Chapter 1
How had it come to this? Many soldiers must have asked that question as the sun rose over a small area of Belgian countryside on Sunday 18 June 1815. Nearly a year ago, Emperor Napoleon I of France had been forced to accept peace terms and went into exile, events that signalled the end of the wars, or so many had hoped. Nonetheless, two great armies now faced each other near the village of Waterloo only 9½ miles (15 km) from Brussels, preparing for another day’s bitter fighting in the knowledge that many would not live to see another sunrise.
Since 1792, the Continent had been plagued by incessant wars, the influence of which had spread well beyond the confines of Europe. The seemingly invincible French armies had challenged and beaten most of the main European powers but were eventually forced back into France by 1814. Their Emperor had dominated the Continent for over a decade but, after his abdication, a new era of peace and prosperity suddenly seemed possible. Yet within a year, he escaped from exile and deposed King Louis XVIII of France with a speed that barely seemed credible. Although Napoleon was not the revolutionary radical he had once claimed to be, most of Europe saw him as the representative of a dangerous new ideology, bent on overthrowing the old order by force of arms. Shocked by his sudden reappearance on the world’s stage, his enemies formed the Seventh Coalition (a powerful international alliance) against him.
While the Emperor now claimed to be fighting in defence of France, many felt that a French victory in this campaign would plunge Europe back into incessant warfare and destruction as Napoleon had always been an inveterate warmonger. Yet his grip on power was tenuous and he needed a decisive victory and, above all, needed it quickly if his new regime was to survive. In contrast, although the Allied powers knew that winning a major victory here might end Napoleon’s ambitions, they still feared him as a general and knew that a serious defeat could prove catastrophic. Other armies were marching upon France and, even if this campaign failed to stop Napoleon, the French were still massively outnumbered. However, Napoleon’s fame as a general was such that a major defeat might have a ruinous political effect, attracting others to his cause and splitting the alliance ranged against him.
REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE, 1792–1814
To understand what was at stake on the field of Waterloo it is necessary to examine the dramatic events that occurred between the years 1792 and 1814. It all began with the French Revolution in 1789. Revolutionary fanaticism witnessed the overthrow of the French Bourbon monarchy, the dispossession of the aristocracy and eventually led to mass executions and the beginning of a class struggle that would continue to the present day. Although the revolutionaries were split into numerous groups and factions, almost all of them opposed kingship in any form and desired a new and fairer society, to be created by force if necessary.
Most European nations were monarchies at this time and feared that revolutionary ideology would spread from France and lead their own people into rebellion. Therefore, they resolved to destroy the new French Republic before its influence could spread but the revolutionaries proved far more difficult to suppress than anticipated. Far from being the disorganized rabble that initially swept the Bourbons from power, their conscript-based armies were inspired by fiery rhetoric and the promise of a fairer society and proved a match for the professional forces of the old order, not only defending their borders but carrying the war further afield.
Napoleon Bonaparte – the man who had dominated Europe for over a decade. The 1815 campaign would be his last chance to regain power. (Bourgeois)
Napoleon Buonaparte (he would later change the spelling to Bonaparte) was the greatest figure to emerge from the turmoil of the Revolutionary Wars. He came from the island of Corsica, which passed from Genoa to France the year before his birth (1768), and his family was respectable but lacked wealth or influence. He qualified as an artillery officer in the Royal Army but, as the revolutionaries permitted promotion by merit rather than through birth and influence, the new system allowed him to rise swiftly due to his remarkable abilities. Once he became a general, he made a substantial contribution to ensuring that successive revolutionary governments survived. Yet Napoleon’s effectiveness as a soldier was matched only by his almost limitless ambition for himself, his family and friends. During 9–10 November 1799, he seized power in a coup d’état and assumed dictatorial powers over the following years. Victories over Austria and other successes allowed him to retain his grip on power and he was crowned Emperor of France on 2 December 1804.
