Chapter 13
Introduction
The Macedonian phalanx, invented by Philip and perfected by Alexander, was instrumental in subduing much of the world, and spreading Greek culture and influence far and wide during the Hellenistic period. The charge of the Macedonian phalanx was thought to be unstoppable – and indeed it was on many occasions. But in 168 BCE, below the heights of Mt Olympus, the Roman consul Aemilius Paullus and his legions crushed the massive phalanx of Perseus, King of Macedonia and supposed descendant of Philip. The Battle of Pydna is important because it brought an end to decades of conflict between Rome and Macedonia, securing Roman dominion over Macedonia and proving a major step in Rome’s steady progress toward controlling the entire Mediterranean world. The battle is important for military history too, as it represents the prime example of legion versus phalanx, the military system of the new and rising power in the West against that of the once dominant but now fading empire in the East. In the end, the legion proved more adaptable and flexible, a combat system that was bound to endure for many more centuries as it forged and maintained the Roman Empire. Without the genius of Alexander, who relied on cavalry as much as infantry, the phalanx was fearsome but ultimately destined for obsolescence. The phalanx, however, did not yield its place easily. Sheer grit and determination on the part of Rome’s legionaries, accompanied by capable command and some good fortune, were required at Pydna in 168.
Directions to the Site
Pydna is probably the most complicated site covered by this book, primarily because there are at least three candidates for where the battle took place, two of which have excellent arguments behind them. The two strongest contenders for the battle site are located near the modern town of Katerini, about an hour’s drive along the National Highway (NH) from two major cities: Thessaloniki to the north and Larissa to the south. We recommend, however, that travellers stay in Litochoro, a charming mountain village in the foothills of Mt Olympus, just a few minutes south of the sites. Litochoro is where the main hiking trail for Mt Olympus begins, and in addition to stunning scenery, the village offers some fabulous dining, far different in character from the food served at typical seaside tavernas.
For the first site, championed by Pritchett, from Litochoro and points south, head north on the NH and take the exit for Nea Efesos. Going west to Nea Efesos, at the very start of the village turn right onto the road heading north, crossing the marked Aisonas River. Just to the west of here, the Aisonas splits into two smaller rivers, and Pritchett argues that the battle was fought in the plain between these two rivers. Continue on until reaching the outskirts of Katerini, then turn north to go along the banks of the northern of the two rivers. One can cross this river at several points to enter the battlefield itself. If you keep going along the northern river, once to the north of Katerini, turn left to go south along the highway towards Svoronos. Just past Svoronos, climb to the large white church on the right, from which you can get a good view of the entire battlefield stretching to the east. The highway running past the church continues along a pass around Mt Olympus, which was the spectacular route taken by Scipio and Fabius in 168, and is worth the hour or two to drive around it. An alternate site for the battle, suggested by Besios and Krahtopoulou, is found near Nea Chrani, off the NH just 5km north of Katerini. A good view of this plain is found at the location Besios and Krahtopoulou give for the Roman camp, on the hills rising to the south of Kato Agios Ioannis, 2km west of Nea Chrani. Ancient Pydna itself is found 11km further north along the NH, on a lovely seaside strip just south of Makrygialos. A third site for the battle, one advocated by Hammond, is found close to here. Ancient Pydna merits a visit for its beautiful location and the substantial remains of a Byzantine church.
Historical Outline of the Battle
Rome began to move towards a Mediterranean-wide empire in the third century BCE. Having already conquered most of Italy, it was the Punic Wars with Carthage that dragged Rome onto the world stage. A Phoenician city on the coast of North Africa, Carthage controlled the most powerful navy in the Western world, and was rich from the trade made possible by this navy. When Rome and Carthage came into conflict over Sicily in the First Punic War, Carthage was the odds-on favourite. For the next six decades, Rome and Carthage were locked in a life-and-death struggle over the span of two ruinous wars. In the First Punic War (264-241 BCE), the notoriously landlubbing Romans built a navy from scratch to beat the Carthaginians at their own game. During the Second Punic War (218-201), the great Carthaginian general Hannibal crossed the Alps into Italy, defeated the Romans at several bloody battles, including most famously Cannae in 216, and seemed destined to sack the city of Rome itself. Though the Romans, under the inspired leadership of the Scipio family, eventually defeated Hannibal in 202, in the immediate aftermath of Cannae no one would have foreseen a Roman victory. Those truly were dark days for the Republic, nearly cutting off Roman power at its root. In this context, the kingdom of Macedonia, heir to the legacy of Alexander the Great and a leading power in the Hellenistic eastern Mediterranean, chose to strike.
