The Middle Kingdom1 was a three-centuries-long period of essential unity in Egypt and concomitant international military power. Unfortunately, the Middle Kingdom “remains one of the most enigmatic periods in the sphere of foreign relations” which has “bequeathed us precious little evidence” on military matters (ECI 70). None the less, there are sufficient sources with enough detail to allow us to reconstruct the broad outline of military history.
The Eleventh Dynasty {2061–1998}2
From a military perspective, the reunification of Egypt and the beginning of the Middle Kingdom was the work of the great Theban warlord Montuhotep I {2061–2010}. In subsequent Egyptian history his great military achievements caused him to be remembered – along with Narmer/Menes and Ahmose of the New Kingdom – as one of the three unifiers of Egypt (EAE 2:437; MKT 31).
Montuhotep (Mentuhotep; Mentuhotpe) I {2061–2011}3
As has been discussed on pp. 373–7, the foundations for Montuhotep I's reunification of Egypt were laid by both his grandfather, Antef II of Thebes, and his grandfather's rival, Akhtoy III of Herakleopolis. The stalemate between these two kings that had developed in Middle Egypt during the 2060s seems to have continued during the first decade-and-a-half of the reign of Montuhotep I {2061–2048}, when he was essentially the regional king of southern Egypt. Although the chronology is uncertain, it appears that during these years, however, he undertook an invasion of Nubia.
Nubian campaigns of Montuhotep I {c. 2050?} (C1/2:485–8; AAA 48–9)
At an unknown date Montuhotep personally led a major expedition into Nubia, which reached Buhen at the Second Cataract; it may have occurred during the fourteen years of his reign that preceded his reunification of Egypt {2061–2048}. The two royal inscriptions, which will be further discussed below, mention “enslaving the Nubians … [of the] Medjay and Wawat [tribes]”, indicating that warfare against Nubia was part of the royal agenda (C1/2:480–2 = MKT 24, 28). The el-Deir inscription of Montuhotep I, though fragmentary, provides a few details about this Nubian campaign:
… [from] Wawat [in Nubia] and the Oasis … I drove out the troublemakers in them. I annexed them to Upper Egypt. There is no [Egyptian] king whom they [the Nubians] served in his time [i.e. in the First Intermediate Period before Montuhotep] … My wrath [against the enemies of Egypt] was slaked … [by the victories of] the strong troops of my recruiting. (ICN 113)
Later in the inscription he recounts: “[as for] Wawat [Nubia] and the Oasis [of Kharga?]. I annexed them to Upper Egypt. I drove out the rebellious [enemy]” (ICN 114). To maintain his control of Nubia he “placed reinforcements in Elephantine [Aswan]” (ICN 114), under the command of an official, Akhtoy, who left a number of inscriptions in the region (C1/2:480). In the year 39 {2022}, Montuhotep again visited the borders of Nubia, commemorating his reunification of Egypt and other triumphs by celebrating a great sed-festival (C1/2:479–80; MKT pl. 12). Two years later, in year 41 {2020}, the “triumphant” commander Akhtoy “took ships to Wawat [in Nubia]” (ARE 1:206–7); the details of this expedition are not known; it may have been largely a trading operation. At the least Akhtoy's fleet would have reinforced the nominal submission of northern Nubia. None the less, the Nubian frontier was by no means permanently subjugated; as described on pp. 397–9, later Egyptian kings were required to undertake regular Nubian campaigns.
One important outgrowth of Montuhotep's relationship with Nubia was the enlistment of Nubian warriors to strengthen his army in its wars against the rival Ninth Dynasty at Herakleopolis.4 We have a remarkable autobiographical inscription by one of these Nubian mercenaries, Tjehemau, who served in Montuhotep's army and described his participation in these campaigns, unfortunately without giving a precise chronology. Both Tjehemau and his son enlisted in the Egyptian army at the time of Montuhotep's Nubian campaigns, subsequently serving in the reunification of Egypt and the invasion of Canaan. His autobiography, recorded in two inscriptions from Abisko, near Aswan, is the best account of the career of a Nubian mercenary.
Inscription which Tjehemau made. Year of smiting the foreign land of the south: I began to fight [as a mercenary for the Egyptians] in the reign of Nebhepetre [Montuhotep I] in the army, when it [the Egyptian army] went south to Buhen. My son went down with me towards the king [to offer our service as mercenaries]. He [the king] traversed the entire land, for he planned to exterminate the A'amu of Djaty [in southern Wawat].
(ITM 11–20)
Here we find Montuhotep I personally commanding one of his Nubian expeditions. As the Egyptians sailed south, Tjehemau and his son – and presumably other Nubians – were recruited to serve as mercenaries to fight those Nubians who were still hostile to Egypt. As Montuhotep's campaign continued, Tjehemau described the decisive battle.
When they [the rival Egyptian and hostile Nubian armies] approached [to give battle, the Egyptian regiments from] Thebes [were put to] flight [by the hostile Nubians]. It was the [pro-Egyptian] Nubian [mercenaries serving Montuhotep] who brought about the rally [against the hostile Nubians]. Then he [king Montuhotep] overthrew [the hostile] Djaty [Nubian tribe]. He [Montuhotep] raised sail in sailing southwards to the south [into Nubia] as a result of raising the arm against the [enemy] ruler of the [Nubian] lands … pleasing the king as when were surpassed those who fled among the people.
(ITM 11–20)
Even if Tjehemau's ethnic pride in the Nubian mercenary regiment perhaps led him to exaggerate the role ofhis fellow Nubian mercenaries in the battle, none the less the martial qualities of the Nubians were highly – and, based upon this battle, rightly – regarded by the Egyptians. On the other hand, it is also important to note that Tjehemau feels no compunction about fighting in the service of the Egyptian king against other Nubian tribes. This reflects an important factor influencing the success ofthe Egyptian domination in Nubia. Tjehemau's loyalty, and that of most Nubians, was to his own specific tribe of Nubians, rather than an amorphous trans-tribal “Nubian people” as a whole. Most Nubians often viewed other Nubian tribes as rivals and enemies, rather than potential allies against Egypt. This tribal disunity was a major factor contributing to the eventual Egyptian subjugation of Nubia, as discussed on pp. 397–9. After contributing to Montuhotep's victory in Nubia, Tjehemau continued in Montuhotep's service in his campaigns of unification of Egypt.
Montuhotep's unification of Egypt {2047–2035?}
Montuhotep's fourteenth year {2047} was “the year when Thinis rebelled” (ITM 25), apparently with the support of the Ninth Dynasty of Herakleopolis. In response Montuhotep mobilized his army; his el-Deir inscription provides a rare glimpse of the pre- and post-battle celebrations of the Egyptian army. Before the campaign the troops were marshaled for ritualized war speeches and chants that inaugurated the campaign.
The king's army addresses him [as they prepare to go into battle]: “ … it is by thy hand [O King] … [that we triumph] “
The King addresses his army: “ … I come and destroy [my enemies]. We shall go downstream [north] when we have crushed the foreign lands … I will give you full title to it [lands captured from the northern kingdom], [and] everything which you desire [in plunder].”
(ICN 112)
The king's emphasis on the material rewards of victory highlights the role of plunder as a motivating force for Egyptian armies. After the campaign, the victorious army is again marshaled for a victory triumph, with more ritualized victory speeches:
And when [the army] had landed in health [after their victory] … the King's army addresses him: “ … the chiefs of the foreign lands come to thee bowing, kissing every limb of yours. Your heart in your body reposes. Upper Egypt and the southern lands [of Nubia] … the [foreign] bowmen [submit] … ”
[The King speaks:] “My ancestors in the necropolis [of Thebes near where the army is marshaled in triumph], at the place where the gods are, they see this thing.
(ICN 112)
Later, however, in proper Egyptian fashion, the king piously attributes his victories to the blessings of the gods:
It was the god … who caused Upper Egypt to be broad for me [i.e. easy to traverse and conquer]. I did this while I was King.… I caused the Two Lands to come to it [in unification] … Wawat [in Nubia] and the [Kharga?] Oasis. I annexed them to Upper Egypt. I drove out the rebellious [enemies] …
(ICN 114)
We have some further details of Montuhotep's campaign of reunification. Montuhotep first subdued the rebellious nome of Thinis, driving off their allies from Herakleopolis who may have instigated the rebellion. These initial victories encouraged him to continue his march further northward, where some of the nomarchs in middle Egypt apparently shifted allegiance, wisely throwing in their lots with rising Thebes. Their descendants were thus able to retain their positions as nomarchs under the Montuhotep and his successors in the Eleventh Dynasty (HAE 144). Other recalcitrant nomarchs, however, were eventually replaced with trusted ministers, strengthening Montuhotep's direct control over middle Egypt (C1/2:483).
The autobiography of the redoubtable Nubian mercenary Tjehemau, now promoted to officer status, provides an eyewitness account of Montuhotep's conquests from the perspective of an officer on the front battle lines.
