The First Intermediate Period1 is the name given by modern Egyptologists to the time in Egyptian history from the end of the Sixth Dynasty {2191} to the reunification of Egypt by the fourth king of the Eleventh Dynasty, Montuhotep I {2061–2011}. It is characterized by political fragmentation and instability, in contrast with the political unity of Egypt in the Old and Middle Kingdoms. Royal monumental building declines and even disappears during this period, replaced by local tombs and cults in the provinces. Instead of centralizing surplus wealth to build royal tombs and temples, regional nomarchs and priests kept local resources and developed local power bases. In terms of power, wealth, and ideology, the First Intermediate Period is thus characterized by decentralization and fragmentation.
Militarily this decentralization is manifest in military conflict between rival regional Egyptian states. Egyptian military intervention outside Egypt ebbed as the grand trading and exploration expeditions of the Old Kingdom into Nubia, Punt, and Canaan largely disappear during the early First Intermediate Period (HAE 139–40). In some ways the records for this period are quite fragmentary and ambiguous, making precise reconstruction of events and dates difficult and controversial. On the other hand, military historians are provided with a number of important tomb autobiographies that contain a great deal of military information. Following late ancient Egyptian historiographic tradition, the First Intermediate Period is divided by scholars into five dynasties, the Seventh through the Eleventh. In some ways these divisions simplify a complex political and military situation.
Seventh Dynasty {c. 2190}
The numerous problems facing Egypt at the end of the Sixth Dynasty were exacerbated by a power struggle for the throne among the numerous progeny of the centegenarian Pepy II. The political chaos following the death of Nitokerty (Nitocris) {2205–2200}, Pepy II's daughter-in-law, was remembered in later Egyptian legends as the “Seventh Dynasty” of Memphis {c. 2190}, which is said to have consisted of”five kings of Memphis who reigned for seventy-five days”, or alternatively, even “seventy kings of Memphis, who reigned for seventy days” (Man. 23–4). These phrases are not seen by modern scholars as specific numbers, but rather a vague recollection of a period of instability. We have no specific information about rulers or military events of this period of coups, civil war, and anarchy, as the power of the Sixth Dynasty collapsed.
Eighth Dynasty {c. 2190–2165}
Thereafter, royal power at Memphis passed into the hands of the so-called Eighth Dynasty, which is tentatively and hypothetically reconstructed with eighteen kings ruling for a mere 25 years in total {2190–2165}, averaging a reign of less than one-and-a-half years per king (CS 1:70). However, the existence of many of these rulers cannot be confirmed by any contemporary records, and the precise number, names, and lengths of reign cannot be determined with certainty. Some scholars suggest that the kings of the Eighth Dynasty may have been descendants of Pepy II of the Sixth Dynasty through a subsidiary line, and were thus the branch of Pepy's family that emerged in a dominant position following the anarchy of the Seventh Dynasty. Nominal authority of the Eighth Dynasty was recognized throughout Egypt, but the nomarchs were becoming increasingly autonomous (HAE 140–1; C1/2:198–200).
The weakening internal situation of the Eighth Dynasty left Egypt more vulnerable to outside military threat than it had ever been before. Bedouins from Sinai and Palestine are thought to have migrated into or possibly even invaded the delta toward the end of the Eighth Dynasty, contributing to the collapse of the dynasty and perhaps establishing some kind of Canaanite hegemony in the northeast delta (HAE 139–40).
The combination of social chaos, political impotence, regional autonomy, ideological instability, and economic crisis, all complicated by low flooding of the Nile and occasional famine, culminated in the complete fragmentation of the Egyptian state, with regional nomarchs transforming their former semi-autonomy into real independence. Famine is mentioned in a number of texts from the First Intermediate Period, and efforts to alleviate or avoid famine appear frequently among the merits in funerary inscriptions of contemporary nomarchs. The nomarch Henqu of the “Mountainviper”, or twelfth southern nome, emphasized that he “gave bread and beer to all the hungry” and “resettled the towns that were enfeebled in this nome with persons of other nomes” (AEAB 23–4, 32–3; M = AAE 14–15, HAAE 31). In part this may simply be vague pious claims to have performed good deeds, as are often found in funerary autobiographies, but it quite possibly reflects the actual circumstances of hunger and depopulation. Contemporary autobiographies from Edfu, Thebes, and Coptos mention “painful years of distress” due to drought and famine, and efforts to transport grain to afflicted cities during this period (AEL 1:87–90, HAE 142).
