CHAPTER 3

“… and I will show you where the Iron Crosses grow….”

Feldwebel Rolf Steiner, The Cross of Iron (1977)

When Manstein arrived at Nikolayev on September 17 to take command of the 11. Armee (AOK 11), he found that the bulk of his forces were advancing toward Melitopol while Hansen’s LIV Armeekorps had moved its 46. and 73. Infanterie-Divisionen up near Perekop but had taken no action to reduce the Soviet defenses. XXX Armeekorps had sealed off the Chongar Peninsula and Arabat Spit with the LSSAH Division, but also had made no effort to penetrate into the Crimea. Schobert’s death had given Kuznetsov a vital breathing space in which to enhance his defenses. The difficulty of moving supplies across the Dnepr, with all bridges down, also made it difficult for the 11. Armee to mount a hasty assault at Perekop, since LIV Armeekorps was short of fuel and artillery ammunition.

Danilin’s 156th Rifle Division built three lines of defense across the Perekop Isthmus, with the main line of resistance centered upon the Tatar Wall. The outer line of defense consisted of two rifle battalions deployed in forward strongpoints, each supported by an artillery battalion. Colonel Vladimir P. Shurygin, the 51st Army’s senior engineer, used civilian labor to dig a 6ft-deep antitank ditch behind this outer covering force, and emplace four lines of tanglefoot-type barbed-wire obstacles. Shurygin’s engineers built concrete and timber/stone bunkers for 76mm cannon and 45mm antitank guns in the main line of resistance, as well as digging in several tanks. The Tatar Wall itself was fronted by the ancient moat, which was now 36ft deep and 104ft wide; the wall sat atop a 15ft-high earth berm. The area was completely open, without trees or vegetation, and the Soviets could observe every move that the Germans made. However, the most frightening aspect of the Perekop defenses for the Germans was the extensive use of antipersonnel mines; up to this point in the war the Wehrmacht had not yet had to penetrate a defense of this kind. Not only did Shurygin’s engineers emplace thousands of PMD wooden antipersonnel mines, but they buried 50kg aerial bombs and even large naval mines from the depots at Sevastopol. Another innovation was the use of buried flamethrowers with trip wires. Indeed, Kuznetsov got a bit carried away in sending materiel to reinforce the Perekop defenses, including some mines filled with mustard gas; when the Stavka learned of this, Kuznetsov was rebuked and told not to employ chemical weapons without permission.¹

Luftwaffe aerial reconnaissance was able to detect much of the Soviet defensive preparations at Perekop, which were unsettling for Manstein. He hoped to avoid a costly frontal assault, and set the 11. Armee’s engineers to finding a method for bypassing the Perekop defenses, just like his Sichelschnitt plan had bypassed the French Maginot Line in 1940. Leutnant Nübling from Gebirgs-Pionier-Regiment 620 conducted an extensive reconnaissance and survey of the Sivash, hoping to find a route across as the Red Army had done in 1920. However, tidal conditions at this time were unsatisfactory; the water at the narrower western end of the Sivash was less than a yard deep, but the bottom was too soft and German scouts sank in to their hips. Manstein asked if assault boats from the 902 Sturmboote-Kommando could be used to cross the Sivash, but Leutnant Nübling found that the water conditions were unfavorable.² Furthermore, Kuznetsov expected the Germans to try and cross the Sivash and directed Danilin to put two rifle battalions from his 530th Rifle Regiment on the Litovsky Peninsula where the Red Army had crossed in 1920. Nor did the route across the Chongar Peninsula look promising, since the Soviets had blown up the main railroad bridge and emplaced obstacles in the water.

Thus, Manstein was forced to conduct a frontal attack at Perekop. He knew that in order to break a fortified line, particularly in a place where any form of maneuver or surprise was impossible, it would be imperative to add every combat multiplier possible to give the assault a reasonable chance for success. His only armor support came from the assault guns from Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 190.³ Since Barbarossa had envisioned maneuver warfare, not positional battles or sieges, the 11. Armee had limited artillery and engineer assets, so Manstein would have to rob from Peter to pay Paul. He decided to accept the risk with XXX Armeekorps, involved in the pursuit to Melitopol, and transfer as much of its combat resources as possible to Hansen. Manstein provided Hansen with four additional heavy-artillery battalions (schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 737 with three Czech-made 14.9cm howitzers; schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 641 with four Czech-made 30.5cm mortars; I./AR 814 with two Czech-made 24cm howitzers, four 10cm s.K 18, and three 15cm s.FH 18; and the Romanian 54th Heavy Artillery Battalion with 12 Skoda 15cm howitzers), plus a Nebelwerfer battery. He stripped XXX Armeekorps of its corps-level artillery, transferring II./AR54 and IV./AR207 to Hansen. When added to his two divisional artillery regiments, Hansen’s artillery park totaled about 152 pieces. When Manstein first took command, LIV Armeekorps was short of artillery ammunition, but by September 23 Hansen had received enough medium-caliber ammunition to mount a attack. However, the heavy-artillery ammunition was very limited, with only 100 rounds of 24cm and 133 of 30.5cm for each assault division.⁴ Hansen also received 2,575 replacements just five days before the attack at Perekop, bringing his two infantry divisions back up to strength. The offensive was set for September 24, and Manstein kept part of the LSSAH Division in reserve to exploit the expected breakthrough.

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Generalleutnant Johannes Zuckertort, who was a so-called Mischling (halfbreed) of Jewish descent, had to receive a German blood certificate signed personally by Adolf Hitler in order to remain in the Wehrmacht. His younger brother Karl, also a general, had commanded Panzer-Regiment 5 prior to the war but had been expelled from the Wehrmacht in July 1941 (probably for anti-regime attitudes). Thus, Johannes had a strong incentive to toe the Nazi line if he wanted to remain in the Wehrmacht. Now he was responsible for planning the artillery support for Hansen’s assault on the Perekop position. Zuckertort directed that HArko 110 (Army-level Artillery Command) would control the light artillery, while HArko 20 would direct the heavy artillery. The artillery preparation commenced at 0500hrs on September 24, with the divisional artillery firing over 2,500 rounds at the Soviet positions. Fliegerkorps IV was able to provide only limited air support to Hansen, but bombers from KG 27 and KG 51 bombed Soviet defenses around Perekop. The Soviet VVS and VVS-ChF were still quite active over the Crimea and neither side had air superiority.

At Y-Hour (0730hrs), assault groups from the 46. and 73. Infanterie-Divisionen moved up to attack Danilin’s outer defensive line. Generalmajor Kurt Himer’s 46. Infanterie-Division was a Welle 1 (1st wave) formation, consisting primarily of pre-war regulars, but Generalleutnant Bruno Bieler’s 73. Infanterie-Division was a Welle 2 formation, made up primarily of reservists. Each division attacked with four or five battalions, supported by pioneers, 2cm flak guns, Panzerjägers and a battery of StuG III assault guns. Oberstleutnant Otto Hitzfeld, commander of Infanterie-Regiment 213 led the 73. Infanterie-Division’s main effort against the Chervonyi Chaban State Farm strongpoint, held by Captain E. K. Ivashin’s 2nd Battalion/361st Rifle Regiment. The Soviet troops were well dug in behind a thick obstacle belt and were supported by plentiful artillery. The engineers from Pionier-Bataillon 173 supporting Hitzfeld’s infantry went first, creating a breach in the Soviet obstacle belt under fire, but suffering heavy losses in the process. Finally, a breach was secured and, under cover of smoke grenades, two battalions from Hitzfeld’s regiment closed in on the Soviet strongpoint. Intense close combat ensued, and flamethrowers and concentrated charges were used to eliminate Soviet bunkers. Ivashin’s battalion was gradually destroyed piece by piece, and the farm strongpoint was overrun after Ju-88s from KG 51 bombed it.⁵ However, Hitzfeld had lost four company commanders, and overall the 73. Infanterie-Division suffered 770 casualties on the first day of the offensive. In the eastern sector the 46. Infanterie-Division had a slightly easier time, but still suffered 329 casualties and made only modest progress. At the cost of over 1,100 casualties, Hansen had defeated Kuznetsov’s covering forces but had not yet reached the main line of resistance.