Warfare continued into the Imperial period, with the French defeating Prussia, Austria and Russia until Britain was the only major power that still stood against him. Up to 1806, it is possible to justify some of Napoleon’s wars on the basis that defending France and republicanism were among his primary aims. Yet after 1807, his wars took on a more sinister tone with the acquisition of territory and power lying at the heart of his ambitions. The Bonaparte family became a new royal dynasty and Napoleon placed his brothers and sisters on the thrones of allied states, and even some of his more successful generals became kings and princes. Hoping to force Britain into a peace settlement, he attempted to close all the ports of Europe against British trade with his Continental System. He intimidated other nations into adopting this policy, which often went against their commercial interests, and ultimately it did little to damage the British economy. Naturally, this commercial embargo was unpopular and its forced imposition helped alienate many nations against Napoleon.
The years 1807–14 saw the French invasion of the Spanish Peninsula and Napoleon’s treatment of Spain, his former ally, left Europe appalled by his treachery. The conflict he began there against Spain, Portugal and Britain was unprecedented in its savagery; mass destruction of property, widespread killing of civilians and incessant guerrilla warfare were commonplace. Thousands of French soldiers died in a ruinous series of campaigns that drained French resources to the extent that Napoleon called this war his ‘Spanish Ulcer’.
The Austrians declared war upon France once again and the Emperor suffered his first serious defeat at Aspern-Essling in 1809. Despite Napoleon’s eventual victory in that campaign, his enemies were increasingly harder for him to defeat as they had become accustomed to his style of waging war. Both sides sustained terrible losses at the Battle of Wagram in the same year which, as well as being his last truly decisive victory, set a new standard for carnage in Europe now that the destruction of armies was the main objective, rather than the acquisition of territory or strategic position.
Allied strategy for June/July 1815.
Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812 was a serious error in his grand strategy as he was compelled to fight on two fronts while the war in the Peninsula still raged. At the head of the largest army ever assembled until that time, estimated at over 500,000 French and allied soldiers, he marched into Russia hoping to force Tsar Alexander I to adopt his Continental System. The Russians fell back before him and, while he defeated their armies and occupied Moscow, the Tsar refused to sue for peace. The battles of this campaign dwarfed the size of the conflicts fought elsewhere in Europe and resulted in crippling losses of men, horses and military equipment. Eventually Napoleon felt compelled to retreat and his army endured a painful withdrawal in terrible weather conditions; he brought fewer than 93,000 men out of Russia. Napoleon’s Grande Armée had finally been humbled and the losses it had suffered were almost impossible to replace.
By 1813, the First French Empire was in serious decline as Napoleon’s allies began to defect in the wake of his disastrous Russian campaign. The Battle of Leipzig in 1813 was a major defeat for Napoleon and French armies had to abandon the bulk of the territory gained during the previous decade. The Peninsular War had also been ruinous for France and her armies retired towards the Pyrenees after suffering a series of defeats at the hands of British, Portuguese and Spanish forces. Although Napoleon’s enemies were massing to destroy him, they still feared his awesome ability as a general and knew that victory would only be possible at a high cost in lives and revenue. Therefore, they offered generous peace settlements that would allow him to keep his crown if he relinquished his territorial gains and restored the balance of power in Europe.
Yet Napoleon’s self-confidence was unshakeable and he believed that it was still possible to split and defeat the coalition of states formed against France. The 1814 campaign was one of his finest; Napoleon used all his skills to win a string of victories against the Allies during a campaign of rapid manoeuvre against fearful odds. Yet the overwhelming number of troops set against him finally proved impossible for the French Army to overcome. Since he had lost a huge number of horses in Russia, Napoleon’s victories ultimately proved futile, as they could not be conclusive unless followed by an effective cavalry pursuit. When Paris surrendered to the Allies, Napoleon’s marshals persuaded him to agree to peace terms and abdicate his throne.