Ninth Dynasty of Herakleopolis {2164–2040}2
The nome of Herakleopolis in central Egypt was the largest and most powerful state during this period, remembered in Egyptian tradition as the Ninth and Tenth Dynasties, which controlled the sacred Old Kingdom capital at Memphis. Its formal establishment of full independence occurred under Akhtoy I (Khety, Achthoes) {2165–2135?}, founder of the Ninth Dynasty, who may have been a descendent of Pepy II through a subsidiary line that had traditionally served as governors of Herakleopolis. The kings of Herakleopolis seem to have retained control of Memphis and maintained at least part of its religious cult – Akhtoy I was buried there. Later Egyptian legends remember Akhtoy I as “behaving more cruelly than his predecessors” (Man. 27–8), which is sometimes thought to be a legendary recollection of attempts to suppress the independence of rival nomarchs. For a decade or two Akhtoy I seems to have exerted at least nominal influence as far south as Aswan, where his name is recorded in an inscription. But his dynasty's power in the south ultimately proved ephemeral. Under subsequent rulers southern Egypt emerged fully into independence, precipitating a civil war.
The struggle for the South {2134–2061}
The move toward the regional autonomy of nomarchs, which had begun during the late Sixth Dynasty, reached its culmination in the Ninth, with the establishment in the 2130s through 2120s of at least six separate states in Egypt. Some of these remained, formally and nominally, loyal to the kings of the Ninth Dynasty at Herakleopolis. Others became defiantly independent. As far as can be determined, the Ninth Dynasty retained control of Middle Egypt from the ninth nome to the southern part of the delta. The rebellion was most pronounced and successful in southern Egypt from the first through the eighth nomes. The following list shows the nomes, capital cities, and rulers of the major players in the southern civil war, dating to roughly 2130 (EAE 1:528–30; M = HAAE 31):
· first nome, at Aswan/Elephantine, ruled by Setika;
· second and eventually third nome, at Hierakonpolis, ruled by Ankhtifi;
· fourth nome, at Thebes, ruled by Antef I (of the Eleventh Dynasty);
· fifth nome, at Coptos, ruled by Shemai and his son Idi, who were the semi-autonomous official governors of southern Egypt for the Ninth Dynasty kings. Tjauti and Woser were also leading figures of this nome;
· sixth, seventh and eighth nomes, at Thinis, ruled by Abichu.
Middle Egypt, from the ninth nome northward, remained loyal to the Ninth Dynasty kings of Herakleopolis. Conditions in the delta are uncertain; some delta nomes may have been independent, while Easterners – Canaanites or Sinai bedouins – may have held hegemony in the north-east delta.
The precise dates and sequence of events in this civil war cannot be determined. However, the surviving records give us occasional incidental snapshots of warfare in southern Egypt. The autonomous nomarchs of southern Egypt caused concern for King Neferkahor of the Ninth Dynasty {c. 2130?}. Neferkahor sent his son-in-law Shemai to serve as “Governor of Upper Egypt”, based at the fifth nome of Coptos, apparently with instructions to regain control of the situation (EAE 1:528). Shemai in turn assigned his own son Idi as governor of the turbulent nomes One through Four. Their attempts to reassert royal control in the south were plagued by recalcitrant nomarchs who refused to submit to royal authority on the part of what they viewed as the upstart kings of Herakleopolis. This defiance soon developed into military conflict.
The campaigns of Ankhtifi of Hierakonpolis {c. 2130–2125?}3
The most instructive source on the early southern civil war is the autobiography of Ankhtifi, nomarch of Hierakonpolis (nome three). Although functionally independent, Ankhtifi's titles include reference to royal offices, indicating a lingering nominal respect from the kings of Herakleopolis – at least he sometimes claimed to be acting in the name and interest of the king. In addition to governor, his titles include military offices such as “General”, “Commander of Mercenaries”, and “Commander of Foreign Lands”, the last title, if not sheer boasting, presumably referred to Nubia. In an attempt to lend legitimacy to his rule, he claimed that the god “Horus brought me to [rule] the Horus-Throne [of Edfu] … for Horus wished to re-establish it, because he brought me to [be ruler to] re-establish” the prosperity and peace of Edfu (AEAB 25); no reference is made to royal investiture. Thus, Ankhtifi claimed to be acting not for personal power or aggrandizement, but according to the will of the gods. The power base of the First Intermediate Period nomarchs was often solidified by local priests and gods. Many rulers, like Ankhtifi, were themselves priests, and were careful to care for and build temples to local deities. Ankhtifi claimed that the “temple of Khuu was inundated like a marsh, abandoned by him [the former nomarch] who belonged to it, in the grip of a rebel” (AEL 1:85). Part of Ankhtifi's justification for seizing power was the restoration of the proper ritual order for the gods. As we shall see, when the nomarchs of Thebes eventually reunite Egypt, they bring to power with them the regional Theban gods Montu and Amun.