Manstein ordered the 22. Infanterie-Division and part of LSSAH to launch diversionary actions at Chongar and along the Sivash, but these failed to impress Kuznetsov. By the end of September 24, Kuznetsov knew that the Germans were making their main effort at Perekop, and he ordered the unengaged 106th Rifle Division to send its 442nd Rifle Regiment to replace Danilin’s losses.

At dawn on September 25, Hansen resumed his assault and continued to mop up Danilin’s forward security positions. The German Stossgruppen (assault groups) were mixed formations, built around an infantry battalion and supported by a pioneer platoon, a section of assault guns, and a platoon of 2cm flak guns. Soviet artillery fire was intense, and inflicted most of the German casualties in the flat terrain, although Soviet machine guns firing from earthen bunkers were difficult to suppress. As the German Stossgruppen approached the main line of resistance at the Tatar Wall, Danilin decided to mount a spoiling attack with his reserve: Infanterie-Regiment 530 and Major Semyon P. Baranov’s 5th Tank Regiment. However, Baranov sent in only his T-37 and T-40 light tanks, keeping his ten T-34s back, so the counterattack was repulsed by German Panzerjäger fire, which knocked out eight light tanks. German losses on the second day of the attack were only 322, but Danilin had lost about one-third of his infantry.

Hansen made his main assault against the Tatar Wall on the morning of September 26, beginning with a terrific artillery preparation that used up much of his remaining artillery ammunition, and dive-bombing attacks by Ju-87 Stukas from StG 77. Fighters from III./JG 77 also appeared in force over the Perekop Isthmus and claimed 27 kills on this day.⁶ Both of Hansen’s divisions were exhausted after two days of heavy close-quarter fighting, but so was Danilin’s 156th Rifle Division. The main strength of the Soviet line was built around the 3rd Battalion, 361st Rifle Regiment. Manstein provided SS pioneers and an artillery battalion from the LSSAH to reinforce the attack. Hitzfeld’s IR 213 committed the III./IR 213 and II./IR 170, plus some SS pioneers, to breach the Tatar Wall. Under cover of smoke and support weapons, assault squads reached the ditch around 0900hrs and used wooden boards to ascend the steep wall of the ditch and reach the top, which was covered with barbed wire and trenches. Inside their trenches, invisible from below, Soviet infantrymen hurled grenades into the ditch, inflicting heavy losses on the German pioneers. Soviet return fire was intense, but Gefreiter Willibald Unfried, a machine gunner in 9./IR 213, placed suppressive fire on the parapet, which kept the Soviet soldier’s heads down at the crucial moment. German combined-arms tactics, aggressive small-unit leadership, and the presence of skilled soldiers such as Unfried paid off, as assault squads managed to fight their way to the top. The 361st Rifle Regiment fought very well, but by 1030hrs their defense was collapsing. Then, west of Fort Perekop, it suddenly broke. Stossgruppen from both divisions surged forward, overrunning mortar and antitank positions. Incredibly, Hitzfeld’s troops fought their way into the town of Armyansk, south of the Tatar Wall, and engaged in tense house-to-house fighting against remnants of the 156th Rifle Division, dug in at a brick factory.

By 1100hrs, Danilin’s Division was broken and the Germans were across the Tatar Wall in force. Kuznetsov committed Operational Group Batov (the 383rd, 442nd, and 856th Rifle Regiments) under his deputy, General-Lieutenant Pavel I. Batov, to immediately counterattack and restore the main line of resistance. Batov’s infantry went in with virtually no artillery support, but they managed to force the 46. Infanterie-Division troops back to the Tatar Wall, and Hitzfeld’s men were ejected from Armyansk by 1400hrs. With the attack faltering, Hansen committed a Kampfgruppe from 50. Infanterie-Division, just arrived from Odessa. The Luftwaffe also arrived in force, tipping the balance to the Germans. With fresh infantry, the Germans surged forward and captured all of Armyansk by nightfall. The day ended with Kuznetsov’s troops still holding the eastern part of the Tatar Wall, but with their operational reserves spent and little infantry left south of Armyansk to stop Hansen from pushing on to the reserve positions at Ishun. The tactical victory of breaching the Tatar Wall had cost Hansen’s LIV Armeekorps over 600 casualties.

The Stavka was incensed that Kuznetsov had lost the Tatar Wall line so quickly, and ordered him to keep attacking. At dawn on September 27, Batov renewed his counterattack to push the Germans back to the Tatar Wall. Initially, Batov’s infantry retook most of Armyansk, and Hitzfeld’s troops retreated to a strongpoint at the brick factory in the northern part of the town. There he held on against Batov’s infantry attacks all day long. However, German pioneers from Pionier-Bataillon 173 began building a wooden 16-ton bridge across the western end of the Tatar Ditch, which enabled them to get some StuG III assault guns from Oberleutnant Reinhard Näther’s 3./Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 190 across. Soviet artillery fire caused great losses among the laboring pioneers, and Pionier-Bataillon 173 suffered 118 casualties in creating the crossing over the Tatar Ditch.⁷ A sharp German attack by a Kampfgruppe from 50. Infanterie-Division, supported by the assault guns and some Stukas from StG 77 retook most of Armyansk and pushed Batov’s depleted infantry back.

In one final fling, Batov attacked Armyansk again at dawn on September 28, and not only drove out Hitzfeld’s troops, but some of Major Baranov’s T-34 tanks even succeeded in reaching the Tatar Wall. Yet the victory was brief, and Batov’s last reserves were spent in the process. By 1835hrs, Kuznetsov reported to Moscow that he had no reserves left and his hold on Armyansk was tenuous. Less than three hours later, the Germans recaptured Armyansk and Kuznetsov pleaded for permission to withdraw to his reserve positions at Ishun, which were unoccupied. The Stavka was very displeased with Kuznetsov and believed – probably rightly so – that he had exercised poor use of his reserves and was unable to coordinate effective counterattacks. Yet the Stavka finally acceded and authorized Kuznetsov to withdraw to Ishun. Over the next few days, Major Baranov’s tankers fought a series of successful rearguard actions that prevented an effective pursuit, and all but one of his ten T-34s came through intact.

The battle of Perekop cost Hansen’s LIV Armeekorps a total of 2,641 casualties, and both of his two divisions were badly mauled after five days of see-saw combat. Hitzfeld’s IR 213 had suffered a total of 746 casualties, including two battalion commanders, eight company commanders, and 49 platoon leaders.⁸ German material losses were also quite heavy. The 73. Infanterie-Division lost 13 artillery pieces and 12 3.7cm Pak guns, along with a good deal of infantry equipment. However, it was the loss of trained combat leaders, particularly the death of five battalion commanders, that was so painful. On the other side of the ledger, the Germans claimed to have captured 10,019 troops from the 51st Army at Perekop, along with 32 tanks, 68 artillery pieces (incl. 7 150mm howitzers), 43 Pak guns, and 88 mortars – indicating that the 156th and 271st Rifle Divisions were almost totally destroyed.⁹ Nevertheless, it is clear that the battle of Perekop was a close-run thing and that the German margin of victory was very slim.

Hansen might have made short work of the Ishun position if the Soviet Southern Front had not recovered and launched a painful counterattack against the Romanians west of Melitopol. In order to feed the fight at Perekop, Manstein had stripped XXX Armeekorps of many of its best resources and pushed Romanian units into the front line, which the Soviets decided to exploit. Just as the Tatar Wall was breached, Manstein was compelled to send the LSSAH, all of Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 190, and much of his Fliegerkorps IV air support to deal with the crisis near Melitopol. The resulting battle of the Sea of Azov lasted more than a week, resulting in the encirclement and destruction of the Soviet 9th and 18th Armies, but the 51st Army received a vital reprieve.