Although permitted to retain the title of Emperor, Napoleon was exiled to the small isle of Elba in the Mediterranean Sea off the western coast of Italy. Political leaders representing all the major powers of Europe met at the Congress of Vienna, where proposals for the redistribution of territory and power were debated. The man whose reputation alone had recently cowed much of Europe was now derided as the ‘New Robinson Crusoe’, and considered safely out of the way. The old reactionary regimes hoped that Europe would now return to the state of affairs that existed before the French Revolution.
Napoleon’s first abdication at Fontainebleau, 6 April, 1814. (Etienne Prosper Berne-Bellecour)
NAPOLEON ESCAPES
Under the circumstances, Napoleon could have suffered a far worse punishment than being exiled to Elba. Although he had not instigated all of the wars that France had become embroiled in, his dynastic ambitions resulted in great loss of life and widespread disruption. On Elba, he ruled over approximately 112,000 subjects and was allowed to retain a bodyguard of several hundred men. Yet he soon became bored and frustrated with his tiny kingdom and the limited opportunities it offered a man with his ambitions.
The Bourbon Government restored by the Allies was proving deeply unpopular in France. Returning royalist émigrés, some of whom had fought against France, behaved arrogantly and received important promotions in the army and government, while old soldiers and administrators were dismissed or pensioned off. The peasantry feared that land they had gained during the Revolution would be confiscated and returned to the Church or aristocracy and the Bourbons seemed bent upon revoking every reform made during their absence. After a brief period of popularity following his restoration, the corpulent and uncharismatic Louis XVIII alienated the majority of his subjects. Compared to the man who had made France the first nation in Europe, he cut a poor figure and many were still loyal to Napoleon. When he learnt about the situation in France, the exile took heart.
To make matters worse, the Allies reneged on several promises made to the Emperor, including the provision of funds necessary to maintain his household. The British Prime Minister, Lord Liverpool, wrote: ‘Buonaparte is reduced to his last shilling. He has spent the little money he brought with him, and his pension has not been paid, although the six months have long since expired. This is abominable.’ He also mentioned the rumour that some influential figures deemed it unsafe to permit this dangerous man to remain close to central Europe. The remote isle of St Helena, lying deep in the south Atlantic, would be a far better home for him they suggested. It is possible that Napoleon heard of these plans.
At the Congress of Vienna, statesmen from all over Europe discussed how they should redistribute territory and power following the defeat of France. Most wished to restore the regimes and borders that had existed prior to 1791 but for many reasons this proved unrealistic. Politically Europe would never be the same again after the French Revolution and the conflicting interests of Prussia, Russia and Britain soon led to disagreements, which were exploited by Talleyrand, a former minister of Napoleon who now represented France’s King Louis XVIII. The Congress’s consideration of such weighty matters was rudely interrupted by the shocking news that Napoleon had escaped.
THE FALL OF LOUIS XVIII
Napoleon left Elba on 26 February 1815 accompanied by only 1,050 soldiers. He landed in France on 1 March where: ‘Amazement, rather than acclaim greeted his arrival.’ Although alarmed at the news, most believed that the government would soon put an end to this threatening venture by arresting and imprisoning him. Nevertheless, he headed determinedly towards Grenoble and despite marching through Provence, which was a staunchly Royalist province, no one made any serious attempt to stop him.
Napoleon reached Grenoble on 7 March where troops of the 5th Ligne Regiment stood to block his progress. Approaching them alone and unarmed, Napoleon dramatically opened his greatcoat and invited them to shoot if they desired to kill their Emperor. Their response was to desert to him en masse and the soldiers flocked around his standard, cheering ecstatically. The 7th Ligne rapidly followed suit and, as news of his progress towards the capital spread, people began to wear revolutionary cockades on their hats and hang the tricolour flag from buildings lining his route. Marshal Ney, at the head of a sizeable force, confronted his former master at Auxerre on 17 March but swiftly renounced the Bourbons and joined Napoleon along with his entire command.