Ankhtifi's first campaign was against Edfu (nome Two). Ankhtifi overthrew the rebel and re-established law and order (AEAB 25). This type of breakdown of authority is also reflected in another text which describes a local leader who “kept alive every man of this province … while the great ones [former nomarchs?] were dead”, and who provided food for the people, not because of”an order that is sent to a servant of the king” but on his own initiative, “out of love for [the god] Min” (EAE 1:530a).
Although no details are given, Ankhtifi also at some point campaigned southward to the first nome, Elephantine, which was under the command of the nomarch Setika. He boasted that “my speech was clever and my bravery won the day when it was necessary to join the [southern] three nomes together” into a single state by conquest (HAE 142). At his death Ankhtifi's domain included “the provinces of Hierakonpolis [the third nome] and Edfu [second nome], Elephantine [Aswan] and Ombos [in the first nome]” (HAE 142).
At the time of this consolidation of power over the southernmost three nomes of Egypt, Ankhtifi's major rival was Antef I, ruler of the fourth nome of Thebes, and founder of what was to become the Eleventh Dynasty of the Middle Kingdom. During the ongoing struggle between Thebes and Ankhtifi, an unnamed general of the Theban city of Armant – supported by allied troops from Coptos – issued a challenge to battle to Ankhtifi, which Ankhtifi accepted:
The commander of troops of Armant had come to say: “Come [to battle], you hero, come [north] to the [war] camps of the Theban and Coptite district, which have separated.” When I went north in the west channel of [the Nile at] Armant, I found the [armies of] the entire districts of Thebes and Coptus as they were making ready the [military] camp of Armant at the mount of Semekhsen. [I said:] “I myself shall approach it! May the strong armed [god] stand for [me in battle]! [I shall pin them down] as with a harpoon on the nose of a hippopotamus ready to flee, after I turned south from destroying their camp with the victorious troops of Hefat. I truly am a man like no other.”
(AF 29–30)
The details of the battle are lost in a lacuna in the text, but Ankhtifi was apparently victorious. Later he continued his campaign against Thebes:
When I had sailed north [to attack Thebes] with my troop of victorious trustworthy [warriors] and had landed on the west side [of the Nile] in the Theban district: the south of my navigation [of the naval operations of my fleet on the west bank of the Nile] was at the mount Smhsn, the north of my navigations [in the Theban district] was at the estate of Tmy. While my troop of trustworthy [warriors] was seeking to fight throughout the west side of the Theban district, no one would come forth for his fear [of my army]. When I had sailed north and I had landed on the east side of the Theban district: the north of my navigation [of the naval operations of my fleet on the east bank of the Nile] was at the tomb of Imbi, the south of my navigations was at the ford of Sg3, which was probed against the walls [of Thebes] after it had closed the doorbolts [of its gates] as it was not ready [to fight] for fear of this troop of victorious trustworthy [warriors]. And so this troop of trustworthy [warriors] became challengers [to the enemy to come out and fight in open combat] through the west and east of the Theban district, while seeking battle, but no one would come forth [from their fortified cities] because of his fear. I, truly, am a man, of whom there is not another [like me].
(AF 37; OHAE 131)
This narrative gives us an excellent view of the use of river fleets in campaigns. It appears that, after his victory over the Theban-Coptos alliance at the earlier Battle of Armant, Ankhtifi took his army in his fleet and sailed up and down both banks of the Nile. His army was either on foot and accompanied and supported by the fleet, or perhaps was entirely carried by the fleet and dropped off at strategic points for land operations. They were able to sail and march unhindered throughout the entire Theban district – presumably plundering as they went. The Theban troops, being cowed by their defeat at Armant, refused to leave the safety of their city fortresses and meet Ankhtifi's army again in open battle. On the other hand, Ankhtifi did not feel strong enough to undertake a serious long-term siege of Thebes itself. His victory over Thebes was thus only temporary; Thebes remained independent and would later challenge Ankhtifi's descendants.
After establishing his predominance in the south, Ankhtifi sought further legitimization of his conquests by asking “the Overseer of Upper Egypt [for the king of the Ninth Dynasty] who is in the Thinite nome” – probably referring to either Shemai or his son Idi – to accept his authority as “the Prince, Count, Chief Priest, and Great Headman” of the south (AEAB 26). The defacto nature of independent rule was apparently recognized by the kings of Herakleopolis, perhaps in return for shipments of grain. The combination of low Nile flooding and political and economic collapse caused “all of Upper Egypt [to die] of hunger and people were eating their children.… The [people of the] whole country had become like locusts going upstream and downstream in search of food.” Presumably in return for recognition of his authority, Ankhtifi sent food to the surrounding nomes (OHAE 129 = AEL 1:87). He may even have made an armed demonstration up the Nile as far as the eighth nome of Thinis, for he claims: “when I travel to the nome of Thinis against one who forgot himself” – presumably meaning he questioned Ankhtifi's authority – “I find it with its watchmen on the walls. When I hasten to the combat [against them], ‘Woe!’ says the wretch” (AEAB 26). This policly of using a combination of carrot and stick made Ankhtifi the predominant military power in southern Egypt.
