Whereas battle narratives are relatively rare, sieges (lawītum) were quite common in Mesopotamia and are discussed in some detail in the Mari archive, allowing us a fairly good understanding of Mesopotamian siegecraft.1 Fortification existed in Mesopotamia from at least 6000, when Tell al-Sawwan near modern Samarra was fortified with a thick brick wall and a three-meter-wide moat (EA 4:473). Siegecraft undoubtedly began when wall building began. By the third millennium every major city in Mesopotamia had massive walls. With a large number of fortified towns and cities closely packed into the river valleys, sieges, rather than open battles, became the normal mode of warfare. If one seeks the face of battle of Middle Bronze Mesopotamia, it is not to be found in the open fields of combat, but in the long, tiresome, dangerous, desperate, hungry and dirty soldiers in sieges.
Pre-Dynastic {3500–3000}
The first artistic evidence we have of siegecraft comes from the Pre-Dynastic period in Mesopotamia {3500–3000}, from the art of the so-called Priest-king (see pp. 37–9). Two different cylinder seals show the Priest-king with a drawn bow shooting at a besieged city. In one scene the defenders are outside the wall in a sortie, punctured by arrows as they flee (Figure 5a, p. 218). The other scene shows the Priest-king with five bound captives, kneeling outside the wall of the city. One man on the wall is fighting, while another falls from the ramparts, apparently as a result of the archery of the Priest-king (AFC 24, PAE 68/1–2, 70, FI §743). A third Pre-Dynastic scene, from Elam, shows a siege with four defenders on a three-storied rampart wall throwing rocks, or perhaps sling-stones, at besieging solders on the ground below (FI §748). Archaeological evidence from destruction levels at some sites provides confirmation that sieges occurred, and that the results of defeat could be devastating. Although the seals show us that sieges occurred, they unfortunately show us little about how sieges were actually conducted. For more information we are required to wait a number of centuries until the martial inscriptions of the Akkadian warlords.
Figure 5 Archery and siege techniques (drawings by Michael Lyon)
Early Dynastic and Akkadian siegecraft {2500–2200}
For the last half of the Early Bronze Age we have two cylinder seals which probably depict sieges, as well as a number of incidental references to sieges in inscriptional sources. Overall, the data is slim, but sufficient for a basic outline of early Mesopotamian siegecraft.
Later texts from the Old Babylonian period {1800–1600} describe two major types of siege engines, the battering ram (yāššabum or ašubum) (CAD 1/2:428–9) and the siege tower (dimtum) (CAD 3:144–7), which will be discussed in detail on pp. 229–30; they are generally mentioned together in most Old Babylonian siege descriptions. Ironically, although our earliest texts about sieges do not mention these siege engines, two cylinder seals depict sieges using what are very probably the ram and tower.
The first seal, from the late Early Dynastic period, is unfortunately badly worn (Figure 5f, p. 219).2 In the center a tower or city wall is under siege, with two men on the ramparts, one facing right and one facing left. The building is shown with at least two stories. If the proportional heights of the men to the wall is accurate, the wall would be about 20–25 feet tall. To the right of the wall stands a large siege tower (dimtum). It rests on a base roughly the size of a four-wheeled war-cart. The top of the tower overtops the wall slightly. A man on the top of the tower is attacking a man on the wall. Two other men appear in the tower on two different stories, indicating the tower has a base level on the vehicle, a middle level, and a top platform. To the right of the tower five men are shown; although a ladder is not clearly visible, I interpret these men as climbing up ladders which are resting against the back of the siege tower. The tower protects the men from missiles shot from the city and allows the men rapidly to ascend the tower for an assault on the wall. To the left of the city wall we see the same type of four-wheeled vehicle, but this one is without a tower. Three men may be standing in the vehicle, while a fourth stands behind it. There are no equids pulling the vehicle and its front rests near the wall. There appears to be a knob projecting from the vehicle against the wall. I interpret this to be a ram (yāššabum) smashing into the side of the wall. Above this vehicle two men, seeming to float in the air, are probably ascending ladders to assault the wall. If one compares this ram with similar, more detailed renderings from the Assyrian period, it appears they are quite similar in form (AW 2:401).
Recently-published cylinder seals from Tell Beydar (Nabada) {c. 2400–2250} in north-eastern Syria show another very early depiction of the siege tower and battering ram (Figure 5g, p. 219; EEH 116 §10–11). Here we again see a four-wheeled vehicle with a three-storied tower upon it: the base, resting on the wheels, a middle level, and an upper platform on which stand two men. Behind the tower stands another four-wheeled vehicle with some type of protective cover on it and a large projecting beam. This second vehicle is again similar in general form to later Assyrian siege rams (AW 2:388, 391, 407–8, 413, 422–5).
Another seal (EEH 116 §10) shows two four-wheeled vehicles with square boxes on them. They are not in the standard shape of chariots, and have no equids pulling them. Instead each has a long rope in front, perhaps used by men to pull it. The scene is a martial one, for there are two dead bodies and men with long hafted maces. One of the vehicles is empty, but the other has three men standing it, with only their chests and heads protruding above the walls of the vehicle. These are perhaps wheeled heavy shield platforms that could be used as a portable wall. The vehicles could be pulled into position and the wooden walls of the vehicle would serve as a shield wall, behind which the soldiers could shoot missiles, undermine a fortification, or throw baskets of dirt to make a ramp. This vehicle may be the enigmatic samukanum (CAD 15:132), occasionally mentioned along with the ram or tower as a siege device: “even if the Amorites should make war for ten years and bring ten battering rams ([y]ašubum), ten siege towers (dimtum) and twenty samukanu, I will remain strong in my city” (OBLTA 14, 46–7). The Epic of Gilgamesh describes “a battering ram that destroys the walls of the enemy” (EOG 49), but we do not know how far back that element of the tale originates.
When a city faced the imminent threat of a siege, special precautions were taken. Walls are described as being strengthened and repaired in the face of enemies (LKA 329). Special guards were mounted on the wall when the city was under threat: a garrison at Eshnunna was informed that the Amorite warlord “Zikhada has taken two thousand Amorites and they are marching against you. It is urgent. Do not do any work [in the fields outside the city]. Night and day the guard should not come down from the wall” (OBLTA 44).