Knowing that his reign had begun badly, Louis XVIII realized that he could expect little or no public support for his government in a fight against the most successful soldier of modern times. He fled Paris in the dead of night on 19 March and headed towards the coast. Reaching Abbeville, he changed direction and crossed the border into Belgium on 22 March. Here he sought refuge in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, a new state founded only the previous year. Napoleon entered the Tuileries Palace less than 24 hours after Louis had fled, receiving a rapturous welcome as he reached the capital with crowds thronging the streets. He had regained his throne in only twenty-three days without firing a shot in anger but it was far from certain that he would be able to keep it.
THE SEVENTH COALITION
Napoleon had been right that the majority of the French people would welcome his return but his illusions that the rest of Europe would accept him at the head of France were soon shattered. His first move was to justify deposing Louis and proclaim his desire for peace. On 4 April, he wrote to all the sovereigns of Europe telling them how the Bourbons had ignored the wishes and rights of the people to the extent that France: ‘was forced to abandon them. The popular voice called for a liberator.’ Furthermore, he declared that Europe was tired of war and: ‘My first and heartfelt anxiety is to repay so much affection by the maintenance of an honourable peace.’
Unfortunately, in the recent past Napoleon had made little secret of his belief that his retention of power rested upon delivering a succession of glorious victories to the French people. Therefore, many viewed him as a warmonger and few considered his desire for peace to be genuine. A week before he returned to Paris, the delegates at Vienna issued a declaration against him stating that: ‘by appearing again in France with projects of confusion and disorder, he has deprived himself of the protection of law, and has manifested to the universe that there can be neither truce nor peace with him’. Representatives of Austria, France, Britain, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, Spain and Sweden signed this declaration. Looking back with hindsight some years later, Napoleon admitted that he had misjudged the political situation by returning too soon. He speculated that had he allowed another six months to elapse, the Allies would not have formed such a strong alliance against him as political rifts had begun to develop between them. Regardless of whether this was true or not, it was now abundantly clear that another war was imminent.
The Seventh Coalition was declared against Napoleon in person, castigating him as a usurper rather than the legitimate ruler of France, and the states involved agreed that there would be no independent settlement with France until he was overthrown. Austria, Prussia and Russia agreed to raise 700,000 men between them, while the Duke of Wellington received command of British, German and Dutch/Belgian troops in Flanders. A Prussian army concentrated in the same region under Field Marshal Gebhard von Blücher, and the two forces hoped to field around 150,000 troops in combination.
Only Murat, King of Naples, voiced his approval of Napoleon’s actions and spontaneously declared war upon Austria. Ironically, he was probably the only head of state whose support Napoleon did not wish to gain. This was due to his disloyalty the year before when he had failed to march his troops to support Napoleon and defected to the Allies in order to keep his throne. Murat was rapidly defeated at the Battle of Torentino on 2 May. He fled to France where Napoleon contemptuously spurned his offer to serve under him, despite his skill as a cavalry general.
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, 1769–1852
Born in 1769, Arthur Wesley was the fourth son of Garret Wesley, an Anglo-Irish aristocrat. Educated at Eton and later in Angers, he showed little promise until his family bought him a commission in the British Army. Displaying a keen interest in all facets of military life, he even devoted himself to studying practical aspects like logistics and supply, which most officers of the day ignored. As his family’s status improved, they changed their surname to Wellesley, the more aristocratic spelling reflecting their rise in fortunes.
He mastered his profession in India during successful campaigns against Tippoo Sultan and the Mahrattas. During the Peninsular War, he acquired his reputation as a great commander. Landing in Portugal, he soon toppled the weak regime established there by the French under General Junot and fought off two further French invasions. The last of these owed much of its success to the construction of the defensive ‘Lines of Torres Vedras’ made to protect Lisbon. The vast scale of this project was an incredible military undertaking and proved so effective that it immediately halted the progress of a large army under Marshal Massena, who was eventually forced to retreat. With Portugal secure, Wellington crossed the frontier into Spain and fought a series of campaigns to oust the French armies occupying that nation. In the course of this war, he defeated some of Napoleon’s best commanders, eventually crossing the Pyrenees and invading France itself.
