Chapter 12
Introduction
In 196 BCE, at the Panhellenic sanctuary of Isthmia, the Roman proconsul Titus Flamininus declared that the Greeks were free. This freedom was to be guaranteed by Rome, by now the greatest power in the Mediterranean. Flamininus’ proclamation was greeted with joyous celebration, since the Greeks, once a proudly free and independent people, had been ruled by Macedonian kings since the time of Philip II, Alexander the Great’s father. The latest of these Macedonian kings, Philip V, had been defeated by Flamininus in the previous year at a place in northern Greece called Cynoscephalae, or the ‘Dogs’ Heads’. The phalanx of Philip V, a bristling hedge of spears and shields, was bested by the manipular legions of the Roman Republic in a bloody melee fought in the morning fog. The Battle of Cynoscephalae was the first major pitched battle fought between Rome and Macedonia, and it demonstrated that the Roman legion was a formidable military machine indeed.
Directions to the Site
The sites of the battles of Cynoscephalae and Pharsalus are very close to one another, so we recommend visiting both on a single day-trip. The sites are within an hour’s drive of the major centre of Volos or the charming seaside town of Nea Anchialos. Both places offer many fine hotels and tavernas, and are near the Pilio peninsula, where Achilles was raised by the centaur Chiron, and where modern visitors can take in the lovely scenery. The main action of Cynoscephalae took place in the hills to the north of the plain of Farsala, between the small villages of Zoodochos Pigi and Chalkiades, which are located along the main Larisa-Lamia road. From Nea Anchialos, head west along the Karditsa-Volos road for about 45km until you reach Farsala. From Volos, simply head west to the National Highway, and then south to the turn-off for Nea Anchialos, and joining the Karditsa-Volos road, follow it west for 36km. At Farsala, turn due north to follow the Larisa-Lamia road, crossing the Enipeus River. After about 9km, turn left, following the signs for Zoodochos Pigi. The ruined church and cemetery at the northern edge of Zoodochos Pigi is a good place to start a tour of the battlefield.
Historical Outline of the Battle
The third century BCE saw Rome transition from the dominant power in Italy to the leading state in the entire Mediterranean world. Scholars continue to debate whether this astounding growth in territory and influence was due to a concerted imperialistic policy on the part of the Roman Senate and its leading magistrates, or whether Rome stumbled upon its new empire through a series of wars fought largely for self-defence. Whatever the case, at the beginning of the century there were several great powers vying for influence in the Mediterranean, but by the early years of the second century, Rome was effectively the only game in town. The Battle of Cynoscephalae, fought in 197 BCE, marks a crucial point in the growth of Rome as the most powerful and longest-lasting empire in the ancient world.
The main rivals of Rome were the Carthaginians, a Phoenician people with a large naval empire based in North Africa in what is now Tunisia, and the Hellenistic kingdoms that had succeeded Alexander the Great, based in Egypt, Syria and Macedonia. Rome fought a series of wars with Carthage (called the Punic Wars by historians) that eventually resulted in the total destruction of Carthage and the unquestioned supremacy of Rome in the western Mediterranean. Likewise, Rome and the Hellenistic kingdoms clashed several times, resulting in Rome taking over the eastern Mediterranean as well. With hindsight, it is tempting to imagine that Rome’s Mediterranean-wide empire was inevitable. But at several points during the third century, it looked as though Roman power might be snuffed out before it had extended much beyond Italy. In 216, the legendary Carthaginian general Hannibal, who had brazenly crossed the Alps into Italy, completely annihilated a large Roman army on the field of Cannae. The city of Rome itself seemed likely to fall to Hannibal, and it still puzzles ancient historians that Hannibal failed to exploit his spectacular battlefield victory. In the aftermath of Cannae, Hannibal allied himself with the king of Macedonia, Philip V, named in honour of the father of Alexander the Great. Philip must have seen an alliance with Hannibal as a way to kick Rome – a potential threat to his own power in Macedonia and Greece – while it was down. In the end, though, inviting conflict with Rome turned out to be a fatal mistake for the Macedonian king.