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After Hansen’s breakthrough at Perekop, Kuznetsov and Oktyabrsky reported to Moscow that they would have difficulty holding the Crimea without reinforcements and recommended evacuating Odessa, transferring the Independent Coastal Army by sea to reinforce the 51st Army in the Crimea. Reluctantly, the Stavka agreed to this recommendation on September 29, 1941, and four days later the 157th Rifle Division began moving from Odessa to Sevastopol, escorted by the Black Sea Fleet.¹⁰ Distracted by the fighting around Melitopol, Fliegerkorps IV made no effort to interfere with the evacuation of Odessa. Quietly, the Black Sea Fleet picked up the pace in the second week of October, and it was not until the final convoy began loading at Odessa on October 14 that the Luftwaffe took an interest in the Soviet operation. Yet of the 11 Soviet transports, loaded with thousands of troops, the Luftwaffe managed to sink only one small transport and damage another. The bulk of the Independent Coastal Army was delivered virtually intact to Sevastopol – this was perhaps the Black Sea Fleet’s finest moment in World War II.

Kuznetsov would need all the soldiers he could get to hold the position at Ishun. Although the 51st Army still had about 50,000 troops in the Crimea, he had to leave one rifle division to guard the Chongar Peninsula and other troops to watch possible crossing sites across the Sivash, leaving barely 15,000–20,000 troops to form a line at Ishun. Furthermore, many of his remaining troops were militiamen, and the cream of Batov’s 9th Rifle Corps had been eliminated in the fighting for Perekop. Oktyabrsky sent Kuznetsov two battalions of naval infantrymen from Sevastopol to reinforce the Ishun position, and the 157th Rifle Division that was the first to arrive from Odessa was en route, but Kuznetsov was short of artillery as well. The Stavka did send aerial reinforcements to the Crimea, including a squadron of the latest Yak-1 fighters for the 32nd Fighter Regiment (32 IAP) of the VVS-ChF, leading to several sharp encounters with the Bf-109s of III./JG 77.

German scouts arrived near Ishun, following in the footsteps of Kuznetsov’s retreating army; they found it to be nearly as formidable as the Perekop position. Ishun was a small town at the southern base of the Perekop Peninsula, flanked by three large salt lakes and the Black Sea. Only three mobility corridors existed between these obstacles, and the widest, between the Black Sea and Lake Staroe, where the rail line ran, was only 1,400 yards wide. The terrain was completely devoid of cover and was marshy, making movement of assault guns or other heavy weapons very difficult. Kuznetsov deployed his steadiest units, the 361st Rifle Regiment, a rifle battalion from the 172nd Rifle Division, and the two naval infantry battalions to guard this critical sector. He put the rest of the veteran 156th Rifle Division in the other potential avenue of advance between Lake Staroe and Lake Krasnoe, with a strongpoint built in a bromide factory. In order to cover his right flank, Kuznetsov deployed his 106th and 271st Rifle Divisions between Lake Krasnoe and the Sivash, even though it was a less likely avenue of approach. Indeed, throughout the fighting on the Perekop Isthmus, Kuznetsov consistently put too many forces to cover his flank on the Sivash even though Manstein had found this option impractical – the memory of the 1920 campaign now created a fear in the Red Army of being flanked. In terms of support weapons, Major Baranov still had nine T-34 tanks operational in the 5th Tank Regiment, but Kuznetsov’s artillery park was much reduced and limited to mostly older 76mm howitzers. Several improvised armored trains were being hastily assembled in Sevastopol’s workshops and the Voykovets would soon be joined by the Smyert’ fashizmu (Death to Fascism), which would provide Kuznetsov with some useful mobile firepower.

Meanwhile, following victory in the battle of the Sea of Azov, Manstein had convinced the OKH that the 11. Armee could not accomplish two divergent operational objectives, and it was decided that AOK 11 would concentrate exclusively on the Crimea, while Generaloberst Ewald von Kleist’s Panzergruppe 1 continued the drive on Rostov. Unfortunately, the OKH also decided to strip AOK 11 of XXXXIX Gebirgs-Armeekorps along with the LSSAH Division, leaving Manstein with just six infantry divisions in XXX and LIV Armeekorps to conquer the Crimea. Hansen’s battered LIV Armeekorps had followed rather than pursued Kuznetsov’s 51st Army to Ishun, but was in no shape to mount a serious attack until the rest of the 11. Armee began arriving in mid-October.

Since tactical surprise and maneuver were impossible in this restrictive terrain, Manstein decided to surprise Kuznetsov by attacking all three avenues of approach simultaneously. However, he would begin his main effort in the east with Generalmajor Ludwig Wolff’s relatively fresh 22. Infanterie-Division, then shift his main effort to the west with Bieler’s 73. Infanterie-Division. Himer’s 46. Infanterie-Division would conduct fixing attacks in the center, to prevent Kuznetsov from shifting forces between his flanks. Zuckertort was once again in charge of the artillery preparation, but had scarcely more heavy artillery pieces or ammunition than he had at Perekop. Indeed, AOK 11’s artillery park was grossly inadequate for a deliberate attack against a fortified position such as this, forcing Manstein to depend even more heavily upon the Luftwaffe to make up the difference. In addition to more Ju-87 Stukas from StG 77, II./JG 3 and III./JG 52 were shifted to Chaplinka airfield to give Fliegerkorps IV a total of three Bf-109 Gruppen over the Perekop Isthmus. Oberst Werner Mölders, the Luftwaffe’s top-scoring pilot at this point of the war, arrived at Chaplinka to direct air operations over the Perekop. The other three divisions of the AOK 11, the 50., 72., and 170. Infanterie-Division, provided their divisional artillery and pioneer battalions to support the LIV Armeekorps attack, but otherwise were kept in reserve to exploit any breakthrough. Manstein’s only armor support was Major Hans Vogt’s Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 190, with about 20 StuG-IIIs, which had been returned after the Soviet defeat at Melitopol. Each of the three assault divisions in LIV Armeekorps were assigned one of Vogt’s assault-gun batteries.

At 0600hrs on October 18, Zuckertort commenced his artillery preparation. His main trump cards were a few batteries of 24cm howitzers and 30.5cm mortars, which he used to pulverize the obvious Soviet strongpoints. He directed the divisional 10.5cm and 15cm howitzers against the enemy barbed-wire obstacles and forward trenches. However, Zuckertort had no accurate long-range guns for counterbattery fire, and he had a tendency to fire small numbers of rounds at a great many targets, failing to achieve sufficient concentration to significantly disrupt the defense. After two hours of pounding away at the Soviet fieldworks and obstacle belt, Hansen’s three divisions sent their Stossgruppen forward. The biggest surprise came on the eastern flank by the Sivash, where Oberst Ernst Haccius led two battalions of his IR 65 across 490 yards of shallow water and caught the 442nd Rifle Regiment by surprise; Haccius lost a battalion commander killed and three company commanders wounded, but his regiment completely tore apart Kuznetsov’s right flank.