Ankhtifi's autobiography also reflects the martial braggadocio of the warlords of the First Intermediate Period. He calls himself “Ankhtifi the Brave”, and boasts that he is the “vanguard and rearguard” of his men, a “champion who has no peer”. He threatens that, “as for any fool or wretch who sets himself against me, I shall give more than he has given” in battle – “my like [in battle] has not been, nor will be!” (AEAB 26). At his death sometime around 2120, Ankhtifi had reason to boast. He ruled the first three nomes directly, and had subjugated, but did not directly rule, the Egyptian nomarchs of the fourth through the eighth nomes. However, his conquests were to prove ephemeral, for Antef II of Thebes {2118–2068} would eventually conquer his kingdom from Ankhtifi's successor.
The Early Eleventh Dynasty at Thebes {2134–2061}
During the Old Kingdom, Thebes (ancient Waset) had been a rather small, sleepy provincial town, dedicated to its local gods Montu and Amun, and adorned with small tombs for the regional aristocracy (EAE 3:384–8). As elsewhere in Egypt, the breakdown of central authority during the early First Intermediate Period led to increasing autonomy of the local elites. According to later Eleventh Dynasty genealogies and legends, by perhaps the 2150s a local nomarch Montuhotep (Mentuhotpe) {2155?–2134} had established semi-independent power at Thebes. He is remembered as the first “ancestor” and father of the “gods” of the Eleventh Dynasty. His position, however, was relatively weak, and judging from Ankhtifi's account of his war with Thebes, discussed on p. 372, his authority was not even secure in his own province.
Ankhtifi of Hierakonpolis’ victory over Thebes made him the dominant power in southern Egypt in the 2130s and 2120s. None the less, although defeated, Thebes under Antef I {2134–2118}, son of Montohotep I, remained independent of Ankhtifi (LA 1:300–1). There is some indication that the Hierakonpolis principality in southern Egypt collapsed shortly after the death of Ankhtifi, allowing Antef I to assert authority over the three southernmost nomes of Upper Egypt, proclaiming himself “great overlord of Upper Egypt” (OHAE 133).
On the other hand, the full subjugation and conquest of the southernmost three nomes of Ankhtifi's domain seems to have occurred early in the reign of Antef I's brother and successor, Wahankh Antef (Inyotef) II {2118–2068}, during whose half-century reign Thebes conquered all of southern Egypt. The details and precise order of Antef II's conquests are not known. In his autobiography he set Thebes's “northern boundary up to the nome of Wadjet [the tenth nome].… I conquered Abydos [the eighth Thinite nome] and the whole surrounding region. I captured all the fortresses of the nome of Wadjet and I made them into the Gateway of the North”, meaning the border with the northern Ninth Dynasty of Herakleopolis. His conquests were “splendid for the glory of Thebes” (HAE 145 = ARE 1:200). We also have a brief autobiographical inscription by the actual commander of the army that led this campaign, Djari, “commander of the foreigners”. He “battled with the House of Akhtoy [Ninth Dynasty] in the west of Thinis”, where he “raised a storm over the nome … [and] made the [new] boundary at Wadi Hesy” in the tenth nome (AEAB 40–1). As reward for his victories, he “was promoted among the elder [commanders] because I was fierce on the day of battle” (MKT 13). Antef II appears to have made use of flanking operations via desert roads to assault his enemies in the Nile valley. A graffito was left by one of his soldiers on the ‘Alamat Tal Road in the Western Desert, recording the march of “the assault troops of the Son of Re, [king] Antef [II]”, which could have given him some element of strategic surprise contributing to his victory.4 The struggle for strategic control of the desert routes allowing surprise flank attacks into the Nile valley is also reflected in an inscription of commander Tjauti's expedition. When Shamai, the pro-Herakleopolitan governor of the fifth nome of Coptos sent general Tjauti on an expedition against Thebes to the south, Tjauti recorded that he was forced to “make this [the ‘Alamat Tal Road] for crossing this desert [with his army], which the ruler of another nome [Thebes?] had closed”.5 Overall the ability to move armies, as well as merchant caravans, overland through desert roads complicated the seemingly straightforward strategy of defending the borders on the Nile River alone. If an army could operate several hundred miles along desert roads, large stretches of the Nile would presumably be vulnerable to surprise attack, requiring the dispersal of garrison troops throughout the entire Nile valley rather than concentrating forces solely on the border regions.
