Chapter 6
On the night of 17 June, the 2nd Kings German Legion Brigade, commanded by Colonel Ompteda, was ordered to garrison the farmstead of La Haye Sainte. Accordingly, Major George Baring occupied the farm and its environs using the 2nd Light Battalion of the Kings German Legion (KGL). This force consisted of between 380 and 400 men of all ranks, divided into 6 companies. Assessing the buildings for defensive purposes, the Major described La Haye Sainte in the following fashion:
The dwelling-house, barn, and stables were surrounded by a rectangular wall, forming a court in the interior. Towards the enemy’s side was an orchard, surrounded by a hedge, and in rear was a kitchen-garden, bounded by a small wall towards the road, but on the other sides by a hedge. Two doors and three large gates led from the court to the exterior; but of these, that of the barn had been unfortunately broken and burned by the troops.
He assigned two companies to hold the buildings and enclosures of the farm itself, one to defend the kitchen garden on the northern side of the complex and the remaining three companies to defend the orchard.
The rain hampered Baring’s efforts to prepare for an attack and the fact that his pioneers had been sent to help fortify Hougoumont meant he would have to improvise when it came to strengthening the farm’s defences. The mule carrying the battalion’s entrenching tools had been lost on the march and he lamented ‘that I had not even a hatchet’ to carry out work on the farm. Therefore, he had to rely upon tools found within the farmstead or borrowed from other units. The officers’ failure to prevent soldiers from destroying the great barn’s gate, for use as firewood during in the night, also rendered the western corner of the farm even more vulnerable.
The legionaries did, however, manage to break three large loopholes in the courtyard walls in addition to holes in the roof for sharpshooters, who took up position in the attics. They did not have timber or suitable objects to manufacture platforms in the courtyard that would enable them to fire over the walls. Only the piggery adjacent to the courtyard gate allowed them to do this and its height meant that men would have to lie or kneel upon the roof or risk exposing themselves to heavy fire during assaults. The garrison also managed to block the entrance of the great barn with farm implements and furniture but this makeshift barricade made a poor substitute for the stout double gate that had recently stood there. In any case, Baring hestitated to block this entrance completely as the companies defending the orchard might need a quick escape route back into the complex if forced to withdraw. Baring later complained: ‘Important as the possession of this farm apparently was, the means of defending it were very insufficient.’
La Haye Sainte farmhouse.
THE FIRST ASSAULT – 1.30PM–2.30PM
During the attack of d’Erlon’s I Corps, La Haye Sainte came under direct assault by Colonel Charlet’s Brigade of Quiot’s I Infantry Division. While French infantry advancing along the highway could be seen approaching, this was not the case directly to the south of the orchard where Baring directed operations, who noticed: ‘the farm lies in a hollow, so that a small elevation of the ground immediately in front of the orchard concealed the approach of the enemy’.
Riflemen lined the southern hedgerow and directed a telling fire as a large number of French voltigeurs pressed forward to trade shots with them. Yet in their eagerness to take the farm, the French did not skirmish for long and rapidly: ‘advanced over the height, with two close columns, one of which attacked the buildings, and the other threw itself in mass into the orchard, showing the greatest contempt for our fire’. Intending to deliver a heavy, concentrated fire into the orchard, the French marched forward swiftly and endured the losses the riflemen inflicted. Rifleman Friedrich Lindau was one of those firing at them and later wrote: ‘At first, as the enemy were packed in front of our hedge we opened such a murderous fire on the dense crowd that the ground was immediately covered with a mass of wounded and dead. For a moment the French halted, then they fired, causing major destruction on us.’
At close quarters, the superior range and accuracy of the Baker Rifle conferred little advantage as it was also slower to reload than the musket. The French were able to fire repeated volleys into the orchard and the hedges only offered limited protection. With a second column advancing on their right, aiming to assault the western side of the farm, they were also in danger of being outflanked. Seeing this, Baring ordered them to retire and Lindau recalled: ‘but when the columns on the right advanced as far back as the barn door and threatened to cut off our withdrawal … we marched slowly back, shooting’. Rifleman Harz, a close friend of Lindau’s, was shot down right next to him. Captain Schaumann and Major Bosewiel also fell in the orchard, along with many of their men as they retreated. Entering the great barn, the defenders laid down a heavy fire through the gateway, preventing the French tirailleurs from entering.
Baring rode his horse along the western side of the farm trying to direct the men outside to retire under the protection of its buildings. General Alten, seeing that the farm was virtually surrounded by French infantry, ordered Colonel von Klencke to lead his Lüneburg Battalion down the slope and relieve some of the pressure on the kitchen-garden position. The Lüneburg Battalion deployed into a firing line and engaged the French attacking the garden and advancing along the western side of the farm. However, Baring saw that cuirassiers were approaching and feared these reinforcements would be caught out in the open as they had not yet seen the cavalry’s approach. He rode towards them and shouted at their officers to retire into the farm along with his men.