In such circumstances the assistance of the gods was always invoked. A garrison commander assured the king of Eshnunna that “the city is safe. The omen report concerning my lord is strong. My lord should not worry” (OBLTA 46). Religious icons and standards were placed on city walls and gates to assure divine protection.
[The god Ningirsu's weapon] “Slaughterer-of-a-myriad” he drove in [the wall] as a huge banner at Lagash; he had it placed at [the gate] Shugalam, the dreadful site. He let terror emanate from it; from the dais of Girnun, where judgment is issued, the provider of Lagash [Ningirsu] lifted horns like a mighty bull. (R3/1:83)
We have a few incidental references to siegecraft in Akkadian and Neo-Sumerian inscriptions. The most important method described in the texts is undermining (pilshum), when the attackers simply dug through the mud brick wall. Shulgi's armies are described as “ripping out the brickwork of the foundations of the walls [of Der]” (R3/2:103; R2:135; LKA 123–5). The fact that most fortifications in Mesopotamia were built from sun-dried bricks meant that undermining the walls amounted essentially to digging through dry clay. Although specifically describing the building of a temple, an inscription from Ur-Bau of Lagash gives us an idea of the construction procedures: “I excavated a large building plot [x] cubits deep; its earth I shifted like gems … This earth I then returned from there. I piled up the foundation. Over it I built a retaining wall, 10 cubits (5 meters) high, and over the sustaining wall I built the Eninnu [temple] … 30 cubits (15 meters) high” (R3/1:19, cf. R2:80–2).
· The early Mesopotamian “Priest-king” shooting his enemies with a bow during a siege of a city, {32–31C}; cylinder seal from Susa, Iran; see FI §743
· Craftsmen making bows and javelins {32–31C}; cylinder seal from Uruk, Iraq; see FI §742.
· Incised plaque depicting spearman with shield protecting an archer; Mari, Syria {26–23C} (Museum of Deir ez-Zor, Syria 11233); see AFC 158 §99.
· Naram-Sin, king of Akkad, striding forward in victory with bow and axe or mace; victory relief of Naram-Sin from Darband-i Gawr, Iran {23C}; see AAM §157.
· Akkadian archer with quiver and drawn bow; fragment of stele attributed to the period of Rimush {2278–2270} (from Telloh, Iraq; Louvre AO 2678); see AFC 201 §129a.
· Badly worn cylinder seal depicting a Mesopotamian siege tower (dimtum) and ram (yāššabum) assaulting a city; southern Mesopotamia {mid-third millennium} (Antiquity Department of the Royal Museums of Art and History, Brussels, O 437); see FI §749.
· Akkadian siege tower and ram; cylinder seal from Nabada (Tell Beydar, Syria) {24–23C}; see EEH 116 §11.
The walls were massive, and the difficulty of undermining would be increased by the enemy harassing the diggers from the walls with missiles, sling stones, and rocks, but there were no fundamentally insurmountable engineering problems. Given sufficient manpower, it was essentially a matter of time until an attacking force could undermine the walls, create a breach, and assault through the breach.
Armies would on occasion march near a city, challenging the garrison to fight in open combat, hoping to avoid a lengthy siege (R2:105–6). The defenders might come out and fight to prevent their land from being devastated by the besiegers. Gilgamesh marched outside the walls to defeat Agga who was besieging Uruk (EOG 145–8). Likewise, Naram-Sin marched out from the protection of the city walls to drive off Iphur-Kish, who was besieging his capital (R2:104–6).
For the most part we have few descriptions of actual sieges; the scribes are content merely to state that a city was taken (R2:14, 41). Akkadian inscriptions include numerous references to the destruction of the walls of conquered cities, a frequent practice for defeated cities (R2:14, 28, 41, 52–5; R4:149). It is not clear from the evidence precisely what the destruction of these walls entailed; it seems most likely that it was the destruction of key sections of walls and city gates rather than the complete leveling of the walls, which would have been a massive undertaking.
The most detailed account of a siege from this early period comes from an inscription of Naram-Sin's siege of Armanum (Aleppo).
When the god Dagan determined the verdict [of battle in favor of] Naram-Sin, the mighty, [the god Dagan] delivered into his hands Rid-Adad, king of Armanum, and [Naram-Sin] personally captured him in the midst of his [city or palace?] gateway.… From the fortification wall [of Armanum-Aleppo] to the great wall: 130 cubits [c. 65 meters] is the height of the hill [and] 44 cubits [22 meters] is the height of the wall. From the quay wall to the fortification wall: 180 cubits [c. 90 meters] is the height of the hill [and] 30 cubits is the height of the wall. Total: 404 cubits [c. 200 meters] in height, from ground [level] to the top of the [highest part of the] wall [of the citadel]. He undermined the city [wall] Armanum [causing a breach which allowed the city to be taken]. (R2:132–5)
The figures given here for Armanum, which may be exaggerated, seem to represent the overall height of the earlier levels of the tell, an outer wall, and then an inner citadel wall on top of the acropolis. Naram-Sin says he took the city by undermining the wall, which presumably created a breach into which the Akkadian army attacked.
Part of the later literary legend of Sargon describes an assault through a breach:
Sargon undermined [the walls of] the city, broadened the Gate of the Princes, [he made a breach] two iku [110 meters] wide. He cast it down; in the highest part of its wall he made a breach; he smote all of his wine-intoxicated men. Sargon placed his throne before the gate. Sargon opens his mouth, speaking to his warriors, he declares, “Come on! Nur-Daggal [the enemy king] … Let him stir himself! Let him humble himself! Let me behold [him surrender].” (LKA 123–5)
However, siegecraft was not always successful, and sieges often turned into blockades which could last for months. A siege of Kullab by the army of Uruk is described in the Epic of Lugalbanda:
Like a snake traversing a grain pile, [the army] crossed over the foothills
But when they were but one double-mile from the city,
[The soldiers of] both Uruk and Kullab threw themselves down prone
In Aratta's field watchtowers and dikes,
For from the city darts rained like rain
And from Aratta's walls clay slingstones came clattering
As hailstones come in spring.
Days passed, the months lengthened, the year returned to its mother.