However, Wolff’s other regiment, Oberstleutnant Albert R. Latz’s IR 47, conducted a frontal assault across open ground against the 397th Rifle Regiment atop the Tumulus Assis burial mound. This small rise proved key terrain and Latz’s two assault battalions had to conduct a World War I-style infantry assault with predictable results. The German infantry was hopelessly channeled down a narrow mile-wide flat isthmus, with marshy lakes on both flanks. The soldiers advanced in loose formations, followed by pioneer platoons. A battery of Nebelwerfer rocket launchers laid down a smoke barrage in front of the Germans, but the Soviet machine gunners simply fired into the smoke while their battalion 82mm mortars laid down a curtain of high-explosive rounds in front of their barbed-wire obstacle belt. I./IR 47 was decimated, with its battalion commander killed and two company commanders wounded. Latz’s men were stopped cold with very heavy losses. Wolff made the mistake of reinforcing failure by sending in his reserve battalion, II./IR 16, which was also shot to pieces. He also failed to employ his assault guns to support his infantry. It had been a painful day for Wolff’s 22. Infanterie-Division, with 685 casualties. In the center, the 46. Infanterie-Division made modest gains against the 417th Rifle Regiment, at a cost of fewer than 200 casualties. On the western flank, IR 170 from the 73. Infanterie-Division penetrated only the outer portion of the main Soviet defensive belt between Lake Staroe and the Black Sea. During the day, Soviet counterbattery fire was quite effective, and knocked out a number of German observation posts and reconnaissance elements. Both Soviet armored trains supported the defense near Ishun with fire from their 76mm batteries. The first day was far from a success for Hansen’s LIV Armeekorps, which suffered over 1,300 casualties for only small gains.

Still, the Luftwaffe had a good day. Mölders began sending his Bf-109F fighters over the Perekop at 0700hrs and caught the VVS-ChF by surprise. Hauptmann Gordon Gollob, the commander of II./JG 3, claimed to have shot down nine MiG-3 fighters over the Perekop during the course of three sorties – while it is unclear if these claims are all valid, there is no doubt that the Soviet naval fighters suffered heavy losses over the Perekop. Gollob, an Austrian, had 61 aerial victories before coming to the Crimea, and had been awarded the Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes, but it was in the Crimea that he really established his reputation.

Despite this lackluster start on the first day, Hansen’s troops enjoyed remarkable success on October 19. Latz’s depleted IR 47 was forced to make another attempt against the Tumulus Assis strongpoint, and this time he sent in Oberstleutnant Rudolf G. Buhse’s III./IR 47 and the assault guns. The 36-year-old Buhse was no stranger to critical situations, having fought in the air-landing operation in Holland in 1940 and then having led his battalion in an assault crossing of the Dnepr at Berislav in 1941. He was an aggressive Prussian infantry officer and an excellent tactician. Supported by a battery of StuG III assault guns, pioneers, and a 2cm flak platoon that suppressed some of the Soviet machine gunners, Buhse led his battalion in small assault teams. Eventually, they managed to get through the barbed-wire obstacle belts and get close enough to suppress some of the forward Soviet positions with grenades and automatic-weapons fire. Once they realized that their defense had been pierced, the Soviet 397th Rifle Regiment abandoned the Tumulus Assis strongpoint. Although Buhse’s gallant attack, combined with the earlier success by Haccius’ss IR 65, had unhinged Kuznetsov’s right flank, the Soviet 106th and 271st Rifle Divisions simply fell further back on the isthmus, which afforded numerous defensive positions.

Infantrymen from Bieler’s 73. Infanterie-Division achieved an even larger tactical success on the western side of the isthmus, where Zuckertort finally massed enough firepower to pulverize the obstacle belt in front of the 361st Rifle Regiment. Once the path was clear, two battalions from IR 186 and the III./IR 213 assaulted through the breach, supported by Oberleutnant Hartmann’s 2./Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 190.¹¹ Zuckertort’s bombardment apparently suppressed the defenders, because the German infantry quickly overran the Soviet infantry in the center of their front and captured the fortified village of Krasnoperekops’k. The two battalions of Soviet naval infantry holding the sector along Lake Staroe and a rifle battalion from the 172nd Rifle Division protecting the Black Sea coast were soon isolated by the German advance. As Soviet resistance evaporated in the center, Bieler’s Stossgruppen continued to advance, and were in the town of Ishun before Major Baranov’s tankers, placed there in reserve, knew what was happening – Kuznetsov’s command and control had collapsed. Two T-34s were immobilized and captured by German Panzerjägers before the remaining seven tanks beat a hasty retreat. Still full of fight, IR 186 pressed on and seized a crossing over the Chatyrlyk River from dumbfounded security troops from the Soviet 42nd Cavalry Division. Bieler’s troops had advanced over 5 miles straight through the densest part of the 51st Army’s defenses, and at the cost of only 150 casualties.

By the evening of October 19, the 51st Army was near broken and Kuznetsov had lost control over the battle. However, the first element of the Coastal Army, Colonel Dmitri I. Tomilov’s 157th Rifle Division, was marching up from Sevastopol and would soon be available for a counterattack. Kuznetsov planned to fling the 157th Rifle Division at the 73. InfanterieDivision’s salient at Ishun, supported by the remainder of Batov’s two dismounted cavalry divisions. General-Major Ivan Y. Petrov, commander of the Coastal Army, was now subordinate to Kuznetsov but doubtless chagrined that one of his best units would be committed into action piecemeal in order to relieve the 51st Army’s situation. On the morning of October 20, two regiments of Tomilov’s 157th Rifle Division, supported by 122mm howitzer fire, attacked Ishun from the southeast while Batov’s cavalrymen attacked from the southwest. Initially, the attack went well and Bieler’s exhausted troops had their hands full trying to hold off a fresh Soviet division supported by Baranov’s T-34s. The 73. Infanterie-Division gave ground and evacuated Ishun, while conducting a fighting delay. The commander of the 2. Batterie from Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 190, Oberleutnant Hartmann, was killed attempting to hold Ishun. However, it was now the Soviet troops who were exposed in the open, and the bombers of Fliegerkorps IV, plus Zuckertort’s artillery, mercilessly pounded Tomilov’s division. A Luftwaffe air strike found Tomilov’s command post and bombed it, wounding him and much of his staff. The Soviet attack faltered and Bieler counterattacked, retaking Ishun and pushing the 157th Rifle Division back to the river. Heavy rain then brought the day’s fighting to a close, with little change in positions. Both sides continued to hack away at each other the next day, but with no major moves.

The Stavka was shocked to find out that Kuznetsov had lost the Ishun position so quickly, and following his loss of Perekop it was clear that his skills at battle command were not up to the task of holding the Crimea. A special Stavka representative was sent to the Crimea, who relieved Kuznetsov of command on the evening of October 22. Amazingly, the Stavka decided to put the navy in charge of defending the entire Crimea, and Vice-Admiral Gordey I. Levchenko was put in command of all Soviet ground, air, and naval forces in the Crimea. For all his faults as a commander, Kuznetsov had a better understanding of the situation at Ishun than Levchenko, who had been Stavka’s naval representative at Odessa. Levchenko, who had been a crewman on the cruiser Aurora during the storming of the Winter Palace in 1917, had impeccable Soviet credentials, but had never commanded troops in ground combat before, and was not familiar with the Ishun position. Whereas Kuznetsov had recognized that the 51st Army was approaching the end of its rope, and recommended retreating to another blocking position, Levchenko dutifully followed his instructions from the Stavka to keep attacking and restore the original defensive line.