Busily engaged in exchanging fire with the French infantry, the Lüneburg battalion was horrified to see French cavalry bearing down upon them from only a short distance away. This force comprised Dubois’s 1st and 4th Cuirassiers whom Ney had placed under the command of Colonel Crabbé with orders to support the infantry assault. Crabbé had deployed his four (possibly five) squadrons in column and now sent a large portion of his force directly at the Lüneburg infantry. While officers and sergeants shouted vainly to form square, disorder rapidly set in and the infantry scattered as the cavalry closed upon them, most fleeing for the ridge hoping to gain the safety of their own lines.
Baring also tried to prevent their flight and deal with the withdrawal of his own men simultaneously. He recalled: ‘My voice, unknown to them, and also not sufficiently penetrating, was, notwithstanding all my exertions, unequal to halt and collect my men together …’. The armoured cavalrymen charged into the infantry, cutting many of them down with their long heavy swords. Von Klencke was killed and his battalion was completely dispersed. It took such heavy losses that it played no further role in the battle. Baring’s riflemen also lost a number of men as they fled back within the farm and the action became so confused that many mingled with the attacking French infantry as they desperately sought cover within the buildings.
Fighting at the gate before La Haye Sainte. (W B Wollen)
It proved unnecessary for Crabbé to use all his cavalry (about 500 sabres) to destroy the Lüneburgers and at least 2 squadrons crested the ridge to the consternation of the battalions formed on the reverse slope, who immediately formed square. However, with British cavalry coming up, the French swiftly withdrew. One squadron rode back through Ross’s Battery and, although the gunners ran for the shelter of nearby infantry squares, many artillerymen were cut down as the cuirassiers retired back into the valley.
At the front of the farmhouse, Lieutenant Graeme’s men fired on the advancing infantry from the abatis (barrier) thrown across the highway but retired as the assault columns engaged in d’Erlon’s attack on the ridge began to draw level with their position. ‘When close upon us we entered the farm, and closed the gates, and poured a constant fire on their Columns as they passed us, and even until they were up on the crest of the British position …’. The long range of the Baker Rifle used by the KGL allowed them to inflict some loss and disruption on the men of Donzelot’s column. Indeed, the formation was so large that even muskets would have had some effect at this range. The garrison received some supporting fire from the three companies of riflemen manning the gravel pit over the highway. The range of their weapons meant they were capable of hitting French infantry advancing along the road next to the orchard.
Having defended the barn for some time, Lindau now joined the defenders of the courtyard and fired through a loophole at the French infantry on the highway. They were trying to break down the main gate and he recorded that they: ‘stood so closely packed here that several times I saw three or four enemy fall by one bullet’. Baring recalled similar incidences and would afterwards claim proudly that the garrison made almost every shot count.
When d’Erlon’s attack on the ridge was repulsed and pursued by the Household and Union brigades, Graeme opened one side of the main gate and mounted a bayonet charge against the infantry falling back along the road. In the wake of this assault, he remembered: ‘The ground was literally covered with French killed and wounded …’. Lindau joined this sally with Graeme and saw cavalry of the Household Brigade escorting hundreds of French prisoners to the rear as they returned. The defenders now benefited from an hour’s respite as a lull in the fighting ensued on their part of the battlefield. Nevertheless, the orchard remained in French hands and skirmishers there still subjected the garrison to intermittent sniping.
RIFLEMAN FRIEDRICH LINDAU KGL
Georg Friedrich Lindau was born in Hamelin in 1788. After Prussia’s defeat in 1806, his native state of Hanover became part of the Kingdom of Westphalia (a French satellite state). Lindau was a wild lad and, against the wishes of his parents who wanted him to pursue a trade, fled from Germany hoping to fight in British service. Subsequently he enlisted in the King’s German Legion in 1809. He fought in the Peninsula and during the invasion of France, fighting at Albuera, Badajoz, Salamanca, Vitoria, San Sebastien, Nivelle and Nive.
Lindau was a hard man who relished combat and enjoyed skirmishing, with his memoirs conveying an open and occasionally disturbing candour about life in the ranks. While on leave, he killed a man in a pub brawl and was placed under arrest for murder. As he was escorted under guard, an officer threatened him saying: ‘that I would see that six men had loaded, if I looked about to run away, the six bullets would be sent after me. I replied that I did not think much of six bullets, many had already whistled past my ears.’ As he was a popular and experienced soldier and very useful to the regiment, his officers ensured that the case never came to trial.
He was highly commended for his role in the defence of La Haye Sainte and Major Baring recalled Lindau’s words when he suggested he should retire and seek treatment for a severe wound: ‘He would be a scoundrel that deserted you, so long as his head is upon his shoulders.’ In addition to the Waterloo Medal, Lindau was awarded the Guelphic Medal having displayed great bravery at the siege of San Sebastien and at La Haye Sainte.