When Alexander died in 323, the giant empire he forged through force of arms was broken up among his top generals, leading to what scholars now call the Hellenistic, or ‘Greek-ish’, period. The major powers that emerged once the dust had settled after many years of warfare were the kingdom of Egypt, ruled by the Ptolemies; the Seleucid Empire, centred on Syria and the Middle East; the kingdom of Pergamum in Asia Minor, ruled by the Attalids; and the kingdom of Macedonia, controlled by the Antigonid dynasty. Though individually much smaller than Alexander’s empire had been, all of these powers were major players in the eastern Mediterranean for centuries, and as Rome gained prominence, these powers variously sought Roman alliance or fought major wars with Rome. The net result of Rome’s dealings with the Hellenistic kingdoms was total Roman control of the eastern Mediterranean, achieved finally with the fall of the last important Hellenistic monarch, Cleopatra, at the Battle of Actium in 31 BCE (also covered by this book). Rome’s wars with Macedonia were the beginning of Rome’s foray into the East.
The Antigonid monarch Philip V, ruler of Macedonia during the time of the Second Punic War, was not really a biological descendant of Philip II and Alexander the Great. Alexander’s family had been killed off by ambitious successors not long after Alexander’s death. But Philip V’s very name implies that his family crafted a public image as the true heirs of the legendary Macedonian conquerors who had forged the Hellenistic world. In the early third century BCE, Pyrrhus of Epirus, another Macedonian ruler, had fought several battles with Rome in Italy, and though he was tactically victorious on the field, his victories were too costly to be exploited strategically (hence the term ‘Pyrrhic victory’). Though by the time of Philip V Rome was much stronger than it had been in the days of Pyrrhus, Hannibal’s stunning success inflamed Philip’s ambition. Here was, he thought, an opportunity to succeed where Pyrrhus had failed, and curtail Rome’s growing power to secure lasting Macedonian control over Greece. He thus allied himself with Hannibal, which brought about the First Macedonian War (214-205). But, against all expectations, Rome emerged victorious, despite having to fight a two-front war against both Carthage and Macedonia. No major pitched battles were fought between the Romans and Macedonians in this war, but by the war’s end Rome had become involved heavily in the eastern Mediterranean, and began to forge a network of alliances with various Greek states, all officially in the name of stamping out piracy. When Philip threatened the sovereignty of Rome’s new allies in the east a few years after the first war ended, Rome sent a massive army to Greece to launch the Second Macedonian War (200-196). This war, culminating in Philip’s final defeat in a great battle at Cynoscephalae in 197, is the subject of the previous chapter in this book. The importance of the Second Macedonian War lies largely in the declaration made by the Roman consul Titus Flamininus that the Greeks were henceforth free, and that this freedom would be guaranteed by the Romans.
It was not long, however, before Philip’s son and successor, Perseus, attempted to reassert Macedonia’s authority over Rome’s Greek allies. Perseus was not satisfied with the humble position to which his country had been reduced, so he set about increasing his power and ability to challenge Rome militarily by amassing soldiers and weapons, as well as forging alliances with neighbouring regions including Epirus and Thrace. Eumenes II, the Attalid ruler of Pergamum and rival of Perseus for influence in the Greek world, denounced Perseus before the Roman Senate. According to Eumenes, Perseus was daily becoming a more dangerous foe and was drawing to himself a great number of Greek allies who were foolishly eager to join the Macedonians in opposition to Rome. Eumenes even raised the spectre of Perseus invading Italy itself, so great were the resources now at the Macedonian king’s command. After his report to the Senate, Eumenes barely survived an assassination attempt by the agents of Perseus. Perseus also contemplated poisoning various Roman officials. The Romans, therefore, eagerly prepared for war against such a villain. The Third Macedonian War began in earnest in 171 when the Roman consul Publius Licinius Crassus crossed over to Greece with a large army.
