a prelude to obtaining active Scottish support in their intrigues against King Henry. There has also been some confusion regarding the location of Cocklaw, with Ormiston sometimes regarded as a separate place. In fact, Cocklaw Castle was situated just outside the village of Ormiston, about 4 miles to the east of Hawick. Far from being a minor outpost just inside Scotland, Cocklaw was in fact a critical garrison, in the heart of Douglas territory.
The Percys, accompanied by George Dunbar, emphasized the seriousness of their efforts by raiding deep into Teviotdale. In short, although the Percys were almost certainly still in touch with both Glyn Dwr and Mortimer, at this stage they probably had no immediate intention of rebelling.
Henry evidently did not, or could not, respond to a plea for assistance that Northumberland now made, taking the view that the Percys should be able to rely on their own resources, which ought to be sufficient to take Cocklaw, and on 26 June the earl wrote again, from Haughhead in North Yorkshire. This time his tone was stronger. He accused the king of failing to support the Percys or give them appropriate payments. Henry had in fact sent them sufficient money to maintain the border defences, but insufficient to invade Scotland and it was clear that he could not, or would not, place any additional funding at their disposal. Money was urgently required, and for the first time, particularly in the signature of ‘your Matthias’, there was the implication that those who had made and unmade kings previously might do so again.
It must have been within the next few days that the decision to rebel was taken. The Percys were, in fact, at a serious disadvantage in striking at this time. Most of their northern forces were tied down in Scotland or on the border, and could not be removed without the risk of the Scots taking advantage of their absence.
By now it seems clear that Thomas Percy, Earl of Worcester, still currently with Prince Henry at Shrewsbury, was actively committed to the family cause. Indeed it was claimed by some that he was the prime mover in the insurrection. Certainly he seems to have been the most intelligent of the family, and was in touch with events at Court. He was also in an excellent position to secure or neutralize Prince Henry. He will also have been able to make his family aware of the considerable discontent among the professional soldiers at Shrewsbury. This may initially have been because of lack of pay, but it is reasonable to assume there were a number of Richard’s old Cheshire Guard among them, whose loyalties still lay with their former master, and whom someone of Worcester’s persuasive powers would find easy to suborn. It may have been because of this that Hotspur, almost certainly with his father’s knowledge and approval (despite the earl’s later denials), decided to raise his standard in Cheshire. This strategy was not without considerable risk. Although Cheshire was a hotbed of pro-Ricardian sympathies, Hotspur’s own record there was not one certain to bring him support now. He had, after all, been actively involved in Richard’s overthrow, and had also been responsible for the suppression of the Cheshire Rising of 1400.
But the deciding factor was probably Cheshire’s military potential. For over a century, the men of Cheshire had been renowned both for their military skill and their experience as soldiers. Cheshire men had played a major role in the Welsh wars of King Edward I, and during the Hundred Years’ War had been a mainstay of Edward III’s and the Black Prince’s armies. Cheshire troops had seen action at Crécy, Poitiers and Najera, and Cheshire soldiers – such as Sir Hugh Calverley – had gained an international reputation and made personal fortunes in the course of the French wars, and in the notorious mercenary ‘Free Companies’, which sprang up afterwards.
Many Cheshire men saw service in the contingents raised to serve in France. In 1338 Cheshire contributed 350 mounted archers; eight years later it was ordered that 1,500 men be raised in Cheshire to follow the Earl of Lancaster in Aquitaine. In 1356 the Black Prince demanded 500 mounted archers. It may be that this number proved too large to produce, although certainly 300 were provided. Most of the commanders of the contingents serving in France were the landless younger sons of minor gentry, who raised by indenture the men who followed them. They often returned home to Cheshire to recruit, frequently from their own locality. In 1355 Sir Ralph Mobberley’s contingent consisted of knight, esquire and around thirty-two mounted archers. Most of these were recruited within a 10-mile radius centred on Mobberley’s estates. Many of them were already followers of Mobberley, with an inner core recruited from relatives, tenants and neighbours. In some cases the more prominent of these would bring their own retainers. There was also a tradition of some English garrisons in France being associated with Cheshire troops. This was especially the case in Guyenne in the 1370s and 1380s. By the closing decades of the fourteenth century there was a significant pattern of professional military service in Cheshire. In 1392, John Massey of Puddington contracted to raise ten men-at-arms and forty archers for service in Ireland, though many others contracted for fewer – in some cases just for a single archer. Service in the French wars led to close bonds between many Cheshire men, either from existing kinship or the relationship known as ‘brothers in arms’ – a recognized bond that carried with it obligations of support. This seems to have been quite common among Cheshire troops, who would continue to serve together under different employers of various nationalities.
Considering the key roles given by King Richard to Cheshire men, it was something of a surprise when, in 1399, the pro-Ricardian faction in the county apparently folded without resistance. This was partly because many of those who might have sided with Richard were still absent in Ireland, and because of lack of effective leadership by the king himself.