HOLDING OUT – THE SECOND ASSAULT – 3.00–5.00PM
The garrison watched a multitude of cavalry sweep past to their west during Ney’s attack. Most were too far away for them to fire upon effectively and Baring did not wish to waste powder or bullets admitting: ‘my greatest anxiety was respecting the ammunition, which, I found, in consequence of the continued fire, had been reduced more than one half’. The French infantry now renewed their assault and, despite receiving a withering fire from the farm as they issued from the orchard, advanced close to its walls. Laying down a heavy fire against any defenders who showed themselves above the walls or at the loopholes, they concentrated on trying to break down doorways and gates.
Baring was also concerned about the huge numbers of cavalry who, although largely concentrated to the north and west of the farm, also rode round the eastern side to reform as charges were repulsed on the ridge. He realized that his line of retreat was cut off and, if the stronghold fell, the entire garrison was likely to be killed or captured, as very few men would make it back up the ridge behind them. Occasionally, the riflemen fired upon the cavalry as they rode past but Baring wrote that this sporadic fire failed to discourage them during their fanatical assaults upon the ridge.
Posted in the courtyard to defend the main gate, Lindau stated that: ‘We soon ran short of cartridges, so that as soon as one of our men fell we immediately went through his pockets.’ Baring sent repeated requests for more ammunition back to his brigade but none was forthcoming. However, reinforcements were sent, Captain Christian von Wurmb leading a light company from the 5th Line Battalion KGL down to their assistance, who were armed with muskets rather than rifles. Coming under heavy fire as they did so, Wurmb was killed by a roundshot but most of his men made it into La Haye Sainte.
The courtyard of La Haye Sainte where a vicious close-quarter fight took place once the French gained entry.
Graeme’s men in the courtyard were under heavy pressure and he later wrote: ‘They never tried to escalade, and we kept them off the great gate by firing from the piggery (where I was placed most of the day), although the abatis served them for cover unfortunately.’ The French were crawling up to the wall in places to fire through the garrison’s own loopholes and any man who showed himself above the wall to fire down at them drew a hail of shots from outside. Lindau was one of about twelve men on the piggery roof firing over the wall and received a musket ball through the back of the head while he did so. It was a serious wound but his comrades doused his scalp with brandy and bandaged it. At least two officers told him to go back for proper treatment but he responded: ‘No … so long as I can stand I stay at my post’.
The French were so close to the farm that several men had their rifles grabbed as they fired through the loopholes or over the walls by attackers who tried to wrest their weapons from them. A hail of musketry was fired through these apertures and the defenders were forced back from them several times and had to wait for this fire to slacken before trying to regain their positions. During this assault, the French set fire to the great barn and Graeme reflected it was lucky for the garrison that the straw it recently contained had been plundered by the garrison for bedding during the night.
Although no ammunition had arrived, about 150 men from the light company of the 1/2nd Nassau Regiment were dispatched from the ridge to reinforce them. These men carried muskets rather than rifles so redistributing their ammunition would do the riflemen no good (the Baker Rifle having a smaller calibre than the India pattern musket). Nonetheless, additional defenders were welcome and Baring was particularly pleased that many of the men carried camp kettles. Using these, he swiftly organized efforts to draw water from the farm’s pond to douse the fires on the barn’s roof.
As the French cavalry assaults on the ridge began to slacken from 4.30pm onwards, the intensity of the infantry assaults against La Haye Sainte also lessened. Taking stock, Baring was horrified to learn that his men were down to three or four cartridges per man (having started the engagement with around sixty cartridges in their cartouches). He had appealed for cartridges at least five times, virtually begging to be re-supplied, and resorted to plain language in his last dispatch stating that the farmhouse would fall if he did not receive further rifle ammunition.
SEIZE AT ALL COSTS!
La Haye Sainte lies about 250yd (228m) from the ridge crest in the centre of the Anglo-Allied positions. Since Napoleon had decided to assault this position with a series of frontal assaults, holding it was crucial for Wellington’s defence. From his point of view, the French were obliged to give the stronghold a wide berth or endure the garrison’s fire on their flanks, which also effectively funnelled their attacks towards either side of his centre. As far as the French were concerned, if they seized the farmstead, they would not only weaken the Anglo-Allied line but would be able to concentrate for new attacks in positions far closer to Wellington’s centre. Possession of such a base would greatly improve their chances of carrying the ridge.
Napoleon was exasperated over losing two valuable hours during the futile and costly cavalry attack. Nonetheless, he judged that the Anglo-Allied Army must be significantly weaker after suffering a series of attacks and bombardments that day. With the Prussians arriving in increasing strength, he needed either to break through swiftly or order a general retreat. He decided that it was all or nothing and ordered Ney to seize the farmhouse at all costs. It was the key to the Allied line and, once taken, would allow him to commit his reserves and destroy Wellington’s centre.