The first two years of the war did not go well for Rome. Perseus won a victory against the Romans in Thessaly, at a place called Kallinikos, which was a notable battle because it was fought almost entirely by light-armed troops and cavalry. During the following years, in 170 and 169, the Romans – under new consuls – continued the struggle largely through plundering raids and other minor actions. The Romans invaded Macedonia itself in 169, largely by means of several precipitous routes around the Olympus range, but failed to bring about a decisive victory and did not fight a single major pitched battle, much to the annoyance of the Roman Senate and people. The Romans eventually had to withdraw back into Thessaly, while Perseus took up a strong position on the north bank of the Elpeus River, which runs from the eastern slopes of Olympus to the coast near the modern village of Litochoro. For 168, the Romans were desperate to choose a leader capable of finishing the fight against Perseus. They chose Lucius Aemilius Paullus, a seasoned military commander who had served as consul once before.
Though initially hesitant to stand for the consulship, Aemilius was persuaded by the many throngs of Romans who regularly begged him to run. Our sources, always eager to impart a moral lesson from the days of Rome’s glorious past, agree that Aemilius demonstrated his staunch Roman virtues from the very beginning of his year in office. Traditionally, the new consuls gave a speech to thank the Romans for his election. Aemilius instead reminded the Romans that it was they who had sought him out, not the other way around, and that if anyone had any opinions as to the conduct of the war, rather than speaking to their fellow Romans in the safety of Rome, they should volunteer to give their advice to Aemilius himself while accompanying him on campaign. Once in Greece, he restored the discipline and proper chain of command among the soldiers stationed in the Roman camp, which was positioned on the opposite bank of the Elpeus from Perseus. Aemilius immediately won respect and admiration by fixing the Romans’ water-supply problems after having wells dug to collect the water flowing underground along the terraces emanating from Olympus. The new consul seemed destined to turn things around for the Romans. Livy tells us that the soldiers in the camp began to practise their swordsmanship and other skills intensely, thinking that under Aemilius’ command they would either win a glorious victory or die a glorious death.
Pydna Map 1. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
Our sources for the campaign and Battle of Pydna are primarily Livy and Plutarch, who, though writing in a much later period, base their accounts on now-lost sections of Polybius’ work. Polybius was a Greek contemporary of the Third Macedonian War, and one of the finest historians of the ancient world. His descriptions of battlefield topography are usually very detailed and much more useful for battle reconstruction than the accounts given by other historians. Judging by what is preserved in Livy and Plutarch, Polybius’ treatment of Pydna was no exception. Polybius’ primary rationale for writing his magisterial history was to explain the rise of Rome to his fellow Greeks. A battle such as Pydna, in which the phalanx that had dominated the Greek world for nearly two centuries was defeated by Roman legions, would obviously be of great importance to Polybius. He had a deeply personal interest in the outcome of the Battle of Pydna too: after the battle, Polybius himself was among the 1,000 captives from the Greek region of Achaea taken to Rome to ensure Achaea’s compliance with the new power in the Mediterranean. While some sections of Livy’s treatment of the battle are unfortunately lost, along with Polybius’ original text, we have an unusually rich description of the actions of the Pydna campaign and the relevant topography.
Topography played an important role in the Pydna campaign from the very beginning. Aemilius, with a force that Kromayer estimates to have numbered 33,400 infantry, 4,200 cavalry and twenty-two elephants, found Perseus in an advantageous position on the bank of the Elpeus, with a force of some 4,000 cavalry and nearly 40,000 infantry. The Elpeus, though largely dry in the summer months in which the campaign took place, still possessed formidable banks. Perseus had reinforced this natural obstacle with a series of fortifications and fearsome artillery weapons. Though Aemilius was pressured by various subordinate commanders to make a direct assault upon Perseus at the Elpeus, he refused, believing that the Macedonians’ fortified position was too risky to test in battle. At 60 years of age, Aemilius took several opportunities to remind his younger subordinates of the invaluable insight long military experience provides. Plutarch says that Aemilius waited calmly on the bank of the river for several days, and that never before had there been such silence when two massive armies were encamped so close to each other. Aemilius eventually settled on a course of action. Rather than risk a direct assault or naval attacks deep into Macedonia, as some were suggesting, he decided to try a bold encircling movement by sending a force around the precipitous passes to the west of Olympus, about which Aemilius learned from local guides.