Hansen’s LIV Armeekorps was near the end of its infantry strength, so Manstein allowed his forces to temporarily shift to the tactical defense while the fresher 132. Infanterie-Division moved up to the front. Manstein had also pleaded with Heeresgruppe Süd for more help from the Luftwaffe, since Zuckertort’s artillery was running out of ammunition. Oberst Mölders sent all three of his fighter Gruppen in a sweep over the Perekop on October 23 and caught the VVS-ChF by surprise. A squadron from III./JG 52 intercepted six Pe-2 bombers and four Yak-1 fighters attacking the positions of the 46. Infanterie-Division near the Bromide Factory on Lake Krasnoe – shooting down all the bombers and three Yaks for the loss of one Bf-109. On the same day, Hauptmann Gordon Gollob claimed another three MiG-3 fighters. All told, Mölders’ fighters destroyed 23 fighters and six bombers for the loss of one of their own aircraft, effectively breaking the VVS-ChF’s control over the Perekop.¹²

Levchenko was not able to organize a large-scale counterattack until the morning of October 24, by which point his air support was gone. He decided to base his effort on Petrov’s newly arrived 25th and 95th Rifle Divisions, both heavily depleted from months of fighting at Odessa, plus the remaining combat-effective elements of the 51st Army, now led by Batov. The Soviets attacked the 73. Infanterie-Division’s positions near Ishun with massed infantry and a few T-34s, but negligible artillery support. Hansen’s frontline units were short of infantry but still had plenty of MG-34 machine-gun teams and 8cm mortar squads, which were used to shred the attacking waves. Overhead, the bombers of KG 27 wreaked havoc on the Red Army formations, and probably destroyed the armored train Smyert’ fashizmu and damaged the Voykovets. Although Petrov’s infantry courageously advanced several miles into the teeth of concentrated German firepower, they could not break the defense and the attack failed. On October 25 Levchenko ordered Petrov to attack again, but the subsequent heavy losses were too much. Sensing weakness, the Germans waited until Petrov’s troops were spent and then committed the fresh 170. Infanterie-Division into a counterattack south of Ishun. The Soviet front began to collapse, and the 170. Infanterie-Division advanced over 4 miles. Soviet command and control disintegrated as Levchenko and Batov both decided to relocate their headquarters to the south but failed to inform Petrov.

On October 26, the initiative clearly shifted back to the Germans, and Manstein released the 132. Infanterie-Division to reinforce Hansen’s push to the south. Here and there, the Soviet defenses began to fall apart, and units began retreating without orders, although others continued to cling to strongpoints. Most of Batov’s 51st Army troops were retreating in disorder before the day’s end, although Petrov had better control over his troops and began a more disciplined withdrawal toward Simferopol on his own authority. Manstein had won the battle at Ishun, but at the exorbitant cost of 7,286 casualties, including 1,515 dead or missing. When the earlier battle at Perekop is included, Manstein’s AOK 11 suffered over 12,000 casualties – equivalent to an entire division – to break through Soviet defenses on the Perekop Isthmus. However, the Soviets had little to rejoice about, since the 51st Army and Coastal Army had lost about a quarter of their strength trying to hold the Perekop positions, including 16,000 prisoners taken around Ishun. Batov’s retreating 51st Army had very little remaining combat power, particularly after the loss of about 200 artillery pieces. Petrov’s Coastal Army was in better shape, since it arrived only in the later stages of the fighting for the Perekop, but it still lost 28,000 of its 80,000 troops.

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Manstein had intended to conduct his pursuit with the LSSAH Division, but since this unit was no longer under his command, he had to improvise. He formed a scratch motorized unit known as Brigade Ziegler under Oberst Heinz Ziegler, the chief of staff of XXXXII Armeekorps, to spearhead the pursuit of the defeated Soviet Coastal Army. AOK 11 provided Oberstleutnant Oskar von Boddien’s Aufklärungs-Abteilung 22, Major Vogt’s Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 190, two bicycle-mounted reconnaissance companies, some motorized flak guns, and the army-level Panzerjäger-Abteilung 560 (equipped with 3.7cm Pak), but AOK 11 was surprisingly short of trucks due to heavy losses from Soviet air and artillery attacks in the crowded Perekop Isthmus. Instead, a good portion of the ad hoc brigade was composed of Romanian motorized cavalrymen from Colonel Radu Korné’s 6th Motorized Rosiori Regiment.¹³ Korné was one of the few Romanian tactical leaders who had impressed the Germans in the early stages of Operation Barbarossa, and he was known for aggressive and rapid advances. Ziegler was instructed to push hard on Petrov’s heels in an effort to keep the Soviets on the run so that they did not stop to form a new line of resistance, but he clearly would not be able to capture a city such as Sevastopol with 2,000 lightly equipped motorized troops.

Once the Soviets were clearly withdrawing, Manstein reorganized and retasked the component formations of AOK 11: General der Infanterie Hans von Salmuth’s XXX Armeekorps (22. and 72. Infanterie-Divisionen) would clear the Sivash coast and push toward Dzhankoy; Hansen’s battered LIV Armeekorps (50. and 132. Infanterie-Divisionen and Brigade Ziegler) would first clear the port of Yevpatoriya, then head for Sevastopol; and Generalleutnant Hans Graf von Sponeck’s XXXXII Armeekorps (46., 73., and 170. Infanterie-Divisionen) would pursue the 51st Army toward Feodosiya and Kerch. Salmuth formed his own ad hoc motorized unit under Major Robert Pretz, commander of Pionier-Bataillon 22, to lead his pursuit. Kampfgruppe Pretz consisted of pioneers, light flak, and Panzerjägers. Manstein was also provided the Romanian Mountain Corps, but its forces were screening the north side of the Chongar Peninsula and were not in a position to aid a rapid pursuit into the Crimea.

Petrov’s Coastal Army fell back toward Yevpatoriya with the 25th, 95th and 321st Rifle Divisions. There were two main roads heading south from the Perekop: the road to Yevpatoriya and the road to Simferopol. Petrov split his three rifle divisions between these two routes and ordered the 42nd Cavalry Division to act as rearguard and covering force. However, the Soviet units had few motorized vehicles, and initially tried to conduct a slow, fighting withdrawal. One of only four T-34 tanks still operational, commanded by S. Borisov, conducted a single-tank delaying action, pausing to ambush the German advance units before retreating some more. Setting out from Ishun, Brigade Ziegler managed to get past Petrov’s ineffectual cavalry screens and not only get between the two roads on which Petrov’s troops were travelling, but get ahead of them by the end of October 29. Once past Petrov’s troops, Ziegler’s mixed German-Romanian force boldly pushed on to the outskirts of Simferopol on October 30, meeting negligible resistance. The main Soviet command post known as “Red Cave” had already been abandoned. The armored train Voykovets tried to fight a mobile rearguard action but was caught by Luftwaffe bombers in the Simferopol rail yard and knocked out. LIV Armeekorps was also force-marching southward, shoving Petrov’s small rearguard forces out of the way. Petrov continued marching slowly toward Simferopol, but was isolated and in danger of encirclement – if Manstein had had the LSSAH Division, the Coastal Army would have been pinned against the coast and destroyed. Yet German newsreels were already calling this “the victory march in the Crimea,” with the attitude that all that was left were mop-up actions.

Meanwhile, Batov’s broken 51st Army retreated toward the rail intersection at Dzhankoy where they hoped to link up with the 276th Rifle Division, which had been guarding the south side of the Chongar Peninsula. Although Batov tried to put up rearguards, XXX and XXXXII Armeekorps were hard on his heels and simply bowled them over before they could dig in, capturing thousands more Soviet troops in the process. A feeble effort to defend Dzhankoy failed when the 46. Infanterie-Division fought its way into the town on October 30. Aggravating Batov’s situation, Kampfgruppe Pretz was nipping at Batov’s flank along the Sivash, threatening to get ahead of the retreating Soviet divisions. After losing Dzhankoy, Batov’s retreat became a rout. South of Dzhankoy, Colonel Aleksandr I. Danilin and the rest of his staff from the 156th Rifle Division were scooped up by a patrol from the German 170. Infanterie-Division around 1100hrs. Through a Bessarabian interpreter, a German intelligence officer from LIV Armeekorps interrogated Danilin, and in return for assuring him that he would not be executed, was able to extract important details about the direction of the Soviet retreat and the confusion in the Soviet command structure after the defeat at Ishun.¹⁴ Thereafter, Danilin and his staff disappeared into German captivity, from which few survived.