Then, [after his Nubian campaign, Montuhotep sailed northward] … to northern Egypt to kill [the rival king of the Ninth Dynasty] … Going forth … against the Lake of Sobek [Faiyum] … I overthrew the [enemy on the] sandbank … [and] the river, to lead the sand-dwellers [nomad mercenaries] and [the Nubian mercenaries of] Wawat … to put to flight the man [king] of the North. Then it [the northern kingdom of Herakleopolis] mustered its war-fleet and it traversed all its nomes of the entire [northern] land to defend itself.
(ITM 11–20)
The details of the next phase of the campaign are not clear. It seems that the army of the Ninth Dynasty won some initial victories and invaded Montuhotep's domain of Thebes. In defense of Thebes, Tjehemau and his Egyptian-Nubian force was required to make an amphibious assault from their boats against an enemy who was marshaled on the banks of the river.
Tjehemau sailed north like a lion in the following of the king [Montuhotep], together with this, his army [of Nubian mercenaries], which he had brought. He tasted of the fighting, his arm being strong due to what he did to the north. I went down to the district of Thebes. I found [the enemy] standing on the riverbank. They planned fighting. The opposition fell [before our attack], fleeing because of me … in the district of Thebes. Then I came and was at peace together with its people, for I was strong against [their enemies] … A herdsman of account of driving off [the enemies’] cattle [as plunder] – it is I, Tjehemau the bold! Extend the arm to me, ye who depart. The lord Tjehemau says: Live, prosper, be healthy!
(ITM 11–20)
After this victory Montuhotep I's forces advanced on Herakleopolis, where the crumbling resistance of the Ninth Dynasty was shattered by the death of king Merikare in unknown circumstances – his tomb is at Memphis, indicating that his successor was still in power long enough to bury him. This successor apparently ascended the throne and ruled for only a few months, for the capital Herakleopolis was soon captured {2040} and the Ninth Dynasty ended. Funerary monuments at Herakleopolis were ritually hacked to pieces by the conquerors (OHAE 145), perhaps in revenge for the earlier desecration of the tombs of Abydos that had occurred in the days of Akhtoy III (TS 221, 225). Thereafter Montuhotep I continued the conquest of the delta, completing his subjugation of the Nile Valley. Tjehemau mentions sailing through “all the nomes of the entire land … in the north, against the king of Lower Egypt [Merikare of Herakleopolis] and his army” (C1/2:482).
The grim reality of warfare during Montuhotep I's reconquests is illustrated by the “Tomb of the Warriors” at Deir el-Bahri in Middle Egypt, where the partially preserved bodies of sixty warriors of Montuhotep I were discovered. All had been killed in Montuhotep's wars of unification, with war wounds preserved for forensic analysis. The exact circumstance of their deaths and burials is not known, but it is generally assumed that they died during a siege in some heroic and decisive circumstances that merited special burial honors, perhaps in the final assault on Herakleopolis itself (SSN, discussed on pp. 438–40).
Foreign campaigns of Montuhotep I {c. 2035–2022?}
The conquest of the Nile Valley did not end Montuhotep's military activities. The traditional desert enemies of Egypt – the bedouins of Sinai and the Libyans of the Western Desert – remained recalcitrant. Although, again, the exact chronology cannot be determined, the conqueror undertook expeditions against the Sinai, Canaan, Libyans in the Western Desert, the western Oases, and Nubia. The evidence for these campaigns, though vague and fragmentary, points to an overall policy of subduing any possible enemy surrounding Egypt. However, permanent Egyptian occupation outside the Nile Valley remained flimsy at this time.
Two royal inscriptions speak rather generically of Montuhotep's foreign campaigns. The Dendera chapel inscription describes “clubbing the eastern lands, striking down the hill-countries, trampling the deserts, enslaving the Nubians … [of the] Medjay and Wawat [tribes], the Libyans and the [Easterners], by [the power of the war god] Horus” (C1/2:480; PSE Figure 25). Inscriptions from a temple at Gebelein also celebrate the reunification and subsequent campaigns. The first shows the kings smiting a Libyan called “Hedj-wawesh, Prince of Libya” (FP 177; PSE Figure 23). The second relief shows Montuhotep smiting four cowering prisoners: an Egyptian – representing his conquest of northern Egypt – as well as a Nubian, a Canaanite, and a Libyan (PSE Figure 24). The king is described as “conquering the Chiefs of the Two Lands, the South and the North [of Egypt], [and] the foreigners and the two Nile banks [east and west], the Nine Bows and both Egypts” (MKT 24 = ARE 1:204–5 = C1/2:482). From these two inscriptions (NEA 36) we see royal propaganda claiming to have not only reunified Egypt, but defeated all of Egypt's traditional foreign enemies.
Montuhotep's el-Deir inscription describes the defeat of the foreigners, and their subsequent ritual acts of submission and oath of loyalty taken to the king.
His [the king's] flames fell among the foreign lands … the foreign lands were hastening [to fight] … the hinterlands were blocked and the Qedem lands were closed [after the Egyptian victory]; … the Easterners came bowing head [in submission] to the banks of the sea. I went downstream to the estate of Khss-seat of the Rule of the Two Lands.… the people of the foreign lands came with arm bent [in submission]. They made the Oath of the God, everyone [of the defeated foreign enemies] therein upon his head, and the subjugated man therein was put to work [as forced laborers for Egypt].
(ICN 113)
Other contemporary inscriptions confirm that this is not mere royal braggadocio. The Western Desert posed two threats: Egyptian fugitives from the Ninth Dynasty and Libyan nomads. Some officials and leaders from the collapsing Ninth Dynasty at Herakleopolis fled into the Western Desert, taking last refuge in one or more of the oases there. One of Montuhotep's commanders named Kay was sent to the oases, where he defeated and captured the fugitives, bringing them back to Egypt for punishment. The oases were apparently permanently occupied, since they were later administered for Montuhotep by Henenu (C1/2:482–3). The efforts to capture the last supporters of the Ninth Dynasty may have been combined with the aforementioned punitive raid against the Libyans in which “Hedj-wawesh, Prince of Libya” was captured (MKT 24). Montuhotep's hegemony over the Eastern and Western deserts is confirmed by a funerary inscription of an official of the Coptos nome, whose name is lost. His titles included “Overseer of All Hunters of the West and East”, indicating responsibility for the nomads of those deserts (ICN 107–8).
Three pieces of evidence describe Montuhotep's campaigns through the Sinai and into Canaan (ECI 69–70). The Deir el-Ballas inscription gives vague reference to military activity in the “Eastern lands” (ECI 69). More detail is provided in the account of an expedition to the “mineral country” in the Sinai – undoubtedly meaning the mines at Wadi Maghara – by an official named Akhtoy. His goal was to re-establish Egyptian mines and quarries that apparently had become largely inactive since the end of the Old Kingdom. Akhtoy reported: “I punished the Eastern [nomads] in their land. It was the fear of the king that spread respect for me and his influence that spread terror of me, so that those countries in which I went [in the Sinai] cried out ‘Hail! Hail!’ to his might” (MKT 35). One suspects that at least some of the nomads’ salutations were less than sincere.
At some point thereafter further expeditions were apparently taken to the urban areas of southern Palestine; the tomb of general Antef at Thebes depicts an Egyptian army assaulting what is clearly a Canaanite city (EWW 38; NEA Figure 3). No text accompanies the mural, but it seems to depict a major siege. Additional details from this scene concerning siegecraft will be discussed on pp. 447–51. The Nubian mercenary commander Tjehemau may have participated in this campaign; in the murals of Antef's tomb Nubian archers are shown along with the Egyptian infantry assaulting the Canaanite fortress.5
By the end of his reign in 2011, Montuthotep I had reunited Egypt, subdued the Nubians, overcome the Libyan nomads and captured the oasis, defeated the eastern nomads, and campaigned in Canaan. His military victories represent a brilliant beginning to the military predominance of Egypt during the reigns of his successors.
Montuhotep II {2011–2000}6
The long and successful reign of Montuhotep I meant that his son, Montuhotep II, came to the throne at an advanced age and ruled for only a decade. The military success of his father on all fronts also meant that Montuhotep II faced no serious military threat, and only few recorded military activities survive from his reign. Instead we find a reign focusing on building, art, and trade.
Montuhotep I's earlier punitive expeditions against the Easterners of Sinai and Canaan, despite their nominal submission, were apparently insufficient to entirely quell their military ardor. Montuhotep II's approach to the military problem of the Canaanite frontier focused on expanding an elaborate fortification system on borders of the eastern delta to prevent further incursions – the “Great Wall” mentality which in military history has only worked in conjunction with a strong army with a policy of regular punitive expeditions beyond the wall. The details of Middle Kingdom fortifications will be discussed on pp. 440–5.
Henenu's expedition to Punt {2004}7
The most notable military mission during the reign of Montuhotep II is Henenu's expedition to Punt – the south-west coast of the Red Sea – which is especially interesting for its detailed description of logistics. Building on the military victories of his father, Montuhotep II was able to reopen the Red Sea maritime trade to Punt, sending his important minister Henenu, governor of southern Egypt, as leader of the expedition. When he had successfully returned from Punt, Henenu carved an inscription describing his expedition on a rock face in Wadi Hammamat. The initial part of the inscription contains the self-adulation so typical of Egyptian autobiography, but the second half provides a detailed description of his expedition to Punt, under orders to return with myrrh, a precious incense.