Pydna Map 2: Three proposed locations for the battle. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
Livy says Perseus had also fortified and stationed troops along these passes, though Plutarch says the troops were only dispatched once Perseus learned of Aemilius’ flanking manoeuvre from a deserter. Whatever the case, Aemilius took every precaution to hide his true intentions from Perseus. Two resplendent commanders volunteered their services to Aemilius for this dangerous mission: Scipio Nasica, the son-in-law of Scipio Africanus, conqueror of Hannibal; and Fabius Maximus, Aemilius’ own son. These two commanders were told to withdraw with a force to Heracleum, a site on the coast a little to the south where the Roman fleet was stationed, to give the appearance of preparing a naval invasion of Macedonia to Perseus’ rear. Plutarch, relying on some actual correspondence of Scipio, states that this force consisted of 3,000 Italian allies, 5,000 Romans, 120 horsemen and some Thracians and Cretans. Once at Heracleum, the Roman force was to head inland to the passes around Olympus and attack any Macedonian forces stationed there at night. A night operation would both surprise the enemy and exploit the Roman tactical superiority in hand-to-hand combat, which is much more useful in the dark than the ranged weapons possessed by the Macedonian troops in the passes. Once the circuit of Olympus had been completed, Scipio and Fabius would enter the plain behind Perseus, thus surrounding him.
After this force was sent towards Heracleum, Aemilius unleashed his light troops against those of Perseus in the middle of the riverbed, to make Perseus think that this was the main point of the action and that the Romans intended to force their way across the river. In two days of intense fighting, both sides suffered many losses, especially the Romans who approached too near the enemy bank where artillery and other ranged weapons were unleashed upon them. On the second day, the Roman flanking force came upon a Macedonian contingent in the pass around Olympus and routed them. Scipio claimed to have killed a Thracian mercenary himself by skewering him with a javelin, an enviable feat for a Roman commander. Scipio and Fabius then entered the plain lying in front of modern Katerini, rendering Perseus’ position untenable. Despairing, Perseus hastily withdrew in the direction of the major city of Pydna, eventually resolving to make a new camp in front of Pydna to stand against the Romans. Perseus chose his ground carefully. There was a broad plain suitable for his fearsome phalanx. There were also hills and broken ground at the edge of the plain, radiating successively from Olympus, which would be ideal for light troops. The plain also had two rivers running through it, the Aison and Leukos, which, though mostly dry in the summer, would still be obstacles for the Romans. Reuniting with Scipio and Fabius, Aemilius led his army in battle array towards Perseus’ new position.
Pydna Map 3: Route of Scipio and Fabius around Olympus. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
Pydna was a major coastal city about 30km from Perseus’ initial position on the Elpeus. Hammond argues that Perseus’ camp and the battle, said to have been fought in front of Pydna, must have been close to Pydna itself, while most other scholars, including Kromayer and Pritchett, place the battle 18km south-west of Pydna, in the plain lying before modern Katerini and not too far from where Scipio and Fabius descended into the plain from Olympus. The site of Kromayer and Pritchett seems to agree with the ancient descriptions of the topography, and the sources give the impression that Aemilius reached Perseus’ position in a single day’s march, which would have been impossible had Perseus been as far as Pydna. Hammond nevertheless objects for a number of reasons, including the distance from Pydna itself, and its close proximity to another major Macedonian city, Dion. Why would a battle fought closer to Dion not have been called the Battle of Dion? Let us here consider a possible answer. The modern Aisonas River (formerly called the Mavroneri, but now named for the ancient Aison) flows between Dion and Pydna, much closer to the former than the latter. Perhaps the river marked the boundary between the respective territories of Dion and Pydna, and so Pydna controlled the entire plain for the many kilometres up to the river. Kromayer and Pritchett locate the main action of the battle on the Pydna, that is the northern, side of this river. Other ancient battles, including ones covered by this book, were fought quite a distance from the cities for which they are named. The decisive action at Plataea, for example, was fought much closer to Hysiai and Eleutherai than Plataea itself. The Battle of Pydna could have been named after the plain of Pydna, which was indeed ‘in front of ’ the city of Pydna. More recently, Besios and Krahtopoulou, basing their work on a geomorphological study of the region, split the difference and place the battle about halfway between the locations of Kromayer/Pritchett and Hammond, between two rivers that existed in antiquity but are no longer visible because of changes to the terrain over time. Further archaeological work – such as finding remains of the Roman camp – is needed to adjudicate between the views of Kromayer/Pritchett and Besios and Krahtopoulou, but in our view the site of Hammond can be ruled out.