A yellowed harvest was about to grow up under heaven …
But no man knew how to go to the city,
Was able to push through to go to Kullab. (HTO 336–7)
With the siege in a stalemate, Lugalbanda seeks an oracle from Inanna, who tells him to fell a certain tamarisk tree and make a sacrifice of sacred fish from the canals before Inanna's battle standard A'ankara (HTO 341–4). Although the end of the epic is lost, it is clear that the divination and sacrifice is successful and the city is taken. Whatever one may think of the intercession of Inanna in the siege, Mesopotamians frequently used divination, oracles, and magic as mechanisms to revitalize flagging morale. A favorable sign from the gods could encourage men to one last effort to break a stalemate. Bad omens might be sufficient to break a siege.
Thus, although the details are generally not known, it is clear from both textual, artistic, and archaeological evidence that the Akkadians were masters at siegecraft. It was this skill, more than any other, that allowed them to create their empire. Indeed, it could be argued that the Akkadian military revolution was one of siegecraft; they discovered the right balance of technologies and methods that permitted them to take cities faster and with fewer resources than had been possible before. This created a sort of force multiplier that allowed their army to accomplish more in a given year than other armies could. The basic principles of Akkadian siegecraft – towers, rams, and undermining – would remain the standard arsenal of weapons against cities throughout the Middle Bronze Age, a period for which we have much greater source materials on siegecraft.
Siegecraft in the Old Babylonian period {1800–1600}
Thanks to the Mari archive (ARM), we are better informed about siegecraft in the Old Babylonian period than about any other time in the Early or Middle Bronze ages. Although we have no artistic representations of sieges for this period, our textual information gives us an excellent understanding of siegecraft in the age of Hammurabi.
Fortifications
The nature of siegecraft in any age is based upon the nature of fortifications. Defense of cities was a primary concern of Mesopotamian kings (WM 158–60). The basic defense pattern of cities is described in one report: “The inner city wall is surrounded by an outer wall, and the palace [citadel] by an outer wall and a moat” (ARM 6.29; WM 158). Some of the larger cities had concentric fortifications, with outer walls (dūrum) around the main city as well as inner fortifications (šalhum) for the citadel which could be defended separately, and to which the population could retreat if the outer city fell (MM 4; MK 145; Figure 6, p. 267).
When city walls were destroyed by old age, natural disaster, or enemy attacks, soldiers were used as labor crews to repair them (L 231, 497; MM 4). Royal inscriptions frequently describe the fortifications built by the king; Gudea of Lagash, for example, built fortifications (E3/1:111, 128) and restored a city gate (E3/1:147, 161). Babylonian kings also describe “levying of the army of my land” for military construction projects (R4:335, 377). In a sense, soldiers were a form of labor conscription, and, like later Roman legionaries, could be used as ordinary laborers.
On the other hand, repairs were often put off until the enemy was at the gates:
The city where our lord is staying is not in good repair. Already before an alarm of the coming [of enemy] troops is heard, our lord must give strict orders to guards and border guards outside. They must not be negligent.… He must not neglect the guard of the wall. Here, we are very concerned about the guard of the wall and the city gates. (L 242)
Brick walls required regular repair, and numerous inscriptions describe the building or refurbishing of city walls. Shu-ilishu {1984–1975} rebuilt the walls of his capital Isin (R4:19). A century later, Enlil-bani of Isin{1860–1837} found it necessary to “build anew the wall of Isin which had become dilapidated” (R4:80). A letter requests bricks to repair a wall (L 376). In reality, the walls of major cities probably required frequent if not constant upkeep.3 In 1733 Samsu-iluma repaired six forts which “in their old age had fallen into ruin of their own accord” (R4:381–2). Repair projects usually took several months (R4:382, 390). Nur-Adad of Larsa {1865–1850} lists the daily wages of each worker on his walls, giving a sense of the expense of such repairs.4
Warad-sin {1834–1823} describes his monumental rebuilding of the walls of Ur:
[At the] fine base [of the walls of Ur] the [Sumerian] people multiply and are able to save their lives. The god Nanna entrusted me the building of [Ur's] wall. In the course of that year five months had not passed when I baked its bricks. I finished the great wall and raised up its parapet. Like a verdant mountain I caused it to grow up in a pure place. I made its height surpassing, had it release its terrifying aura. I raised its head commensurate with its name and greatness. I caused it to shine forth splendidly to the wonder of the nation. I chose the place for my royal foundation inscription in its foundation, and raised the head of its gate there. I made its fosse strong, circled it with bricks, and dug its moat. I built for him [the god Nanna] the great wall, [the top of] which like a mountain raised high cannot be touched.… I surrounded his [Nanna's] city. The name of that wall is “The god Nanna makes the foundation of the land firm”.5
Samsu-iluna, son of Hammurabi, also has a detailed description of the city walls of Kish: “by means of the labor of his army [Samsu-iluna] built the city of Kish. He dug its canal, surrounded it with a moat, and with a great deal of earth made its foundations firm as a mountain. He formed its bricks and built its wall. In the course of one year he made its head rise up more than it had been before” (R4:385–8).
Many walls had water-filled moats surrounding them (LKA 329; MM 4). Abisare of Larsa describes digging “the canal of the wall of Larsa” (LYN 13). Anam of Uruk in the nineteenth century provides more details: he “restored the wall of Uruk – the ancient work of divine Gilgamesh … in baked bricks in order that the water might roar in [the wall's] surrounding [moat]” (R4:474–5). Hammurabi “raised the head of the wall of Sippar with earth like a great mountain. I encircled it with a swamp” (R4:348), probably referring to a moat (ASD 15). Likewise, Samsu-iluna of Babylon “surrounded Nippur with a moat. He dug the Euphrates and made the wall reach the bank of the Euphrates” (R4:374, 390). The moat was frequently simply the quarry pit from which the earth was taken to build the wall. Samsu-iluna claims that “in the course of two months, on the bank of the Turul river, he built Fort Samsu-iluna. He dug its surrounding moat, piled up its earth there, formed its bricks, and built its wall. He raised its head like a mountain” (R4:390–1).
Gates (abullum) of the city were often massive; up to six meters high and built of imported cedar wood (ARM 3.10; MM 4), with bronze reinforcing and bolts (LKA 199, 215). An artist's depiction of a Middle Bronze gate survives in a small plaque (SDA 291c). It shows high brick walls with crenellations, and a large gateway with a brick arch and projecting towers. A similar surviving arched gate and stretch of wall can be seen at Tell Dan in Israel (ALB 208; Figure 7, p. 278). Like walls, gates needed to be regularly repaired: one city ordered the construction of a new city gate (L 263). City gates were frequently named after gods. In Sippar two gates were named after the gods Nungal and Shamash, while a third was named “Stairway Gate”, presumably because it included a stair leading to the ramparts. City officials included the Gatekeeper (sha abullim), who was in charge of security, traffic control, and duty collection (ASD 15–16, 85; cf. HTO 175).