In addition Antef II claims to have subdued the southern Libyan “chiefs who rule the Red [Western Desert] Land” (AEL 1:91), and placed his treasurer Thethi over the regular tribute required from the Libyan chiefs (ARE 1:202). By the death of Antef II {2068}, he ruled the southern eight nomes from “Yebu [Aswan, first nome] to Thinis [eighth nome] … [receiving] tribute from this entire land, owing to the fear of him throughout this land” (AEL 1:91).
The wars of Akhtoy (Khety) III {c. 2090–2070?}6
The martial progress of Thebes and the decline of the Ninth Dynasty at Herakleopolis was halted, though only temporarily, by king Akhtoy III. In his famous Instructions for his son and successor King Merikare (see pp. 377–9), he describes how he mobilized a strong army, stopped the Theban attack at Thinis, reconquered the Delta from Eastern nomad invaders, and refortified the frontiers, leaving the Ninth Dynasty in its strongest military position in decades.
Counterattack from Asyut {c. 2080–2070?}
Some aspects of resistance to Antef II's invasion of Middle Egypt can be found in the autobiographical inscriptions from the tombs of the nomarchs of Asyut (AEA 23; EAE 1:154–6). From these sources we learn that Antef II's triumphalist rhetoric masks a more problematic reality. His campaigns into middle Egypt were strongly resisted by a family of nomarchs of Asyut allied to Akhtoy III {c. 2090–2070?} of the Ninth Dynasty at Herakleopolis. The exact chronology cannot be determined – all dates given in this section are quite speculative, and are intended only to give a rough sense of chronology. It is clear that the territory between Thinis and Asyut (Siut) (nomes 8–12) became a battleground between Antef II of Thebes and the nomarchs of Asyut, the provincial allies of the Ninth Dynasty.
In a fragmentary inscription Tefibi (Ity-yeb), nomarch of Asyut {c. 2090–2070?}, describes his successful counterattack against the invasion by Antef II. Tefibi's father, the nomarch Akhtoy {c. 2110–2090?} – not to be confused with king Akhtoy III – had laid the foundation for resistance to growing Theban power in the south. His autobiography emphasizes his efforts at canal construction and agricultural restoration after the lean years of the late twenty-second century (ARE 1:188–9). This economic revival also permitted him to restore the strength of the pro-Ninth Dynasty provincial Egyptian army in Middle Egypt.
Thus, when Antef II's invasion of Middle Egypt occurred, Tefibi was able to benefit from the military foundation laid by his father. According to Tefibi's autobiography, “my soldiers fought with the [armies of the] southern nomes [of Antef II]”, describing the advance of Antef II on the “west side” of the Nile to an unnamed city north of Asyut – presumably beyond Thinis in the eighth nome, which according to his own inscription is the maximum extent of Antef's conquests.
When I [Tefibi] came to the city [that was besieged or recently conquered by Antef], I overthrew the foe, and drove him as far as the fortress of the port of the South. [Antef] gave to me the land [which he had previously attempted to conquer].
(ARE 1:182)
His offensive toward Asyut thus foiled, Antef of Thebes attempted a different strategy, sailing an armed fleet up the Nile. When word of this second attack reached Tefibi in Asyut, he mobilized his own fleet and took to the river. Tefibi's autobiography describes a naval victory on the Nile – which will be discussed on pp. 453–5 – and concludes with a discussion of restoring order in Egypt.
When a man did well, I promoted [him] to the head of my soldiers.… The land was under the fear of my soldiers; no [enemy from the] highland [desert surrounding the Nile valley] was free from the fear [of my soldiers].
(ARE 1:183)
Tefibi's great victory may also be remembered in the Instructions of Akhtoy III (discussed on pp. 377–9), although with a different emphasis on who was responsible for the victory. “I [claims King Akhtoy III] went to Thinis on the southern border; like a thunderstorm I seized [Thinis from the king of Thebes]; [my predecessor] King Meriibre, the justified, had not done this” (TS 222). This last phrase is presumably an allusion to the earlier sequence of victories of Antef II of Thebes before the counterattack by the nomarch Tefibi and Akhtoy III. During this campaign there was apparently the destruction or desecration of a necropolis – perhaps the famous mortuary complex of Abydos. A battle may actually have taken place there, for Akhtoy's Instructions mentions this battle as fulfilling a prophecy that “Egypt will fight in the necropolis, destroying tomb-chambers in a destruction of deeds” (TS 221). Akhtoy, however, refused to take personal responsibility for the sacrilege: “a vile deed happened in my time: the nome of Thinis was destroyed. It happened, but not as my action, and I knew of it only after it was done” (TS 225). He instructs his son to “destroy not the [sacred and funerary] monuments of another” (TS 222).