When the Romans encountered Perseus, most of the soldiers and officers, including the battle-hungry Scipio, fresh from his splendid individual victory over a Thracian, wanted to fight immediately. For too long these aggressive warriors had sat idle on the banks of the Elpeus, staring across at their Macedonian enemies. Moreover, the Romans did not want Perseus to withdraw into Macedonia without fighting a decisive battle. Aemilius, however, was worried that his men had marched for too long in the heat of the summer, and would thus be fighting in a state of exhaustion against a fresh and rested enemy. He checked the eagerness of those under his command, explaining that he too would have been impatient for a fight as a young man, but his long experience counselled him against immediate battle. Arranging his forces in line of battle, he withdrew his soldiers into camp from the rear lines first, to hide his intentions from Perseus and provide cover in case the Macedonians attacked. The Romans camped for the night on the hill called Olokros, probably a ridge extending along the southern bank of the Leukos River, while Perseus and his men waited in the plain between the Leukos and Aison. The night was an ominous one: there was a lunar eclipse, about which Aemilius had forewarned his army. The Macedonians, on the other hand, were frightened by the strange events unfolding in the heavens. As the Macedonians worried that the eclipse meant that their king would soon fall, the Roman soldiers spent the night free of such fears, but frustrated that they had not been given a chance to fight. Aemilius knew that he could not check the spirit of his men for much longer.
The battle took place on the next day. The sources say that Perseus was not eager to begin the fight since the Romans were now rested and in good order, as opposed to their situation on the preceding afternoon, and the Romans were camped on high ground unsuitable for the advance of the phalanx. It is axiomatic of phalanx warfare that level ground is absolutely essential in order to maintain tight formation. Aemilius did not advance against the enemy straightaway either. Even though he had delivered a suitable rebuke to his overeager soldiers on the previous day, his control over the men threatened to evaporate if he delayed much longer. He did, however, spend much of the early part of the day in his tent, facing the enemy, in order to wait for the sun to pass into the west so that it would not shine in the faces of the Romans. When the time came to fight, the battle erupted over a loose pack animal, either by chance, according to Livy, or by design, according to Plutarch. The Romans and Macedonians had both posted guards along the Leukos River to protect those gathering water. A horse from the Roman lines broke free and ran to the opposite shore, pursued by a few Romans. Thracian soldiers in the service of Perseus attempted to capture the horse, and a fight broke out between these and the Romans who had sped across the river. The Romans managed to kill one of the Thracians and recapture the horse, but the fight began to escalate once the Thracians tried to avenge their fallen comrade. Aemilius, who very well might have set the horse free for such a purpose, saw that the struggle at the river was drawing in more and more troops and decided to order a general advance of his army. The Battle of Pydna had begun.
The pages of Livy that described the battle order of the two armies are missing, but scholars have suggested several possibilities. The basic plan listed on Kromayer’s map of the battle is reasonable and will be followed here. Perseus was camped between the Leukos and Aison rivers, closer to the Leukos, and before his camp his battle lines extended in a north-west to south-east direction parallel to the river. On his extreme right, where the ground was broken by the hills emanating from Olympus, Perseus stationed cavalry and light troops. Next to them were contingents of allies, followed by the mainstay of his Macedonian phalanx in the centre. On the left were more allies and his medium-armed troops, armed with long sarissas like the phalanx. Across the river, encamped on the high ground of Mt Olokros, was Aemilius. He placed his cavalry on his own left, to match the cavalry and light troops of Perseus. Next in line were the Romans’ Greek allies, followed in the centre by the legions. Roman allies were placed on the right, with a line of elephants in front of them. The Romans seem to have lined up right along the river, and the battle probably took place on both sides of the river, but with most of the action happening in the plain between the rivers. As the battle commenced, the Macedonians in their eagerness charged so boldly that the first soldiers to fall did so only a few hundred metres from the Roman camp.