I set out from Coptos [in the fifth nome] on the way his majesty commanded me, with me being an army of Upper Egypt from the w3bw-garrisons of the Theban nome, from Imyotru to Shabet. All royal offices from town and country were assembled and followed me, and four companies of scouts [s3-prw] cleared the way before me, smiting any [nomads] who rebelled against the king. Hunters, natives of the deserts, were employed as bodyguards … Setting out with an army of 3000 men, I made the road into a river, the desert into a field border. For I gave a water skin and a bread bag, with two ḏs-measures of water and twenty loaves, to every one of [the 3000 men in the expedition] every day. Donkeys were laden with sandals; when a foot became unshod another sandal was ready. I also made twelve wells on the valley floor and two wells in Idahet, one measuring twenty cubits, the other thirty. I made another in Yaheteb of 10 by 10 cubits at all water levels. Then I reached the sea and then I built this fleet. I loaded it with everything when I made for it a great sacrifice of cattle and goats. When I had returned from the sea I had done what his majesty had commanded me, bringing for him all kinds of gifts that I had found on the shores of god's land [Punt].… Never had the like been done by any King's Friend since the [mythical] time of the god.
(AEAB 53–4)
The extensive logistical and scouting preparations described in this account demonstrate why Egyptian armies were able to operate successfully hundreds of miles from their military bases in Egypt. Nomads were hired – or perhaps bribed – to serve as scouts and guides. Four companies of scouts – perhaps one vanguard, one rearguard and one on each flank – kept the army safe from ambush. Donkeys were organized for supply transport, including food, water, and spare sandals, and presumably other equipment. Although generally not mentioned in the sources, similar logistical planning undoubtedly lay behind all successful foreign campaigns.
Montuhotep III {2000–1998}
Major military activities are not recorded in this short and poorly documented reign. One mining expedition was dispatched to the Wadi el-Hudy amethyst mines under Shed-ptah, “commander of the foreign troops”. Another was sent to Wadi Hammamat, possibly to establish some water stations on the desert routes to the quarries. It was commanded by Se'onkh, “the general responsible for the [desert] highlands” who, like Henenu, equipped his men, numbering only 60 adults, with “water skins, baskets, bread, beer and every fresh vegetable of the South” (ARE 217 = ECI 72), again emphasizing the logistical basis of Egyptian expeditions.
The most notable mission, however, occurred in 1999 and was commanded by the vizier Amenemhet, who led an expedition to the quarries in Wadi Hammamat, reaching the port of Mersa Gawasis that was destined to become the principal Red Sea port in future years.8 His expedition, said to have numbered “10,000 men from the southern nomes of Upper Egypt, and from the garrisons of Thebes”, was sent to “bring a precious block of the pure stone of this mountain” for the king's sarcophagus. The expedition included “miners, artificers, quarrymen, artists, draughtsmen, stonecutters, and gold-workers”. Three thousand sailors later transported the huge block down the Nile to the delta. Amenemhet emphasized his personal administrative skill, noting that not a man nor animal perished on the expedition – a not uncommon claim in autobiographies from this period, implying divine blessing on the journey. It is important to note that Amenemhet's ability to mobilize, supply, and command 10,000 men in the Eastern Desert probably contributed to his later victory in the civil war that followed the death of Mentuhotep III.
Civil war {1998–1991} (ECI 72–4)
The Turin Canon records a gap of seven years after Montuhotep III; this possibly covers a year or two of the reign of an ephemeral Mentuhotep IV, but probably indicates a period of chaos and civil war, the details of which have not been preserved (C1/2:492–3). It is sometimes suggested that the vizier Amenemhet, who led the Wadi Hammamat expedition described in the last section, rebelled against Montuhotep III or his successor. However that may be, some fragments from contemporary biographies reflect the problems of the time. These come from the family of Nehry, nomarch of Hermopolis (the fifteenth “Hare” nome, ECI 73). After the standard flamboyant self-aggrandizement, Nehry records a battle with an unnamed king who had besieged Nehry's army in Hermopolis and was challenging Nehry to come out of his city to battle: “[The king challenged:] ‘draw you up the battle line! See, I too am in battle line!’ But I [Nehry] was a fortress for fighting in Shedyet-sha to which all the people rallied … who rescued his city on the day of terror instigated by the [attack of the army of the] king's house” (ECI 73). Meanwhile, Nehry's son Kay aided in the defense of Hermopolis [I]:
recruited the city's draftees of young men in order that its levees be numerous.… I trained my draftees of young men and went to fight along with my city. I acted as its fortress in Shedyet-sha. When there was no one with me except my retainers; [while the king's army included mercenary Nubian] Medjay, Wawat, [Egyptian] southerners, Easterners, the Southland and the Delta being united against me. I emerged, the affair being a success, my entire city being with me without loss.
(ECI 73)
Kay is apparently describing a more professional army of the “young men” in his service supported by the city militia mobilized to defend his city when under attack. But the exact background and circumstances of this battle are unclear. Since his family retained power in Hermopolis, it appears that he was in alliance with the upstart Amenemhet against the soon-to-be-toppled “king's house” of Mentuhotep IV. Here we see a local nomarch, mobilizing his provincial army, resisting a royal army behind fortress walls, but unwilling to leave the safety of those walls and face the enemy in open battle. The king's army, it will be noted, included troops from Egypt, and mercenaries from Nubia and Canaan.
Two literary sources provide a broader context for the events of the civil war and the rise to power of Amenemhet I: the “Instructions of Amenemhet” and the “Prophecy of Neferti”. Although purporting to describe events associated with the reign of Amenemhet I, both works are at least semi-fictional, and their precise historical significance is debated. These texts none the less provide insights into the Egyptian view of the rise of Amenemhet, at least from the perspective of the later royal propaganda of the victor.
The “Prophecy of Neferti”9
This is a fascinating proto-messianic text – a prophecy of the coming of a future king who will free Egypt from its enemies and restore the divinely established order of the gods. Although the “prophecy” is set in the time of king Sneferu of the Fourth Dynasty, it is generally assumed to be a work of propaganda from the reign of Amenemhet, which justifies his ascension to the throne as the fulfillment of the gods’ plan as described in an “ancient” prophecy. According to the text, all the courtiers and priests are gathered to pay their respects at court; the king is informed of a great sage named Neferti, a priest of the cat-goddess Bastet of Bubastis in the eastern delta. Neferti is brought before the king and asked to prophecy the future. The prophecy begins with a vision of devastation in Egypt before the reign of Amenemhet – presumably during the period of instability and civil war before his ascension {1998–1991}. The Nile is dry, storms rage, the land is infertile and depopulated. Then the Easterners invade the Delta from the east:
The land is burdened with misfortune
Because of those searching for food,
Easterners roaming the land.
Foes have arisen in the east,
Easterners have descended into Egypt.
The [frontier] fortifications are destroyed …
The animals of the [nomads] of the desert
will drink from the river of Egypt (CS 108)
Chaos spreads, as civil war breaks out in Egypt:
I will show you the land in turmoil
That which has never happened [before] has happened
One will seize the weapons of warfare,
The land lives in confusion
One will make arrows of copper,
One will beg for bread with blood …
A man sits with his back turned,
While one man kills another.
I show you a son as an enemy,
A brother as a foe
A man killing his own father.…
The land [ruled by the king] diminishes
But its [small independent] rulers are numerous
[The land is] bare, but its taxes are great …
Re [the supreme god] separates himself from mankind.
(CS 108–9)
All is not lost, however, for in his vision Neferti sees the coming of a redeemer king who will drive out the enemies of Egypt and restore order. He reunites Egypt, defeats rebellious Egyptians and drives out the Libyan and Eastern invaders:
Then a king will come from the south
Imeny [Amenemhet], the justified, is his name
A son is he of a woman of the land of Nubia,
A child is he of Upper Egypt.
He will take the white crown [of south Egypt],
He will wear the red crown [of north Egypt];
He will unite the Two Mighty Ones [goddesses of Upper and Lower Egypt] …
Rejoice, O people of his time
The son of man [Amenemhet] will make his name forever and ever.…
The Easterners will fall to his slaughter,
The Libyans will fall to his flame,
The rebels [within Egypt] to his wrath,
The traitors to his might,
He will build the “Walls of the Ruler” [on the north-east Delta]
To prevent Easterners from descending to Egypt …
Then order will come into its place.
(CS 109–10)
Amenemhet's rise to power is thus portrayed as the divine mandate of the gods to save Egypt from chaos and invasion.
Amenemhet's victory in the Civil War {1993?–1991}
The rather vague and propagandistic panegyrics of the “Prophecy of Neferti” are supplemented by several more concrete reference to Amenemhet's victories in the civil wars. The first comes from an inscription of Khnumhotep I, a nomarch of Beni Hasan in Middle Egypt:
I went down with his majesty [Amenemhet] to Im[et] in twenty ships of cedar; then he came to Pelusium [in the north-east delta] … When he had expelled him [the rival in the civil war] from the two banks of Horus [the Nile].… Nubians perished … and Syrians fell. [Amenemhet] organized the land [of Egypt] … the two banks [of the Nile].
