13

Alexander’s Image in the Age of the Successors

Alexander Meeus

The history of Alexander the Great did not end with his death.¹ His generals, striving for personal power in the vacuum he left, immediately saw the benefit of exploiting his name. Many scholars, however, hold that in the era of the Successors Alexander was rather unpopular, and that his father Philip was the king the Diadochi tried to connect themselves to. Cassander is especially assumed to have promoted Philip’s memory while denigrating Alexander’s. These scholars presume that a distinction was made between Philip’s branch of the royal family and Alexander’s. The main advocate of this view is Malcolm Errington (1976: 145–51), but others have put forward similar arguments.² In discussing the various marriage proposals to Alexander’s sister Cleopatra, Errington (1976: 151–2) writes:

Cassander, who would inevitably have been most concerned by any attempt to exploit Cleopatra, decided to build his influence and power on Philip and the Argead house in general rather than on Alexander in particular – which may indeed, have possibly been the attraction of Cleopatra all along. His lasting marriage with Philip’s daughter Thessalonice, his restoration of Thebes, and his treatment and finally murder of Alexander IV and Roxane after Olympias had already been removed, his honourable burial of Philip Arrhidaeus, Eurydice and Cynane all point in the same direction.

One may well wonder whether the distinction between the two branches of the family so emphatically stressed by Errington makes sense. After all, Alexander was the son of Philip, and thus belonged to the same family branch.

In this essay I shall first analyze the evidence for the popularity of the Argead dynasty with the Macedonian people, mostly the soldiers, in the age of the Successors, also investigating whether there are any traces of a preference for Philip or Alexander. After that, I shall look at the use the Successors made of the names of Philip and Alexander in their quest for legitimacy.

Argead popularity among the Diadochi generally seems to be underestimated. One reason for this is that most of the Diadochi are considered separatists who were not interested in maintaining Alexander’s empire.³ This opinion mostly affects the interpretation of Alexander’s image, since, if this is so, he need not have been as important as his father, especially in Macedon itself. In the last decades several scholars have recognized that there was no opposition between separatist and unitarist Successors.⁴ If a Successor had wanted to control Alexander’s entire legacy, one would have expected him to try to establish some sort of connection with the late king. This problem exceeds the scope of the present essay, but it is clear that it is a factor which should be taken into account when investigating how the Diadochi used the names of their Argead predecessors.

Another question beyond the scope of this essay is the breadth of popularity Philip and Alexander enjoyed before that fateful day in June 323. Events such as the Cleitus episode or the mutiny at Opis show that there is much to be said about this issue.⁵Alexander’s dealings with the Persians seem to be the main problem in this respect. It is clear that many Macedonians resented Alexander’s orientalization policy,⁶ but things might have changed somewhat when the king died. The chaos after his death may well have inspired Macedonians to remember Alexander’s reign in a more positive way. The generals might even have realized the need to give the Persians some part in the administration of the empire. The often repeated view that after Alexander’s death all the marshals except Seleucus repudiated their Persian wives is ill-founded.⁷ Seleucus is the only one we know of, but on the other hand, only in Craterus’ case is divorce attested.⁸ With hindsight this might seem a natural thing for Alexander’s successor in Asia to have done,⁹ but Seleucus had decided to stay married to Apame long before he knew he was going to establish an Asian empire or even that he would become satrap of Babylonia. In spite of their initial lack of popularity, Alexander’s half-Asian sons Alexander and Heracles did not fail to attract popular support later (see below). Curtius (10.10.13) claims that Alexander’s body was embalmed by Egyptian and Babylonian priests and the Diadochi in Babylon seem to have decided to bury their late king at Siwah.¹⁰ Both Leonnatus and Craterus, and maybe some of the other Successors as well, tried to imitate Alexander’s persona (see further below). For example, they seem not to have shunned the Persian elements of Alexander’s attire.¹¹ In the epigram accompanying Craterus’ lion hunt monument in Delphi, Alexander is called Asias basileus, in this context a highly remarkable statement for a Macedonian traditionalist.¹² Peucestas entertained a very close relationship with the Persians, and his example was followed by Ptolemy, Seleucus, Alcetas, and Eumenes.¹³ Nor do the Successors seem to have been as reluctant to work with Asian and Egyptian troops as scholars have often thought.¹⁴ Indeed, any astute politician would recognize that one cannot completely ignore the major part of the population. From all this, it should be clear that the attitude of the Macedonians toward the conquered peoples after Alexander’s death is a problem that begs further study and a more balanced analysis. In any case, any putative resentment of Alexander’s orientalization cannot be used as an argument to dismiss a priori the possibility of his popularity after death.¹⁵

The reactions to Alexander’s death are the first element to consider. The sources present two opposite versions. According to the first, transmitted by Arrian (7.26.1), Curtius (10.5.1–16, 10.6.3) and Justin (12.15.2–3), the Macedonians grieved over their king as he lay dying and after he had died. The second version is found in Justin’s rather long description of the reaction to Alexander’s death (13.1.7–8, 2.1), where he states that the Macedonians were delighted at his passing. Since this contradicts his own comments elsewhere, most likely this is Justin’s own rhetorical and dramatic elaboration.¹⁶ No other source mentions any joyful sentiments among the Macedonians. The lack of enthusiasm for Roxane’s child can be explained by the fact that it would be half-Asian and that it was unborn. The uncertainty was no attractive prospect for the soldiers being so far from home without a leader.¹⁷ This is one of the reasons why they even seemed prepared to accept Perdiccas as king, and it does not necessarily tell us anything about their affection for the Argeads or Alexander in particular.