Preparations for a siege
When a city faced imminent threat, special precautions were taken. Walls are described as being strengthened and repaired in the face of enemies (LKA 329). Border guards (bazāhātum) manned outposts and patrolled the land, watching for enemy raiders and troop movements (L 573, 382, 393; MM 5, 7). Such patrols were reported to have ranged fifty kilometers from their bases (L 482). This type of duty was considered onerous: “the guarding of a city is a hard [duty]; and there are few troops available” (L 449). When there was fear of approaching enemy troops, the scouts, outposts, and city-guards were increased: “Because an alarm [caused by the enemy's approach] might be heard, we ordered a herald [to be ready] to call it out over the town.… Our lord must give strict orders to keep the guards of the wall and outposts at the ready by night and siesta” (L 239–40). During wartime, officers inside cities were required to report daily to the commander at the main city gate-fortress to receive their orders (L 462). Beacon fires were lit to alert the surrounding regions of approaching enemies (L 398; MM 10; WM 119–21), as described in a dispatch:
I departed from Mari, and spent the night at Zuruban. All the Banu-Yamina [nomad confederacy] raised fire signals. From Samanum to Ilum-Muluk, from Ilum-Muluk to Mishlan, all the cities of the Banu-Yamina of the Terqa district raised fire signals in response, and so far I have not ascertained the meaning of those signals. Now I shall determine the meaning, and I shall write to my lord whether it is thus or not. Let the guard of the city of Mari be strengthened, and let my lord not go outside the gate! (ANET 482a)
Fire signals could thus inform a ruler of a danger and perhaps the direction the danger was coming from, but additional information had to be obtained by field officers and reported in dispatches.
As an enemy army approached, sheep and other livestock were collected into safe areas (L 394); the king would “gather before him [in his city] oxen, sheep, and his population that were loyal to him” (PH 78). Border guards also went on patrol to capture enemy agents or stragglers, and sent dispatches with reports of enemy troop movements back to the commanders (L 383). When a major enemy army approached, the border guards alerted the regiment in the city, but were unable to offer more than nominal resistance, as one report indicated: “the [advancing] enemy has pushed the border guards out of the way” (L 243).
Standing orders were given to move people and troops into the city upon the approach of the enemy: “when the enemy comes, let those seeking refuge enter the strongholds” (L 398, 247, 315, 361; MM 6). Supplies and provisions were also gathered into the city in preparation for a siege. Cattle and sheep were brought into the city for protection and kept in the peoples’ houses (L 466). As an Elamite army approached Babylon, Hammurabi ordered: “[The enemy] will soon cross the border. Collect cattle and grain, straw, small boys, [small girls, all of them] and bring them into Babylon!” (L 320). Panic might spread among the population as the enemy pillaged their land and surrounded their city (L 317).
Offensive first moves
When first approaching a city an army often tried to make a surprise attack, capturing the city before it could prepare a proper defense (L 314). On occasion, a city that was surprised could fall to a conqueror in a single day. “During that same night, troops [of king Haya-Sumu] went to [the city of] Kahat and, upon their arrival, seized the city of Kahat and caught [its king] Kapiya. Attaya, who is with Haya-Sumu, ascended [the former Kapiya's] throne on that early morning” (L 299). The potential of surprise attack necessitated constant vigilance by both attackers and defenders. During time of war soldiers were constantly admonished to be on the alert: “I am afraid [that the enemy king] Ishme-Dagan may be enabled, through some negligence [of the soldiers], to do harm in the encampment” (L 359).
If a surprise attack failed, cities were frequently given a chance to surrender before the siege formally commenced. One surrendered three days after a siege began (L 350). Most cities, however, seemed to have rejected these initial overtures of surrender, preferring instead to make at least nominal resistance. For example, in one siege, “after he [the enemy king] laid siege to the city, he offered it peace but kept his troops in place. And he requested [the surrender of the besieged city's] king. They [the city] did not give [their king] to him [the enemy king]” (L 399). If a city surrendered on terms, it was spared looting; if it fought on and was taken by assault, it could be plundered and destroyed, and its population taken as slaves (MM 48). Hammurabi instructed his commanders of his policy towards Mashkan-Shapir, a major city in the kingdom of Larsa in southern Mesopotamia:
If you succeed [in negotiating a surrender], and if the city opens [its gates] in front of you, accept its peace! Even if he [the commander] violates the oath by [the gods] Shamash and Marduk, [do not plunder] that city! If the city does not open [its gates, besiege it] and send for me [for reinforcements]! (L 333)
This policy created a psychological crisis for the defenders of the town as they saw the siege ramp daily progressing towards their walls (L 352). As it turned out in this case, the city of Mashkan-Shapir did not immediately surrender, but as the siege progressed, the besieged army began to lose heart as they saw Hammurabi's siege ramp, ladders, towers, and rams moving closer. Hammurabi's commander reported:
They [the army of Larsa] are dreading an assault [by the Babylonians].… Sin-Muballit, the brother of Rim-Sin [king of Larsa] … is surrounded [by the Babylonian army] in the city of Mashkan-Shapir. And the land of Larsa dreads an assault and he [Sin-Muballit] is about to change sides. [Then] the city of Mashkan-Shapir will open its gates three or four days from now. (L 334)
It is not clear if the city eventually surrendered or was taken by assault, but Hammurabi was victorious and moved on to capture the capital Larsa and annex the entire kingdom.
Sometimes an attacker would give the defender an ultimatum, allowing him a few days to surrender a city before the battle began in earnest. This was potentially dangerous, however, since it gave the defenders an opportunity to receive reinforcements. One Mariote commander, Buqaqum, reported:
Five thousand men [of Mari] are fortifying the city of Yabliya. And [the enemy general] Shallurum is strengthening Harbe together with 15,000 men.… Shallurum spoke … as follows: “I will wait five days for you [to withdraw from the city], then [if you do not] I will commence fighting.” A rescue detachment [from Mari] must get here soon [or the city will surrender]. (L 383, 384)
If a relief army came they might camp near the camp of the attackers, hoping to force the enemy to withdraw. When facing an enemy relief force, the commander of one siege hoped he could lure the enemy out to an open battle: “when I lay siege to the city, and he [the enemy relief army] quits his camp and sets himself in motion toward me, at that time I will do battle” (L 418).