(AIB 148–9 = ARE 1:225, 283; C1/2:496–7)
In return for his services, Khnumhotep was appointed “overseer of the eastern desert in Menat-Khufu” (AIB 152).
The Nesu-Montu inscription, written by one of Amenemhet's generals, probably recalls some of the battles of the civil war as well:
I am one firm of foot, excellent of counsel, one whose conduct his lord [king Amenemhet] praises. The conscripts of Thebes adore me, as I never made display of cruelty [in disciplinary punishment].… I am the only one worthy to be called the hero of this land, swift of hand and quick of pace, a citizen skilled in arms. I trained the troops in ambush, and at daybreak, the landingstage [of the city] surrendered. When I grasped the tip of the bow, I led the battle for the Two Lands. I was victorious, my arms making so much spoil that I had to leave some on the ground. I destroyed the foes, I overthrew the enemies of my lord [Amenemhet], there being none other whole will say the like.
(AIB 108)
Thus, despite the uncertainties concerning the specific course of the civil war, the final result is clear: the prime minister Amenemhet emerged victorious, ascending the throne as king Amenemhet I, founder of the Twelfth Dynasty.
Twelfth Dynasty {1191–1786}10
Amenemhet I {1991–1971/1962}11
In the posthumous “Instructions of Amenemhet”,12 the dead king appears to his son Senwosret I as a ghost in a dream or vision after his assassination, giving his son a broad summary of his military career in rather generalized and poetic terms:
I [Amenemhet] strode to Elephantine [Aswan in the far south]
I traveled to the Marshes [of the delta in the north]
I stood firm on the limits of the land, having seen its midst
I attained the borders of the [frontier] strongholds
With my strong arm, and my [military] feats.…
All that I decreed was as it should be.
I tamed lions, and captured crocodiles.
I subjugated the Nubians, and captured Medjay;
I made the Syrians do the “dog-walk”.
(TS 207–8 = AEL 1:137)
Though this is a stylized and poetic summary, the essence of Amenemhet's campaigns is clear from the text. He conquered all Egypt during the civil war (as in the previous section), established firm frontier fortifications, and campaigned against both Nubia and Canaan.
Upon securing the throne through victory in the civil war, the new king built a new fortified capital named Amenemhet-Iti-tawy – “Amenemhet, seizer of the Two Lands”, some fifty miles south of Cairo (modern el-Lisht; EAE 2:294–7; AEA 84), perhaps in part to establish a new secure base of operations outside the sphere of influence – and possible intrigue – of the priests and courtiers of the old regime he had overthrown. Amenemhet also reorganized the nome structure and appointed new officers to insure personal loyalty to himself (AIB 152–3), and continued royal sponsorship of expeditions to the diorite quarries to the southwest of Aswan (C1/2:497).
With Egypt unified, Amenemhet faced the two standard military problems of all Egyptian rulers: the Nubian frontier, and the north-eastern frontier. On both frontiers Amenemhet's policy was the same: offensive invasion aimed not so much at direct occupation, but at undermining the military capabilities of the Nubians and Canaanites, while securing the frontier with a strong fortification system.
Amenemhet's Nubian policy (AAA 49–50)
Amenemhet was said to have been “the son of a woman from Ta-sety” (TS 138), a term often associated with Nubia. Though he was half Nubian, he did not show any particular favor towards his mother's ancestral homeland. The broad outlines of Amenemhet's Nubian strategy can be learned from archaeology and some fragmentary inscriptions from Girgawi, which describe a campaign against northern Nubians – called the “C-group” by archaeologists (EAE 1:258–9). The expedition was under the command of the vizier Intefiqer, who left a description of the desolation caused by his invasion.
This [temporary fortified] enclosure being built, then I slaughtered Nubians and all the rest of Wawat [Nubia]. Then I went upstream [south] in victory, slaughtering the Nubian in their own land, and came back downstream stripping crops, and cutting down the rest of their trees so that I could put fire to their homes, as is done against a rebel against the king. I have not heard of another soldier doing the like.… Intefiqer [sailed] in the ship called “Great Oar”.
(VAE 95–6 = AIB 134)
From this account it appears that the Nubians had “rebelled” against Egypt, perhaps simply implying either a refusal to accept Amenemhet's suzerainty, or some type of raid by Nubians into Egypt. In response, the Egyptians sent a fleet around the First Cataract at Aswan, probably through the canal originally cut by Weni in the Sixth Dynasty (AEL 1:21). The army regiments either marched on the riverbank, supported by the river fleet, or were transported by the fleet. At some point they built a temporary fortified camp as a base for military operations. Thereafter, the army advanced further southwards, systematically slaughtering any Nubians they found, while destroying their crops, orchards, and cities, and leaving devastation in their wake.
The Korosko inscription allows us to date the campaign to year 29 {1962}, and mentions a number of the other commanders: Shnumu, Amenemhet (not the king), Ishteka, and “the king's son Nakhti” who “came to overthrow Wawat [northern Nubia]” (AIB 128 = ARE 1:228). Intefiqer's fleet, described as “coming and going against Wawat”, was under the command of”Redis, the overseer of the ships” (AIB 129). Amenemhet's Nubian campaigns resulted in the extension of Egyptian military power to the Second Cataract, where he built the Semna fortress (HAE 161), the first in a string of fortresses designed to give Egypt direct domination over northern Nubia and control over trade between Nubian Africa and Egypt.
The northern frontiers
Whereas Amenemhet's Nubian policy was one of invasion and pushing the boundaries southward, in the north he remained essentially on the defensive. The earlier problem of Eastern bedouin incursions continued, compelling Amenemhet to strengthen the eastern delta fortifications with the “Wall of the Ruler” at Wadi Tumilat (CS 1:110; C1/2:497); archaeological remains of these fortifications have not been discovered. This fortification process was supplemented by punitive raids against the nomads beyond the Egyptian fortified border. The Nesu-Montu inscription describes one such expedition in Year 24 {1967}:
I destroyed the [nomadic] wild bow-people, the Sand-dwellers. I demolished [their] fortresses and prowled like a jackal on the desert's edge. I went up and down through their streets, there being not my match therein, because [the war god] Montu had ordered the victory.
(ECI 77 = AIB 109 = ARE 1:227–8)
As on the north-eastern frontier, fortresses were also built in the western delta at Qaret el-Dahr south of Wadi Natrun to defend the Western Desert approaches to Egypt. Details about campaigns against the Libyan western frontier are not known, though the “Prophecy of Neferti” claims “the Libyans will fall to [Amenemhet's] flame” (CS 110), implying that some type of punitive expeditions were undertaken to subdue the Libyans. Indeed, when Amenemhet was assassinated in 1962, his son Senwosret was on a campaign in the Libyan desert, from which he was quickly recalled to secure the vacant throne (TS 27).
In year 20 {1971} the aging Amenemhet made his son Senwosret I co-regent {co-regent, 1971–1962; sole ruler, 1962–1928}. Thereafter Senwosret seems to have controlled foreign policy and led most major military expeditions. The military affairs of the last decade {1971–1962} of Amenemhet's reign, during his co-regency with Senwosret I, will thus be discussed in the next section, since they represent the military policy of Senwosret. Despite his great military achievements, Amenemhet's political policy caused dissatisfaction and instability at court, where he was assassinated by a harem conspiracy that was organized by a vizier but implemented by his own bodyguard. According to the “Instructions of Amenemhet”, the ghost of the murdered king returned to his son and successor Senwosret and described his murder:
After supper, when darkness had fallen … I was lying on my bed … I woke to fighting, and I found it was an attack of the bodyguard … Had women [of the harem] ever before commanded troops [to attack the king]?
(TS 207; Man. 34–6)
Amenemhet's murder apparently created a temporary succession crisis, but ultimately the conspirators failed, and his son Senwosret was able to succeed to the throne.
Senwosret (Sesostris) I {1971/1962–1928}13
Senwosret's personal reign began with a crisis {1962}. He had been sent by his father on a punitive expedition into Libya, and “was returning [to Egypt], having carried off Libyan captives and all sorts of cattle without number”, when a messenger met his army on the march and informed him of the assassination of his father. Remembering his father was himself a usurper, and realizing that his throne was at stake, “he did not wait a moment; the falcon [Senwosret] flew off with his [personal] followers (šmsw), without informing [the rest of] army” of the death of king Amenemhet. His quick march to the palace at el-Lisht forestalled the assassins, and he was able to claim the throne (TS 27–8).
Although the first ten years of Senwosret's reign {1971–1962} had been spent in co-regency with his father, Senwosret appears to have been in charge of foreign and military affairs during most of this period. Some punitive expeditions were undertaken against the Libyans (TS 27); an officer, Ded-Iqu, who is proud of having “secured his majesty's borders”, records that “as commander of young recruits” he was sent “to secure the land of the oasis-dweller”, probably the Libyans around the Kharga Oasis (AEA 93–4).