The soldiers’ support for Arrhidaeus’ accession should not be seen as an indication of Philip’s popularity over Alexander.¹⁸ The troops wanted a leader as soon as possible, and within the Argead house there was no other choice. With Arrhidaeus on the throne under the supervision of a capable regent, their concerns for the immediate future would be gone. The decision to rename their new king Philip clearly indicates Macedonian reverence for Philip II, but need not be the result of any dislike of Alexander.¹⁹ The soldiers’ enthusiasm for the incapable Arrhidaeus as ruler of their empire does show their strong loyalty to the Argead clan (Curt. 10.7.15).

Alexander’s body and his relics had a high symbolic value during the struggle in Babylon. Curtius (10.6.4) describes how in the first meeting after the king’s death Perdiccas had Alexander’s throne placed clearly in view, with Alexander’s diadem, robe, and arms displayed on it.²⁰ Then he added the dead king’s signet ring, a gesture probably even more theatrical than Curtius’ description of it, but one involving an evident message: Perdiccas’ claim to preeminence as Alexander had given him the ring.²¹ The whole scene apparently made a deep impression on those present.²² As the meeting proceeded, Aristonus proposed to appoint Perdiccas king because Alexander had given him his ring, and many Macedonians agreed with him (Curt. 10.6.16–18). Surely the view that Perdiccas enjoyed Alexander’s preference was not the only reason for the success of Aristonus’ proposal. If Perdiccas became king, the Macedonians at least had a capable leader to solve the crisis caused by Alexander’s unexpected death.²³ It proved impossible, however, to reach a consensus acceptable to both the nobles and the common soldiers, and for a time the threat of civil war was very real. The elite retreated to the chamber where Alexander’s body lay, and the first struggle over the king’s remains ensued, in which the nobles had to yield to the numerical superiority of the rank and file (Curt. 10.7.16–19).

The episode of the Hypomnemata likewise testifies to the feelings the Macedonians had for Alexander. Diodorus (18.4.3) writes that Perdiccas did not want to take a decision which might detract from Alexander’s glory on his own:²⁴

But that he might not appear to be arbitrarily detracting anything from the glory of Alexander, he laid these matters before the common assembly of Macedonians for consideration.²⁵

According to Diodorus (18.4.6), the Macedonians cancelled Alexander’s last plans, although they thought favorably of them:

When these memoranda had been read out, the Macedonians although they applauded the name of Alexander, nevertheless saw that the projects were extravagant and impracticable and decided to carry out none of those that have been mentioned.

Justin provides further testimony to Alexander’s popularity with the soldiers when discussing the Argyraspids (14.2.7):

But after Alexander the Argyraspides had little respect for any leader, for after all the memories of the great king, they thought it an indignity to serve under others.

Although this is obviously a rhetorical exaggeration, and the Silver-Shields did serve under other generals, it is not unlikely that such sentiments existed among the Macedonians.²⁶ Having remained loyal to the Argead house, they might well have been filled with nostalgia for the days when they were actually led by their kings instead of regents or other officers. Moreover, the Argyraspids’ obedience to the generals was often qualified and their support of Eumenes clearly resulted from Polyperchon’s role as regent for the Argeads, and Eumenes’ display of respect for Alexander.²⁷

The continuing support for the Argead cause is indeed proven by many events. In 322 Philip’s daughter Cynnane crossed to Asia in order to marry her daughter Adea to King Arrhidaeus. Perdiccas felt his power threatened and had Cynnane killed, thus enraging the Macedonian soldiers. The only way to placate them was to let Adea marry Arrhidaeus after all.²⁸ Errington (1976: 146) argues that this incident is another proof that “direct blood-relationship to Alexander was at first less important in practice to influential sections of Macedonian opinion than the general factor of relationship to the royal house of the Argeads, in particular with Philip.”

I have already pointed out that this is a false dichotomy, and in no way does the event suggest anything about a lack of interest for Alexander. Moreover, Polyaenus’ account (8.60) of Cynnane’s expedition explicitly says that the princess was regarded as related to both:

When Alcetas opposed her with his force, the Macedonians, upon seeing Philip’s daughter and Alexander’s sister, felt ashamed and changed their minds.

Furthermore, such negative response from the Macedonians to the murder of an Argead seems to have been the normal reaction in all instances. When Cassander had Olympias killed, he was afraid of the reaction of the people (D.S. 19.52.4), even if Alexander’s mother had become less popular because of her harsh and violent actions (D.S. 19.11.9; Just. 14.6.1–2). Later, when he eliminated Alexander IV and Roxane, he concealed it (D.S. 19.105.2). Antigonus acted in the same way after the death of Cleopatra (see further below), trying to blame others and honoring her with a royal burial (D.S. 20.37.6). Just like Cynnane’s, the publicly known royal murder of Thessalonice backfired immediately (Plu. Demetr. 37.2). In Triparadeisus Adea, now named Eurydice, successfully used her influence on the soldiers against the regents Peithon and Arrhidaeus, and even Antipater had problems asserting his authority under her attacks. If a young girl had such an effect on the army, it is clear that the Argeads meant a lot to them.²⁹

In 318 Ptolemy sent messengers to the Macedonians urging them not to obey Eumenes, who had been sentenced to death by the Macedonian army, but they could not be convinced, because the royal house had sanctioned the Cardian’s appointment:

But no one paid attention to him because the kings and Polyperchon their guardian and also Olympias, the mother of Alexander, had written to them that they should serve Eumenes in every way, since he was commander-in-chief of the kingdom. (D.S. 18.62.2)

It is remarkable, however, that when a little later Antigonus did the same (D.S. 18.63.2), the Macedonians did not ignore his orders with the same determination, and even they were in great dismay. The only plausible reason for this seems to be that Antigonus threatened them with punishments if they did not do as he asked, while in Ptolemy’s case such intimidation is at least not mentioned by Diodorus. In any case, allegiance to the royal house again prevailed, in spite of the soldiers’ fear of Antigonus.³⁰

Olympias was held in high esteem because she was the wife of Philip and the mother of Alexander. Both kings are often mentioned when our sources explain the respect for Olympias. Thus, when describing the proceeding of Perdiccas’ council on the eve of the First Diadoch War, Justin (13.6.11–12) says:

Some were in favour of transferring the theatre of operations to Macedonia, the very source and heart of the empire: there they would have Olympias, mother of Alexander, to add significant support to their cause, as well as the favour of the citizens because of the names of Alexander and Philip.

