Despite the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939, Hitler’s intention was always to invade the Soviet Union. It was, along with the destruction of the Jews, fundamental to his core objectives – lebensraum, or living-space, in the east and the subjugation of the Slavic race. This was meant to be a war of annihilation – Russia’s non-signing of the Geneva Convention legitimized, in Hitler’s view, the enforcement of ‘executive measures’ in occupied territories. Despite the vastness of Russian territory and manpower, Hitler anticipated a quick victory, hence the lack of provision for winter uniforms. ‘You have only to kick in the door,’ said Hitler confidently, ‘and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down.’ Two tons of Iron Crosses were waiting in Germany for those involved with the capture of Moscow.
The Soviets’ dismal display against the Finns was proof to Hitler of their military weakness – but Hitler underestimated the Russian ability to learn by their mistakes. He believed that the Russian population would welcome his troops and in many places they did, but instead of harnessing this allegiance, the Germans’ brutal methods soon alienated these potential collaborators. He also underestimated the Russians’ determination and tenacity; determination that would have existed even without Stalin’s infamous ‘Not one step back’ directive of 28 July 1942, ordering execution for the slightest sign of defeatism. Behind the Soviet front lines roamed a second line ready to shoot any retreating cowards or ‘traitors of the Motherland’. As Georgi Zhukov, one of Stalin’s top generals, said: ‘In the Red Army it takes a very brave man to be a coward.’
Stalin’s spies had forewarned him time and again of the expected attack, but he refused to believe it. He strenuously forbade anything that might appear provocative to the Germans, even allowing the continuation of Soviet food and metal exports to the Germans, as agreed in the Tripartite Pact, and forbidding the evacuation of people living near the German border and the setting up of defences. So when, at 4 a.m. on 22 June 1941, Operation Barbarossa was launched with over 3 million Axis troops along a 900-mile front, progress was rapid. The date was significant: it was exactly 129 years since Napoleon’s ill-fated attack on Russia. Within the first day, one quarter of the Soviet Union’s air strength had been destroyed. By the end of October, Moscow was only sixty-five miles away, over 500,000 square miles of Soviet territory had been captured, and as well as huge numbers of Soviet troops and civilians killed, 3 million Red Army soldiers had been taken prisoner of war, and, unlike in the west, the rules of captivity held no meaning for the Germans. A large percentage of Soviet prisoners of war died of malnutrition, disease and brutality.
By the end of June, Finland, Hungary and Albania had all declared war on the Soviet Union. For Finland it was a ‘holy war’, an opportunity to avenge their defeat the previous year. For the first week of the invasion Stalin suffered what is believed to be a mental breakdown,disappearing to his dacha, issuing nothing in the way of direction. When his Politburo came for him, Stalin feared he was about to be arrested. Instead, they came to ask him what to do. Once stirred, Stalin re-emerged. In his first public address since the invasion, on 3 July, Stalin spoke of ‘The Great Patriotic War’.
German troops during Operation Barbarossa, July 1941
Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-009-0869-24 / Schröter / CC-BY-SA
The speed of the German advance soon slowed down – the further they reached, the longer the lines of supply had to become. As Russian forces retreated, they adopted a scorched-earth policy, destroying anything that might be of use to their pursuers – food, crops, livestock and shelter. To add to their increasing discomfort, behind the German advance, groups of Soviet partisans sprang up, hiding away in the unending forests, disrupting the German lines of communication and denting German morale. At the front, for every ten Russian divisions the Germans destroyed, another ten sprang up – the reserves of manpower were simply unending and soul-destroying for the attackers. When Stalin learnt that Japan, despite signing the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, were not going to renege on the earlier Soviet-Japanese Nonaggression Pact, he was free to redeploy his troops in the east to face the Germans in the west.
But it was Russia’s great ally – ‘General Winter’ – that changed Russia’s fortunes. With autumn came the heavy rains, hampering German progress as vehicles became bogged down in poor roads and mud, and then came the onslaught of winter. Hitler had only provided his troops with summer uniforms, fully expecting victory to come before the onset of the Russian winter. His men suffered terribly in the sub-zero conditions, and with the lack of food and medical supplies, disease spread and morale fell.
As his troops approached Moscow, Hitler diverted the main thrust south, towards Kiev, citing the capture of crops and oil reserves in the Ukraine (and thereby denying them to the Russians) more important than the fall of the Soviet capital. Although Germany’s lack of natural resources was a constant worry for Hitler, many saw it as a fateful decision, sealing Germany’s fate in the Soviet Union. Stalin, meanwhile, was relocating the Soviet Union’s factories to the east, and output soared as the war waged on. In December, the German juggernaut ground to a halt, just thirty miles from Moscow with the spires of the Kremlin within view. Hitler’s attack on Yugoslavia and Greece had delayed Operation Barbarossa by a month, leaving many of his generals wondering what could have been achieved if they hadn’t lost that precious time.
In September, German forces had encircled Leningrad, but Hitler chose to starve it into submission rather than bomb it. Every cat, rat and living animal was eaten, glue was made into soup, and wood for fuel ran out as the city froze. During 872 gruelling days, until 27 January 1944, the city endured an epic siege in which approximately 1,000 civilians died of starvation and the cold each day (in all there were up to a million deaths in Leningrad – more than British soldiers and civilians throughout the war). Limited supplies of food were brought in from the east over Lake Ladoga – by boat during summer and by lorry over the frozen waters during winter – but there was never enough and cannibalism was rife.