None the less, for the most part Senwosret was satisfied to maintain his northwestern and north-eastern frontiers secure by strongly garrisoned fortifications that had been begun by his father (C1/2:500–1). This policy is explicitly stated by Sinuhe, “he [Senwosret I] will conquer the southern lands [of Nubia], without yet considering the northern countries [of Syria]” (TS 31). The maintenance of the northern frontier required occasional expeditions against the Sinai bedouins, perhaps in conjunction with mining expeditions to the Sinai for turquoise and copper (LA 5:892). A nobleman named Montuhotep described one such punitive expedition in his funerary inscription: he “put his terror among the barbarians when he silenced the Sand-dwellers, pacifying the rebels because of their [rebellious] deeds” (ARE 1:256).
The Eastern Desert of Egypt was also the scene of other paramilitary mining expeditions (SI 361–400). Senwosret sent an expedition under the vizier Intefiqer to Wadi Gawasis on the Red Sea, from which ships were built (or assembled from transported parts) and dispatched to Punt (AIB 139). Several expeditions were sent to the quarries in Wadi Hamammat; an inscription from year 38 {1933} describes one with 17,000 men that transported 210 huge stones to make sphinxes (C1/2:500). Although not strictly a military expedition, the huge size of the force reflects the Egyptians’ logistical capacity to mobilize and sustain large armies in the field. The military prominence of the reign of Senwosret I is also reflected in some of the tomb paintings of the period. The Beni Hasan rock-cut tombs of Khety (tomb 17, c. 2000) and Amenemhet (tomb 2, c. 1950) both contain depictions of wrestlers training, and of actual combat (EWP 120–1, 126), which will be discussed in greater detail on pp. 433–8.
The Nubian frontier
Senwosret's major military efforts, however, were centered on the Nubian frontier, focusing on securing access to the mineral resources of Nubia (SI 237–360; M = HAAE 45; AAE 41). Expedition inscriptions tell us that he exploited gneiss at Toshka, amethyst at Wadi el-Hudi, and gold and copper at Wadi Allaqi in the Nubian eastern deserts. Ameni, commander of the troops of the Oryx nome, participated in two of these gold-seeking expeditions, which he described in his autobiography:
I sailed south [into Nubia] to fetch gold ore to the majesty of King Kheperkare [Senwosret I], living forever and ever. I sailed south with the Prince, Count, Eldest King's Son of his body, [the future] Amenemhet II, life-prosperity-health. I sailed south with 400 conscripts, the choicest of my troops, and returned in safety without loss to them. I brought the gold he had demanded, was rewarded for it in the king's house, and the king's son thanked me.
(AEAB 138 = ARE 1:251–2)
The second expedition is similarly described:
Then I sailed south to bring gold ore to the town of Coptos.… I sailed south with 600 conscripts, the bravest of the Oryx nome. I returned in peace, my soldiers safe, and I had done all I had been ordered.
(AEAB 138 = ARE 1:251–2)
Senwosret's increased military activity in Nubia was closely linked to the economic importance of gold, intended to protect the mining expeditions, control trade, and prevent possible raids by Nubians into Egypt. In the sixth year {1965}, Ibes, son of Id, participated in an expedition to Nubia, in which he “traveled downstream with the army”. However, he laments: “there was no fighting”, because of which he was unable to “bring a Nubian back as captive from the land of the Nubians” (VAE 95). These incidents reflect the fact that even a moderate Egyptian force of from 400 to 600 men could at this time operate with some impunity in northern Nubia, perhaps because of the devastation wrought by former campaigns such as that of Intefiqer, described on pp. 394–5. Ibes's complaint that he was not able to bring back Nubian slaves also illustrates the importance of personal plunder to Egyptian soldiers.
In his eighteenth year {1953}, Senwosret launched the major campaign of his reign, an expedition into Nubia, commanded by his general Montuhotep (C1/2:499–500). In the first phase, Montuhotep led his army to the Second Cataract, where they established a new fortified base at Buhen, intended to be the basis for permanent Egyptian occupation and annexation of Nubia. (The nature and importance of these fortifications will be discussed on pp. 443–5.) A fragmentary inscription by the “commander of the army” Montuhotep describes the devastation wrought on the local population by this campaign: “[the Nubians’] life is finished, [they are] slain … [their] tents are burned … their grain cast into the Nile” (ARE 1:249).
An inscription near Buhen commemorates this campaign, showing Senwosret and the war-god Montu with ten bound and cowering Nubians symbolizing ten cities, regions, or tribes defeated in the campaign (ARE 1:247). The first name on the list is “Kush”, the leader of the enemy confederation. This is the first historical mention of an important new military power in the Sudan, which will be discussed on pp. 402–6. Although permanent Egyptian occupation under Senwosret I ended at the fortress of Buhen at the Second Cataract, the army campaigned further south into to the land of Kush. Ameni, “commander of the troops of the Oryx nome”, described the second phase of the expedition:
I followed my lord [Senwosret I's heir apparent Amenemhet II] when he sailed south to overthrow his enemies [in Kush] among the foreign barbarians. As Count's Son, Royal Sealbearer, and Chief Troop Commander of the Oryx nome did I sail …
I passed by Kush, sailing south,
I reached the ends of the earth;
I brought back tribute of all kinds
And praise of me reached [even] to heaven.
Then his majesty returned in safety, having overthrown his enemies in wretched Kush. I returned in his following in alertness and no loss occurred in my troops.14
Like Alexander's army on the banks of the Indus, Ameni and his Egyptian soldiers felt like they had marched to the end of the earth.15 It is possible that the Egyptians were militarily active as far south as Argo Island, near the Kushite capital of Kerma (twenty-five miles north of modern Dongola), where the name Senwosret was found inscribed on a vessel – whether it was brought by trade or military expedition is unclear (C1/2:500). The new military frontier of Kush was not completely stabilized by Senwosret I's campaign and fortress building; his great-grandson Senwosret III was required to undertake a number of additional campaigns and build more fortresses a half-century later. None the less, the military successes of Senwosret I laid the foundation for the permanent Egyptian occupation of Nubia and a century of prosperity for Egypt.
Amenemhet II {1929–1895}16
Until 1980, historians of ancient Egypt generally described the reign of Amenemhet II as one of peace (C1/2:503, HAE 165). The publication of a recently discovered inscription from Memphis, however, contains passages from Amenemhet's “Daybook” describing details of his military campaigns into Syria during a single year. Beginning in the Middle Kingdom the Egyptian court kept a “daybook or journal (hrwyt) as a means to record day-to-day accounts (income and disbursements) and events (arrivals, departures, civil and military matters, court cases, etc.)” (EAE 1:97a; LA 3:789–90). Nearly all of these records have perished, but some passages have survived and other sections were used as the basis for official military inscriptions on stone.17 In the case of Amenemhet II, the recently discovered inscription includes a portion of the court journal for a single year – often called by Egyptologists the annus mirabilis, or “amazing year” – which includes accounts of tribute received and military campaigns to Syria.
Unfortunately the beginning of the inscription is lost and the year in question is not certain. None the less, the inscription describes a number of different military expeditions during this single year. First, there is the “dispatch of the army to Khenty-she [Lebanese coast]” and its return later in the same year: “the return of the army dispatched to Khenty-she in ten ships” (ECI 78–9). The size of the expedition, ten ships, indicates that the total size of the force involved was probably in the hundreds, certainly not many more than a thousand men. None the less, this force was able to return with substantial wealth – though it is not clear if this was trade, tribute, or plunder. Their goods included “1665 units of silver; 4882 units of gold, [and] 15,961 units of copper” (ECI 79). The list of wealth also included bronze weapons inlaid with gold, silver, and ivory. A second army left Egypt that year, but is not described as returning. It laconically mentions the “dispatch of the army together with the commander of the elite troops and the commander of the army to hack up Iw3s [Alse?] in Syria” (ECI 79).
Two other armies returned to Egypt in this year, although they had apparently been sent out the year before. The first “army” returned with wealth from the “turquoise terraces”, presumably an expedition to the Sinai mines. The second was more clearly military, a naval plundering raid to Cyprus and another land, perhaps on the Levantine coast:
Arrival of the shock troops sent to destroy the towns of Iw3y and I3sy [Cyprus]. Tally of prisoners of war brought back from these two foreign lands: 1554 Easterners [as prisoners]; bronze-and-wood [weapons]: 10 battle-axes, 33 scimitars; 12 daggers; 11 knives; [?] javelins, as well as copper, gold, lapis lazuli and gems.
(ECI 79)
From the military perspective one thing is particularly striking: although fifteen hundred people were taken prisoner, only 66 weapons (and an unknown number of javelins lost in a lacuna) are included in the plunder. This first indicates that a large number of the prisoners would have been women and children. The weapons list may, in fact, include only bronze weapons, which were considered worthy of special attention as plunder for the king. There is also the mention of thirty-three “scimitars” – literally “reaping implements” (ECI 79 n49) – taken as plunder. Presumably these are the curved “sickle-swords” found in Royal Tombs I–III at Byblos in Syria and Shechem in Canaan during the late Middle Bronze Age {c. nineteenth century} (MW 1:142–3, 2:514; AW 1:172–3, 206–7; FP 51). The Egyptians called this weapon the kopesh (ḫpš, EG 513, sign T16); there is limited evidence for the use of these weapons in Egypt before the New Kingdom, when they became more widespread.