Cassander, when looking for a way to get rid of Alexander’s mother, tried to convince the families of those who had fallen victim to Olympias’ harsh and violent conduct to accuse her in front of an assembly of the Macedonians. At the same time he also sought other means to kill her, because he was afraid that the people would not condemn her:

As Olympias, however, refused to flee but on the contrary was ready to be judged before all the Macedonians, Cassander, fearing that the crowd might change its mind if it heard the queen defend herself and was reminded of all the benefits conferred on the nation by Alexander and Philip, sent to her two hundred soldiers who were best fitted for such a task, ordering them to slay her as soon as possible. (D.S. 19.51.4)

In 317 Adea-Eurydice was ready to face Olympias in battle, but her soldiers went over to Olympias before the fighting even began. The sources explain this event in the same vein: Diodorus (19.11.2) gives only Alexander’s memory as the reason, while Justin (14.5.10) says that it was Philip’s memory or Alexander’s greatness. Both passages seem to stem from the same source which actually mentioned both Alexander and Philip.³¹

Some time after the peace of 311 the popular support for Alexander IV’s personal rule increased to such an extent that Cassander saw it as a serious threat and had the boy secretly eliminated. Not much later, about 309, the same happened to Heracles when Cassander feared that his troops would join the cause of the young pretender. Justin, who seems to have confused the deaths of both boys, expressly says that the name of Heracles’ late father was the reason for the support he received.³²

Even in the later years of the Diadochi the names of Philip and Alexander were still remembered. When describing how Demetrius as king of Macedon refused to hear petitioners, Plutarch (Demetr. 42.3) says:

And they called to mind, or listened to those who called to mind, how reasonable Philip used to be in such matters, and how accessible.

Although variants of the accompanying anecdote of the old woman telling Demetrius not to be king if he had no time to listen to the people are also told of Philip himself, Antipater, and Hadrian,³³ Demetrius’ inaccessibility and the perceived contrast with Philip might well be historical. Bosworth has shown that this attitude toward his subjects probably was one of the reasons why Demetrius lost popular support.³⁴ It is not surprising that the Macedonians referred to Philip rather than to Alexander in this context: Philip was the king they had known so well, while Alexander had spent his period of government almost entirely on campaign, far away from those who had stayed in Macedon. At any rate this episode in Plutarch need not mean that Alexander was less popular: the Macedonians in the motherland simply were less familiar with his practices in hearing the people.

Yet another story in Plutarch shows that the Macedonians still thought highly of Alexander at this time. Set in the context of the war between Demetrius and Pyrrhus c.290, the Macedonians scorned Demetrius’ efforts to imitate Alexander’s actions and images, preferring Pyrrhus who showed himself equal to Alexander’s battlefield glories.³⁵ Such a judgment clearly argues for the respect of later generations for Alexander’s achievements.

Thus, the sources provide no evidence for the view that the Macedonians would have preferred Philip over Alexander. They seem to have had affectionate memories of both kings. Although other factors, such as the prospect of success and loot, were important as well, it is clear that allegiance to the royal house still influenced the Macedonian soldiers in their choice of whom to side with. Therefore, it would be rather surprising if the Successors did not use a positive image of both of them in their propaganda. I shall now consider how the Diadochi used the names of their Argead predecessors in their wars over Alexander’s empire.³⁶

Confirmation of Plutarch’s statement that Craterus and Leonnatus among the Diadochi modeled themselves after Alexander is found in two fragments of Arrian (Succ. F12, F19). Given that Plutarch mentions a comparison between Pyrrhus and other generals, we can assume that some of the Successors who survived into the third century also desired to imitate Alexander’s image. Such flamboyant displays are clear indication that the Diadochi deemed a connection with Alexander to be useful.

One of the most important means for political exploitation of Alexander’s memory was his body. The one who could bury the dead king legitimized himself as the true heir to Alexander.³⁷ We have already seen that immediately after Alexander’s death a row between nobles and infantrymen ensued around his body. Two years later, when Alexander’s funeral carriage was ready to be transported to the king’s final resting place, the struggle became more serious. The Babylonian settlement stipulated that Alexander was to be buried at Ammon’s sanctuary in Siwah. It seems, however, that in the mean time Perdiccas had decided to take the royal remains to Macedonia, to entomb him at the traditional burial spot at Aegae.³⁸ Ptolemy, however, was in contact with Arrhidaeus, the man entrusted with the task of escorting the funeral cortege. On arrival at Damascus, he delivered the body to Ptolemy who was waiting for him there. Perdiccas sent out an expedition to regain possession of the dead king, but his men came too late (Arr. Succ. F24.1). Ptolemy buried Alexander in Memphis, and later transferred his body to Alexandria.

Many scholars have discussed the significance of this event to both Perdiccas and Ptolemy, and they usually do not attribute the same motives to the satrap of Egypt as to the regent. While Perdiccas is thought to have aimed at legitimizing his personal power over the entire empire, Ptolemy’s goal is mostly interpreted as neutralizing the important symbol of the empire’s unity or substantiating his claim to rule the Ptolemaic empire.³⁹ The last notion is especially anachronistic: in 321 there was no Ptolemaic empire. Although Ptolemy was clearly striving for the establishment of a personal power base in Egypt, to the outside world his territory remained a satrapy like any other and his authority that of any other satrap. Moreover, at a time when most people must still have considered Alexander’s realm one united empire, it would have been ridiculous to use the most powerful political symbol there was to legitimize one’s rule over such a small portion of it. It is hard to see how in the agonistic Macedonian society anyone would have taken Ptolemy seriously if he claimed to be the most worthy to succeed to Alexander and to surpass all his rivals, while at same time he limited his rule to Egypt alone. After the successful hijacking of Alexander’s body, Ptolemy held games and sacrifices in honor of the deceased king, and many soldiers decided to join his cause. Diodorus lists Ptolemy’s honoring of Alexander as one of the reasons for his increased appeal (D.S. 18.28.4–6). Perdiccas, however, did not leave it at this. Although he had planned to depose Ptolemy before, he now seems to have considered an expedition against Egypt an absolute priority (Arr. Succ. F24.1). The propagandistic value of Alexander’s body was too high to let a rival exploit it.