Following this victory, there seems to have a temporary truce between Thebes and the Ninth dynasty, bringing peace to Middle Egypt {c. 2070–2060?}, and the boundary was set at the northern border of the eighth nome. Near the end of his reign, king Akhtoy told his son Merikare “there is now no enemy on your borders.… All is now well for you with the Southern Region [of Thebes], which comes to you bearing produce, bearing tribute.… to you comes granite [from the south] unhindered.” Merikare is therefore instructed “to be kind to those who yield to you” and “renew the treaties” with Thebes (TS 222). None the less, he should be prepared for war: “Arm your border against the South [kingdom of Thebes] – they are bowmen who take up the war belt!” (TS 224). This was excellent advice, for within two decades after the death of Akhtoy III, Thebes renewed the offensive {2047} under the great warlord Montuhotep I, who would destroy the Ninth Dynasty and conquer all Egypt.
According to Tefibi's son and successor Akhtoy (Khety) {c. 2070–2050?} (again not to be confused with king Akhtoy III), “there was no one fighting, nor any shooting an arrow” during his administration at Asyut (ARE 1:187). He none the less maintained a strong army in the face of possible renewal of the Theban threat: “I am one strong of bow, mighty with his army, much feared by his neighbors. I formed a troop of spearmen and a troop of bowmen, the best Thousand of Upper Egypt. I have a fine fleet” (AEAB 28–9). The nomarch Akhtoy served Merikare, son of king Akhtoy III, the last (or next to last) king of the Ninth Dynasty at Herakleopolis, who claims to have “repelled the evil-doer” Antef III and “overthrown the rebels” of Thebes in alliance with Tefibi and Akhtoy of Asyut (ARE 1:184–5). The victories of the Asyut nomarchs in Middle Egypt were secured by a grand river campaign through Middle Egypt led by king Merikare, who sailed his fleet to Shashotpe (Shutb), near Asyut, intimidating and stalemating Theban aggression for a time (ARE 1:185–6 = MKT 23).
“Akhtoy Ill's Instructions for his Son Merikare”7
One of the most intriguing and potentially useful texts of the First Intermediate Period purports to be the political and military instructions of king Akhtoy III {c. 2090–2070?} of the Herakleopolitan Ninth Dynasty to his son and successor Merikare {c. 2070–2050?}, the last (or next to last) king of the line. Unfortunately, both the authorship and the date of this text is controversial. Wendy Raver, for example, argues that “the text may be pseudepigraphical, but it was most probably composed in the court of Khety [Akhtoy] III during the tenth dynasty (EAE 2:169).”8 R. Parkinson, on the other hand, believes the text “is not contemporaneous with the Heracleopolitan [Ninth-Tenth] Dynasty” but should “be dated to late in the Middle Kingdom” (TS 212). Given the paucity and ambiguity of the data, it is impossible to resolve this question with certainty. For this discussion I will assume the text originated in the court of the late Ninth-Tenth Dynasty, and that it reflects the historical realities of that period.
At the very least the Instructions for Merikare represent Egyptian views on dealing with periods of internal turmoil and military crisis such as the First Intermediate Period. As such, it is an excellent reflection of the practical military policies of ancient Egypt, even if it cannot be linked to the specific historical situation in the late First Intermediate Period. The advice given in the Instructions is both practical and ideological – how to raise armies and win battles, as well as how to gain the support of the gods. Akhtoy III gives a great deal of didactic military advice to his son, reflecting the standard military policies and practices of ancient Egypt. Although the work by China's great military theorist Sun Tzu The Art of War is frequently described as the earliest surviving military manual,9 Akhtoy's Instructions, written fifteen hundred years earlier, contains sufficient military advice to consider it an archaic military manual, perhaps the first surviving military handbook in history.
In the First Intermediate Period the king was dependent on the support of the nomarchs. “Great is the great one [king] whose great ones [nomarchs] are great. The king who is the lord of an entourage [of nomarchs] is strong” (TS 219). Nomarchs and other powerful officials must be cultivated to insure their allegiance. “If you encounter a mighty man who is the master of a town [i.e. a nomarch], and is the lord of a clan, care for him” (TS 216–17). Diplomatic skills are crucial for the king. “Be skillful with words, and you will be victorious. The strong arm of the king is his tongue. Words are stronger than any weapons” (TS 218).
The power of the nomarchs is also reflected in the fact that, for Akhtoy, a major concern is the ever-present danger of rebellion. For such there should be no mercy: “Do not be lenient to [the rebel]! You should kill those who owe him allegiance.… Punish the people who are conspiring.… Drive him away! Kill his children! Erase his name!” (TS 216–17). At the same time, the king must “beware of punishing wrongly” (TS 220).