When the two armies clashed, the Macedonians fixed their long sarissas against the shields of the Romans. The Romans, unable even with their shields and armour to stop the points of the Macedonian two-handed spears, were having a hard time of it. The Roman short sword, excellent in close combat, is useless when one is unable to get within a few feet of the enemy. Nowhere along the Macedonian line did any gap present itself to the Romans, who began to be repulsed. Plutarch says that fear gripped Aemilius when he saw the predicament of his army, a fear that he talked about frequently in later days. On the battlefield, however, Aemilius maintained a calm demeanour, and rode up and down his lines, at 60 years of age, without armour, as an exhibition of confidence. In desperation, the commander of the Roman-allied Pelignians hurled his unit’s standard in the midst of the Macedonian phalanx. The Pelignians hurled themselves recklessly against the wall of spears in an attempt to retrieve the standard, trying to shove aside the spear points with the bare hands. They managed only to be skewered. Once this front line had been annihilated, the contingents behind them were forced back onto Olokros, where the Roman camp lay. At this sight, Aemilius tore his garments.
The retreat to Olokros saved the Roman army. Here the ground is broken and uneven, and, stretched to the limit as they advanced to kill their enemy, the Macedonians began to have gaps form in their lines. On even ground, the charge of the Macedonian phalanx is irresistible, but where the ground causes gaps to form, the flexibility of the Roman legion has a distinct advantage. When he saw the Macedonian line beginning to lose cohesion, Aemilius ordered individual cohorts from his legions and allies to rush into the gaps and attack the Macedonian soldiers in the sides and rear, where they were virtually defenceless. The battle devolved into several scattered fights all along the line. The Romans, able at last to get in close with their enemy, hacked the Macedonians to pieces with their swords. For their part, finding their long sarissas useless in such combat, the Macedonians could resist only with their light wicker shields and small daggers. Roman legionaries practised with their swords for hours on end. At Pydna, this practice paid off, with gruesome results for Perseus’ army. On the right of the Roman line, a charge of the elephants and the allies made short work of the Macedonians arrayed against them. Livy says that the Macedonian defeat began in this sector, with the raging beasts trampling countless soldiers under foot.
Pydna Map 4: Battle at Kromayer/Pritchett site. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
Pydna Map 5: Battle at Besios/Krahtopoulou Site. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
All along the line, the soldiers of Perseus were being killed, by man and beast alike. The Macedonians were routed, and all but 3,000 picked troops turned to flee, some towards Pydna, some to the sea. The 3,000 elite troops were slaughtered, and those who fled to the sea, thinking that they would at least be taken prisoner by the Roman boats, were killed in great numbers by those on board. The sources say that on no day were more Macedonians killed by the Romans, perhaps as many as 25,000 according to Plutarch. When the Romans crossed the Leukos on the next day, the river was supposedly filled with blood. The Romans also took thousands of prisoners. When things began to go awry for the Macedonians, Perseus is said to have fled towards Pydna with his cavalry. Though first detailing Perseus’ cowardice, Plutarch gives an alternate account too in which Perseus withdrew only after fighting bravely and being injured. Whatever Perseus did personally in the battle, his power was broken and his kingdom was at the mercy of Rome.
After a short flight through several Macedonian cities, Perseus surrendered to Aemilius and was brought to Rome. Using Perseus as an object lesson in the changeability of fortune, Aemilius could not hide his disgust as Perseus wept before him. As a result of the Third Macedonian War, the Romans took some 150,000 slaves, a virtually unprecedented number, from Epirus, Macedonia’s ally in northeastern Greece. As already mentioned, they also secured 1,000 Achaean hostages, including the historian Polybius. Macedonia itself was broken up into four much smaller regions, none of which would ever really be capable of challenging Rome again. The final blow to Macedonia came a little over twenty years later when the Romans turned both Macedonia and Achaea into two new provinces. Perseus was thus instrumental in hastening Rome’s total conquest of Greece.
The Battle Site Today
As we have seen, the exact site of the Battle of Pydna is still in dispute among scholars. The various options proposed are in some cases nearly 20km apart, with battle lines in vastly different orientations. While we will provide some information concerning various interpretations of the battle, we will in the main follow the reconstructions of Kromayer/Pritchett and, alternatively, Besios and Krahtopoulou, which we find the most convincing and most faithful to both the ancient literary sources and the topography.
Fig. 13.1: A scene from the Battle of Pydna on the Aemilius Paullus Monument at Dephi. Authors’ Photo. © Hellenic Ministry of Culture and Sports / Ephorate of Antiquities of Phokis.