This time there would be no mistake and Ney committed Colonel Gourgeon with three battalions of the elite 13th Légère from Donzelot’s 2nd Infantry Division, Pégot’s relatively fresh brigade from Durutte’s 4th Infantry Division and a company of the 2/1st Engineers to assault La Haye Sainte. Artillery now opened fire upon the ridge above the farm to cover the assault and cavalry moved forward to protect the infantry against potential counter-attack.
COLONEL BARON VON OMPTEDA
Ompteda was born in Hanover in 1765 and previously served in the Hanoverian Guards before transferring to the British Army and taking a commission with the King’s German Legion in 1807. He suffered a mental breakdown in 1811 and briefly convalesced in Germany before recovering and returning to fight under Wellington’s command in the Peninsula the following year.
Ordered to recapture La Haye Sainte, he objected vociferously but was denied the option of advancing in square or in a line four-men deep to protect his men against the counter-attack by French cavalry that he believed was inevitable. Realizing that he stood little chance of success and fearing the worst, Ompteda asked Lieutenant Colonel Baron von Linsingen of the 5th Line to look after his two young nephews (who served under him as junior officers). Linsingen had his horse shot from under him and struggled to extricate himself during the melee but survived and managed to keep his word. However, the 5th Battalion lost around a third of their strength.
Ompteda led his men forward on horseback and when the cuirassiers rode into his battalions plainly saw that all was lost. He rode forward alone, jumping the garden hedge and charging into the midst of the French infantry there. Captain Berger reported seeing French officers shouting at their men to spare him and striking up the barrels of muskets levelled at him: ‘the nearest French officer looked on in admiration without attempting to check the attack’. Yet, this gallant officer refused to surrender, striking down at the men ringing him in with his sword, and eventually received a shot through the throat that killed him instantly.
LA HAYE SAINTE FALLS – 5.00PM–6.30PM
The infantry assault recommenced with renewed fury as Durutte’s men tried to force their way into the buildings. Hearing the Germans within crying out desperately for more cartridges to each other and realizing that their volume of fire had diminished, they pressed forward with increasing boldness right up to the walls. The barn was set alight once more and Graeme recalled that: ‘Lieutenant Carey, in spite of the enemy’s fire, went out, and with his men, poured water on the flames.’
Tirailleurs clambered onto the walls and the roofs of the barn and stables to fire down on the men below, most of whom were unable to shoot back (having run out of ammunition) and were shot or forced under cover. The French now stormed all the gates and doors simultaneously trying to smash their way in and, surrounded on three sides, the farm seemed about to be swamped by a great wave of attackers. Lieutenant Vieux of the engineers: ‘struck with heavy blows of the axe upon the gate. He received one ball in the wrist and another in the shoulder. The axe was passed from hand to hand, the gate finally yielded, and the wave inundated the court.’
During this combined assault, the west yard door was broken down and French infantry charged into the courtyard. They also mounted a bayonet charge and rushed through the open gateway of the great barn, overwhelming the men defending it. As the French entered the courtyard from two directions, French voltigeurs also struggled over the courtyard walls and a vicious fight developed as the two sides crossed bayonets. Standing on the piggery as men below him scaled the wall, Lindau ran a soldier through with his sword bayonet, bending it during his struggle to withdraw it as it became trapped in the unfortunate man’s chest. Forced back as more men clambered over the wall, he witnessed:
At the entry to the farmhouse I saw my captain fighting hand to hand with the French. One of them was about to shoot Ensign Frank but Captain Graeme stabbed him with a sword through his body, another he struck in the face. I wanted to rush to help, but then I found myself suddenly surrounded by the French. Now I used the butt of my rifle and hit out in all directions around me …
A photograph of La Haye Sainte today from its south-east corner.
With his defences breached in several places, Baring felt compelled to abandon La Haye Sainte and later lamented that: ‘Inexpressibly painful as the decision was of giving up the place, my feeling of duty as a man overcame that of honour, and I gave the order to retire through the house into the garden.’
Having mounted three costly assaults, the French infantry were enraged after losing so many comrades. The passageways in the farm were very narrow and many German soldiers were overtaken by their pursuers as they fled through them: ‘who vented their fury upon them in the lowest abuse, and the most brutal treatment’. The cry went up to give no quarter to ‘les coquins verde!’ (‘the rascals in green’) and many were mercilessly shot at point-blank range, bayoneted or clubbed to death with musket butts as the French hunted them down.
Towards the end of the furious melee in the courtyard, Lindau was among a group of riflemen taken prisoner and recalled that they received rough treatment from their captors. As they were marched back towards the French ridge, most were searched and had their valuables stripped from them. Those who failed to move quickly enough for their guards were beaten or even killed.
Since farm buildings now in French hands closely overlooked it, Baring swiftly realized that defending the garden was untenable. He ordered his men to retire one at a time back towards the ridge and was amazed that the enemy declined to fire upon them as they did so. The major told the men from other regiments to seek out their own brigades and formed the remnant of his 2nd Battalion upon two companies of Lieutenant Colonel Lewis von dem Bussche’s Battalion. Only 42 men out of the nearly 400-strong garrison remained with him. After hours of desperate fighting, the farmhouse had fallen to the French at around 6.30pm.