In summary, Egypt had four separate military expeditions underway in a single year. Two were naval expeditions, one to Lebanon and the other to Cyprus. Two others were overland into the Sinai and Canaan. Egypt was successfully able to exert moderate levels of military force throughout Cyprus, Lebanon, southern Canaan, and Sinai in a single year. In the same year, emissaries arrived from both Nubia and Syria bringing “tribute” for the king – often a euphemism for merchants arriving with trade goods – as well as “suppliants of the Tmp3w [Ugarit?]” with “238 ingots of lead” (ECI 79). The inscription also records a large number of donations given to the gods and temples, exemplifying the symbiotic relationship between the gods, who granted Egypt prosperity, wealth, and victory in battle, in return for which the pharaoh gave a portion of this wealth back in the form of donations to the gods, through priests of the temples, in thanks for divine blessings. While praising and thanking the gods for their assistance, however, the army was not forgotten; the Daybook also records distribution of rewards to the military officers in command (ECI 79).
The survival of Amenemhet II's journal for this one year points to an important historiographical principle that needs to be repeated when trying to reconstruct the military history of the ancient Near East: absence of evidence is not necessarily evidence of absence. Before the publication of this inscription in 1980, Amenemhet II's reign was described as essentially peaceful. In reality there were four simultaneous campaigns underway in a single year – the only year for which we have surviving evidence from the Daybooks. Records for most of Egypt's military history simply have not survived. All we can do is reconstruct a minimal account of Egyptian militarism.
That the military affairs of Nubia were not neglected by Amenemhet is indicated by an inspection tour of some of the Nubian frontier fortresses (ARE 1:278). Two mining expeditions were undertaken to the Sinai in which the local chiefs were “suppressed” (VAE 137 = ARE 1:274). In addition there is one record of military intervention on the Nubian frontier, commanded by the “assistant treasurer” Sihathor, who “reached the land of Nubia [where] the Nubians came bowing down [in submission] for fear of the Lord of the Two Lands [king Amenemhet II]” (VAE 138 = ARE 1:274). There were likewise at least two trading voyages to Punt from the major Egyptian Red Sea port of Sawu (Wadi el-Gasus). The first was in 1901, when “Captain of the Gate” Khentekhtay-wer returned safely from an expedition to Punt, “his army being with him” (ARE 1:275). The second, in 1897, was under the Treasurer Khnumhotpe (C1/2:504).
Commercial relations played an increasingly important role during this period. In addition to the Nubian trade for gold and semi-precious stones, Egyptian commercial and cultural contacts flourished with Syria, and extended into Anatolia and Crete as well. A number of Egyptian artifacts have been found at Ugarit, Megiddo, and other Canaanite cities. Byblos was especially important as an Egyptian ally; its rulers took the Egyptian title h3ty-’ (“count” or “mayor”), and the court at Byblos was strongly influenced by Egyptian culture (C1/2:503–4; EAE 1:219–21; DANE 62). Byblos probably served as a naval base for at least some of the maritime expeditions of Amenemhet II described in the Daybook. Although the presence of Egyptian artifacts in Syria is generally thought to represent prestige items acquired through exchange (possibly even in exchanges that occurred several generations after the artifact was made), given the previously unknown military activities of Amenemhet, it is not impossible that some may represent the extent of potential Egyptian military activity as well.
A treasure consisting of four bronze caskets filled with gold and silver tribute from Syria was discovered at the temple of Montu at Tod in Upper Egypt, indicating the rich trade, tribute, or plunder – the Egyptians didn't necessarily always distinguish between these categories – that was obtained during the reign of Amenemhet II. The growing wealth of Egypt from trade, tribute, plunder, mining expeditions, and expansions and improvements to irrigation systems (such as those undertaken by Senwosret II in the Fayyum, OHAE 164), laid the foundation for Egypt's military power. The Tomb of Khnumhotep at Beni Hasan (Tomb 3) has splendid color murals depicting the arrival of a Canaanite caravan under the chieftain Abisha in Egypt (AW 1:166–7; EWP 124; OHAE 192; BH 1 §30; AAK 2/1:6). This mural gives us a good indication of the dress and weapons of Canaanite soldiers during this period. The men of the caravan are dressed in colorful kilts and tunics, and are armed with bows, javelins, throwing sticks, and a curved axe. The fact that the men in this caravan are armed indicates the dangers of crossing the Sinai, and adds support to the assumption that most trading expeditions mentioned in Egyptian texts were paramilitary affairs.
No major military campaigns are recorded for Amenemhet II's successor, Senwosret (Sesostris) II {1897–1877}.18
Senwosret (Sesostris) III {1878–1843}19
Militarily, the thirty-five-year reign of Senwosret III was one of the most important of the Middle Kingdom. Senwosret III's military prowess became the stuff of later legend; he was remembered over 1500 years later by the Greeks as a conqueror greater than Alexander.20 Within Egypt, Senwosret III suppressed the semi-independence enjoyed by some of the nomarchs, contributing to a stabilization of the internal political situation for the next century, while also increasing the central resources of the king (C1/2:505–6). It is unclear if these activities involved the exercise of military power, or were purely political in nature. Outside of Egypt, Senwosret III campaigned on both the Nubian and Canaanite frontiers.
Nubian campaigns {1870–1859}21
In order to facilitate both trade and military access to Nubia, Senwosret III repaired and expanded earlier Old Kingdom work on the Aswan canal which allowed ships to bypass the First Cataract. In his eighth year {1870}, the king had the canal enlarged to 75 meters long, 10 meters wide and 7 meters deep (ARE 1:291–2). With his communications and logistics between Egypt and Nubia secured by the refurbished canal, Senwosret marched his army southward, past the fortification line of Buhen at the Second Cataract that had been established by his grandfather, conquering to half-way between the Second and Third Cataracts and establishing a new southern military boundary for Egypt at Semna (ARE 293–4), where in the coming years he built and garrisoned eight large mud-brick fortresses.22 According to Senwosret's official policy declaration, the new fortified boundary was designed …
to prevent any Nubian from passing it downstream, either overland or by boat, or any herds of the Nubians, apart from any Nubian who shall come to trade at [the Egyptian fortified, officially sanctioned trading center at] Iken [at the Second Cataract], or upon any good business that may be done with [the Nubians], but forever forbidding a ship of the Nubians to pass by [Fort] Heh [Semna].
(EP 135 = ARE 1:293–4)
As with most Egyptian campaigns, efficient young officers who caught the eye of the pharaoh were given rewards and promotion for their successful service. On this or one of the later campaigns, Senwosret was accompanied by one of his courtiers, Sebek-khu, who served as a commander in the army and left an account of his promotion during the campaign in his autobiography.
I commanded sixty men when his majesty traveled upstream to overthrow the tribesmen of Nubia. Thereupon I captured a Nubian in Kenket [while fighting] alongside the regiment of my city. Then I returned downstream [north], following with six men of the [royal] residence. Then his majesty appointed me as inspector of the retainers and [command of a company of] 100 men were given to me as a reward.
(AIB 120 = ARE 1:306)
Another undated text from the mortuary biography of Ibia describes his command of a campaign in Kush, probably under Senwosret III, but perhaps under another ruler:
The king sent me to open up Kush because he deemed me efficient. I set the power of the Lord of the Two Lands [the king of Egypt] in the midst of rebellious foreign lands [of Kush], and followed the monuments of the king into remote foreign lands.
(AEA 127)
This text indicates the difficulty of subduing Kush, the land beyond Nubia; the view that it was a “remote foreign land” implies that military operations in Kush stretched the logistical limits of the Egyptians to their maximum capacity. The phrase “following the monuments of the king” into foreign lands possibly has reference to images of the king carried with the army and set up in a portable shrine (e.g. BH 2 §15c). Since the king was always the official, though frequently absent, leader of the campaign, images of the king may have been carried with the army; statues and stele of kings were certainly erected along the campaign trail. Alternatively, the phrase “following the monuments of the king” may refer to the stele of Senwosret at Semna, or a similar monument.
The goals of Senwosret Ill's original campaign were not immediately fully achieved. The Nubian frontier was by no means stable and secure in the coming years, requiring several additional punitive expeditions. In 1866 Senwosret III again “journeyed to overthrow Kush” (ARE 1:294); four years later, in year 16 {1862}, Senwosret erected a victory and boundary stele near fort Semna, which describes his ongoing efforts at the pacification of the Nubians.
[The King] making the southern boundary [of Egypt] at Semna:
I have made my boundary, going further south than my forefathers.
I have exceeded [the military conquests] that were handed down to me.
I am a king, whose word becomes deed …
One who is aggressive to capture, swift to success …
Who is unmerciful to the enemy that attacks him;
Who attacks when attacked, and is quiet when it is quiet; …
For he who remains quiet after [an enemy] attack,
He is making the enemy's heart strong.
Aggression is bravery; retreat is vile.