In Sevastopol, Vice-Admiral Levchenko was out of touch with events at the front, and futilely attempted to direct Petrov and Batov by radio to form defensive positions, unaware that the Germans had already occupied them. Soon, Levchenko lost all radio contact with both armies, and became unable to exercise any kind of command and control over Soviet ground forces in the Crimea. Panic began to set in as the local Soviet military leadership came to realize the extent of the defeat at Ishun and the obvious fact that the Red Army was on the run. Vice-Admiral Oktyabrsky wasted little time, hoisting his flag on the destroyer Boiky in Sevastopol on the evening of October 28 and sailing for the port of Poti, with the battleship Parizhskaya Kommuna and the heavy cruiser Molotov. It was a sauve qui peut moment, like that the French army experienced at Sedan in 1940, with little thought for the consequences. Despite the fact that the Black Sea Fleet had already demonstrated an ability to conduct evacuations under fire at Odessa, which could have saved some of Petrov’s and Batov’s troops who were already cut off by German advances, only a feeble effort was made to save a few troops from Yevpatoriya. Similarly, naval gunfire might have delayed the German advance guard from entering Yevpatoriya and Feodosiya, but aside from two light cruisers and a handful of elderly destroyers, the rest of the fleet was running for cover in the Caucasian ports. Oktyabrsky was finally ordered to return to Sevastopol five days later, but the failure of the fleet to act contributed to the unfolding Soviet debacle in the Crimea.

Nor was there was any unity of command in Sevastopol during the critical days after Ishun. Instead, the newly formed Sevastopol City Defense Committee (Komitet oborana Sevastopolya or KOS) headed by SimferopolCommunist Party boss Boris A. Borisov concerned itself with local defense measures directed by the party, while the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet (Voyenniy Sovyet Chernomorskogo flota), normally headed by Oktyabrsky, was temporarily headed by his deputy Rear-Admiral Gavrill B. Zhukov, who did little more than proclaim the city to be in a “state of siege.” Yet not everyone in Sevastopol lost their heads. Colonel Pavel P. Gorpishchenko, an iron-willed instructor at the Black Sea Fleet’s Mine Warfare School, formed an ad hoc defense unit from his cadets, then began recruiting sailors from several dry-docked warships in Sevastopol. In short order, Gorpishchenko organized several thousand armed sailors under his command, which was designated as the 1st Naval Infantry Regiment. The 6ft-tall Gorpishchenko was an experienced combat veteran of the Russian Civil War and a charismatic leader who instilled confidence in his sailors-turned-infantrymen. Three other naval infantry battalions, numbered 15, 16, and 17, were formed on October 29 from naval reservists, crewmen from ships under repair, and VVS base personnel. Soon thereafter, 18th and 19th Battalions were formed as well. General-Major Petr A. Morgunov, commander of all the coastal artillery batteries around Sevastopol, did not have the option of running, and put his batteries on full alert to fire on any approaching enemy ground forces.

Just as Oktyabrsky was leaving Sevastopol, the lead elements of Colonel Vladimir L. Vilshansky’s 8th Naval Infantry Brigade were arriving on the cruiser Krasny Krim from Novorossiysk. Vilshansky’s brigade was made up entirely of naval reservists, most of whom had not yet gone through basic training. His brigade had no artillery and very few automatic weapons. Upon arriving at Sevastopol, Vilshansky was met by Rear-Admiral Zhukov, who ordered him to concentrate his brigade at the Mekenzievy Mountain (named after Thomas Mackenzie, who founded Sevastopol in 1783) railroad station 2½ miles north of Sevastopol. By 1600hrs on October 30, Vilshansky had assembled 3,744 sailors from his brigade, and Zhukov ordered him to occupy a position behind the Kacha River near the town of Duvankoi to block the approaches to Sevastopol from the north.¹⁵ Zhukov also dispatched 16th and 17th Naval Infantry Battalions and a training battalion north to form a blocking position at the Kacha River bridge to delay Brigade Ziegler from moving down the Simferopol–Sevastopol road. The black-clad sailors marched to these positions during the night of October 30/31 and by November 1 Zhukov had a thin screen of fewer than 6,000 sailors, armed mostly with rifles, protecting the approaches to Sevastopol. However, many of the sailors were equipped with AVS-36 automatic or SVT-38 semi-automatic rifles, which provided more firepower than standard bolt-action rifles. Ziegler’s troops were surprised when they were assembling to attack the Kacha River bridge and came under fire from Coastal Battery No. 30’s 305mm guns; the Soviets claimed that they inflicted very heavy casualties upon the German vanguard, but German records indicate approximately 35–40 casualties and that five trucks were lost.¹⁶

Without air or naval support and their command and control gone, the Red Army units in the Crimea scattered like a flock of birds. The only intact unit was Colonel Evgeny I. Zhidilov’s 7th Naval Infantry Brigade, which had marched from Sevastopol to Simferopol. Zhidilov was an experienced combat veteran who had participated in the Soviet conquest of the Crimea in 1920, and his naval infantrymen were among the best Soviet troops in the Crimea. Yet by the morning of October 31, Ziegler’s motorized columns had already blocked the Simferopol–Sevastopol road and captured Bakhchisaray, cutting off Zhidilov’s brigade and Petrov’s Coastal Army. Lieutenant Ivan A. Eaika’s Coastal Battery No. 54, located north of the Kacha River, fired several rounds of 102mm fire at Ziegler’s motorized column, but without effect.¹⁷ On the same day, Aufklärungs-Abteilung 132 captured Yevpatoriya, thereby cutting off most of the 321st Rifle Division. Zhidilov’s brigade put up a brief fight against the vanguard of the 72. Infanterie-Division north of Simferopol but then joined Petrov’s herd of retreating units, trying to evade the German dragnet by heading southeast through the Crimean Mountains to Alushta. The last three T-34 tanks were abandoned in Simferopol due to lack of fuel, as well as many other vehicles. By the end of the day, the 72. Infanterie-Division had occupied Simferopol. Before leaving Simferopol, however, the NKVD executed a number of prisoners, mostly Tatars or people with foreign heritage, who had been rounded up in September as part of the effort to clear the Crimea of “enemies of the people.”¹⁸

After the fall of Dzhankoy, Sponeck’s XXXXII Armeekorps continued pursuing the 51st Army toward the Kerch Peninsula, while Salmuth’s XXX Armeekorps veered southward to pursue Petrov and clear the Black Sea coast. The Romanian 1st Mountain Brigade succeeded in getting across the Chongar Peninsula and also pushed directly south for the Black Sea. Hansen’s LIV Armeekorps advanced more slowly toward the northern approaches of Sevastopol with just the 50. and 132. Infanterie-Divisionen, while Salmuth sent the 72. Infanterie-Division on a wide sweep through the mountains to seize Yalta and then approach Sevastopol from the east along the coast road. The shortage of water had a major impact in slowing the German pursuit, particularly since the bulk of the artillery and supplies in the infantry divisions were dependent upon horse-drawn transport. Nevertheless, Gottlob H. Bidermann, then serving as an enlisted Panzerjäger in the 132. Infanterie-Division, noted that his division succeeded in marching over 30 miles per day during the pursuit phase.¹⁹

Although Manstein preferred a rapid descent upon Sevastopol, his forces were simply not structured for rapid-pursuit operations. Neither the 50. nor 72. Infanterie-Division possessed a reconnaissance battalion, which was usually the basis for forming a Vorausabteilung (vanguard battalion) for pursuit operations. Instead, they were forced to form Vorausabteilungen from the motorized Panzerjäger and infantry-gun companies organic to infantry regiments, which barely amounted to 200–300 troops in a few dozen thin-skinned vehicles. Aside from Ziegler’s provisional brigade, Hansen’s only other fast asset was Aufklärungs-Abteilung 132, which was split between clearing the area around Yevpatoriya and advancing toward Sevastopol. At best, an Aufklärungs-Abteilung in an infantry division had about 600 troops in three squadrons, including one mounted on horses and another on bicycles or motorcycles. The battalion’s so-called “heavy squadron” had just three light armored cars, usually Sd. Kfz. 221, and a platoon each of towed 3.7cm Pak guns and 7.5cm infantry guns. These forces were not designed to punch through fortified lines or to operate more than 6 miles forward of supporting infantry and artillery.