Assault
If a city refused to surrender, the next alternative was assault, which could be difficult and costly to both sides. Whenever Mesopotamian soldiers campaigned in close proximity to the enemy they built fortified encampments (nawūm) (L 193, 319, 320, 328), especially when besieging an enemy city (L 457). Such camps were often built by the gates of a city to prevent the besieged people from leaving, communicating, or receiving reinforcements (L 301, 346). One fortified camp is mentioned as being about three kilometers from the city under siege (L 400). If the armies remained in encampments for a long period of time they built houses and towers (L 468). When two allied armies besieged the same city, they built separate encampments for each army (L 275, 346). If enough troops were available the city would be completely surrounded (L 309).
Attackers would generally plunder the countryside for food and attempt to ambush and capture anyone coming in or out of the city (L 316). If possible they would attack at harvest time, harvesting the fields to feed the besieging army while the enemy watched hungrily from their city (L 324, 396). Besieging armies naturally had their own problems with supplies. One group complained that “they transport water to the troops day and night from five kilometers away. Who from among the two to three thousand [enemy troops in the besieged city] might attack the water carriers?” (L 497). Night operations were also sometimes undertaken (L 358).
The size of armies besieging cities could vary greatly, depending on the size of the city being attacked. Vast forces were not necessarily needed. Five hundred men captured the small town of Tilla (L 455). The siege of Shehna was undertaken by 2000 men (L 301), while the same number took Urgish (L 455). A major city, however, like Shubat-Enlil, required at least 4000 men to besiege it (L 455), and sometimes more (L 383). The size of defending armies also varied. Royal garrisons of towns were often very small: 20 (L 299), 50 (L 312), and 100 (L 314) men are mentioned, though those numbers would swell dramatically when war began, by reinforcements and conscription of the city militia into service. One city was strongly defended by a garrison of 300 (L 352). The city of Ashihum was defended by “1000 good troops”, which allowed that commander to make numerous sorties (L 346).
Once a city was blockaded and defensive camps constructed, the attacker had to decide on the best approach to assault the city. One method was to attempt to undermine (pilšum) the walls causing them to collapse (ARM 1.35; WM 171). Ishme-Dagan successfully took the city of Qirhadat with this technique: “As soon as I had approached the town of Qirhadat I set up siege towers. By sapping I caused its walls to collapse. On the eighth day I seized the city of Qirhadat. Rejoice!” (ARM 1.135; WM 172).
The preferred technique for besiegers, however, was to construct siege equipment and a siege ramp (epirum) (L 321, 328, 331, 356; WM 171). The purpose of the siege ramp was to provide access to the upper wall for ladders, mobile siege towers and rams, as exemplified in a siege by Ishme-Dagan:
The town of Nilimmar that Ishme-Dagan besieged, Ishme-Dagan has [now] taken. As long as the siege-ramps did not reach to the heights of the top of the city [wall], he could not seize the town. As soon as the siege-ramps reached the top of the city [wall], he gained mastery over this town. (ARM 1.4; WM 173)
Like Roman legionnaires, soldiers of Bronze Age Mesopotamia were frequently used in military engineering, building fortified camps and siege ramps, as well as defensive engineering activities. Although a relatively small army could besiege a town, the construction of a siege ramp was a major operation requiring a great deal of labor. While the soldiers certainly provided manual labor for siege engineering, they were frequently helped by corvee laborers (L 318–19).
Mesopotamian engineers had turned siegecraft into a science, creating mathematical exercises that allowed them to calculate the volume of earth, number of men, and time it would take to construct a siege ramp reaching a given height.6 According to one problem, the engineers had to build a ramp to assault a wall 22 meters high. The ramp began 240 meters from the city wall, and was 36 meters wide. The ramp progressed slowly towards the wall, leaving an ever decreasing gap between the unfinished end of the ramp and the wall. This was presumably done so that as much of the work on the ramp could be done as far away from the city wall as possible. The reason that siege ramps were preferable to undermining the wall is probably that all of the operation of undermining had to occur directly under the wall, and therefore was more vulnerable to enemy attacks.
The rampart and wall of the besieged city in this mathematical problem was 22 meters high;7 the total height of the ramp at 48 meters from the wall was said to be only 18 meters. It is unclear if the end of the ramp was intended to reach a total height of 22 meters, or if it leveled off at 18 meters high for the last part of ramp. A gap of 4 meters (13 feet) between the top of the wall and the end of the ramp could be bridged by siege towers and ladders. There would be no need to construct rams, ladders, and siege towers, which were always used on the ramps, if the end of the ramp reached the height of the wall. If this interpretation is correct, it gives us a good sense that a Mesopotamian siege tower was about five meters tall, which corresponds with our artistic evidence discussed elsewhere (see pp. 216–7). Wooden planks (GIš.arammum) were laid down to form a more solid pathway up which the towers and rams could be pushed (WM 180 n16).
According to this hypothetical mathematical problem, it would take 9500 men, each carrying two cubic meters of earth per day, only five days to build a siege ramp to the top of the wall. This number, however, was derived from a hypothetical mathematical exercise assuming ideal conditions. It does not take into account the number of men who would have to blockade the city or protect the camp. It does not consider that some of the men would be required to gather and prepare supplies for food, or that some men would be sick or injured. Most importantly, it doesn't deal with the reality of building the ramp in the face of enemy missiles and sorties, requiring men with shields to defend the workers, slowing the work and creating casualties. In reality it probably took several weeks to build such a siege ramp, even with 10,000 men. Most importantly, however, this hypothetical military engineering exercise does not match the reality of the size of actual besieging armies in the Middle Bronze, which seldom numbered 10,000 men. None the less, given the right men and circumstances, towns could fall to an assiduous attacker in a week. Ishme-Dagan, son of Shamshi-Adad, reported, “I set up a tower and a battering ram against [the town of Hurara], and in seven days I captured that town” (ARM 1.131); and on another occasion “As soon as I had approached the town of Qirdahat, I set up a tower and made its wall fall down by tunneling, and in eight days I captured the town” (ARM 1.135; cf. 1.138).