DISASTROUS COUNTER-ATTACK
The fall of La Haye Sainte was a blow to the Allies and, being in French hands, it posed a grave threat to Wellington’s central positions. General von Alten (who commanded the 3rd Division) ordered Colonel Ompteda to counter-attack and attempt to retake the farm. Ompteda objected to this, pointing out that the buildings were held in considerable strength and at least two regiments of enemy cavalry covered the infantry assault and remained to the south-west of the farm. Alten repeated the order but the Prince of Orange then rode up and entered the discussion. Accounts vary but many believe that the Prince mistook the cavalry for Dutch troops and promptly endorsed Alten’s instructions, insisting: ‘I will hear no further arguments.’ Ompteda considered this foolhardy but felt obliged to obey, declaring angrily: ‘Then I will!’ and rode away to organize the attack, which took place at around 6.45pm.
Ompteda led the 5th KGL Line Battalion down from the ridge, driving in the enemy skirmishers before them who had advanced up the slope to snipe at the infantry formations on the ridge. French infantry were deployed in and before the garden and began to fire upon them as they approached. The Germans charged but two regiments of French cuirassiers, having observed their advance, immediately counter-attacked just as Ompteda had predicted.
Lieutenant Kincaid of the 95th Foot watched the slaughter from the crest and bluntly recorded that: ‘the cuirassiers broke in among them, and so complete was the surprise that they were annihilated almost without firing a shot’. Assailed from the flank and rear while they were charging, the 5th Battalion suffered horrific casualties as the cavalry wrought a terrible revenge for the losses they had endured that day. One of their colours was captured and Ompteda fell in the desperate melee that ensued. The effective loss of a battalion left a gap in the Anglo-Allied line that Wellington struggled to fill as repeated attacks had thinned their numbers considerably.
As the farm complex and its garden were firmly occupied by the French, they were able to make a determined attack across the road on the gravel pit. This forced the 95th to fall back from their position for a while. The French also sent skirmishers directly to the north of the farm, who advanced up the ridge. Although the battalions there sent out their own skirmishers to oppose them, the French dispatched voltigeurs in considerable numbers and soon forced them back, allowing them to fire upon the main battalions deployed on the reverse slope. Ney also ordered guns forward and a battery of horse artillery unlimbered three cannon very close to the farm. Beginning to fire upon the crossroads and Wellington’s centre from a distance of around 218yd (200m) these guns soon inflicted grievous losses.
A PYRRHIC VICTORY
Captain James Shaw-Kennedy (who served as Alten’s Assistant Quarter Master General) believed that Wellington’s greatest mistake at Waterloo: ‘was his overlooking the vast importance of retaining possession, at any cost, of the farm and enclosures of La Haye Sainte’. He added that the Duke admitted as much to Lord Ellesmere some time afterwards and its loss was certainly a considerable blow to him. Shaw-Kennedy also believed that Napoleon recognized the farm’s importance from the outset having: ‘from the first seen the vast importance of his possessing himself of this part of Wellington’s field of battle, as is proved by his massing so very large a force immediately opposite to it, and by his establishing a battery of 74 guns to bear upon it’.
While there is much truth to this, it has never been satisfactorily explained why the Grande Batterie failed to train guns against the farm walls and buildings. The slight rise and orchard before the farm obstructed their view and prevented direct fire but, since the orchard has been felled, it is now impossible to assess its effect with any accuracy. Notwithstanding, guns could have been brought closer on either side to support the assaults or batter down walls or gates. Although the French may have wished to seize the structure intact, Napoleon knew that he was running out of time and artillery fire would certainly have hastened its fall. Perhaps these failures go some way to explaining that, while there are many British and German accounts of the defence, there are no memoirs from any French participants of the assaults on La Haye Sainte. Considering the fame of the action and the fact that it prepared the ground for the even more famous attack of the Imperial Guard, this omission is mystifying.
La Haye Sainte after the battle.
There are many theories about the Allied failure to resupply La Haye Sainte’s garrison with ammunition. Historian Christopher Summerville makes the point that Baring should have ensured that he had a surplus before the battle began. As he had occupied the farm on the night of 17 June and had most of the morning to prepare, he certainly had time to do so. Some believe that the wrong kind of ammunition was sent, being the 0.760in calibre intended for use in muskets rather than the 0.615in ball used by the Baker Rifle. Yet, William Siborne came up with the most plausible explanation that the cart containing the bulk of the 2nd Light Battalion’s ammunition overturned in a ditch during the retreat from Quatre Bras and that rifle ammunition was consequently in very short supply.