The sources often note that so and so had campaigned with Alexander. Such phrases as tn Alexandr synestrateumenn not only distinguished such individuals for their military experience, but also because of the status the claim provided.⁴⁰ The career of Lysimachus testifies strongly to the usefulness of the claim of having campaigned with Alexander. Bosworth has convincingly argued that before the battle of Ipsus in 301 Lysimachus did not have a strong foundation for his claim to kingship other than the services he had rendered to Alexander during the Asian campaign. That his kingship was accepted nonetheless shows once more how strong the effect of a connection to Alexander was.⁴¹

The following example illustrates how the Successors made use of this distinction. In 317 a large coalition of satraps from the eastern parts of the empire together with Eumenes and the Argyraspids was ready to fight it out with Antigonus. In an army with so many generals, however, tensions unavoidably arose about who was to be in charge:

Peucestes thought that because of the number of soldiers who followed him on the campaign and because of his high rank under Alexander he ought to have the supreme command. (D.S. 19.15.1)

In the end Alexander’s memory did offer the solution, but certainly not as Peucestas would have imagined. Eumenes came up with the idea of holding daily meetings in a tent passing for Alexander’s.⁴² Thus all would participate in the decision-making process as peers, with Alexander watching over them. Every morning a sacrifice was offered to the deceased king.⁴³ Clearly, Eumenes was not so much concerned with reverence for Alexander as with finding a way to end the power struggle to his advantage. However, what matters for our purpose is that the appeal to Alexander’s memory apparently did not miss its effect, as Eumenes’ proposal was accepted. Peucestas, not giving in so easily, tried to outdo the Cardian by lavishly feasting the army in a setting clearly inspired by Alexander’s mass marriage ceremony at Susa, with the guests sitting in concentric circles.⁴⁴In the middle were placed altars “for the gods and Alexander and Philip” (D.S. 19.22.3).

Eumenes claimed that the idea for the meetings in Alexander’s tent came from the deceased king himself, who had appeared to him in a dream.⁴⁵ This was not the only time Alexander came to Eumenes in his sleep, and Pyrrhus, Demetrius, and Seleucus also had dreams of Alexander appearing to them.⁴⁶ The dreams served the purpose of showing that Alexander was on one’s side, and not on that of their adversaries. In Demetrius’ vision, the late king asked him the Antigonid watchword for the battle at Ipsus. Upon hearing that it was “Zeus and Victory,” Alexander went to the other side because they welcomed him, implying that their watchword included his name. For their battle in Cappadocia, both Eumenes and Craterus also had watchwords with Alexander’s name in them (Plu.Eum. 6.6).

Another story about Eumenes is very instructive. The sources claim that after Antipater’s death, Antigonus, becoming more ambitious, aimed at gaining control over the whole of Alexander’s realm, and deemed it very useful to have a friend like Eumenes to help him achieve this goal.⁴⁷ The Cardian, however, had been condemned to death and Antigonus was besieging him. The latter thus decided to raise the siege and release Eumenes if he would join him. Antigonus prescribed a formula according to which Eumenes had to swear loyalty to him, but the clever Greek made up his own oath pledging allegiance to Olympias and the kings as well. He asked the Macedonians which of the oaths was more just and they preferred his version.⁴⁸ There are many problems surrounding this story, and its historicity has been challenged.⁴⁹ Even if a fabrication, it is telling that someone deemed it credible that the Macedonians would indeed prefer an oath of loyalty to the royal house and Antigonus instead of to Antigonus alone. It may also be argued that the source aimed to show Eumenes in the best possible light by claiming that the Cardian was loyal to the dynasty.

Ptolemy, a true master of propaganda, reached for his pen to display his connection with Alexander. Nowadays, it is almost generally accepted that he had a political axe to grind in writing his Alexander history.⁵⁰ One aspect of his perhaps not so hidden agenda was to show how important a part he had played in Alexander’s expedition and how close he had been to the king. Although this is not generally accepted, in my opinion Bosworth’s recent demonstration that the so-called Liber de morte is also a product of Ptolemaic propaganda is convincing.⁵¹ The included fake Alexander testament presents Ptolemy as the only one who has remained truly loyal to Alexander’s will in order to exalt him above all the other Diadochi.

In the declaration of Tyre in 315 Antigonus exploited Macedonian sentiment for the dynasty by persuading them to convict Cassander of assorted crimes. Antigonus accused him of having married Thessalonice by force, of murdering Olympias, and of maltreating Roxane and Alexander IV (D.S. 19.61.1–3). If the Macedonians did not think highly of Alexander, it seems they would have cared even less about the fates of his mother, wife, and son.

When Perdiccas conceived the plan to marry Cleopatra, his main motivation was that she would bring him the support of the Macedonians (D.S. 18.23.3). If Diodorus’ testimony (20.37.3–4) is valid, the same thought inspired all leading men after Alexander’s death who wooed Cleopatra at one time or another:

She was the sister of Alexander the conqueror of Persia and daughter of Philip, son of Amyntas, and had been the wife of Alexander who made an expedition into Italy. Because of the distinction of her descent Cassander and Lysimachus, as well as Antigonus and Ptolemy and in general all the leaders who were most important after Alexander’s death, sought her hand; for each of them, hoping that the Macedonians would follow the lead of this marriage, was seeking alliance with the royal house in order thus to gain supreme power for himself.