No artistic depictions of siege ramps, ladders, rams, or siege towers exist from the Middle Bronze period, but they were probably broadly similar to the Early Bronze representations discussed on pp. 216–7 (Figure 5f–g, p. 219), and to the Assyrian practices of a thousand years later as depicted in the much later Assyrian martial murals (AW 2:406–49). Siege ramps and other siege earthworks were generally taken down after a siege (L 459), meaning that they survive archaeologically only if the city was captured, destroyed, and never reinhabited. An Assyrian ramp, from the siege of Lachish in Judea, was discovered during the excavations of Lachish.8 Indeed, most of the elements found in later Assyrian siegecraft of the early first millennium seem to have been developed by the Middle Bronze Age.
While the siege ramp was being constructed, special craftsmen were busy building the ladders, siege towers, and battering rams for use in assaulting the wall when the ramp was completed.9 They were generally used simultaneously in an assault; frequently the attacker is said to have only a single ram and tower (ARM 1.131, 135), or sometimes only two (L 457). The construction of these devices was difficult, requiring skilled craftsmen and special materials (ARM 6.65). The precise details of these siege engines are not know, but their basic function seems clear.
Ladders (simmiltum) (L 205) were obviously devices that allowed the soldiers to scale the last part of a wall once the siege ramp had reached it. A large number were used in sieges, and were stored after siege for reuse and transported to the siege by boat or cart. Commanders felt an assault on a city wall could not be undertaken without sufficient ladders:
About the [siege] ladders that Ibal-Pi-El brought into [the city of] Rapiqum – they are being kept inside Rapiqum. And there are no boats inside Rapiqum for bringing them upstream to Hurban [the city that is being besieged]. We lack ladders. If it pleases our lord, we must not have a lack of ladders. (L 393)
Battering rams (yāššabum) were used to break down walls or gates.10 They were also used from the top of siege ramps. Battering rams were sometimes used to break down revetment walls supporting earthworks; it was possible that when the revetment walls collapsed, the slumping earthworks would bury the ram (L 479). Siege towers (dimtum) do not seem to have been extraordinarily tall – perhaps about five to six meters.11 They were essentially strengthened and protected ladders allowing the soldiers to assault the top of the wall from the siege ramp. Another siege device which seems to have been part of the tower is the “leaner” (humadia) (L 205–6, 393); it is either some type of ladder, or a gangplank that was lowered by ropes from the top of the siege tower onto the top of the wall. The arrival of 500 reinforcements with a siege tower caused consternation for a besieged garrison commander, but he vowed to continue the fight: “[even] if he comes with a [siege] tower, I will not permit him to enter the city” (L 305). Towers could be disassembled, moved, and used in another siege (L 470).
On some occasions the siege equipment was constructed at a distance and transported to the site of the siege, either by boat (ARM 2.107, 2.110 14.45) or by wheeled vehicles (ARM 2.7, 2.15). Shamshi-Adad ordered the transport of siege equipment by river and land: “as soon as they have brought the siege towers and the battering ram upstream to Mari they should load them on wagons”. In the latter case, it is not clear if the disassembled parts of the tower and ram were transported by cart, or if the tower and ram were built on wheels and moved on their own. The latter option is probably indicated by the siege representations of the Early Bronze period, discussed on p. 216, which show siege towers and rams on wheels. As in the Middle Ages, siege engines were given special names by the soldiers; one was called haradan – wild donkey (ARM 6.63; CAD 6:88), which, coincidentally, in a Latin form onager, was used by the Romans for a type of catapult.
On the other hand, siege equipment was often built at the site of the siege. The lack of high quality building timber throughout most of the Mesopotamian floodplain caused difficulties for sieges, requiring that either siege equipment or good timber be shipped to the site of the siege. One general asked the king to ship in special wood for building siege equipment.
About cutting trees for xattassi12 and axletrees for a battering ram and towers, of which my lord wrote – [we need] straight stems which are suitable for xaṭṭassi, and axletrees do not exist on the bank of the Habur [River, a tributary of the Euphrates], and cornel wood, straight stems, do not exist. (L 414)
Another commander had put his assault on hold while waiting for good building timber to build thirty ladders for a siege.
Load on one boat those pines from the dry pines that are with you, that is, 40 pines of two reeds length for ladders, 20 pines for short ladders (kammu), 20 pines for “leaners” (hu-mu-da-ia), and provide silver for buying travel provisions for the haulers [of the equipment]; those pieces of wood must arrive tomorrow. Do not neglect this letter of mine! Further: send a blade of one pound [of bronze] for the battering ram! The assault [on the city of Mishlan has been] on hold for nine days [because of this lack of siege equipment]. (L 205–6)
Archers were also used during sieges, but again apparently in rather small numbers. A small plaque from Mari shows an archer, behind another man holding a large shield, shooting upward, apparently at enemies on a wall during a siege (Figure 5c, p. 218).13 One letter from the commander of a besieging army requested more ammunition:
Have made 50 bronze arrowheads of 5 shekels weight (40 grams) each, 50 arrowheads of 3 shekels weight each, 100 arrowheads of 2 shekels weight each, and 200 arrowheads of 1 shekel weight each. Make it a priority, so that it is finished quickly. It looks as if the siege of Andarik may be prolonged, and that is why I am writing to you. (ARM 18.5; MK 63)
The total number of arrows requested was only 400, enough to arm only twenty archers with twenty arrows each. The urgency of the letter seems to imply that the commander felt that these 400 arrows were important, possibly reflecting the overall small levels of archery used in Middle Bronze Mesopotamia. Thirty men with javelins are also described as harassing the city walls (L 497).
Defensive operations
One standard response of a besieged city was to make sorties to disrupt the attackers (L 400). An active defense could include many sorties. One defending commander had “1000 good troops” in his garrison, allowing him to “constantly keep coming out [of the city] to do battle” with the besieging army (L 346). A well-timed sortie could break a siege: “Two hundred troops and [commander] Saggar-Abum went out from Kurda, and he defeated 500 Eshnunakean troops. He drove them from their [fortified] camp” (L 417).
A series of contemporary dispatches to king Zimri-Lim of Mari from his city commander named Zimri-Addu give a vivid description of the course of the siege of Hiritum by the Elamites in 1764 (L 103–5). The city was defended by both Mariote and Babylonian allied soldiers (L 459). The Elamites had surrounded the city, built a fortified camp, and constructed a ramp that was nearing the walls of the city. In response Zimri-Addu undertook active defensive tactics.