The physical difficulties of resupplying the farm, while under heavy fire, also bear consideration. Its main entrances lie towards the southern end of La Haye Sainte and gaining access during the repeated harassment of the garrison was difficult if not impossible. Dragging a cart over a planted field and through the hedged kitchen garden presented difficulties and the door on the northern side was narrow. Wellington later recalled discussing the possibility of making large holes in this side of the farm, enabling ammunition to be passed through to its defenders by hand but left the execution of this task to subordinates. Admittedly, with his entire line under great strain at this time he had other concerns, adding: ‘it was impossible for me to think of everything’.
The garrison, however, did manage to hold out for many hours against fearsome odds. Their numbers never exceeded much more than 800 men, including the reinforcements dispatched to them. In contrast, the French committed some 7,000 men, drawn from 13 battalions, during their attempts to seize the farmhouse. With a 765yd (700m) perimeter, it is likely that only about 2,000 men were able to storm the complex at any one time during the 3 main assaults but Baring’s men still faced odds of at least 4 : 1. The accepted military formula for an attacker to stand a good chance of taking a well-defended position is 3 : 1. These figures provide ample testimony to the heroic endurance and tenacity of the German troops.
After the battle, when men returned to their colours and casualty figures were drawn up, the 2nd Light Battalion of the King’s German Legion recorded the loss of 202 men. While perhaps not as drastic as the forty-two men left under Baring’s command after the loss of the farm implies, this still represented over 50 per cent losses. Around 400 reinforcements also entered the farm itself and only 200 to 250 of them returned to their regiments. Nevertheless, according to Mark Adkin’s figures, the farm absorbed the attention of around 7,000 French soldiers at various stages in the battle. As French casualty figures for the 1815 campaign are incomplete, their losses can only be estimated. However, considering the defensive advantages that this well-built farm enjoyed, the French probably lost at least double the number of the casualties sustained by its garrison during a series of attacks over a 5-hour period.
Historian David Chandler cited 6.00pm as the moment when Wellington’s line came under the greatest strain during the battle. Ney now made up for his previous mistakes by mounting a determined assault with combined arms that had brought results. With the farm in French hands, d’Erlon’s I Corps advanced again and began to engage the Anglo-Allied line on their left, though it was not the force it had been before. Yet the troops on Wellington’s left flank had suffered too with their numbers thinned considerably by incessant cannonades during the day. However, Ney knew he lacked sufficent troops to break through and sent a dispatch to Napoleon, suggesting that he attack immediately to exploit his gains.
The Emperor watched from the ridge and witnesses reported him pacing up and down, hands clasped behind his back with his head inclined downwards. Severe fighting had broken out in Placenoit as the Prussians contested possession of the village with his Young Guard and he needed to relieve some of this pressure on his right flank before he could move against Wellington. When Colonel Heymes rode up with Ney’s desperate plea for reinforcement, Napoleon glowered at him, retorting sarcastically: ‘Troops? Where do you expect me to get them from? Do you expect me to make some?’
Napoleon has received great criticism for failing to attack at this point and, in truth, the weakened Anglo-Allied centre may well have shattered if he had done so with sufficient force. Yet any forward manoeuvre he made would be compromised as an attacking force would have its right flank exposed to a potential Prussian attack. Napoleon knew that he must secure his right flank before committing more troops to taking Wellington’s centre and was correct to delay until he was sure it would hold. While he waited for his Imperial Guard to do this, another opportunity for the French gradually slipped away.
Viewpoints
LA HAYE SAINTE FARMHOUSE AND ITS MEMORIALS (LOCATION MAP REFERENCE 5)
The name of La Haye Sainte (also spelt La Haie Sainte) translates as ‘The Sacred Hedge’ in English and it is grimly ironic that such carnage occurred at a place with such an innocuous sounding name. The farm rests in a hollow just at the foot of the ridge and this feature, along with the hedged orchard that used to lie before it, probably spared the farm from a ruinous cannonade that could have rendered further defence untenable. The farm suffered relatively little structural damage during the battle. The great barn’s roof was set alight but its walls did not suffer irreparable harm and, although a similar calamity followed in 1936 due to an accidental fire, its walls remain much as they appeared in 1815.
This orchard to the south was felled years ago but some new trees have been planted next to the farm where it once stood. In 1815, a pond lay to the left of the main gate inside the courtyard but subsequent farmers thought it obstructed access to the courtyard and filled it in. Most accounts suggest that it was a fairly deep pool and its position could not have been better when the barn was set alight and the garrison drew water from it to quench the flames. Without this water, La Haye Sainte may have fallen to the French assault far sooner.
The kitchen garden is walled on its eastern side with hedges to the north and west that follow similar boundaries to those that existed during the nineteenth century. During the intervening years, one farmer broke down the south-east corner of the courtyard wall (next to the main gate) to allow greater vehicular access to the courtyard. This has since been rebuilt, probably due to the inconvenient numbers of battlefield tourists crossing the highway and entering the courtyard, but this also had the effect of restoring the farm’s frontage to its former appearance. Outbuildings such as the piggery still exist and La Haye Sainte still looks very similar to how it appeared in 1815.