The First Macedonian War (214-205) was fought between Rome and Macedonia at the same time as the much greater Second Punic War (218-201) between Rome and Carthage. Philip, urged on by his ally Demetrius of Pharos – who, as a sort of pirate king in Illyria had been defeated by Rome a few years earlier – tried to extend Macedonian influence over the ports of Greece and Illyria along the Adriatic Sea. Rome declared war on Macedonia because of Philip’s expansionist actions, but no major pitched battle was fought between the two powers during this first war. Instead, it seems as though Rome’s primary interest was in keeping Philip occupied in the east so that he could not join up with Hannibal in the west. This war ended in 205 in a virtual stalemate, with little changing in the respective positions of Rome or Macedonia. In 201, Rome finally achieved total victory over the Carthaginians after defeating Hannibal at the Battle of Zama in the previous year. Enjoying some breathing room after decades of ruinous conflict, Rome seemed little inclined to any more involvement in the eastern Mediterranean, an area in which it had shown little interest up to this point.
In the years after the First Macedonian War, Philip began to expand much more aggressively into the Aegean, mostly at the expense of the Ptolemaic Kingdom, based in Egypt but controlling much territory in Asia Minor, which is now Turkey. In the interests of expansion, Philip had entered into an agreement with Antiochus III, the ruler of the Seleucid Empire centred on Syria. These developments need not have concerned Rome, since the Hellenistic kingdoms had been fighting each other and forming and breaking alliances for well over a century, with no real threat being made against Italy or the western Mediterranean. But Rome’s new position as the de facto referee of the Mediterranean world was made apparent when delegations from Rhodes and Pergamum, two Aegean states that feared Philip’s lust for power, appealed to Rome for help in 200, and Rome sent envoys to Athens to assess the situation. Athens itself declared war on Philip, only to have its territory promptly ravaged by the Macedonians. Initially Rome showed its war-weariness when its Centuriate Assembly, one of the main electoral bodies, rejected a motion to declare war on Macedonia. But eventually Rome decided to intervene, either, as our sources indicate, because it feared that Philip might try to invade Italy itself (a farfetched prospect), or because Rome saw an opportunity to gain wealth and power in the east. Philip had upped his aggression, despite Rome’s insistence that he leave the Greek states alone. During his siege of Abydos, a city along the Dardanelles in Turkey, Philip advised the population that if anyone wanted to commit suicide rather than face the Macedonian invaders, they had three days to do so. Every person in Abydos took him up on the offer, killing their own women and children before hurling themselves against Philip’s army. Perhaps it is not unreasonable to think that Rome might have feared to leave such a violent and merciless foe to his own devices.
The Second Macedonian War (200-197) broke out in earnest later in 200, when Rome finally declared war on Philip. The first two years of the conflict went rather poorly for the Romans. Aside from gaining the states of the Aetolian League as allies in Greece, the Roman commanders achieved little and even faced a mutiny among their troops. In 198 a new consul, not yet aged 30 but teeming with energy and ambition, took over command: Titus Quinctius Flamininus. One of our sources says that from the very beginning the new consul deployed a powerful new propaganda weapon against Philip by claiming that Rome intended to liberate the Greeks from Macedonia. In reality, Flamininus might have voiced such a programme explicitly only after Cynoscephalae, but there are indications that freedom propaganda was used to a certain extent to justify Rome’s intervention in Greece well before the battle. The ‘Freedom of the Greeks’ had been a slogan for centuries, deployed in the war against Persia in the early fifth century, by Alexander the Great in his crusade against Darius III and by various Hellenistic kings vying for advantage over one another. Now it was the Romans’ turn to court the Greeks’ favour. At a conference with Philip at the pass of the Aoös River in Illyria, Flamininus demanded that the Macedonians withdraw their garrisons, which had come to be known as the ‘fetters of Greece’, from cities in Thessaly, Euboea and Corinth. When Philip refused, Flamininus promptly defeated Philip’s army in the pass and forced his way into Greece. This was the first major victory for the Romans in the war.
With Roman forces now in Greece, Flamininus won over most of the members of the Achaean League as allies. Desperate, Philip asked for another conference with the consul, which took place near Thermopylae. During the conference, both sides sent representatives to Rome, Philip to find some way to gain peace on favourable terms, Flamininus to have his agents secure his appointment as proconsul for the following year. Philip achieved nothing, but Flamininus got what he wanted, namely to continue his command over the Roman forces for another year, into 197. To add to Philip’s woes, the Romans managed to add Nabis, the tyrant of Sparta, as an ally not long after Nabis had first agreed to fight for Philip. Failing in his attempts at negotiation, haemorrhaging allies to Rome and losing territory in southern Greece once under his influence, Philip decided to rely on his one remaining asset, the fearsome Macedonian phalanx. The stage was set for a decisive battle.