Even so, an attempt was made to rescue Richard on his journey to London, and in 1400 the leaders of the Epiphany Revolt called on the men of Cheshire for assistance. On 22 May, King Henry issued a general pardon to the Cheshire men, with around 125 exceptions. Among these were forty-one members of Richard’s Guard, including John Legh, John Donne, Thomas Beeston and Thomas Holford, with a number of citizens of Chester, where there had been two unsuccessful attempts to secure the city for the rebels.
News of the failure of the rebellion caused the Cheshire men to disperse. Hotspur was put in charge of extinguishing the embers of revolt when he was appointed Justicar of Chester, with most key posts given to outsiders from the county. In a further sign of royal disfavour, inhabitants of Cheshire were forbidden to seek legal redress for any damage allegedly committed by Henry’s supporters in 1399.
There seems to have been continuing unrest and lawlessness in the principality, though this may have been limited by raising forces there for Henry’s campaign in Scotland. Sir John Massey of Puddington was ordered to muster sixty men-at-arms and 500 archers. Significantly, five of the watch commanders of Richard’s Guard were involved in recruiting, only one of them, Richard Cholmondeley, not having been implicated in the 1400 rising.
However, the outbreak of Glyn Dwr’s rising placed an increasing strain on Cheshire. As well as the financial burden, a number of leading Cheshire gentry were called away to serve in the English garrisons in Wales or elsewhere, while Thomas Percy, Earl of Worcester, recruited a large number of Cheshire men to serve with him under Prince Henry. This left something of a leadership vacuum in the county, which Hotspur, as Justicar, was able to fill.
The direct impact of the war on Cheshire itself was fairly limited – trade with the Welsh, even if officially forbidden, seems to have continued unabated, while military activity was largely confined to the area west of the River Dee. The greater impact was on the manpower of the county, with regular demands for troops to serve in Wales.
Hotspur may be presumed to have retained some links with the Cheshire leadership after 1402, although this did not apparently extend to any detailed planning for rebellion.
His plan to rely on forces raised in the principality to spearhead the Percy rebellion was something of a gamble, however. His own record there had been somewhat mixed, both in terms of military success and in his relationship with the local population. But the uncertainties were outweighed both by the potential advantages and because Hotspur possessed few other practicable alternatives. A rising in Cheshire was likely to come as a complete surprise to the king. It would also be taking place in the part of England with the greatest amount of experienced military manpower available.
Hotspur apparently slipped away from Cocklaw in early July with a handful of companions. Somewhat surprisingly, his prisoner, Archibald Earl of Douglas, with around twenty Scottish knights, was among them. At first sight this is puzzling. It may be that Hotspur had promised Douglas restoration of an enlarged share of Southern Scotland in the event of victory, and a chance to strike at his hated rival, George, Earl of March. It is equally possible that Douglas joined Hotspur in a spirit of military adventure.
Hotspur rode south through Yorkshire, where he certainly must have consulted with his father. Northumberland himself would claim later that he had played no part in the rebellion, but this seems highly unlikely. What does seem clear is that a letter was received at this point from King Henry, announcing his intention of marching north in person to assist the Percys. This clearly came as bad news to Northumberland, who, in contradiction to his previous pleas, wrote back to Henry that such assistance was not required. The Percys probably suspected that Henry had got wind of their plans. This indeed is possible: when, on 10 July, from Higham Ferrars in Northamptonshire, the king wrote to the royal council announcing his intention of marching north to ‘give aid and comfort to our very dear and loyal cousins the Earl of Northumberland and his son Henry in the fight honourably undertaken between them and the Scots’, he added in a postscript that the council should take heed of some additional information that would be given to them verbally by the king’s messenger, Elmyn Leget. It is open to question that this information may have included suspicions regarding the Percys’ loyalty.
On 12 July Henry reached Nottingham, where he received the first reports of Hotspur’s arrival at Chester, and his raising of the standard of revolt. The younger Percy had arrived in Chester with 160 followers, including a few recruited in Lancashire on 9 July. Staying in the house of one Petronella Clarke, he immediately began to call out the men of Cheshire in rebellion against King Henry.
By this time Glyn Dwr’s summer campaign was in full swing. He began operations with a spirited attack on 1 July against Brecon Castle, which was repulsed, but the result was widespread alarm among the English-held garrisons of mid and South Wales. The rebels were obviously out in strength and the whole position of the English forces seemed imperilled.
Glyn Dwr had with him two of his leading commanders, Rhys Gethin and Rhys Ddu, suggesting that the Welsh were operating in at least three large bodies. The Welsh forces pressed south-westwards into the valley of the River Towey, an area hitherto untouched by the rebellion, but whose inhabitants now flocked to join Glyn Dwr.