The gravel pit where three companies of the 95th were stationed used to lie about 54yd (50m) north of the farm on the other side of the highway. The pit has been filled in and the area is lined with trees, providing visitors with a quiet space where they can view the monuments around Wellington’s crossroads. The riflemen posted in this area would have had a good view of the French columns as they began to climb the ridge and it was a natural defensive position. Furthermore, they had a clear view down the highway and the main gate where so much fighting took place was well within range of their Baker Rifles. In addition to the garrison’s fire, riflemen here were able to inflict considerable losses on French infantry advancing along the road and probably levelled a lethal fire against those trying to break in through the gate.
The famous gate of La Haye Sainte, which was the scene of vicious fighting as the French fought to gain entry to the courtyard.
The main gateway has not changed much since 1815, and enthusiasts will probably recognize it and the general frontage of the farmstead from the many famous battlefield paintings that usually show La Haye Sainte from this angle. It still has a roofed dovecote above the gateway and high double doors, which are now seldom used. This is because the current farmer has created a more convenient access route to his property by constructing a dirt lane running down the ridge behind the farm from the Route du Lion. The farmer also knows that many tourists are incapable of resisting the temptation to enter the courtyard if he leaves this gate open. Although it is acceptable to cross the road and view the plaques set into the walls, it is unwise to trespass over the land at the side of the farm and the buildings are all private and closed to the public.
The main farmhouse has mullioned windows and dates back to the late eighteenth century. It is easy to see why Wellington decided to protect this area by giving the farm a strong garrison. In Cotton’s original guidebook of the battlefield, he referred to how strong the buildings were, being constructed of both brick and stone, which is still the case today. Yet he also recalled the limitations placed upon the garrison for strengthening its defences, writing: ‘A dozen loop-holes in the west or Lion side of the buildings would have added considerably to the strength of the post. Loop-holes were made in the south and east walls as well as in the roofs …’.
Today La Haye Sainte is whitewashed, just as it was two centuries ago but its frontage is often marred by the mud and exhaust fumes from the busy Brussels–Genappe highway that runs immediately in front of it. Nevertheless, a good number of Waterloo enthusiasts will wish to take numerous photographs of this acclaimed farmhouse, which has been depicted many times in paintings, wargaming models and film. Great care must be taken when crossing this thoroughfare but the local authorities have ensured that there is a pedestrian crossing point nearby and the pavements are relatively wide. It is inadvisable to park nearby, though, and visitors with cars will find it preferable to park in the Lion Village or near the crossroads and walk down to the farm.
Crossing the road, visitors will see a number of monuments set onto the eastern walls of La Haye Sainte. Originally, Prince George of Hanover, along with a group of Anglo-Hanoverian veterans, set a marble plaque here in 1822 to commemorate their compatriots’ valiant defence. This was replaced by a diamond-shaped, iron plaque in 1847, although the text remains the same. It is placed on the wall of the farmhouse itself and is written in German, which translates as:
The Officers of the 2nd Light Battalion King’s German Legion to their comrades-in-arms who fell in the defence of this farmhouse on the 18 June 1815: Major H. Boswiel/Captain W. Schaumann/Ensign F von Robertson and 46 NCOsand Riflemen of the 2nd Light Battalion/Raised again by his Royal Highness Crown Prince George of Hanover on 18th June 1847 dedicated at the same time to those who also fell: Captain H von Marschalk from the 1st Light Battalion/Captain von Wurme from the 5th Line Battalion/In recognition of the Hanoverian heroism they showed.
In 1998, a further memorial was dedicated to the King’s German Legion, which includes a tribute to Colonel Ompteda’s valiant but doomed counter-attack. This was placed on the kitchen-garden wall next to the road and reads: ‘To Major Baring and the 2nd Light Btn KGL’s heroic defence of La Haie Sainte 18 June 1815/Also to Col. von Ompteda who fell leading a brave counter-attack after the fall of the farm. Dedicated by Bexhill-on-Sea England/A King’s German Legion Garrison 1804–14’. The English inscription is repeated underneath in German.
The English village, then known simply as Bexhill, was home to the KGL between 1804 and 1814. The regiment was well behaved and popular among the locals who benefited from the trade they brought them. The Legion was disbanded in Osnabrück in 1816, whereupon its association with England ended but the Bexhill Hanoverian Study Group (formed in 1989) were instrumental in dedicating this monument to their former guests, who have never been forgotten.
Two French monuments are set into the wall on the right of the gate and dovecote. The left-hand plaque reads:
18 June 1815. Towards 6.30pm the farm of La Haie Sainte was captured by Marshal Ney after heroic assaults by engineers of the 2nd Company, 2nd Battalion of the 1st Engineer Regiment under Colonel Lamore, and the 2/13 Light Infantry Regiment of Donzelot’s division.