The two forces met first at Pherae, a major city in Thessaly near modern Volos. Moving into Thessaly, Flamininus tried unsuccessfully to take the city of Phthiotic Thebes (near modern Nea Anchialos) by treachery, before heading north to search for Philip’s army. The Romans camped about 10km south of Pherae, while Philip moved south-east from Larisa and brought his forces to a position about 6.5km north of Pherae. Based on Livy and Plutarch, both of whom used Polybius as a source, the size of the respective forces was as follows: Philip had 25,500 soldiers, including 16,000 in the phalanx, 2,000 peltasts, 2,000 Thracians, 2,000 Illyrians, 1,500 assorted mercenaries and 2,000 cavalry; the Romans had about the same number, or slightly more at around 26,400, which Kromayer interprets to mean that the infantry numbered 24,000 and the cavalry 2,400, more than 8,000 of which were Greeks. In terms of gaining allies, Philip had clearly lost the propaganda war. The Romans also had some elephants, which would prove decisive in the coming battle. From their bases near Pherae, both sides sent out infantry forces to scout the area, and they encountered one another on a series of hills rising above Pherae itself. The scouts asked their commanders for instructions on what to do, but the entire day passed without any fighting. On the next day there was a cavalry skirmish on these same hills, in which the Romans had the better of it, due mainly to their Aetolian allies.
Cynoscephalae Map 1. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
Philip decided that the area around Pherae was unsuitable for a battle, since there were many trees and other obstructions such as the walls of agricultural plots. The Macedonian phalanx required smooth and level ground to operate effectively, so Philip turned inland to find a good battlefield and resupply his forces from the city of Skotoussa. Seeing his enemy on the march, Flamininus turned inland as well. A range of hills, today called Mavrovounion, separated the marching routes of the two armies, so Philip and Flamininus moved without having a sure idea of where the other force was or to where they were headed. While scholars have debated the location of most of the points related to the marching before the battle, we tend to favour Hammond’s reconstruction, which states that after a day’s march, Flamininus reached Eretria, identified with the modern village of the same name, while Philip arrived at the Onchestos River, which is most likely the stream by the modern village of Ag. Triada. On the next day, Philip reached Melambion, which was in the territory of Skotoussa, probably near Ag. Konstantinos, while Flamininus made it to a shrine to Thetis in the territory of Pharsalus, which is probably not the modern village of Thetideion, which would be in land controlled by Skotoussa, but further west, at modern Zoodochos Pigi. As already stated, Philip’s goal was twofold, namely to resupply his army and to find suitable ground for his phalanx. To that end, after acquiring food and other supplies around Skotoussa, he had an interest in moving west and south-west into the plain north of Pharsalus while protecting the major road to Larissa, an important Macedonian base. For his part, Flamininus sought to deny food and a level plain to Philip while trying to secure the Larissa road himself. Their respective movements meant that by the end of the second day, the two armies were only about 7km apart. The Romans and Macedonians, though, were still separated by a ridge emanating from Mavrovounion that effectively formed the boundary between Pharsalus and Skotoussa.
On the morning of the third day after marching from Pherae, the weather was terrible. Following a torrential rainfall, the sky was overcast and dark, and a thick fog hovered along the ridge that separated the two armies. Fearing a surprise attack in the gloom, Flamininus decided to stay put in his camp near the shrine to Thetis. Philip chose to continue marching despite the weather and lack of visibility, but he only made it a short way, to the summit of the ridge. This ridge was called Cynoscephalae, or ‘Dogs’ Heads’, for the peculiar shapes of its hilltops. Philip posted an advance guard on the summit, probably near the tiny village of Kremasti, and then backtracked to pitch his camp, likely near Chalkiades, only a few kilometres from his base the previous night. From his own camp, Flamininus sent out some cavalry and light troops to scout in case the Macedonians planned to attack. This force suddenly encountered the Macedonian advance troops stationed on the ridge. The shock of seeing the enemy emerge from the fog caused both sides to freeze in terror, but they soon regained their composure. After sending messengers to their respective leaders, the soldiers of both sides engaged one another. Reinforcements were quickly sent to join the fray, and the Battle of Cynoscephalae had begun.