A good place to begin a tour of the Kromayer/Pritchett battlefield is in the vicinity of Nea Efesos, a small village just to the south of Katerini, along the southern banks of what is now called the Aisonas River, after the name given by the ancient sources to the Aison River closely connected to the battle (N40° 14.038"; E022° 30.862"). It is more likely, however, that the Aisonas is actually the ancient Leukos. Just to the north of Nea Efesos, this river forks into two smaller streams, flowing down from the foothills of Olympus. These streams adhere to the ancient descriptions of the Leukos and Aison, and based on our sources, the southern of the two streams should be identified as Leukos, while the northern would be the Aison. From the broader Aisonas at Nea Efesos, which still contained a modest amount of water when we visited it in early July, you can easily follow the roads north towards Katerini, and then proceed to the west along the banks of the Aison. Several smaller roads branch to the south, affording access to the plain between the two smaller rivers. Perseus’ camp was likely located in the middle of this plain, and the main action of the battle took place here (N40° 15.237"; E022° 29.617"), and further to the south along the banks of the Leukos, which the sources say was a modest river that had water about knee-deep when the battle was fought. The Macedonian line extended for 3-4km towards the broken and hilly ground between the rivers towards the north-west where the village of Svoronos now lies. Our ancient sources say that Perseus chose this ground because it afforded a broad plain for the phalanx, while continuous hills emanating from Olympus allowed the light troops to take advantage of high ground on the flanks. Plutarch tells us that the battle left the Leukos filled with blood, which the Romans noticed on the day after the battle when they crossed the river.
Extending to the west of Nea Efesos, on the southern bank of the Leukos, is a substantial stretch of foothills, possibly to be identified with what the ancient sources call Mt Olokros. The Roman camp was located on these foothills, 3-4km to the west of Nea Efesos on a commanding height some 60 metres above the elevation of the plain itself. At the base of this position, stretching along the southern bank of the Leukos, the Roman lines were extended to match the Macedonians on the other side of the river. Somewhere towards the eastern section of these lines, where the Romans and Macedonians were both drawing water, a Roman horse, either by accident or design, ran into the river towards the Macedonians’ Thracian allies on the other bank, eventually precipitating the general action. We are told that the Macedonians were so eager for battle that they rushed towards the Romans and came very close to the Roman camp when the battle first broke out. That is, the battle probably erupted on the northern bank of the Leukos, very close to the river itself.
On the Roman left wing were the cavalry, arranged opposite the lighter troops of the Macedonians, themselves taking advantage of the hilly ground on the Macedonian right. The Romans’ allies were next to the cavalry, while the legions, Rome’s mainstay, stretched in the centre and towards the right. Flanked by lighter, yet still sarissa-wielding units, the principal Macedonian phalanx was in the Macedonian centre. On the extreme Roman right, closest to Nea Efesos, more allies and the elephants were arrayed, and it was the elephants’ charge that first caused the Macedonian allies and lighter troops on the Macedonian left wing to flee, marking the beginning stage of the Macedonian rout and Roman victory.
In the centre and left of the Roman line, the Romans initially fared poorly against the sarissas of the enemy, and were forced to withdraw to Mt Olokros. The broken terrain near Olokros, in the north-west of the plain, and on both sides of the river since some Macedonians likely crossed the river itself to pursue the Romans who had withdrawn, made it difficult for the phalanx to maintain its formation. The Romans exploited the gaps that formed in the Macedonian line, eventually surrounding and cutting down various phalanx units and bringing about a general rout of the enemy. The Romans pursued the Macedonians for a great distance, probably in the direction of Pydna to the north, and towards the sea, to the north and north-west. We are told that many Macedonians reached the sea, and began to run and swim towards boats that were anchored off shore, only to be killed in great numbers by those who were aboard.
An excellent overview of this proposed battlefield can be gained by ascending to the prominent white church along the small highway running through the village of Svoronos, at the north-western edge of the plain (N40° 16.276"; E022° 26.148"). This church is located on the continuous hills that were to protect Perseus’ flank and afford ground to his light troops. Looking towards the south-east, you can see the battlefield itself, and the sea beyond. To the south are the hills making up Olokros, where the Romans were encamped on the other side of the Leukos. The highway running in front of the church continues to the west and south to cut around Olympus, and represents the encircling route taken by Scipio and Fabius to dislodge Perseus from his initial position on the Elpeus River. This rugged route around Greece’s highest peak is worth a drive for those not prone to motion sickness.