One of the French memorials placed upon La Haye Sainte commemorating the French infantry and engineers who assaulted the farm on Ney’s orders.
To the right of this is another, smaller plaque, which simply states: ‘To the memory of the French soldiers who gave their lives heroically before these walls of La Haie Sainte, 18 June 1815’. All of the plaques on the farm walls can be safely viewed and photographed from the pavement and it is humbling to think how many men gave their lives trying to take or defend this farm that, by an accident of history, became a focal point of Europe’s most famous battle.
Another memorial stands in the modern picnic area across the road from La Haye Sainte’s garden commemorating the action fought by the 8th Ligne Regiment who, along with the 29th Ligne, were deployed by Ney during his attempts to follow up and exploit his gains after the fall of La Haye Sainte. They clashed with Ompteda’s Brigade and the French-language plaque reads: ‘Near this place on 18 June 1815 the 8th Infantry Regiment from Durutte’s divison successfully attacked the German Legion under Colonel von Ompteda’.
MEMORIAL TO THE 27TH (INNISKILLING) REGIMENT
The memorial to the 27th Regiment of Foot is situated on the Rue de la Croix near the junction between the Chemin d’Ohain and the Brussels–Charleroi highway (N5). The 27th was held in reserve until about 3.00pm and saw serious action when La Haye Sainte fell to the enemy. They deployed in square very near the crossroads, not to repel cavalry, but to enable them to fire both forward and to their left onto the highway as infantry from both directions closely assailed them. Unfortunately, this made them a prime target for both skirmishers and artillery and they suffered great losses accordingly, as this plaque recalls:
In memory of the heroic stand by the 27th (Inniskilling) Regiment of Foot at the Battle of Waterloo on 18th June 1815 when, of the 747 officers and men of the Regiment who joined the battle 493 were killed or wounded. A noble record of stubborn endurance. Of them the Duke of Wellington said, ‘Ah, they saved the centre of my line’ erected by their successors the Royal Irish Rangers (27th (Inniskillings) 83rd, 87th) 18 June 1990.
The stone recording the stand of the British 27th (Inninskilling) Regiment of Foot who endured terrible losses defending this area.
It is rare for a military unit to sustain such casualties (66 per cent losses) without breaking. The 27th was also the only battalion entering combat here under the command of a captain (John Hare) who held a brevet rank of major. Sixteen of its nineteen officers became casualties and some companies fell under the command of sergeants by the end of that terrible day.
MEMORIAL TO THE BELGIANS (LOCATION MAP REFERENCE 2)
This monument is located at the north-east angle of the crossroads and commemorates the sacrifices made by Belgian troops on 18 June 1815. An estimated 4,200 Belgian troops were present at Waterloo under 4 generals. They suffered 1,200 casualties with General van Merlen slain that day and General Collaert subsequently dying of his wounds.
Planning for this monument began in 1911 and the Centenary Committee, which commissioned the architect Callewaerts to create it, intended to present the memorial to the public on 18 June 1915. The outbreak of the First World War disrupted this plan and the opening was brought forward to 13 September 1914, with many dignitaries attending the ceremony. The monument takes the form of a bluestone obelisk that carries a bronze image of a battle-torn standard with a Belgian coat of arms surrounded by laurels. The inscription is in French and Dutch and translates: ‘To the Belgians who died on XVIII June MDCCCXV while fighting for the defence of the flag and the honour of arms.’ Railings surround the memorial, some headed with representations of various weapons such as sabres, javelins, arrows, axes and maces.
THE HANOVERIAN MEMORIAL (LOCATION MAP REFERENCE 3)
The Hanoverian Memorial stands roughly opposite the Gordon Memorial in the crossroads area above La Haye Sainte. It is a large stone obelisk and is one of the earliest monuments raised to commemorate the Battle of Waterloo, being built in 1818. Officers who survived the battle, along with contributions from their regiments, paid for this memorial. Many soldiers from the German states served in the British Army, which was partly due to King George III reigning as the monarch of Hanover until Napoleon annexed that state in 1803. Hanover came under the dominion of the British Crown once again in 1814 and remained as such until Queen Victoria’s time.
The obelisk commemorating the Hanoverian soldiers who fell at Waterloo. It stands to the south of the crossroads opposite the Gordon Memorial.
The memorial has inscriptions on all four of its sides and forty-two Anglo-German officers are buried in the immediate vicinity. It is said to be placed over or near the site of an enormous mass grave containing as many as 4,000 men from both sides killed in this area along with several hundred horses slain in the battle. The names of officers killed who belonged to the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th and 8th Line Battalions in the King’s German Legion are listed on two sides of the monument but pride of place is allotted to Colonel Christian Baron Ompteda of the 5th Line Battalion and Colonel Charles du Plat of the 4th Line Battalion. The majority of these men fell during the attempts to support or retake La Haye Sainte, although many were undoubtedly killed defending the main line on the Allied centre right. It is a sobering thought that so many men are buried here having died in such a confined area.