He who is driven from his boundary is a true back-turner,
Since the Nubian only has to hear [of the approach of the Egyptian army]
to fall [in submission] at a word:
Answering [the Nubian] makes him retreat.
One is aggressive to him and he shows his back;
Retreat and he becomes aggressive.
(VAE 43–6 – ARE 1:294)
Perhaps protesting too much, Senwosret's grandiose claims are undoubtedly a reflection of the problems of securing his new southern border beyond the Second Cataract. When Senwosret talked of “he who remains quiet after [an enemy] attack is making the enemy's heart strong”, he was probably alluding to an actual military experience of Nubian insurgency against Egyptian occupation. When strong Egyptian armies were present on the southern frontier, the Nubians and Kushites submitted. But such submission was nominal, and when the major Egyptian field army withdrew or they saw other signs of Egyptian weakness on the frontier, the Nubians and Kushites recommenced resistence and raiding. Senwosret's statement is given in the form of military advice, probably representing the conventional wisdom of Egyptian policymakers on dealing with recalcitrant enemies on their frontiers.
Senwosret faced this ongoing Nubian insurgency to his invasion with usual Egyptian brutality.
[The Nubians are] not a people to be respected. …
I have seen it in person, it is not an untruth,
For I have plundered their women, and carried off their underlings,
Gone to their wells, driven off their bulls,
Torn up their corn, and put fire to it ….
(VAE 43–6)
The plunder from Nubia also included gold, one of the principle reasons for the Egyptian desire to control the trade there. The holy of holies in the Osiris temple at Abydos was adorned with some of the Nubian plunder, a gift for the victory the gods had given him, “which he [the god Osiris] caused my majesty [the king Senwosret III] to bring from Upper Nubia in victory and in triumph” (ARE 1:298).
Even after the expeditions in 1866 and 1862, another campaign was necessary in year 19 {1859}, in which “the King of Upper and Lower Egypt Khekure [Senwosret III], living forever, journeyed [southward], overthrowing the wretched Kush” (ARE 1:301). Thus, the pacification of the Nubian frontier required military intervention every three to four years, frequently under the command of the king himself; it is likely that there were other campaigns whose records are lost. Obviously aware of the potential difficulties of the Nubian frontier, Senwosret concluded his victory stele at Semna with a special plea to his descendents to maintain his territory in Nubia:
As for any son of mine who shall maintain this boundary which My Majesty has made, he is my [true] son and was born to me … but he who shall destroy it and fail to fight for it, he is not my son and was not born to me.
(EP 135)
Senwosret was obviously concerned that the ongoing military difficulties and expense of his occupation of southern Nubia might encourage his successors to abandon his hard-won conquests. In order to administer his new domains, Senwosret created a third Egyptian administrative ministry (waret) alongside the standard two of northern and southern Egypt. He called it the “head of the south”, which incorporated Elephantine and Nubia (HAE 167).
The Confederation of Kush23
The people of central Sudan south of the Second Cataract who faced the Egyptian onslaught are known historically as the Kushites, and archaeologically as the Kerma Culture. The kingdom of Kush centered on their capital city of Kerma (EAE 2:227–8), a few miles north of modern Dongola, in a fertile agricultural basin on the southern Nile. By the time of Senwosret's invasion the inner city of Kerma was surrounded by imposing fortifications, probably built in response to the growing Egyptian threat. The site has been occupied since around 2500, but the region seems to have coalesced into a kingdom perhaps around 2000. The kingdom – perhaps more accurately described at this time as a confederation – encompassed the land from the Second to the Fourth Cataracts. By the Second Intermediate Period it would become a serious military rival to Egypt, intervening militarily in Egypt; a thousand years later the other Kushite kings would conquer and rule Egypt as the Twenty-fifth Dynasty {755–656}.
Due to lack of surviving indigenous written sources, we are forced to rely on Egyptian records and archaeology for historical information about Kush. From the Execration Texts (discussed on pp. 415–8), we know the names of several rulers of Kush during the nineteenth century. Unfortunately, little more is known about them than their names; the following dates can be nothing more than vague estimates. King Kaa ruled around 1900. He was succeeded first by his son Teriahi {1880?}, and then by a second son Awawa {1870?}; Awawa was in turn succeeded by his son [Uterer]ses {1850?}. The Execration Texts also contain the names of a number of other Nubian commanders and chiefs, and of queens (CS 1:50–1; SIP 253–4).
Although generally described as “wretched” and cowardly in Egyptian military propaganda, their military prowess in facing the Egyptian invasion can be inferred by reading between the lines. As described above, Senwosret III was forced to undertake four known campaigns – there were quite possibly others for which records have not survived – in a dozen years against the Kushites, building six large fortresses at the Semna rapids (midway between the Second and Third Cataracts) to control the border. Given Egypt's overwhelming superiority in wealth, resources, and manpower, the Kushites obviously defended their homeland with valor; their capital and three-fourths of their kingdom remained unconquered. The new boundary at Semna also probably in part represents the maximum Egyptian logistical capacity at this time.
The Canaanite campaigns of Senwosret III (M = HAAE 49)
The military activity of Senwosret III in Canaan is much less well documented than his Nubian campaigns. This may in part reflect less interest in Canaan, but, if the example of the inscription of Amenemhet II discussed above is typical, it more likely represents a dearth of surviving sources. It seems, however, that there was no attempt by the Egyptians to establish permanent colonial rule in Canaan as there was in Nubia. None the less, the sparse evidence demonstrates that Egyptian armies and navies did operate throughout Canaan, and on the coastal regions of Syria.
The most important military text relating to Canaan is the Inscription of Sebek-khu, an important military commander of the age who had begun his military career during Senwosret's Nubian campaigns. Sebek-khu described an undated campaign of Senwosret against Canaan:
[After the Nubian campaign] his majesty traveled downstream [northward] to overthrow the Bedouin of the Canaan. His majesty arrived at a foreign land, Shechem [skmm] by name.… Then Shechem fell, together with the vile Retjenu [Canaanites], while I acted as the rearguard [for the army on its return march to Egypt]. Then the soldiers joined in to fight with the Easterners [who attacked the rear of the column]. Thereupon I [personally] captured an Easterner. Then I had his weapons seized by two soldiers. There was no turning back from the fray, but my face was [always] to the fore [of the battle]. I did not show my back to the Easterner [in retreat].… [In reward, Senwosret] gave to me a staff of electrum into my hand, a bow, and a dagger wrought with electrum, together with the weapons [I had captured from the enemy].
(AIB 120 = ARE 1:304–5)
This text is interesting for what it both does and does not say. The purpose of this mortuary inscription is to glorify the deeds of the deceased Sebek-khu, and thus it unfortunately provides neither a date nor a broader strategic context in which the campaign occurred. None the less, if the identification of skmm with the biblical Shechem is correct, it demonstrates that the Egyptian army at this time could operate well into northern Canaan. In any event, it is clear from the text that the Egyptians did not permanently occupy Shechem, nor decisively defeat the Canaanites, for as Sebek-khu leads the rearguard of the withdrawing Egyptian army, the Canaanites are still bold enough to attack the retreating Egyptians. There are hints of other military activity in Canaan as well; a mining inscription in Wadi Hammamat records a “smiting of the four eastern countries” (ARE 1:302), which may have reference to Canaan, but could alternatively refer to nomads in the Eastern Desert or Sinai.
The legend of Sesostris the Conqueror
Senwosret is also an important figure in later Greek legends, which seem to conflate several different kings into a single composite figure whom they called Sesostris or Sesoōsis.24 Manetho records late Egyptian legendary recollections of Senwosret's Canaanite campaigns.
In nine years [Senwosret] subdued the whole of [the Near East], and Europe as far as Thrace, everywhere erecting memorials of his conquest of tribes. Upon pillars he engraved for a valiant race the secret parts of a man, for an ignoble race those of a woman. Accordingly he was esteemed by the Egyptians as next in rank to [the god] Osiris.
(Man. 32–6)25
According to Diodorus, Sesostris's conquests outstripped those of Alexander the Great, including India and the Ganges valley, and Scythian Central Asia (1.55). Whereas Alexander only dreamed of an Arabian campaign before his death, Sesostris accomplished it: “he overcame drought and failure of provisions to subdue the entire nation of the Arabians, which had never been conquered ere this time”; Sesostris is likewise said to have “reduced the greatest part of Libya to subjection” (Diod. 1.53). He also organized a fleet of 400 ships for the conquest and exploration of the Red Sea (Diod. 1.55). Diodorus claims that Sesostris's victories were stopped in Thrace – by the unconquerable ancestors of the Greeks, of course – only because of lack of supplies. However exaggerated these tales may be, they none the less demonstrate that Senwosret's military career was extraordinary enough for him still to be remembered 1500 years later as the greatest Egyptian conqueror.
Amenemhet III {1843–1797}26
Amenemhet III is most famous from later Greek legend as Ammenemes, the builder of the fabled Labyrinth, which was actually the pyramid and temple complex at Hawara.27 His prominence as a cultural figure is well justified by the prosperity and achievements of most of his nearly half-century reign, including both Nubian and Syrian trade, the agricultural expansion of the Fayyum, and mineral exploitation of the Sinai and Nubia (HAE 169–70; C1/2:509–12). From a military perspective, his reign seems to have been largely a period of peace, though there are a few indications of some low-level military activities.