To my lord [king Zimri-Lim] speak! Your servant Zimri-Addu says: “The troops of my lord [in the city of Hiritum] are well. Some time ago I wrote my lord that [we set] fire to the tower [standing on] the lower fringe [of the Elamite siege ramp], and that the enemy [are seeking materials] for obtaining another tower. Now, that method [was successful in destroying] one tower, [but one tower] remained standing. And the work within the city against the tower of the enemy and his earthworks [continues]; a counter-ramp14 that [we defenders] made was two ropes wide, earthworks for two ropes. And the [Babylonian] servants of [the allied king] Hammurabi were talking as follows. They said: ‘We will make these earthworks higher toward our […] counter-ramp, and do battle from their top [against the enemy attack from their siege ramp]. The enemy will not be able to do anything to this city!’ ”
(L 457–8)
The defenders seem to have been building a counter-ramp inside the city, with revetment walls and earthworks allowing them to make the overall height of their wall higher, forcing the enemy to increase the height of their siege ramp.
Zimri-Addu continued the narrative in a subsequent dispatch written on the very eve of the battle he is describing. Some unfortunate lacunae leave part of the text unclear:
To my lord [king Zimri-Lim] speak! Your servant Zimri-Addu says: “The troops of my lord [in the city of Hiritum] are well. The day I sent this tablet to my lord, the troops of my lord and [the allied] Babylonian troops were positioned against the enemy in front of the [enemy siege] tower and the earthworks [of the enemy]; [our soldiers] fought and drove [the enemy] from his [siege ramp] earthworks.… In the morning [the enemy] returned … to the top of his earthworks [and] was coming out toward the [gate]. One of the ‘leaners’ [siege gangplank] and [… the siege tower?] gave way [and collapsed]. And I heard the following: ‘There is no [siege] tower left to [the enemy], and he [is waiting for more materials] to obtain a [new] tower.’ This I heard. The day when the battle was fought, Dagan-Mushteshir distinguished himself very much. [A] fire [was lit] and was kept burning in front of the [enemy siege] tower. And of the troops of my lord, many troops distinguished themselves.” (L 459)
In the aftermath of their failure to break into Hiritum and the loss of their siege towers, the Elamite army withdrew (L 460), as Zimri-Addu describes in his next dispatch:
The troops [of Mari] are staying in the camp of Hiritum. The Babylonian troops took down the [temporary fortifications of] the city of Hiritum [including] the counter-ramp that they had built. They are spreading the earthworks [of the siege ramp] that the enemy had heaped up.… Now the enemy has crossed to Kakkulatum. He has regrouped.… The enemy has released the work detail [which had been conscripted to build the earthworks and siege ramp] to [return] to his land. (L 459)
Another siege for which we have some detailed narratives is the siege of Razama by the Elamites (L 65–9). It began when Atamrum, king of Allahad and ally of the Elamites, with an army of 700 Elamites and 600 Eshnunakeans (L 496) made an attack on the city. Zimri-Lim of Mari was overlord of the city, but he was engaged in the north, and needed time to return to Mari, refurbish his army and relieve Razama (L 496). The city was thus required to hold out on its own for nearly a month. The king of Razama, Sharraya, a loyal vassal of Zimri-Lim, strongly resisted the siege. As Atamrum made siege ramps against the walls and prepared rams and siege towers for the final assault, Sharraya led sorties to disrupt the besiegers’ efforts, specifically targeting the craftsmen making siege engines.
The city of Razama is under siege, and [its commander] Sharraya is staying inside his city [to defend it]. He put up a fight. He went out and felled 500 troops from among the [enemy] troops. [He also killed] two leatherworkers and battering-ram makers [in the sortie]. (L 489)
The ramp had progressed well, and a siege tower and ladders were ready for their final placement when Sharraya's soldiers made another impressive sortie.
Sharraya placed lumps of pitch opposite a tower and then lit a fire under the lumps of pitch, and the tower collapsed. And the fire consumed the “leaners” [siege tower gangplanks].… [Thereafter] Atamrum wrote to Sharraya [offering to withdraw on terms, saying]: “Give me tribute! And release to me the troops that you [captured in battle] and brought inside [the city]!” But he did not give him tribute.… And the city is strong. I am afraid Atamrum and his troops will quit [the siege] before the arrival of my lord [with reinforcements]. (L 300)
At this point the attacking commander Atamrum considered negotiating, and wrote to his Elamite overlord, explaining: “I put a chokehold on the city [of Razama]. Write to me if you want me to quit, and I shall receive the tribute of the city and quit. Otherwise [I shall take down] the fortifications of the city” (L 495–6). The townspeople seemed willing to accept an offer and pay tribute, but by this time the situation had changed; Atamrum's confidence had been restored and he broke off negotiations.
They [the attackers] took a break for ten days, and then the elders [of the city] came out to Atamrum and told him the following. They said: “We are for making peace. The [besieging] troops must withdraw five kilometers from his camp, and I shall supply silver [as tribute].” And he [Atamrum] answered them as follows. He said: “You really have decided the following: ‘We shall deceive him with words. Let him withdraw from his camp, and we shall [thereby] put a stop to the exertions [of the siege] ….’ If you are for making peace, why does Sharraya [the king of Razama] not come out to me [personally to negotiate]? Go, put up a fight, strengthen your city [for the coming attack]!” And the townspeople answer him as follows: “The city is Zimri-Lim's, and his regular army went behind him [to Aleppo]. Stay [and fight] until the lord of the city [Zimri-Lim] comes to [attack] you!” [Thus king Sharraya] made his decision, strengthened the city, and started coming out regularly [in sorties], and he was beating the Eshnunakean troops. And he [Atamrum] was heaping up earthworks going toward the city. (L 496)
As the siege ramp advanced toward the city wall, an urgent message was sent to Zimri-Lim requesting immediate assistance.
Atamrum is besieging Razama. [His siege ramp] is astride the lower city [wall]. The troops of the city are doing battle all the time. If the city of Razama does not stop him, the whole land of Idamaras might change sides to him, judging by what I keep hearing from those [local citizens] around me. The eyes of Yamutbal and its entire land are fixed entirely on [what] my lord [Zimri-Lim will do to respond to this siege]. (L 454)
While waiting for the relief army from Zimri-Lim, Sharraya redoubled his efforts at resistance with a secret assault on the attackers.