Cynoscephalae Map 2: Routes to the battle. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
The initial clash between scouts and advanced troops continued for some time, with the Romans having the worst of it, until some reinforcements of Aetolian cavalry and other troops arrived. Led by the Aetolians, the Roman force drove their enemies to the very top of the ridge. The Macedonians sent message after message to their king, but Philip did not want to commit to a pitched battle on such terrain. The ground of Cynoscephalae was too broken for his phalanx to operate to its full potential, which is why he had left the region of Pherae in the first place. However, he was eventually persuaded to send some reinforcements in the form of mercenaries, light troops and cavalry, who quickly ascended the ridge and took advantage of the high ground to drive the Romans back down the hills. Only the skill of the Aetolian cavalry ensured that the Roman soldiers withdrew in an orderly fashion, a testament to the quality of Rome’s Greek allies.
The Macedonians, excited at pushing back even a relatively small part of the Roman army, sent word to Philip that the Romans were in full retreat, and that the hour had come when he could strike a decisive blow. His eagerness for victory got the better of him, and Philip sent his entire right wing into the field to climb the ridge and finish off the Romans struggling in the valley below. Philip ordered his subordinate Nicanor to follow with the rest of the Macedonian army, primarily the left wing, as soon as possible. Seeing the Macedonians committing fully to battle, Flamininus also made ready his entire army, forming up his legions, the mainstay of the Romans’ military might. The proconsul gave a rousing speech, reminding the Romans that they had just repulsed the Macedonians from the mountain pass at Aoös and that the Macedonians were no longer the great warriors they had once been. Philip V, after all, was no Alexander. Flamininus then placed a squadron of elephants in front of his right wing, which he left in reserve, and took personal command of the left wing. At his arrival, the Roman troops who were already engaged took heart and began to push the Macedonians back up the hill once again.
The Roman legion at the time of Cynoscephalae was made up of maniples, groups of 120-160 men that could operate relatively independently and between which there were often gaps. The battle formation made by this type of legion was called the quincunx, or ‘chequerboard’, since the legion formed up in three staggered lines whereby the gaps between the maniples in one line would be offset by the maniples in the next line. When he was ready to make a general attack, our sources say that Flamininus had the light-armed troops who had so far been fighting the Macedonians withdraw between the gaps in the maniples, which is one of our only pieces of literary evidence concerning how the manipular legion worked on the field of battle. Sounding a terrifying battle cry, Flamininus then drove his legionary troops headlong against the Macedonian right. When Philip arrived at the summit of the ridge and saw that his troops had been far less successful than he had been led to believe, he took desperate measures in an attempt to compensate for having to fight on broken ground. He halved his front to make his formation deeper than it was wide and ordered his soldiers to stand more densely packed than usual, presuming that this would make his lines less likely to break. Levelling their spears, this dense phalanx charged downhill, supported on their wings by light-armed troops. A Macedonian phalanx was typically able to project the spear points of the first five ranks against the enemy. Each Roman, therefore, had to face five giant spear points being driven against him by soldiers charging from higher ground. Despite the presence of their commander, therefore, the Romans on the left began to be pushed steadily back.
Cynoscephalae Map 3: The first phase of the battle. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
As his army was faltering on his own left, Flamininus moved to the right wing in the hope of securing a victory from that quarter. He ordered the elephants on his right to charge against the Macedonian left. The Macedoniaian left, under the command of Nicanor, was thrust into battle hastily, before all the soldiers had time to crest the hill. The divisions of the phalanx were still moving into the field in column of march instead of line of battle, and had not yet spread out into attack formation. The charge of the huge beasts struck such terror in their enemies that the Macedonian left broke entirely and fled. A legionary tribune on the Roman right, whose name has not been recorded, saw that the enemy in front of him was thoroughly defeated, and thus broke off twenty maniples from the legion. These soldiers wheeled to their left to assault the victorious phalanx on the Macedonian right. The twenty maniples with the enterprising tribune appeared to the rear of the phalanx, on higher ground since the phalanx had pushed the Roman left a good deal down the hill. The phalanx, heavy with long spears and packed in a dense formation, was notoriously unable to about-face. The Romans thus made short work of the phalanx, slaughtering many. As would be made abundantly clear at Pydna thirty years later, the flexibility and divisibility of the legion gave it a great advantage over the terrifying yet unwieldy phalanx. Many scholars think hat this unnamed tribune’s action was so decisive and prescient that it probably originated with a command from Flamininus himself, who has suffered from his treatment in the literary sources.