Proper recruitment and pay of troops is emphasized, for “soldiers are good for their lord” (TS 221).
Raise your Youth [shwt], so that the [royal] Residence will love you! Make your supporters plentiful among the Veterans [s'qyw]! Look, your town is full of new growth [of the next generation ready for military recruiting]. These twenty years, the Youth has been happy, following its heart; and the Veterans are now going forth once again; the recruits are recruited to it [the army]. … On my accession I raised up troops from them. So make your great ones [nobles] great! Advance your fighters! Increase the Youth ofyour following, equipped with amounts [of wealth], established with fields, and endowed with cattle!
(TS 220–1).
The precise meaning of this passage is uncertain, but the general picture is fairly clear. The “Youth” or “Young Men” seem to be a military or paramilitary group recruited from the populace. It is possible that they are the town militia, but also possible that they are professional soldiers. Throughout the ancient Near East the term “Young Men” commonly refered to men in their late teens and twenties at the prime age for military service. These Young Men are contrasted with the Veterans, an older, more experienced class of soldier. It is possible that these are simply generic terms for young and old people, but they may reflect technical categories, rather like the Greek and Roman practice of categorizing soldiers according to age groups.10 The phrase “twenty years” may refer either to the length of military service, or the length of Akhtoy's reign during which his policies were followed. Akhtoy emphasizes not only the importance of continually recruiting soldiers into the two classes of troops, but also of ensuring their happiness and loyalty by paying them well in moveable wealth, agricultural fields, and domesticated animals. These types of payment are reflected in the autobiographies of soldiers as well. The importance of a fortified and garrisoned frontier is emphasized in the Instructions: “Strengthen your borders and your [frontier] patrols! … Protect your border! Secure your fortresses!” (TS 219, 221).
Akhtoy also gives some very specific military advice for dealing with the nomadic Easterners:
But now, these things are said about the barbarian [Eastern] bowmen: the vile Easterner is wretched because of the place where he is – lacking in water, barren of trees, whose roads are painful because of the mountains. He has never settled in any one place, lack of food makes him wander about on foot! He has been fighting since the [mythical] Time of Horus [at the beginning of the world]. He cannot conquer; he cannot be conquered. He does not announce the day of battle, but sneaks about like a gang of thieves.… Do not worry about him! The Easterner is a crocodile on its riverbank that can snatch [his victim] from a lonely road but cannot take from the quay of a populous town.
(TS 223–4 = ECI 67 = AEL 1:103–4)
These ideas are remarkably similar to the broader views of sedentary peoples about their nomadic enemies. The nomads are described as destitute raiders from the wilderness, who make sneak attacks and plunder, before fleeing back into the desert. Although they can raid and plunder, they are not viewed as posing a serious military threat to security.
As is normal in Egyptian warfare, religion played a crucial role in military policy. The gods are in control, and ultimately determine military success or failure: “God will impose his doom with blood” (TS 220). Disaster will strike anyone “who goes against God” (TS 222). Because of this, the gods must be placated with proper cultic piety. “Make many monuments for God.… Make the [sacrificial] offering tables [in the temples] flourish” (TS 221). Royal patronage of the proper religious rites will insure the gods’ blessings. “Act for God – with great offerings for a flourishing altar, and with inscriptions [in temples] – and he will act for you” (TS 226). Opposing the king was equivalent to opposing the gods: Indeed, “to revolt against [the king] is to attack [the gods of] heaven” (TS 225). Likewise, “God will attack someone who rebels against the temples” (TS 224).
Magical practices, such as Execration Texts, were also “a weapon” against enemies (TS 226). Prophecy and divination could play a key role in military decision-making. Akhtoy refers to one such prophecy: “The Youth will attack the Youth [in civil war] just as the ancestors foretold it. Egypt will fight in the necropolis, destroying tomb-chambers” (TS 221). It was also generally believed that divination and oracles revealed the will of the gods and could therefore influence military policies and practices. Referring to his campaign against Thinis, Akhtoy describes the fatalistic belief in the inevitable fulfillment of prophecy: “You [my son Merikare] know what the [temple prophets at the royal] residence foretold it. As such things happen, these happened. Those things could not go otherwise, even as they [the prophets] said it” (TS 22).