The north-eastern frontier
An inscription from year 2 {1842} mentions “the opening of the land of the Easterners” by the “army commander” Amenemhet son of Ibeb (ARE 1:313). Some military activity in Canaan is confirmed, at least in an idealized sense, by a splendid pectoral of the princess Mereret, showing a scene of her brother Amenemhet III in the traditional “smiting” stance, grabbing the hair of a Canaanite bedouin and raising an axe-mace to smite him, with a generic martial inscription: “the good god [the king], the lord of the Two Lands [of Egypt], smiter of all foreign lands, Nimaatre [Amenemhet III]” (EWP 116; TEM 150–1; RA3 122). Other glyphs speak of him as “he who defeats the Eastern bedouins” (TEM 151). In general, however, the north-eastern frontier seems to have been relatively peaceful. By the end of Amenemhet III's reign a policy of more or less open borders seems to have allowed the peaceful migration of Eastern nomads into the north-east delta, laying the foundation for the rise of semi-autonomous Canaanite rulers in the delta in subsequent generations (OHAE 169; see Chapter 18 Chapter Eighteen).
The Sinai (RA3 217–27)
Throughout the Middle Kingdom the turquoise and copper mines of the Sinai continued to be exploited by regular Egyptian expeditions. This exploitation reached its peak in the reign of Amenemhet III, perhaps achieving the point where we can speak of a quasi-permanent Egyptian garrison at the mines. The reign of Amenemhet III is particularly rich in surviving inscriptions of such expeditions; 59 graffiti or inscriptions from Amenemhet III's reign have been discovered in the region, nearly three times the number of those from all his Middle Kingdom predecessors combined (RA3 251; OHAE 168). These expeditions presumably reflect the overall pattern of Egyptian paramilitary operations in the Sinai throughout this period. Although frequently commanded by Treasury officials, and generally concerned solely with mining turquoise and copper, there seems to have been a military component to most, if not all, expeditions to the Sinai mines.
Some inscriptions mention explorers in the Sinai (RA3 22), presumably prospecting new areas for precious stones and metals. On the other hand paramilitary forces are occasionally described as “opening up the foreign lands” and “trampling” enemies (RA3 16; ECI 80–1). Since such phrases are generally descriptions of military conflict, it can be assumed that there were military activities designed to protect the miners from raids from Sinai nomads (RA3 70). On the other hand, there does not seem to have been a formal invasion, conquest, or permanent military occupation of most of the Sinai (RA3 217–19). Relations with local peoples could also be peaceful: one inscription implies peaceful interaction with the “brother of the Prince of Retjenu [Canaan], Khebded” (RA3 21–2, 45, 155–6).
An expedition in year 2 {1841} to the Sinai to mine malachite and copper numbered 734 men (RA3 221; ARE 1:315). This expedition, or a related one, went overland from the Nile to the coast of the Red Sea, crossed by sea to the Sinai, and then marched inland to the mines at Wadi Maghara, presumably thereby avoiding the arduous journey through the Sinai desert, and also possible conflicts with Sinai nomads (RA3 32, 53, 224–6; ARE 1:316). A second Sinai expedition is recorded for year 6 {1837} (VAE 97–8). Additional inscriptions about expeditions to the Sinai mines are recorded for years 41 through 45 {1802–1798}, but most contain no military information (ARE 1:316–18).28 None the less, there was clearly a paramilitary component to these expeditions, if only for protection from possible bedouin raids. Ptahwer, the commander of the expedition of year 45 {1798}, wrote that “I was sent to bring plentiful [resources] from the land of [Sinai] … delivering the East to him who is in the palace [Amenemhet III], bringing Sinai at his heels, traversing inaccessible valleys, reaching the unknown extremities [of the world]” (ARE 1:319). Similar quarrying expeditions were also sent to Wadi Hammamat by Amenemhet (RA3 38–41), one of which included 2000 men (RA3 41).
Nubian frontier
In the south, Amenemhet's reign was again relatively peaceful. Some of the frontier fortresses at Semna were repaired and perhaps enlarged in year 33 {1810} (RA3 58–9, 212; OHAE 168), indicating that there was still tension and possible danger from the kingdom of Kush. The repair of the fortresses was undertaken by the Overseer of Treasure Intef, son of Sem-ib, who tells us that “the number of bricks which went into the rampart … when [I] was on frontier-patrol from Elephantine was 35,300” (RA3 59). The need to count every brick used in repairing the fortress is quite typical of the Egyptian bureaucratic mentality. The repairs to the city fortification at El-Kab in Egypt are also recorded (RA3 73). A royal river fleet was also maintained in Nubia (RA3 213), probably to control trade and to transport men and supplies.
There are only two recorded military expeditions against Kush in Amenemhet's nearly fifty-year reign. An inscription by the “army commander” Amenemhet son of Ibeb in year 2 {1842} alludes to the “smiting of the Nubians” (RA3 16; ARE 1:313). This may have been the final phase of the preceding Kushite wars of Senwosret III, described above, which finally forced Kush into submission. As long as access to the trade, gold, and other mineral resources of northern Nubia was secure, Amenemhet did not seem interested in further expansionist conquests; the majority of the Nubian-related texts of his reign deal with day-to-day administration (RA, 210–16).
An inscription near the Semna fort from Amenemhet's ninth year {1835} describes the suppression of a Nubian rebellion, indicating that not all was stable and peaceful in the region. A local commander, Nekhen Samontu, describes a punitive expedition:
Together with my crews, I sailed downstream through Nubia, without a casualty among them. I did not put any [Nubian] man in jail, but I destroyed and killed those rebels of [the Nubian chief] especially for the praise of the king who desires justice. (RA3 26–8, 193)
This text implies that local leaders and their garrison troops in the Egyptian border fortifications were generally able to deal with the problem of “rebellion” in Nubia without the need for the direct involvement of the central government. It is possible that there were a number of similar local punitive expeditions undertaken on the authority of local commanders which were never recorded.
Byblos in Syria29
The full military implications of Egypt's relationship with Byblos are not clear. Byblos was certainly ruled by a local Canaanite dynasty, whose tombs from a Middle Bronze Age cemetery have been excavated. However, some of these rulers took the Egyptian title of “mayor” (or “count”, h3ty), suggesting some type of Egyptian hegemony over Byblos, if only nominal. It may be that the kings of Byblos wanted to be seen as allies of the Egyptians by the kings of their rival Canaanite city-states. The kings of Byblos also wrote inscriptions in hieroglyphics, indicating either the presence of Egyptian scribes, or that Byblite scribes were familiar with the Egyptian language. Middle Kingdom statues and other inscribed objects have been found in the city.
Egypt's major interest in Byblos was trade, which focused on the all-important cedar wood for palace, temple, and shipbuilding. Other products were imported from Syria and beyond, including lapis-lazuli and tin. One can thus probably speak of Egyptian hegemony over Byblos, with strong political, cultural, religious, and economic ties of mutual interest. There were probably permanent Egyptian merchants and administrators in Byblos, with perhaps a regular military presence. The port of Byblos would certainly have been available to the Egyptian fleet for repairs and resupply, as well as serving as a potential base of embarkation for land forces.
Amenemhet IV {1798–1790} and Sobekneferu (Nofrusobk) {1790–1786}30
The reigns of the last two rulers of the Twelfth Dynasty are short and poorly documented, with no recorded military activities. The exact nature of the succession is also obscure. Manetho claims that Amenemhet IV was the son of Amenemhet III and brother of Sobekneferu (called “Scemiophris”, Man. 34), but this is unconfirmed by any contemporary evidence. Some scholars think Sobekneferu, daughter of Amenemhet III, was the wife of Amenemhet IV, who ruled Egypt as husband of the legitimate queen; when her husband died, Sobekneferu continued reigning in her own right (OHAE 170). On the other hand, it is possible that Amenemhet III had no surviving male heir, and chose one of his court officials to succeed him as Amenemhet IV. Sobekneferu, as the daughter of Amenemhet III, might thus have been seen by some as the legitimate heir in place of the usurper Amenemhet IV. This might suggest a succession crisis and possible strife or even civil war during the 1780s, though this is quite uncertain (SIP 294–5).
Amenemhet IV was probably an older man when he succeeded to the throne, reigning only eight years before being succeeded by Queen Sobekneferu {1790–1786}, one of the few women to rule Egypt independently. Despite the lack of recorded military activities during the reigns, it is clear from a Nile inundation inscription at the Nubian fortress of Kumma that Egyptian military control over the Nubian fortresses and frontier continued until at least the third year of Sobekneferu's reign {1787}. A statue depicting the Queen trampling the “Nine Bows”, the traditional enemies of Egypt (EAE 3:301), could memorialize some type of military campaign during her reign, but is also possibly a stylized depiction of royal power. At the end of the reign of Sobekneferu {1786}, Egypt entered another period of crisis and fragmentation known as the Second Intermediate Period {1786–1569}, which will be discussed in Chapter 18 Chapter Eighteen.