Cynoscephalae Map 4: The second phase of the battle. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
When the Macedonians who were still rushing from their camp to join the battle saw that the Romans were everywhere victorious, they lifted their sarissas from the attack position and held them upright, a typical Macedonian gesture of surrender. Though Flamininus was told what this posture meant, his soldiers did not understand and so continued with the slaughter unabated. Once Philip saw that he had lost, he fled the field and made for Macedonia as quickly as he could, through the Vale of Tempe. We are told that 8,000 from the Macedonian army perished, while 5,000 were taken prisoner. The Roman side lost only 700. Humiliated, Philip was allowed to remain king, but was forced to abandon Greece entirely and pay Rome a huge indemnity. In the following year, Titus Flamininus attended the great Panhellenic games at Isthmia, where he declared to thunderous applause that the Greeks would henceforth be free, with the Romans as guarantors of that freedom. Rhetoric aside, the Romans were now irrevocably involved in Greek affairs, which would lead, within little more than half a century, to the total and direct control of Rome over all of Greece and Macedoniaia.
At Cynoscephalae the Romans and Macedonians had roughly equal numbers of soldiers. The Romans had slightly more, with an edge especially in cavalry, which was led by the skilled Aetolians, but Philip still had the flower of his phalanx, the military formation that had conquered much of the known world. Philip was also fighting much closer to home, which should have been a sizeable advantage. Flamininus, though, had won over many of Philip’s former allies, demonstrating that the promise of freedom, as well as the relatively restrained behaviour of the Roman soldiers in Greece, went a long way towards convincing the Greeks that they could do better than Philip. On the field of battle, however, diplomatic machinations often count for little. Due to chance as much as Flamininus’ prescient route into the plain of Thessaly, Philip was forced to deploy his phalanx on unfavourable terrain. Though he had the advantage of high ground for most of the battle, his entire phalanx was unable to form into one continuous line. When his right wing had been victorious because of its thunderous charge downhill, the flexibility of the Roman legion proved indispensable, since several maniples could be drawn off from the Roman right to attack the Macedonian phalanx in the rear. At Cynoscephalae, where the terrain – and Philip’s rush to follow up a tactical success in one small part of the battlefield – meant that the battle consisted of several scattered engagements at more than one point of the field, the legion had an insuperable advantage.
The Battle Site Today
At the northern edge of Zoodochos Pigi, a ruined church and a small cemetery overlook the village (N39° 22.072"; E022° 24.203"). This church has achieved fame since a Roman mile marker from the time of Trajan can be seen built into one of its columns, its inscription still easily legible, though now upside down. The church is important for the study of Cynoscephalae, since Hammond claimed to have located the outlines of a Roman camp just to the west of it. Walking along the dirt road that runs up the hill behind the church and cemetery, you can make out faint lines on the ground over which the power lines now extend, stretching towards the bottom of the small valley, where there is another dirt road and a concrete reservoir cap. These markings trace out an area that is roughly rectangular, and about 100 metres corner to corner. If Hammond is right, and these markings represent part of a Roman camp, then this almost certainly marks the spot where Flamininus and the Roman army were located on the night before and morning of the battle. We are told that Flamininus was camped near a shrine to Thetis, and the well-watered area of Zoodochos Pigi, which literally means ‘life-giving spring’, is as good a candidate as any for the location of this shrine. In addition to the mile marker, the church contains many other ancient marble elements, including fluted columns, which might indicate that an ancient structure was located on or very near this spot. (The modern village of Thetidio, named after the ancient shrine, is almost certainly too far east to be the ancient site.)
Fig. 12.1: View towards what Hammond identified as a Roman camp, visible as a square ditch on the hillside in the middle of the photo. Authors’ photo.
From behind the church, a series of ridges slope northwards towards the village of Chalkiades, some 3.5km distant. The high point of these ridges is about halfway between Zoodochos Pigi and Chalkiades, and obstructs the view between the two villages. The battle was probably fought along this high point (N39° 22.945"; E022° 25.077"), where Philip had left a rearguard after abandoning his planned march due to fog. The initial clash took place on these hills as Flamininus’ scout troops encountered Philip’s rearguard unexpectedly. From behind the church and standing at the high point, one can clearly see that these hills render the ground very broken as it slopes down from Chalkiades to Zoodochos Pigi, making sense of Philip’s initial reluctance to join battle here.