There is no reason to doubt Diodorus’ statement about the number of proposals Cleopatra received. We know Ptolemy wanted to marry her, because she was killed when attempting to reach him (D.S. 20.37.3–5). Antigonus had Cleopatra in his power for many years (D.S. 20.37.3–5) and it is very likely that he or his son wanted to marry her as well. No further information is available on Cassander and Lysimachus, but the former married another daughter of Philip, Thessalonice (D.S. 19.52.1–2; Just. 14.6.13), and it is not unlikely that he would have aimed at Cleopatra first. Besides these men, Leonnatus (Plu. Eum. 3.9) and Perdiccas (D.S. 18.23.3) also aimed at marrying Cleopatra.

Some scholars have questioned Cleopatra’s importance as none of the Successors actually married her and Antigonus eventually had her killed.⁵² There might have been more to it, however.⁵³ Cleopatra was not left unmarried because nobody wanted her, but because two potential husbands, Leonnatus and Perdiccas, died before any marriage could take place. With Ptolemy, it was Cleopatra who met a violent death before she reached the bridegroom. In the cases of Lysimachus, Cassander, and Antigonus, Cleopatra might well have refused the proposals, deeming them not in her own interest. Some hold that Antigonus had her killed because it did not really matter whether she was alive or not,⁵⁴ but the reason seems rather to be that it mattered too much whom she married to allow her to marry a rival. Similarly, Alexander’s sons Alexander and Heracles were killed because their existence was considered a threat, due to the popular support they attracted from the Macedonians. In the context of Eumenes’ visit after Triparadeisus Justin (14.1.7–8) confirms that Cleopatra held such prestige:

He [Eumenes] next moved on to Sardis and Alexander the Great’s sister, Cleopatra, with the intention of using her influence to secure the loyalty of his centurions and senior officers, who would think that royal authority rested on the side favoured by Alexander’s sister. Such was the respect that Alexander’s greatness commanded that even women were used as a path to the prestige conferred by his hallowed name.

The battle of Ipsus certainly did not mark an end to the political usefulness of the memory of Philip and Alexander. When Demetrius Poliorcetes seized Macedonia in 294, Justin (16.1.12–17) mentions a speech in which Demetrius argued that he had the best claim to the throne of Macedon because his father Antigonus had served with Philip and Alexander on all their campaigns and had held the guardianship for Alexander’s children.⁵⁵ Demetrius also argued that Cassander’s sons were deserving of their fates because their father had brought the Argead dynasty to extinction, an argument which features in Plutarch’s account (Demetr. 37.2), and,

if the spirits of the dead had any awareness, Philip and Alexander would surely prefer to see their avengers on the throne, rather than those who murdered them and their family, as the rulers of Macedon. (Just. 16.1.17)

Apparently such arguments did not misfire, as Justin concludes:

This appeased the people, and Demetrius was declared king of Macedon. (Just. 16.1.18)

In Plutarch’s narrative (Pyrrh. 12.6) of the later war between Lysimachus and Pyrrhus, Lysimachus uses his connection to Alexander to get the Macedonians on his side:

by letters and conferences he corrupted the leading Macedonians, upbraiding them because they had chosen as lord and master a man who was a foreigner, whose ancestors had always been subject to Macedonia, and were thrusting the friends and familiars of Alexander out of the country. After many had thus been won over, Pyrrhus took alarm and departed. . . .

Of course, that Lysimachus had just seized Pyrrhus’ provisions will not have been inconsequential, but it is nonetheless interesting to see that Lysimachus still deemed his connection to Alexander useful in trying to get the Macedonians over to his side in 285.

The Successors also honored Alexander by founding cities named after him (Str. 13.1.26). Appian (Syr. 57) lists two cities founded by Seleucus which were named after Alexander; after Ipsus, Lysimachus refounded Antigoneia Troas as Alexandria (Str. 13.1.26), while Antigonus might have been responsible for the foundation of Alexandria-by-Issus. Ptolemy did not found his own Alexandria, but he spent great efforts on the development of Alexandria in Egypt.⁵⁶

As Wheatley (see ch. 3) has also noted, the coinage of the Diadochi has all too often been neglected by historians. It provides important evidence for the attitude of the Successors toward Alexander’s memory: coins represent the official view of the issuing authority, but the lack of context makes their iconographic messages often difficult to interpret. The study of Alexander’s image through the coins of the Successors actually requires an essay of its own, but here I list only some basic facts.⁵⁷ In the first years after his death, coinage bearing Alexander’s name continued to be struck in almost all mints throughout the empire.⁵⁸ Antigonus and Cassander even upheld the issuing of coins with the name of Alexander after they had themselves become kings, an obvious statement of political continuity. After his father’s death, Demetrius still struck Alexander drachms, but now in his own name.⁵⁹ Cassander’s brother Alexarchus, founder of a utopian city called Uranopolis, also issued Alexander tetradrachms.⁶⁰

The first to introduce a new coinage was Ptolemy: shortly after 321 he started striking coins depicting Alexander wearing an elephant scalp and the ram’s horns of Ammon, to which were added a few years later a fillet which is usually interpreted as a Dionysiac headband, and the Aegis of Zeus.⁶¹ About 304, after his assumption of kingship, Ptolemy started minting gold staters with his portrait on the obverse and Alexander standing in a quadriga of elephants with a thunderbolt in his hand.⁶² On his bronze coins, which were smaller denominations meant for local use only, Ptolemy depicted Alexander with the fillet and the ram’s horns.⁶³ From c.300 Ptolemy no longer issued gold and silver coins bearing Alexander’s image.⁶⁴