Sir Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington. He had fought Napoleon’s Marshals in the Peninsula but in 1815 he would face the Emperor himself. (Sir Thomas Lawrence)
While justly renowned for his defensive skill, he demonstrated his offensive capability by attacking and defeating French armies many times in the Peninsula at battles like Salamanca 1812 and Vitoria 1813. Although some contemporaries resented his family’s political influence, by 1815 he was already Britain’s greatest general through his own hard work and abilities with an unbroken string of victories to his name. Wellington was meticulous in preparation and tried to foresee every possibility on the battlefield, striving to ensure that his troops were well provisioned and supported. While warfare is unpredictable by nature, Wellington’s careful approach usually paid off and he left little to chance. This was in direct contrast to Napoleon, who, while he always calculated the odds, was often prepared to take a gamble in order to win. Wellington did not believe in taking unnecessary chances.
While he had fought the French extensively, he had never faced Napoleon himself and Waterloo would be the first battle where the two greatest commanders of the age would confront each other.
ALLIED WAR PLANS
The Allies planned to assemble vast numbers of troops along France’s eastern frontier, which was about 600 miles (965km) long. They intended to mount two major offensives along this border with a supporting invasion from the south. The first, under the overall command of Field Marshal Prince Karl Schwarzenburg, would cross the Meuse and Rhine rivers and march on Paris. The second offensive was aimed at Lyons to the south and, if successful, would also converge on the French capital. Spanish and Portuguese forces were massing on the Spanish border with the intention of invading over the Pyrenees and attacking in the south. The Allies knew that Napoleon’s armies would be heavily outnumbered in all three sectors and, if he concentrated his forces to stop any one incursion, they could be swiftly outflanked and cut off by the others. They predicted that he would choose to delay their advance and fight a defensive campaign focussed on defending Paris.
The Allies were capable of raising vast forces to crush Napoleon, but time was a pressing factor. Elated at the peace following years of conflict, most nations had rushed to demobilize, the ruinous cost of the wars making rulers keen to cut military expenditure and begin repairing the damage wrought on their economies. Furthermore, thousands of Wellington’s Peninsula veterans were currently in Canada and North America following the recently concluded War of 1812 (actually fought between 1812 and 1815) against America. The Russian Army would also take several months to reach the French border. Many of their soldiers would be inexperienced recruits and the Allies needed time to concentrate sufficient numbers of men to overwhelm and crush Napoleon’s armies.
Ultimately, the Allies were confident about their long-term strategy as long as they managed to deploy in sufficient numbers and maintain their nerve politically. However, they feared that a successful pre-emptive strike by Napoleon might discourage some states from opposing him and persuade others to switch their allegiance. A great deal depended upon how quickly they could manoeuvre their forces into position. By mid-1815, only Wellington and Blücher’s armies were in place and in a state of readiness. The Austrians would not reach the Rhine before July at the earliest and the Russians would not arrive until much later. Many were eager to march on France but, realistically, the Allies would not be able to invade until the autumn.
FIELD MARSHAL BLÜCHER, 1742–1819
Born near Rostock in 1742, Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher was a veteran of the Seven Years War. He remained in the army after hostilities had ended but was eventually compelled to leave due to his penchant for carousing, gambling, womanizing, duelling and occasional insubordination. He became a gentleman farmer for a time but rejoined the army to fight in the Revolutionary Wars and, during the Imperial period, participated in the disastrous 1806 campaign. At Auerstädt, he attacked with his typically impetuous style but managed to fight a tenacious rearguard action to cover the Prussian retreat. Stubborn to the last, he was one of the last to surrender to the French whose rapid defeat of the vaunted Prussian Army shocked all of Europe.
His vitriolic hatred of the French saw him forbidden from holding military office for a time but he returned to fight in 1813 when the Sixth Coalition was formed against France. Although defeated at the battles of Lützen and Bautzen, he went on to play a key role in defeating Napoleon at the decisive Battle of Leipzig, the largest single action of the Napoleonic Wars that saw 365,000 Allied troops sent into the field against 195,000 French and allied soldiers. Promoted Field Marshal by 1814, when the Allies invaded France he pressed for a more aggressive strategy during the drive on Paris. Other Allied commanders only managed to suppress his ruthlessness and lack of caution with difficulty.