The Macedonian camp at the time of the battle was likely near Chalkiades (N39° 22.945"; E022° 25.077"). Chalkiades is at a higher elevation than Zoodochos Pigi, which explains why the sources portray the Macedonians as having the advantage of higher ground for most of the battle. At the tiny village of Kremasti, near the summit of the ridges, an ancient square block can still be seen in the churchyard, which Hammond suggests could have been from an ancient trophy (N39° 23.269"; E022° 24.486"). If so, the churchyard would be located at the crucial point in the battle, where the Macedonians were turned to rout. Thus, Kremasti probably represents the point at which the Roman right wing turned the still-disordered Macedonian left to flight. During the battle, therefore, the forces likely spread westward from the vicinity of Kremasti across 3km or so of the ridges.
The name Cynoscephalae has perplexed scholars for generations. Plutarch says that the place got its name because it featured several steep summits of hills lying close to one another and resembling dogs’ heads in their shape. Since no clear dogs’ heads in the terrain have been identified or agreed upon by scholars, several locations for Cynoscephalae have been proposed. While no smoking gun, the series of ridges along which we have placed the battle, following Hammond’s arguments, do indeed resemble the profile of the head of the type of dog common in ancient Greece, especially when viewed from points to the east and north-east such as Chalkiades. In the end, it is unlikely that there will ever be agreement as to which topographical features in this part of Greece most resemble dogs’ heads, but this series of ridges fits pretty closely the topographical descriptions given by the ancient sources.
Fig. 12.2: View of ridges on which the battle took place, looking north from Zoodochos Pigi towards Kremasti. Authors’ photo.
Fig. 12.3: View of ridges on which the battle took place, looking south from Chalkiades towards Kremasti and Zoodochos Pigi. Authors’ photo.
In addition to exploring the battlefield itself, it is important to track the movements of the two armies on the days before the battle, since these moves are crucial to pinpointing the location of the battle. It is well worth driving along the routes taken by the Romans and the Macedonians to reach Cynoscephalae, since this will afford a good sense of the geography and the strategic considerations of both sides.
The earliest skirmishes took place near the city of Pherae, the remains of which are located at the modern town of Velestino, just to the west of Volos and right off the National Highway. On the western edge of Velestino, follow the signs for the ancient acropolis, which today consists of substantial foundations of ancient fortification walls and towers on a prominent hill (N39° 22.889"; E022° 44.103"). We are told that Philip camped a few kilometres to the north of Pherae, while Flamininus camped roughly an equal distance to the south. Both generals sent out advance parties, which encountered one another on the hills and ridges above Pherae and fought a minor engagement. This clash likely took place on the high and broken ground visible to the west of the acropolis. In antiquity, the vicinity of Pherae was overgrown with trees and cluttered with the walls of agricultural plots, so Philip decided to break for country more favourable to his phalanx.
The sources say that Philip headed for the territory of Skotoussa, which was across the mountain to the west of Pherae that today is called Mavrovounion. Skotoussa itself has been identified as modern Ag. Triada (N39° 23.105"; E022° 33.455"), which is at the eastern edge of the rolling hills and plains extending to the north of Pharsalus. To reach Skotoussa from a position north of Pherae, Philip probably took the pass that runs between the two parts of Mavrovounion. Heading north on the small roads out of Velestino, turn south-west after 6.5km at the village of Agrokipio. The pass cuts through the mountain, passing Mikro Perivolaki before reaching Ag. Triada or ancient Skotoussa. The total distance travelled by Philip between his position north of Pherae and his goal of Skotoussa was around 17-18km, which Hammond argues could have been accomplished in a single day’s march, though Pritchett doubts that the Macedonians could have covered so much distance. The pass is not particularly rugged or challenging, so we tend to favour Hammond’s arguments. Flowing past Ag. Triada is a small river that Hammond identifies as the ancient Onchestos, which Philip is supposed to have reached after his first day of marching.
Seeing the Macedonians on the move, Flamininus also set out towards the west, taking roughly the same route as the modern Karditsa-Volos road between Nea Anchialos and Pharsalus. Setting out later than Philip, Flamininus reached Eretria on his first day, and camped there for the night. Eretria has been identified with the modern village of the same name, and the remains of its acropolis (N39° 17.366"; E22° 36.635") are on the prominent hill to the south-west of the modern village. The southern portion of Mavrovounion lies between Eretria and Ag. Triada, which ensured that the two forces, some 12km apart as the crow flies, could not see each other.