Seleucus, who at first continued minting posthumous Alexander coins, introduced new types after his assumption of the kingship. Some of these featured Alexander’s portrait: he also used the Alexander with elephant scalp iconography, while another issue depicts a hero, possibly Alexander, with a leopard skin helmet decorated with bull’s horns and ears. Even after Ipsus some of his coins were struck in the name of Alexander.⁶⁵

Lysimachus did not control a mint before his foundation of Lysimacheia c.305, but apparently he was supplied with coinage by Cassander before that date.⁶⁶ Before Ipsus Lysimachus hardly struck any coins of his own. Thereafter he first issued some traditional Alexander drachms in Alexander’s name but with his own badge, the forepart of a lion. About 297 he introduced his famous coinage showing Alexander with the diadem and ram’s horns.⁶⁷

Now that it appears that there is no evidence for a preference of Philip over Alexander, let us look at Cassander’s policy as interpreted by Errington and others. Although some ancient authors had represented Cassander’s actions as partial to Philip (D.S. 17.118.2; Paus. 9.7.2), certain scholars have rightly pointed out that it would have been politically harmful for Cassander to have conducted an anti-Alexander policy.⁶⁸ It is indeed true that Cassander killed Olympias, Roxane and Alexander IV, and Heracles, that he gave an honorable burial to Arrhidaeus, Eurydice, and Cynnane, that he married Thessalonice and restored Thebes, but is this necessarily a policy aimed at promoting Philip’s memory to the detriment of Alexander’s? Cassander became politically active in his own name after the death of his father, Antipater. His father’s decision not to appoint him regent immediately made him an enemy of Polyperchon (D.S. 18.48.4–49.1). The latter appealed to Olympias for help, as she was the natural enemy of his two main opponents, Queen Eurydice and Cassander (D.S. 18.49.4, 57.2). For Cassander, in turn, it was logical to side with Eurydice against Olympias, especially after she had offered him the regency (Just. 14.5.3). Given that Olympias had killed his brother Nicanor and destroyed the tomb of another brother, Iolaus (D.S. 19.11.8), and tried to set the Macedonians against him (D.S. 19.35), Cassander’s murder of Alexander’s mother needs no ideological explanation.

At the same time, Cassander tried to capitalize on the royal burial for Arrhidaeus, Eurydice, and Cynnane (D.S. 19.52.5; Ath. 4.155a). This was in itself an important opportunity for public display and legitimation, and need not necessarily have been explicitly aimed at promoting Philip’s memory. Neither is there any reason why Alexander’s memory would have been excluded from the event. Cassander’s contemporaneous marriage with Thessalonice (D.S. 19.52.1) was a further step in his quest for legitimacy, but probably she was only his second choice, after Cleopatra. There is no reason to assume that a preference for Philip over Alexander played any part here, and Diodorus mentions that she was both Philip’s daughter and Alexander’s half-sister.

The restoration of Thebes, although already represented as an anti-Alexander measure in antiquity (D.S. 17.118.2; Paus. 9.7.2), seems to have been intended to gain glory and support among the Greeks, not to be an attack against Alexander (D.S. 19.53.2, 54.1–2). The murders of Roxane, Alexander IV, and Heracles came at a time when popular support for their accession became a grave threat to Cassander’s own power (see above). If he had not killed them, they might well have permanently ended his hopes of seizing the throne for himself. Throughout Macedonian history Argeads had been killed by other Argeads simply because they were contestants for the throne.⁶⁹ Cassander merely continued this practice. Moreover, Goukowsky has pointed out that there certainly was nodamnatio memoriae of Alexander in Macedon under Cassander: people could refer to their deeds under Alexander; Aristobulus started writing his Alexander history; the deme of Thessaloniki named after Alexander’s horse, Bucephalas, might well have gotten its name from Cassander; one of his sons was named Alexander, and he commissioned a painting of a battle of Alexander by Philoxenus.⁷⁰

The stories of Cassander’s hatred of Alexander most likely emanated from the propaganda of his rivals.⁷¹ Many scholars accept most or all of Plutarch’s catalog of anecdotes illustrating the enmity between Cassander and Alexander, or at least assume that the hatred on which the anecdotes are based is a fact.⁷² The first one, however, of Cassander laughing when he saw Asians performing proskynesis before Alexander seems to have been modeled on a similar anecdote about Leonnatus.⁷³ The story of Cassander being so frightened by a statue of Alexander that he started trembling so badly he could hardly recover would have been credible if it concerned a 4-year-old, but seems rather ridiculous when a ruthless Macedonian warlord is involved. That an argument ensued between Cassander and the king after an embassy had complained about Antipater is in itself not unlikely, but it does not prove any hatred. The statement that Alexander “was particularly afraid of Antipater and of his sons, one of whom, Iolaus, was his chief cupbearer” (Plu.Alex. 74.2) refutes itself. Who would have as cup-bearer one whom he feared at a time when poison was such a popular murder weapon? The tensions between Alexander and Antipater too seem to have been greatly overstated as a result of the propaganda wars of the Diadochi. Arrian (7.12.5–7) denies that Alexander would have called his regent to Asia out of mistrust, and indeed certain scholars have argued convincingly that the relationship between Antipater and the king was good.⁷⁴ Thus, we see how the Successors were interested not only in stressing their connection with Alexander for their own political benefit, but also in presenting their rivals as enemies of Alexander.

The result of this investigation shows that Alexander enjoyed great popularity after his death and that the Successors did all they could to exploit his name. Their propagandistic choices were determined by expediency rather than by ideology: they referred to Philip, Alexander, and the other Argeads as it suited their cause at the moment. Political realities and existing enmities often played a part in determining the propagandistic claims a Successor could plausibly make, but there seems to be no trace of any absolute preference for either Philip or Alexander.⁷⁵

¹ Cf. Errington 1976: 138: “The immediate political importance of Alexander did not end with his death”; Dahmen 2007: 1: “Much of Alexander’s importance lies in his posthumous fame.”