It is a sad truth that war is very good to some people. Leutnant Erich Bärenfänger, the 26-year-old commander of 7. Kompanie of IR 123, was enjoying the pursuit. He was part of the Vorausabteilung of the 50. Infanterie-Division, and when the senior officer was wounded on the morning of November 2, Bärenfänger assumed command of the advance guard, which consisted of two rifle companies and a heavy-machine-gun platoon. The blond-haired, blue-eyed Bärenfänger was the prototypical Nazi, who had joined the SA at age 18 and received his commission just before the start of World War II. By the Crimean campaign, Bärenfänger already had three campaigns under his belt and he enjoyed a meteoric rise during the war, going from platoon leader to Generalmajor in six years. Pushing his troops to advance rapidly on their bicycles, horses, and a few captured vehicles, Bärenfänger’s point squad caught up with the rear of one of Petrov’s columns north of the Alma River on the afternoon of November 2. Imprudently, one Russian heavy-weapons column, with five trucks and 80 horse-drawn vehicles, halted to rest near a village without deploying proper security. Once apprised of their location by his scouts, Bärenfänger expertly maneuvered his companies into firing positions without being detected. When Bärenfänger gave the command to fire with all weapons, his heavy machine guns sliced into the enemy column, which disintegrated into chaos. By the end of the short action, Bärenfänger had captured an entire eight-gun artillery battery and 500 prisoners.²⁰

While lack of mobility hindered the German pursuit, the Soviet retreat was hindered by multiple problems. Retreats are very difficult for even a well-trained and disciplined army to conduct, and few Soviet commanders had demonstrated much aptitude for this kind of maneuver during Operation Barbarossa in 1941. Yet the 45-year-old Petrov proved to be an above-average commander who held most of his army together, despite a complete breakdown in communications and logistics. He managed to keep the bulk of the 25th, 95th, and 172nd Rifle Divisions and Zhidilov’s brigade together, moving southeast through mountain trails. He hoped to slide due west and reach the Kacha River north of Sevastopol, but the rapid advance of Brigade Ziegler discouraged this approach. Instead, he was forced to take the Coastal Army on a circuitous and time-consuming route through the mountains to reach Sevastopol from the east. Petrov was also aware that Levchenko had lost control of the situation, so he decided to move ahead of his troops to take command at Sevastopol. If the city fell, his army would be doomed. Leaving General-Major Trofim K. Kolomiets, commander of the 25th Rifle Division, to lead the retreating units, Petrov set out for Sevastopol. By late November 3, Petrov reached Balaklava, although most of his troops were strung out in the mountains and would not reach Sevastopol for another five days. The next day, the Stavka directed Petrov to temporarily take command of the Sevastopol Defensive Region (Sevastopolskogo Oboronitelnogo Raiona or SOR), until Oktyabrsky returned.

Levchenko apparently believed that Sevastopol could not be held for very long, and, like Oktyabrsky, began to quietly make plans to evacuate the naval base. The Stavka had authorized the bulk of the Black Sea Fleet to rebase at ports in the Caucasus, but had not sanctioned the evacuation of Sevastopol. Borisov, in charge of the KOS, recruited thousands of local civilians to complete trenches and antitank ditches on the city’s approaches that had been begun weeks before. He also issued orders to stockpile food in anticipation of a siege. The only bright spot was that the Fliegerkorps IV had withdrawn most of its air support after the victory at Ishun in order to support Kleist’s drive on Rostov, which left Manstein’s AOK 11 with minimal air support. Although a number of VVS squadrons retreated to the Caucasus, the VVS-ChF’s 62nd Fighter Brigade remained at Sevastopol and provided Petrov with air superiority over the city.

On the evening of November 2, soldiers from the II./IR 438 of the 132. Infanterie-Division assaulted Lieutenant Eaika’s Coastal Battery No. 54, which was overrun after a tough fight. It was the first of Sevastopol’s coastal defenses to fall. Despite a punishing Stuka attack that knocked out three of the battery’s four 102mm guns, the German battalion still suffered heavy casualties, including 21 dead. Lieutenant Eaika escaped into the hills to join the partisans while 28 of his men swam out to a Soviet patrol boat. Following this hollow triumph, the 132. Infanterie-Division pushed across the Kacha River with two regiments, including Bidermann’s IR 437, with the 50. Infanterie-Division coming up close behind. While crossing the Kacha, the German infantry came under fire from Lieutenant Mikhail V. Matushenko’s Battery No. 10, which was armed with four 203mm naval guns. Lieutenant Aleksandr’s Battery No. 30 also opened fire with its twin 305mm turrets, which the German infantry found unnerving. Between November 1 and November 4, these two batteries fired 276 203mm and 142 305mm rounds at the troops of the 132. Infanterie-Division.²¹ Even more worrisome, small groups from Zhidilov’s 7th Naval Infantry Brigade (7 NIB) that had been bypassed by Ziegler’s Brigade now tried to fight their way through the 132. Infanterie-Division to get to Sevastopol. Gottlob Bidermann recounts how his Panzerjäger platoon, attached to a company from IR 437, was attacked from behind several times by groups of naval infantrymen trying to infiltrate through the German lines; Bidermann also described these naval infantrymen as elite troops and noted that their SVT-40 automatic rifles gave them a firepower advantage over German infantry armed with the bolt-action Kar98k.²²

During November 4–6, Hansen used the 132. Infanterie-Division to methodically begin clearing the Bel’bek River valley around Duvankoi, but ran into increasing resistance from Vilshansky’s 8 NIB, the 17th and 18th Naval Infantry Battalions, and the newly raised 3rd Naval Infantry Regiment. In just two days, the 132. Infanterie-Division suffered 428 casualties – the equivalent of a battalion – in minor skirmishing actions. However, Soviet casualties were much higher among the inexperienced naval units. Hansen was trying to jockey the 50. Infanterie-Division to the southeast, to hit Sevastopol’s defenses from due east, but this left the 132. Infanterie-Division unsupported and with its hands full against a growing assortment of ad hoc Russian units. Ominously, the first elements of Petrov’s Coastal Army had slipped into the defenses around Sevastopol on November 5, further reinforcing the defense. The Soviet 17th Naval Infantry Battalion was encouraged enough to mount a local counterattack that recaptured Duvankoi from IR 438. Sensing that the 132. Infanterie-Division was vulnerable to a spoiling attack, Rear-Admiral Zhukov ordered Vilshansky’s 8 NIB to mount a full-scale counterattack north of Duvankoi at dawn on November 7.²³ Bidermann’s IR 437 was on the receiving end of Vilshanksy’s counterattack:

Suddenly and silently, from out of the darkness, poured waves of enemy soldiers. Elite troops of the Soviet Naval Infantry massed toward us… They assaulted our positions from the thick underbrush before Makenziya, pouring toward us in dark waves, hoarse shouts of “Urrah!” erupting from the oncoming line… We opened fire with high explosives point-blank into the rows of attackers.²⁴

Although MG 34 machine-gun fire and 8cm mortar rounds broke up the first Soviet assault, the naval infantrymen attacked in waves that stressed the German defense to its limits. Matushenko’s Battery No. 10 laid down a prepatory barrage that succeeded in destroying some German vehicles, and, after three hours of fighting, Vilshansky’s sailors had seized three hilltop objectives. Vilshansky claimed to have eliminated 250 German soldiers, and Bidermann admitted that his battalion “suffered numerous losses.” However, the Soviet sailors could not hold their hard-won ground and were forced to yield to German counterattacks on November 8. Nevertheless, Vilshansky’s counterattack caused Manstein to realize that LIV Armeekorps was not strong enough to fight its way into Sevastopol with just two divisions, and he ordered Salmuth to transfer the 22. Infanterie-Division to reinforce Hansen’s corps. On the Simferopol–Sevastopol road the German pursuit was now over, and Hansen now had to begin preparing for another deliberate assault, which bought precious time for the defenders.