Polybius says that on the next day, Philip proceeded to Malambion in the territory of Skotoussa, while Flamininus moved his force to Thetideion, or a shrine to Thetis, in the territory of Pharsalus. Neither of these two places is known today, which is why scholars have proposed such a variety of locations for the battle. Once again, Hammond’s arguments make sense. As Philip supplied his army in the territory of Skotoussa, he would have wanted to protect the route north to Larissa, a major supply centre for the Macedonians. Accordingly, he probably moved westwards across the ridges extending from Mavrovounion, following roughly the route taken by the road between Ag. Triada and Ag. Konstantinos. Driving along this route, notice the line of hills and ridges to the south, towards the plain of Pharsalus, that would have continued to hinder the visual contact between the two armies.
Flamininus continued westward himself, but instead of heading to Pharsalus, he probably stayed to the north of the Enipeus River, making his way across the plain of Pharsalus, towards the hills across which Philip was marching. The modern town of Thetidio is probably not the location of the ancient shrine to Thetis. Rather, as Hammond argues, Zoodochos Pigi is a more likely candidate, and if there really are the remains of a Roman camp here, it is likely that Zoodochos Pigi is where Flaminius camped after marching some 20km over easy terrain. Though Philip and Flamininus were now only about 6km apart, a series of hills continued to separate them, ensuring that they did not see each other. These hills probably formed the boundary between the territories of Skotoussa and Pharsalus. The battle took place on the following day, after Philip marched only a short distance, which probably brought him to the area of modern Chalkiades, where we have placed his camp.
We suggest that visitors to the site drive first along the Karditsa-Volos road, past Eretria, and then north at Farsala to Zoodochos Pigi, approximating the route taken by Flamininus. After exploring the battlefield itself, follow in reverse the route of Philip by heading east at Chalkiades, driving past Ag. Konstantios, Ag. Triada and Mikro Perivolaki before turning south at Agrokipio and reaching Velestino to end the tour at ancient Pherae, where the fighting began.
Further Reading
Ancient Sources
–Polybius 18.19-27
This Greek historian of the second century BCE was taken to Rome as a hostage in 167 BCE, after the Third Macedonian War. He wrote his history in order to explain the rise of Rome to his fellow Greeks. He was an excellent military historian, and his accounts of topography and troop movements during battles are among the best that survive from antiquity. He provides the basis for all subsequent accounts of Cynoscephalae.
–Livy 33.3-10
This Roman historian of the late first century BCE and early first century CE based his account of the battle on the work of Polybius, adding a few colourful details about Philip’s character and motivations, but little in terms of substantive corrections to Polybius’ account. At one point, he egregiously mistranslates Polybius’ original statement to the effect that the Macedonians ‘lowered’ their spears by saying instead that they ‘dropped’ their spears to fight with swords.
–Plutarch, Life of Titus Flamininus 7-8
This Greek biographer of the first and second centuries CE included a brief account of Cynoscephalae in his biography of Flamininus, basing his version largely on Polybius’ original. He does add a few details about the name of Cynoscephalae itself, since he knew the topography well, having covered it in another biography (that of Pelopidas) in relation to an earlier battle at the same location (in 364 BCE).
Modern Sources
Books
–Kromayer, J., Antike Schlachtfelder in Griechenland, Vol. 2 (Berlin, 1907).
Though in German, Kromayer’s work offers very useful maps and illustrations. He places the battle slightly to the south-east of Chalkiades, closer to Hammond’s site than Pritchett’s.
–Pritchett, W.K., Studies in Ancient Greek Topography, Part II (Berkeley, 1969).
Based on a detailed reading of the sources and in-person investigation of the terrain, Pritchett places the battle near ancient Skotoussa, or modern Agia Triada, much further to the east than most other reconstructions. Pritchett’s account, however, does not seem to account adequately for the sources’ description of the topography of the battle itself.
–Walbank, F.W., A Historical Commentary on Polybius, Vol. 2 (Oxford, 1957).
The indispensable commentary on the battle’s most important ancient source, with a detailed discussion of the battle itself and earlier scholarly treatments. Walbank generally follows Kromayer’s reconstruction of the battle.
Articles
–Hammond, N.G.L., ‘The Campaign and Battle of Cynoscephalae in 197 BC’, JHS 108 (1988), pp.60-82.
Offering a challenge to all earlier treatments of the battle, Hammond proposes a new location for Cynoscephalae based on his reading of the sources and a detailed examination of the terrain. Hammond’s version of the events and location of the battle seems by far preferable to the others, and lines up with the ancient accounts rather closely.