² E.g., Müller 1973: 64; Bosworth 1986: 11–12; Wirth 1989: 206; Stewart 1993: 149–50 with n. 86; Billows 1995: 39 with n. 42; Badian 1999: 84; Landucci Gattinoni 2003: 81–3, 145. The most substantial reaction to this view came from Goukowski 1978: 105–11.

³ See Wheatley, ch. 3. Others who have recently advocated this view include: Hammond 1999b; Erskine 2002: 163–73; Plantzos 2002; Landucci Gattinoni 2003: 146; Grainger 2007: 103.

⁴ Carney 1988: 402; Lund 1992: 51–2; Adams 2006; Meeus 2007; D.S. 20.37.4; Nepos, Eum. 2.3–4. Cf. also Gruen 1985, who argues that there was no opposition between unitarians and separatists but also that no one aimed at controlling Alexander’s entire empire; Bosworth 2002: 246–7. The cause of the eventual break-up of Alexander’s empire was not that some strove for separatism, but that none of the Successors achieved the elimination of all his rivals. Cf. Heckel 2002b, arguing for the same cause for the disintegration of the empire from a different point of view, esp. 86–7: “equality in both competence and authority led to the disintegration of the newly-won empire. Ironically, the very talent, the military potential and the large pool of candidates for supreme office made the survival of the empire virtually impossible.”

⁵ On the Cleitus episode see Tritle 2003; on Opis see Carney 1996.

⁶ Plu. Eum. 6.3; Plu. Al. 47.9; Bosworth 1980a: 7; Heckel 2003b: 215; Roisman 2003b: 292–3.

⁷ This view has been expressed, e.g., by Tarn ii. 434; Briant 1972: 61; Brosius 2003a: 176–8; Holt 2003: 17. Will 1979: 273 and Ogden 1999: 69 at least note the uncertainty.

⁸ Memnon, FGrH 434 F4.4.

⁹ Ogden 1999: 119.

¹⁰ D.S. 18.3.5; Just. 13.4.6; Heckel 1992: 160 n. 516; Bosworth 2002: 13 n. 30. D.S. 18.28.3 shows that the Successors had originally intended to bury Alexander at Siwah.

¹¹ Goukowski 1978: 86.

¹² ISE ii, no. 73, v. 8.

¹³ Briant 1972: 60–1.

¹⁴ Schachermeyr 1970: 23–4; Briant 1972: 60–73; Rodriguez 2004.

¹⁵ Even before his death, it seems that any conflict between Alexander and his soldiers did not diminish the latter’s respect for their king: Anson 1991: 245.

¹⁶ Boerma 1979: 99–100.

¹⁷ On the soldiers feeling ill at ease: Errington 1970: 50; Mooren 1983: 235.

¹⁸ Pace Errington 1976: 146.

¹⁹ Arrhidaeus’ name change: D.S. 18.2.4; Curt. 10.7.7; Arr. Succ. 1.1; Just. 13.3.1; App. Syr. 52; Heid. Epit. 1.1; Greenwalt 1999. Cf. also Carney 2001.

²⁰ On the value of Curtius’ account of the events at Babylon: Errington 1970: 72–5; Bosworth 2003a: 175–86; Meeus 2008.

²¹ For Alexander handing his ring to Perdiccas: Curt. 10.5.4; D.S. 17.117.3, 18.2.4; Just. 12.15.12; LM 112; Luc. Dial. Mort. 13.391; Nepos, Eum. 2.1. The historicity of the event has sometimes been doubted, but I see no good reason for this; cf. Rathmann 2005: 9–26. In any case, the episode under discussion shows that Perdiccas claimed – whether justly or not – that Alexander had done so.

²² Errington 1976: 139.

²³ Thus I do not agree with Errington’s view (1975: 139) that the exploitation of Alexander’s memory failed to be effective because “other more immediate problems were more important” to the Macedonian soldiers. Actually for them both aspects must have made Perdiccas a rather good candidate at the moment, especially since he seems to have been related to the royal house: Curt. 10.7.8. It was Perdiccas’ wavering that cost him the throne, but his wavering was well advised because none of the nobles would have accepted his authority: Mooren 1983: 236–7; Meeus 2008b; cf. Heckel 2002b on the competition among the Successors.

²⁴ Anson 1991: 238.

²⁵ All translations are from the Loeb Classical Library, except those from Justin, quoted from Yardley Develin 1994, and Polyaenus, quoted from Krentz and Wheeler 1994.

²⁶ Anson 1991: 246.

²⁷ D.S. 18.61.3; Anson 2004: 148; see also below. That they betrayed him in the end is no argument to the contrary, as their allegiance to their own families would surely take priority. Cf. Anson 2004: 255: “[T]he argyraspids surrendered Eumenes to gain the return of their families and property, the ultimate bribe.”

²⁸ Polyaen. 8.60; Arr. Succ. 1.22–3.

²⁹ D.S. 18.39.2–4; Arr. Succ. 1.31–3; Carney 2000: 132–4.

³⁰ “While the Macedonian troops were showing signs of their true mercenary nature, the old traditions of loyalty to the Argead house were still strong” (Anson 2004: 155).

³¹ On the common source of Diodorus and Justin, see Reuss 1876: 23–35; Hornblower 1981: 65–7.

³² Alexander IV: D.S. 19.105.2–3. Heracles: D.S. 20.20.3, 20.28.1; Just 15.2.3. For Justin’s confusion: Schachermeyr 1920.

³³ Philip: Plu. Mor. 179c; Antipater: Stob. 3.13.48; Hadrian: Cassius Dio 69.6.3.

³⁴ Bosworth 2002: 256–9.

³⁵ Plu. Demetr. 41.5; Plu. Pyrrh. 8.2.