While Hansen’s corps had been trying to push through directly to Sevastopol, the 72. Infanterie-Division had been pursuing Petrov’s Coastal Army through the Yaila Mountains. Here and there the Soviets turned to fight when the German pursuit grew too arrogant. On November 4, the 95th Rifle Division ambushed Panzerjäger-Abteilung 72 near the village of Ulu-Sala, destroying half its vehicles and most of its Pak guns. A winter storm that brought heavy rain on November 6 further slowed down the German pursuit, and the Coastal Army steadily won the race to Sevastopol. Nevertheless, the 72. Infanterie-Division had to fight its way into Yalta, which was occupied on the morning of November 8, and an advance guard began to march west along the coast road toward Balaklava. Near Baidary on the coast, Lieutenant Aleksandr S. Terletskiy was in charge of a small group of NKVD border guards retreating toward Sevastopol. On November 9, his group moved through the Baydar Gates, an important mountain pass east of Balaklava. In order to delay the pursuing Germans, Terletskiy’s detachment emplaced explosives on a rock overhang over the narrow coast road and then detonated it to block the pass. Terletskiy was later awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union for delaying the 72. Infanterie-Division’s advance along the coast from Yalta, although the impact of his feat on German operations appears to have been minimal. Furthermore, Terletskiy’s group failed to reach Sevastopol and instead joined a partisan group in the mountains east of Balaklava, as did other Soviet troops who became isolated by the German pursuit.

By November 9, the German pursuit across the Crimea was over. Petrov had managed to save 17,000 troops from his Coastal Army, but had lost a good part of his artillery and vehicles. The 25th Rifle Division Chapaevskaya had suffered 50 percent losses and only 4,233 of its troops made it to Sevastopol; two of its three rifle regiments were reduced to fewer than 500 troops.²⁵ One exception was Colonel Ivan I. Khakhanov’s 52nd Artillery Regiment, which made it to Sevastopol with 13 of their 155mm Schneider Model 1917 howitzers (taken from Poland in 1939). Brigade Ziegler had captured 2,711 prisoners, 52 trucks, and 9 76.2mm guns, while suffering 215 casualties in the pursuit.²⁶ Nevertheless, the escape of Petrov’s Coastal Army was a minor tactical feat for the Red Army, and a major blow to Manstein’s plans to seize Sevastopol in a swift coup.

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While Petrov was trying to organize Sevastopol’s defenses, the remnants of the 51st Army continued to retreat toward Kerch. On the evening of November 3, the 170. Infanterie-Division captured the port of Feodosiya. With the Germans racing across the Crimea and cities falling like nine pins, Communist Party officials and NKVD personnel bolted toward the coast in an effort to save themselves. The Komsomol (Young Communist League) had established Artek camps in the pleasant climate of the Crimea to indoctrinate the next generation of Soviet leaders, and these camps still had thousands of youths stranded by the German invasion; many were the children of party officials who now used their influence to get them evacuated from the Crimea. Everyone who could headed for the ports of Yalta and Alushta, which had not yet fallen.

A number of cargo ships were pressed into evacuating civilians and military wounded from the Crimea ports to Novorossiysk, but Levchenko made little effort to coordinate this effort or to ensure proper air cover and naval escorts. Since Levchenko did not believe that Sevastopol could be held for very long, he permitted the entire medical staff of the Black Sea Fleet to board the 5,770-ton freighter Armeniya, which left Sevastopol on the evening of November 6. The Armeniya also carried thousands of wounded, and stopped briefly in Balaklava to pick up NKVD personnel. The vessel might have made it to safety had not Communist Party officials radioed for it to dock at Yalta to pick up local politicians, their families, and Komsomol members. Six hours were spent waiting in Yalta for the last people to arrive, by which time the sun was up. The VVS-ChF provided two I-153 fighters as token cover over the Armeniya as it left Yalta and the fleet sent two MO-IV sub-chasers to act as escort. However, Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft quickly spotted the Armeniya, and an He-111 bomber from 1./KG 28 attacked at 1125hrs. A single aerial-delivered torpedo struck the ship’s bow, tearing it off. Within four minutes, the ship plunged to the bottom of the Black Sea, taking an estimated 5,000–7,000 passengers with it. There were only eight survivors.

Meanwhile, Levchenko ordered Batov to mount a defense at the Parpach Narrows near Ak-Monai, where army engineers had some good-quality bunkers. This was the narrowest point of the Kerch Peninsula, but it was still 11 miles wide and Batov’s army had suffered very heavy losses during the retreat. Nevertheless, the 51st Army turned to fight its pursuers one last time. Sponeck’s XXXXII Armeekorps attacked the Ak-Monai position with three divisions at 0700hrs on November 4. The German soldiers were tired from days of forced marching, but they had air and artillery support. Batov complained to the Stavka that he had two battalions of Katyusha multiple rocket launchers, but no rockets for them to fire. It still took Sponeck’s troops three days to overcome the Ak-Monai position, after which Batov’s defeated troops fell back to the outskirts of Kerch.

Too little and too late, the Stavka decided to send Batov fresh troops to help defend Kerch. Colonel Nikolay V. Blagoveshchensky’s 9th Naval Infantry Brigade was ferried across the Kerch Strait, followed by elements of Colonel Mikhail K. Zubkov’s fresh 302nd Mountain Rifle Division. A rough defensive perimeter was formed around Kerch by November 10, using every available soldier and sailor. The initial German probing attack at noon on November 10 was repulsed by Blagoveshchensky’s naval infantrymen, but the Germans had no intention of conducting a house-to-house battle against trapped Soviet troops, and Manstein directed Sponeck to pulverize the city with aerial and artillery bombardment. Bombers from III./KG 27 and III./KG 51 dropped bundles of incendiaries in the center of Kerch, setting the city of 104,000 people alight. By November 12, Sponeck’s divisional artillery could range the center of the city and added their firepower as well. Stukas from StG 77 knocked out the electrical power plant in Kerch, set military fuel storage dumps alight, and systematically pulverized the port facilities.

Even with the addition of reinforcements, Batov’s troops were virtually out of ammunition and could not hold the city. Even before official sanction was given on November 13, an exodus began across the 5-mile-wide Kerch Strait to the imagined safety of the Taman Peninsula. Rear-Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov’s Azov Flotilla assisted the evacuation, using patrol boats and armed trawlers, which could make the crossing in less than half an hour. By November 15, Sponeck’s 170. Infanterie-Division was fighting its way into Kerch, and Batov instructed Blagoveshchensky and Zubkov to provide the rearguard while the rest of 51st Army evacuated. Spotting the evacuation in progress, the Germans intensified their air attacks on shipping in the straits, inflicting numerous casualties. Even though Fliegerkorps IV had only a handful of fighters left operating over the Crimea, the VVS-ChF made little effort to protect Gorshkov’s flotilla from Luftwaffe raids.

By dawn of November 17 it was over, and Gorshkov’s small craft took off the last of Batov’s troops that could be saved. Although Blagoveshchensky and Zubkov’s units were decimated, both commanders managed to extract a portion of their troops in the final evacuation. Surprisingly, the two pre-war units in Batov’s 9th Rifle Corps, the 106th and 156th Rifle Divisions, managed to save 8,214 of their approximately 25,000 personnel, but all heavy equipment was abandoned.²⁷ All told, the Soviets claimed to have evacuated 50,000 from Kerch, but fewer than a third were able-bodied combat soldiers. The 51st Army left many troops behind, some of whom were captured, and others went into hiding to form local partisan units. However, the main impact of the loss of Kerch and the bulk of the 51st Army was that Manstein’s AOK 11 could now turn its entire attention to the last Soviet foothold in the Crimea: Sevastopol.