Akhtoy Ill's reconquest of the Delta {c. 2075?}
Although we have no details or archaeological confirmation (OHAE 139) it appears that, during the decline of royal power under the Ninth Dynasty, the delta was raided and partially occupied by both Libyan and Eastern nomads {c. 2125–2075?}. After securing the southern frontier with Thebes, Akhtoy's “heart grieved because of the [situation in the] Delta” (TS 222), and he undertook two campaigns to restore Egyptian authority there. They first focused on the western delta: “from Hetshenu to Sembaqa, and south to Two-Fish Channel [a south-western branch of the Nile], I pacified the entire West as far as the sand-dunes of the [coastal?] lake” (AEL 1:103 = TS 222). This may have been a reference to the restoration of royal authority over recalcitrant nomarchs of the western delta, but could also include punitive expeditions against Libyan nomads who had been raiding or infiltrating the delta.
The reconquest of the Libyans in the western delta was followed by an offensive in the east against Sinai and Canaanite nomads who had penetrated that region. Thereafter, Akhtoy recaptured some of the Delta cities the nomads had occupied:
These [barbarian nomad] bowmen were [like] a walled fortress, whose fortifications I breached, [and] which I had isolated [as in a siege]! I have made the [Egyptian army of the] Delta attack them, I have enslaved their underlings and taken away their cattle, to horrify the Easterners who are enemies of Egypt.
(TS 223–4 = AEL 1:104)
The eastern nomad threat, however, was not completely eliminated. Akhtoy describes his efforts to restore Egyptian power in the delta:
The [land of the delta] which [the eastern nomads] had destroyed is made into nomes; every great town is refounded; what one man ruled now belongs to ten [nomarchs loyal to the king] … The taxes of the Delta belong to you [my son and successor]. Look, the border marker [of Egypt] which I have made in the East is driven in, from Hebenu [in Middle Egypt] to the Ways of Horus [roads leaving eastward from Egypt from Sile in the north-east delta], [Egypt is] founded with townspeople, full of people, the best of the whole land, to beat back attacks on them [from the Canaanite and nomad raiders].
(TS 223)
His defensive preparations are further emphasized. The region of the apex of the delta was said to be the “defense against foreigners. Its walls and fighters are many, whose commoners know how to take up weapons” – probably an allusion to a regional militia. The area of Memphis had “ten thousand men [in the army], commoners and freemen who are without labor duty [because of their military service].… its borders are firm, its strongholds are mighty” (TS 224). This is possibly a reference to a form of tax exemption in return for military service, but whatever the exact meaning, it is clear that Akhtoy was engaged in raising troops and fortifications for the defense of his delta conquests.
If Akhtoy Ill's Instructions are to be believed – and they may be pseudepigraphical hyperbole – Akhtoy in many ways prepared the path for the unification of Egypt by reuniting the delta with Middle Egypt. The fruit of his victory, however, would be harvested by Montuhotep of Thebes, the founder of the Middle Kingdom, as will be discussed in Chapter 16 Chapter Sixteen. Additional characteristics of the military system of the First Intermediate Period will be discussed along with those of the Middle Kingdom in Chapter 17 Chapter Seventeen.
Nubia and Nubian mercenaries in the First Intermediate Period
It has been observed that “the periods of [northern] Nubia's greatest prosperity were usually those of Egypt's greatest weakness” (AAA, 47). This was certainly true for the First Intermediate Period, when Nubia witnessed increasing population and prosperity as attested by the “C-group” archaeological finds (EAE 25–89). During most of the First Intermediate Period there are no records of conflict along the Nubian frontier. Although Nubian mercenaries had served in Egyptian armies from at least the Sixth Dynasty of the Old Kingdom, during the First Intermediate Period the use of Nubian mercenaries expanded rapidly throughout southern and middle Egypt.11 Indeed, it is likely that the ongoing civil wars in Egypt during the First Intermediate Period increased the demand for Nubian mercenaries. The Thebans may have ultimately emerged victorious from their war with northern Egypt in part because they had ready access to the Nubian mercenary market, thereby bolstering their military strength relative to the north's. Nubian mercenaries intermarried with Egyptian women during this period; a mortuary stele from Gebelein shows Nenu, a tall Nubian mercenary, holding his bow, with his Egyptian wife by his side (OHAE 129).
In his biography, Qedes, a common soldier from Gebelein, boasts of his military prowess, claiming to be “the foremost [soldier] of his whole troop”, and that he “surpassed this whole town in swiftness – its Nubians and its Upper Egyptians” (AEL 1:90). This text reflects both the obvious fact that soldiers were selected for their physical prowess, and that Nubian mercenaries made up a significant portion of the armies of southern Egypt. Qedes's biography also makes it clear that a common man could become relatively wealthy through mercenary service in the Egyptian army. During his military career, Qedes “acquired oxen and goats. I acquired granaries of Upper Egyptian barley. I acquired a title to a great field. I made a boat of 30 cubits [12 meters] and a small boat.”