³⁶ See also: Briant 1973a: 129–31; Errington 1976: 138–58; Hammond, in Hammond–Walbank 123–4, 194; Völcker-Janssen 1993: 20–4; Billows 1995: 33–40; Bosworth 2002: 246–78, passim.

³⁷ Schubert 1914: 180–1; Briant 1973a: 130, 318; Greenwalt 1988: 41; Hammond 1989a: 219–20; Stewart 1993: 222; Whitehorne 1994: 64–5; Erskine 2002: 171; Schäfer 2002: 59–60.

³⁸ Paus. 1.6.3; cf. Arr. Succ. 1.25.

³⁹ Most extensively Errington 1976: 141–3; Erskine 2002: 163–73; Rader 2003: 151–61.

⁴⁰ The cases which clearly show its value as an asset of status are: D.S. 18.7.3, 18.48.4, 19.15.1, 19.46.2, 19.51.1; Just 13.4.10, 16.1.12, 24.4.10; Plu. Demetr. 44.4; Nepos, Eum. 7.1; Plu. Pyrrh. 12.6; ISE ii, no. 73, ll. 7–8; SEG xxi (1965), no. 310. Cf. D.S. 19.55.3, 19.56.1, 19.69.1, 19.81.5, 19.82.1, 19.90.3–4; Plu. Eum. 1.6; Plu. Demetr. 5.2. See Seibert 1969: 152–6; Errington 1976: 159–62; Rosen 1979: 463; Billows 1995: 34, 36.

⁴¹ Bosworth 2002: 274–8.

⁴² D.S. 18.60.4–61.3, 19.15.3–4; Plu. Eum. 13.3–4; Nepos, Eum. 7.2–3; Polyaen. 4.8.2; Errington 1976: 140–1; Mooren 1983: 238–9; Schäfer 2002: 19–37; Anson 2004: 150–2.

⁴³ D.S. 18.61.1, 19.15.4.

⁴⁴ D.S. 19.22–23.1; Bosworth 2002: 255–6.

⁴⁵ D.S. 18.60.4–5; Plu. Eum. 13.5; Polyaen. 4.8.2.

⁴⁶ Plu. Eum. 6.5; Plu. Pyrrh. 11.2; Plu. Demetr. 29.1; D.S. 19.90.4; Weber 1999: 13–18.

⁴⁷ Plu. Eum. 12.1; D.S. 18.50.1–4.

⁴⁸ Plu. Eum. 12.1–4.

⁴⁹ Briant 1973b: 69–79; Anson 1977; Bosworth 1992c: 66–7.

⁵⁰ E.g., Badian 1964: 256–8; Errington 1969; Goukowski 1978: 141–5; Rosen 1979: 462–72; Bosworth 1996: 41–53; Schepens 1998: 91; Bingen 2007: 20–3. Contra: Roisman 1984.

⁵¹ Bosworth 2000a; for a different interpretation see Heckel 1988.

⁵² E.g., Errington 1976: 148; Völcker-Jansen 1993: 18; Carney 2000b: 151.

⁵³ For a reappraisal of Cleopatra’s importance: Meeus 2008a; see also Whitehorne 1994: 61–9. Carney 1988 is skeptical of Cleopatra’s significance to the Successors.

⁵⁴ Carney 2000b: 151.

⁵⁵ There is no good reason to doubt the historicity of the substance of the speech: Bosworth 2002: 251–2 with n. 22.

⁵⁶ Billows 1990: 298.

⁵⁷ See Stewart 1993: passim; Arnold-Biucchi 2006; Dahmen 2007.

⁵⁸ Mørkholm 1991: 56; Price 1991.

⁵⁹ Mørkholm 1991: 59, 61.

⁶⁰ Mørkholm 1991: 60.

⁶¹ Davis and Kraay: 36; Mørkholm 1991: 63–4; Stewart 1993: 233–42; Dahmen 2007: 10–11, 42, 112–14. A recently discovered golden coin from the Mir Zakah hoard, belonging to the so-called Elephant medallions group (on which see Holt 2003; Le Rider 2003: 329–33; Dahmen 2007: 6–9), also depicts Alexander with the elephant scalp. If genuine, this coin would be Ptolemy’s source of inspiration, but its authenticity is highly doubtful: see Dahmen 2007: 9 with n. 13.

⁶² Mørkholm 1991: 65; Dahmen 2007: 12–13.

⁶³ Dahmen 2007: 13.

⁶⁴ Mørkholm 1991: 65; Dahmen 2007: 12–13.

⁶⁵ Mørkholm 1991: 71–3; Houghton and Lorber 2002: 5–9 (with due reservations about the identification of the helmeted hero as Alexander); Arnold-Biucchi 2006: 36–7; Dahmen 2007: 14–15.

⁶⁶ Mørkholm 1991: 60–1.

⁶⁷ Mørkholm 1991: 81; Arnold-Biucchi 2006: 36; Dahmen 2007: 16–17.

⁶⁸ Goukowski 1978: 105–8; Bosworth 1986: 11; Koulakiotis 2006: 95.

⁶⁹ Cf. Carney 1983.

⁷⁰ Goukowski 1978: 108–11.

⁷¹ Goukowski 1978: 105–8. For the stories: Plu. Alex. 74.2–6; Plu. Mor. 180–1; cf. D.S. 17.118.2; Paus. 9.7.2.

⁷² E.g., Bendinelli 1965; Hamilton 1969: 206; Bosworth 1986: 11–12; Billows 1995: 39 with n. 42; Badian 1999: 84.

⁷³ Hamilton 1969: 206; Heckel 1978.

⁷⁴ Griffith 1965; Ashton 1992: 126–7; Baynham 1994: 343–6. For a recent statement of the opposite view see Heckel 1999.

⁷⁵ I am much indebted to Professor Hans Hauben, Professor Hubert Meeus, Dr. Karolien Geens, and Mr. Bert Saerens who commented on earlier versions of this essay. I would also like to thank the editors for their criticisms and suggestions.