News of defeat was sent to John Faireford, a royal official at Brecon, by Jenkin Hanard, Constable of Dynevor Castle:
Dear Friend,
Owain Glyn Dwr, Henry Don, Rhys Ddu, Rhys Griffiths ap Llewellyn, Rhys Gethin, have won the town of Carmarthen and Wigmor, Constable of the Castle, has yielded up the castle to Oweyn [sic], who has burned the town and slain of men of the town more than fifty and they are and that is a great peril for me and all that are here with me, for they have made a vow that they will kill us all, therefore I pray you that you will not boggle [scare] us but send us a warning within a short time whether we shall have any help or not; or if there be no help coming that we may steal away by night to Brecon…
Written in haste and dread, Faireford urged the king’s officers in Hereford to act:
Rees ap Griffith, of the county of Carmarthen, William ap Philip, Henry Don and his son with many of their adherents were on Monday last treasonably rising in the plain country, against the king our most sovereign Lord and hath laid siege to the Castle of Dynevor with a great force of rebels. And moreover it was certified to me by Ralph Monnington and others who were in the castle of Llandovery how that Owain Glyn Dwr and his false troops were at Llandovery on Tuesday and that the men there being surprised they in the said castle are assured and secured to him, and three hundred of the rebels were at their ease, lying round in siege of the said castle and at night were lodged in Llandeilo, at which time the men of the said county and of other Lordships around were also assured and sworn to him. And at this same Wednesday the same Owain, and all other rebels are on their march towards this town of Brecon for the destruction of the town, which God avert, and after they purpose to make a diversion against other parties in the March if they be not resisted […]
And you will know that all the Welsh nation being taken a little by surprise is adhering to this evil purpose of rebellion and they are assured thereunto, how fully, from one day to another by the support they give to it, clearly appears more openly; and I pray you, please to ordain the most speedy resistance against the rebels that you can and if any mounted expedition be made, be pleased to do this first in these Lordships of Brecon and Cantref Sellyf.
Written at Brecon this Wednesday afternoon and in great haste.
On 6 July, Glyn Dwr, with an army precisely numerated at 8,420 spearmen, captured Carmarthen, though he was quickly forced to abandon it after a series of minor reverses. The Welsh were meeting with their usual problem of capturing the English-held castles, without which, though they might dominate the surrounding countryside, they could seldom gain uncontested control of an area.
Sir John Skidmore was Constable of Careg Cennan Castle, and would later mark a shift in his allegiance by marrying Glyn Dwr’s daughter.
For the moment, he remained loyal to the English regime, and wrote:
For as much as I say I may not spare any man from this place away from me to certify neither my king nor the lord my province in the mischief of the countryside about, nor no man pass by anyway, hence I pray and require you that you certify them how all Carmarthenshire, Kidwelly, Carnwaltham and Isckenyed were sworn to Owain yesterday. And he lay tonight in the castle of Dryslwyn with Rhys ap Griffeth and there I was on truce and prayed for a safe conduct under his seal to send home my wife and her mother and her train but he would not grant me. This day he is about Carmarthen and thinks to abide there until he may have town and castle; and his purpose then is to go into Pembrokeshire, for he holds all the castles and towns in Kidwelly, Gowersland and Glamorgan for the same countries have undertaken the siege of them until they be won.
Excite the king’s advisers that they should excite the king here in all haste to avenge himself on some of his false traitors he has cherished overmuch and to rescue the towns and castles in these countries, for I dread full sore there be few true to maintain them.
Faireford did indeed write urgently to King Henry:
Ordain a remedy for the resistance and destruction of the traitors which are daily reinforced and from time to time cause great evil and destruction to your faithful subjects without any resistance; considering my most gracious lord that if assistance come not speedily, all the castles and towns and your loyal subjects within them are in great peril and on the point of being utterly ruined for default of succour and good government.
The sheriffs of Herefordshire pointed out to the king that they could provide little assistance without outside aid, and the Archdeacon of Hereford, Richard Kingeston, followed up their comments with a blunt warning:
Letters are arriving from Wales containing intelligence by which you may learn that the whole country is lost if you do not go there as quickly as possible. For which reason may it please you to prepare to set out with all the power that you can muster and march day and night for the salvation of these parts. And may it please you to reflect that it will be a great disgrace as well as a loss, to lose or suffer to be lost in the beginning of your reign a country which your noble ancestors have won and for so long a time peaceably possessed. For people talk very unfavourably.
By now, however, the worst of the crisis in South Wales appeared to be over. On 12 July, the townsfolk of Caerleon reported to their counterparts at Monmouth that
There was this day a battle between the worthy baron of Carew and Owain Glyn Dwr, and we do wish you to know that the night before the battle Owain was on purpose to have avoided him and to find out whether the way was clear to pass, if he had need of it. He sent 700 of his men to search the ways and there they met with the baron’s men who slew everybody so there was none on that scene alive.
They also reported a rumour suggesting that Glyn Dwr had been consulting a local soothsayer:
He sent for Hopkyn ap Thomas of Gower to come and speak with him on truce and Hopkyn came. Owain he prayed him, inasmuch as he held him to be a Master of Brut, that he should tell him how and in what manner it should fall out for him, and he told him that he would be captured in a short time between Carmarthen and Gower, and the taking would be under a black banner.
It was unfortunate Hopkyn’s knowledge did not apparently extend to telling Glyn Dwr of developments to the north.