A charismatic hussar officer of the old school, Blücher was an inspiring commander who referred to his soldiers as his ‘beloved children’ and saw himself as the father of his army. While an instinctive tactician and a dedicated soldier, he was no strategist. His obsessive hatred of Napoleon and the French after what they had done to Prussia occasionally clouded his judgement. Aged 72, he was about to retire when the news of Napoleon’s escape from Elba brought him back into the field.
NAPOLEON’S GRAND STRATEGY
In all likelihood, despite later protests to the contrary, Napoleon had probably taken it for granted that he would have to fight in order to keep his throne. Yet he was surprised by the strength and unity of the Allied reaction and only resumed the policy of conscription in France that April. This had been one of the most unpopular impositions of his regime and had become known as the ‘blood tax’. During the latter half of the Imperial period, the horrendous losses the army sustained in Russia and the Peninsula justified this gruesome label and French citizens were dismayed by its reintroduction.
Nevertheless, the former Royal Army of 200,000 men had come over to Napoleon almost to a man and around 100,000 old soldiers swiftly returned to their colours when they heard Napoleon was back. Many young volunteers were also eager to serve for the first time but, although his forces looked good on paper, Napoleon was well aware that he had to prove himself anew following his disastrous campaigns between 1812 and 1814. Some of his former marshals refused to serve under him again or renewed their allegiance with considerable reluctance, knowing that France was economically exhausted after years of conflict. Though his army was a well-equipped and cohesive force, it needed a swift victory to inspire it. French historian Henry Houssaye observed that: ‘Never did Napoleon have so formidable or so fragile a weapon in his hand.’
If Napoleon’s backing among the military hierarchy was patchy, he could expect even less from the elite among the French civilian population. Although he was currently more popular than ever with the French people, support would evaporate if too great a strain was placed upon France, especially among those who possessed property or influence. Many were trying to gauge the strength of his new regime before committing themselves so he wished to avoid a destructive campaign on French soil. He knew that if he fought defensively he was doomed, believing that: ‘Against greatly superior forces, it is possible to win a battle, but hardly a war.’ After years of hardship, French resources were low and the country could not hope to sustain a long war of attrition with so many nations united against her.
As France was threatened on all borders, Napoleon faced a serious strategic dilemma. His solution was to distribute small armies throughout France to counter potential invasions but these were spread thinly along long frontiers. Two armies under Clausel and Decaen protected the southern frontier, with a combined force of 14,400 men, facing a potential 80,000 Spanish and Portuguese troops. Lamarque commanded 10,000 men in north-west France to discourage Royalist revolts, while Marshal Davout had 20,000 troops to defend Paris. Along the eastern borders were 5,500 men under Brune, 8,400 men under Lecourbe and 23,500 men under Marshal Suchet. These faced three Austro/Italian armies that would soon field over 100,000 men between them. General Rapp commanded only 23,000 men for his Armée du Rhin, which was likely to face the main Austrian force under Schwarzenburg who hoped to amass a colossal 200,000 men. Combined with Barclay de Tolly’s Russian army of 200,000, the Allies would soon wield massive forces to set against France, which even a commander of Napoleon’s ability would find difficult to match.
Napoleon had committed 128,000 men, over half of his available strength, to the Armée du Nord (Army of the North). With these he intended to invade Belgium and defeat the Anglo-Allied and Prussian armies before the other Coalition forces were ready to invade France. He was gambling on securing an early, decisive victory that would reassure a doubtful France and make his enemies question their resolve to undertake a long, destructive war. Throughout his military career, he had always tried to strike first and Napoleon habitually chose to fight on the offensive whenever possible. Yet he needed a victory more than ever before and the outcome of the entire war would depend upon the success of the opening campaign.