The front of the earthworks [of Atamrum's army] reached the parapet of the wall of the lower town, and the townspeople … made two tunnels [through the wall], right and left toward the front of the [enemy's approaching] earthworks. At night they [the troops of Razama] entered [the tunnels] at the front of the [enemy] earthworks, and in the early morning the troops of the city came out [in a surprise attack] and beat half of the troops [of Atamrum]. They made them drop their bronze spears and their shields [in flight] and brought [the discarded weapons] inside the city [as booty]. The townspeople keep invoking the name of my lord [Zimri-Lim in victory]. (L 496)
At this point Atamrum was reduced to attempting a rather feeble stratagem of his own.
He supplied bronze javelins to thirty imposters [who pretended to be soldiers from Mari], and they hassled the city, saying: “Why do you keep invoking the name of [king] Zimri-Lim? Do not his troops besiege you right now?” And the townspeople answered them as follows: “You [Atamrum] equipped impostors and let them approach [the city wall]. Yes, in five days, the troops who are with Zimri-Lim will arrive for you. You will see.” (L 497)
The morale of the besiegers continued to deteriorate as that of the besieged improved with the news of the immanent approach of Zimri-Lim's relief army.
The alarm of the coming of [the relief army] of my lord [king Zimri-Lim] has been sounded for the [besieging] troops [of Atamrum], and in the course of the night the troops in camp are being woken up twice.… Those from inside the city will come out and they will kill many [enemy] troops! And those troops in that [enemy] camp are sleepless. They keep being apprehensive about [the arrival of the army of] my lord. My lord must do what is necessary to come here and save the city. (L 497)
The end of the siege is not recorded, but it appears that Zimri-Lim's army did arrive and save the city. These examples show that an active defense – with counter-ramp, sorties and fire, and hope for a relief army – could defeat a determined besieging army.
Climax of the siege
On the other hand, when an enemy siege was nearing success the morale of the defenders played an increasingly important role. In some situations, the soldiers began to panic and even mutiny. Sleeplessness and exhaustion contributed to deteriorating morale (L 347, 400, 466). At the siege of Shehna, the city commander “said to the herald, ‘Get the troops up on the wall [to defend against the coming assault]!’ [One of the officers] Ushtashni-El rose and said, ‘My troopers will not go up on the wall.’ The herald said, ‘My commander sent me.’ He [Ush-tashni-El] acted maliciously and shoved the herald” (L 302). On the other hand, many commanders and soldiers were willing to fight to the death for their king; one defender of a besieged garrison proclaimed: “I will not open the city to anybody. If a rescue detachment of my lord arrives, I will have lived. Otherwise I will have been killed [in the fall of the city]” (L 304).
As the situation became more desperate, cities under siege usually requested a relief army to march to their rescue (L 298, 299). “A rescue detachment must arrive like one man on the day we hear the alarm of [the enemy] coming out [to attack our city]” (L 239). Sometimes reinforcements arrived just in the nick of time to save a city: “Had the troops of my lord been one day late, the city of Karan might have long since been seized [by the enemy]” (L 352). City commanders complained when they didn't get the reinforcements they thought they needed; the king, of course, wanted them to make do with the men they had: “One time, two times, and three times I made my request before Zimri-Lim, and still he did not give anything to me” (L 262). Another commander echoed the same concern: “The city was left to itself. Now, my lord must dispatch troops, and they must take control of [the city of] Nahur. That city must not slip from the hand of my lord!” The simple reply – “There are no troops” (L 311) – has been echoed throughout history.
The exasperation of the defending city commander is reflected in his refusal to take responsibility for defeat if he is not given sufficient resources:
He [the king] disregards our word! We wrote to our lord once, twice, about troops entering Mishlan, and our lord [responded], “Whom do you fear that you keep writing me for troops?” … If our lord does not dispatch us the troops, he cannot blame us [if we are defeated] in the future. We guard the wall and the city gates. We are afraid about [enemy devastation of] the flanks of the cultivated zone [around our city]. If there were one thousand or two thousand troops staying with us, one-half we would leave on the wall [to protect the city] and one-half we would send out on rescue missions [against the enemy pillaging the countryside]. (L 241)
As a siege progressed, starvation for the garrison and citizens became a real possibility (L 465). One commander wrote asking for assistance against a besieging army, claiming: “There is no grain in the city. My lord must do what is necessary to bring grain to the city” (L 311, 304, 309; ARM 2.50). With a deteriorating situation the loyalty of some besieged towns could be dubious as a growing portion of the population came to believe that a negotiated surrender was preferable to enslavement and the destruction of their town. The king of Mari had 100 soldiers garrisoning the city of Qatara (L 404) that was besieged by an enemy general, Kukkutanum, who managed to instigate a revolt of the citizens:
He [Kukkutanum] caused the opinion of the commoners to turn against [Mari].… And the commoners turned to the side of Kukkutanum. They started seizing Qattara. If it had not been for the troops of my lord [from Mari, who were garrisoning the town], they [the rebel citizens] would have seized Qattara. (L 354)
When a besieging army took the lower city, they faced the reality of an entirely new siege to conquer the citadel. One besieging army “took shelter in [the captured lower city of] Kiyatan. He fixed up the lower city for use as his camp.… The citadel of the city is strong. The townspeople entered it and are holding the citadel. And [the enemy] is occupying the lower city. His elite troops are in his camp” (L 362). When the lower city fell, it was plundered: “the soldiers looted the lower part of that city, but the citadel is untouched” (L 368). Often, however, when the lower city fell the citizens decided to take the last chance to surrender the citadel on terms (L 365).
Thus the entire range of siege techniques of the ancient Near East – siege towers, battering rams, undermining, ramps, protective shelters, siege shields, and ladders – were all in place by at least the eighteenth century, and probably several centuries earlier. Although there were many subsequent important technical improvements, the basic elements of siegecraft had all been developed by the Middle Bronze Age. The only siege devices unattested in the Bronze Age Near East are the large, projectile throwing devices which developed in three phases: basic torsion devises beginning in the fourth century BCE; counterweight trebuchets in the twelfth century CE, and gunpowder in the late fourteenth century CE. Despite these significant advances, the essence of siegecraft was an invention of the Bronze Age.