Since the Greek terrain has often changed dramatically since antiquity, Besios and Krahtopoulou undertook a geomorphological study of the plain to the northeast of Olympus, and concluded that there once were two prominent rivers running near the modern village of Nea Chrani, corresponding to the ancient descriptions of the Leukos and Aison rivers. This location, a plain between the modern villages of Nea Chrani, Korinos and Kato Agios Ioannis, would appear to be a suitable location for the battle, and much closer to Pydna to boot (N40° 18.902"; E22° 33.432"). Besios and Krahtopoulou argue that the Roman camp, and this Mt Olokros, are to be found on the hills to the south of Kato Agios Ioannis, reached by following the local roads about 2km west of Nea Chrani. These hills match the ancient descriptions of rolling hills extending on the flank of the battlefield, and afford a commanding view of the plain below (N40° 19.079" E22° 31.680"). We hope that future archaeological work can confirm the presence of a Roman camp at either location, putting to rest the scholarly debate.
Fig. 13.2: View of the pass around Olympus. Authors’ photo.
When things began to go poorly for the Macedonians, Perseus rode back towards Pydna, some 20km to the north of the Kromayer/Pritchett site and around 11km from the location of Besios and Krahtopoulou, just beyond the sprawling Kitros Salt Pit along the coast (N40° 23.859"; E022° 37.008"). Hammond locates the main action of the battle just to the west of Pydna itself (N40° 21.980"; E022° 36.124"), and suggests that the Roman and Macedonian lines stretched in a north-south direction, instead of the more north-west to south-east direction posited by Kromayer and Pritchett. Though the topography has doubtlessly changed since antiquity, it is still difficult to square Hammond’s location with the sources’ detailed description of the topography. For example, no substantial rivers are found near Pydna, nor are there hills adjoining the plain that match the sources as closely as do the hills near either Katerini or Kato Agios Ioannis. As with several other clashes in antiquity, the plain of Pydna, rather than the city itself, gave its name to the battle.
Fig. 13.3: View of the Besios/Krahtopoulou battlefield, looking east from the Roman camp towards the sea. Authors’ photo.
Further Reading
Ancient Sources
–Livy 44.33-42
A Roman historian of the age of Augustus, Livy based his account of Pydna on now-lost sections of the work of Polybius, a Hellenistic Greek historian who sought to explain the rise of Rome to his fellow Greeks. Polybius was an excellent historian, especially on military matters, but Livy’s passage on the battle itself unfortunately suffers from significant missing sections in the manuscripts.
–Plutarch, Aemilius Paullus 11-22
This Greek biographer of the first and second centuries CE also based his account of the Pydna campaign on the work of Polybius. Plutarch’s text is more complete than Livy’s, filling in some major gaps concerning the progress of the battle itself. Plutarch’s description of the battle, though, offers too little detail to satisfy military historians.
–Cassius Dio 9.22-23 (epitome of Zonaras)
The relevant sections of the work of this second- and third-century CE Roman historian are preserved only in the epitome of Zonaras, a Byzantine scholar. Though offering some information on the campaign as a whole, there is virtually no detail preserved concerning the battle.
Modern Sources
Books
–Lendon, J.E., Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity (New Haven, 2005).
Providing a lively account of the battle for popular audiences, Lendon also offers useful notes and a bibliographic essay for further reading.
–Pritchett, W.K., Studies in Ancient Greek Topography, Part II (Battlefields) (Berkeley, 1969).
A good, first-hand survey of the region of the battle, and a very useful summary of previous work on the battle and the campaign, including the influential study of Kromayer. Pritchett places the battle several kilometres away from Pydna itself, just south of the modern town of Katerini and north of the modern village of Nea Efesos, on the foothills emanating from Mt Olympus. Pritchett’s location for the battle is plausible.
Articles
–Besios, M., and Krahtopoulou., A., ‘Landscape History of Northern Pieria’, To Archaiologiko Ergo stē Makedonia kai Thrakē 15 (2001), pp386-400.
Based on a geomorphological study of the Pierian Plain to the northeast of Olympus, this article plausibly suggests a location for the battle at a midpoint between the reconstructions of Kromayer/Pritchett and Hammond.
–Hammond, N.G.L., ‘The Battle of Pydna’, JHS 104 (1984), pp.31-47.
Hammond disagrees with Pritchett and other earlier scholars, and situates the battle several kilometres further north, just outside of the town of Pydna itself. Hammond offers a good summary of previous views, but his location for the battle is ultimately unconvincing and fails to make adequate sense of the topographical details provided by the sources.