Old-time sailors refer to Lake Superior’s Whitefish Bay as “The Graveyard of the Great Lakes.” The bay’s savage reputation is well earned, claiming more than 200 vessels during the last two centuries according to the Great Lakes Shipwreck Museum. However, one shipwreck in 1975 captured the public’s imagination like none before it: the wreck of the SS Edmund Fitzgerald. The loss of a modern freighter—vanishing suddenly and with no witnesses or survivors—was a cruel reminder of the untamed power of the Great Lakes. The calamity has been immortalized in a theatrical production and a ballad by Gordon Lightfoot. So inconceivable was the loss that it has continued to spawn wild speculation and urban legends as to the true cause of its sinking.
The ship Edmund Fitzgerald foundered and sank in a Lake Superior storm in 1975, thereby adding to the large collection of shipwreck lore associated with the Great Lakes. The region’s folk cultures draw heavily from the relationship between people and the watery natural environments. (Lake Superior Maritime Collections, UW-Superior)
The Edmund Fitzgerald was the Great Lakes’ answer to the Titanic: unsinkable. Launched in 1958, the Fitzgerald was the largest and most advanced vessel of its day. At 729 feet long, the Fitzgerald was capable of hauling 26,000 tons of iron ore from the Minnesota Iron Ranges south to the Detroit steel mills (Stonehouse 2001, 13). Its pilothouse accommodated the latest in navigation and communications equipment. Its combination of graceful lines and luxurious amenities “was such that reporters flocked to marvel at the vessel” (Ratigan 1977, 316).
By the 1970s, longer ships capable of carrying even larger cargos had been developed at the expense of such aesthetic details. None of this diminished the admiration of freighter enthusiasts for the Fitzgerald, which they viewed nostalgically as the last of a vanishing breed. So it was that when the Fitzgerald plummeted to the depths of Lake Superior on November 10, 1975, a legend was created overnight.
Great Lakes shipping is at best a calculated risk. Native American legends testify to the long antagonism between human commerce and nature. Chippewa folklore speaks of “Superior never giving up its dead.” Especially risky are voyages in late fall. The shifting weather patterns before winter create highly volatile meteorological conditions above the Upper Great Lakes. It was under such conditions that the Edmund Fitzgerald left Superior, Wisconsin, on November 9. That evening the National Weather Service issued a gale warning for Lake Superior. In response the captain of the Fitzgerald, Ernest McSorley, and the captain of an accompanying freighter, Arthur Anderson, chose to turn north into the more sheltered waters along the Canadian coast.
By the afternoon of November 10, the storm had intensified as the two ships turned southeast toward Whitefish Bay. Winds were reported in excess of ninety miles an hour, and waves reached twelve to sixteen feet. At 3:30 the Coast Guard ordered all ships to find safe anchorage. For the Anderson and Fitzgerald this meant anchoring off the leeward side of Whitefish Point. Later at 4:10 Captain Cooper of the Anderson received a message from McSorley that the Fitzgerald had developed “a bad list, had lost both radars, and was taking heavy seas over the deck” (Stonehouse 2001, 27). He asked Cooper to provide navigational assistance as he cleared the shoals off Caribou Island.
For the next three hours, Cooper kept a close eye on the Fitzgerald. At 7:10 the Anderson received its last radio transmission from the Fitzgerald. The conversation ended with the Anderson inquiring whether the Fitzgerald’s list had improved. Captain McSorley replied, “We are holding our own” (Stonehouse 2001, 29). Less than five minutes later, the Fitzgerald disappeared from the Anderson’s radar screen, never to be heard from again.
In the spring of 1976, the Coast Guard thoroughly investigated the wreckage of the Fitzgerald and reported on the probable cause of the accident. Improper fastening, they concluded, of the twenty-one cargo hatches on the deck gradually allowed water into the cargo hold. A collision with an unknown object caused significant topside damage, allowing even more water into the ship’s ballast tanks. No longer buoyant, the freighter took a nosedive, hitting the bottom with its prop still turning. The impact broke the ship into two sections, which lie nearly perpendicularly to each other in 530 feet of water (Stonehouse 2001, 49).
The Holy Grail of Lake Michigan
Although thanks to Gordon Lightfoot and the Great Lakes Brewing Company the Edmund Fitzgerald is likely to remain the most famous shipwreck in Great Lakes history, it is hardly the only one; indeed, the lakebeds are littered with the skeletons of lost vessels. One of the earliest in recorded history is perhaps one of the most evocative, and has, indeed, been referred to as “The Holy Grail” of the Great Lakes. In 1679, a forty-foot French sailing ship named the Griffin captained by one Robert La Salle was lost in Lake Michigan under mysterious circumstances. For centuries aficionados have argued about whether the Griffin was lost to the waves, to hostile tribes, or to mutinous sailors. Although this mystery may never be solved, divers recently have claimed to have found its remains; whether Mr. Lightfoot will pen another song is an open question.
C. Fee
Shipwreck enthusiasts were less than satisfied with the report. “People all around the Lakes were asking incredulously: ‘How could a steamer … vanish without a trace in the night … while other lesser vessels survived the storm?” (Ratigan 1977, 337). An oversight as basic as the crew forgetting to batten down the hatches seemed inadequate to explain the loss of such a majestic vessel.
Conspiracy theorists have latched upon the sinking of the Fitzgerald as evidence of a Great Lakes version of the Bermuda Triangle. Others have implicated UFOs. Shipwreck experts who have explored the wreck have offered more plausible alternatives. The most prominent theory is that the Fitzgerald ran aground on Caribou Shoals. However, other popular explanations include haul failure due to improper maintenance and the rogue wave theory that suggests that three consecutive thirty-foot waves forced the Fitzgerald’s bow under the water until it lost buoyancy. None of these theories can ever be verified. The key to the mystery is the Fitzgerald’s haul, which is embedded deep in the clay of Lake Superior’s bottom.
Andrew Wickersham
See also Bermuda Triangle; Conspiracy Theories; Sea Shanties
Further Reading
Bourrie, Mark. 1995. Ninety Fathoms Down: Canadian Stories of the Great Lakes. Toronto: Hounslow Press.
“Edmund Fitzgerald.” 2014. Great Lakes Shipwreck Museum website. http://www.shipwreckmuseum.com/edmundfitzgerald. Accessed on July 18, 2014.
Ratigan, William. 1977. Great Lakes Shipwrecks and Survivals: Edmund Fitzgerald Edition. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdman.
Stonehouse, Frederick. 2001. The Wreck of the Edmund Fitzgerald. Gwinn, MI: Avery Color Studios.
Wreck of the Edmund Fitzgerald—Primary Document
Marine Board of Investigation on the Sinking of the SS Edmund Fitzgerald (1977)
Disasters on the scale of the wreck of the Edmund Fitzgerald would seem to warrant complex explanations. The Marine Board of Investigation’s report, however, attributed the wreck to the failure to properly seal the hatch covers on board the ship. For many people, the simplicity of this report is unsatisfactory. Mariners, not wishing to see blame assigned to the crew, began looking for alternative explanations, while conspiracy theorists began postulating stories ranging from the improbable to the supernatural to try to explain this seemingly inexplicable catastrophe on the Great Lakes.
The record of the Marine Board of Investigation convened to investigate the subject casualty has been reviewed; and the record, including the findings of fact, conclusions, and recommendations, is approved subject to the following comments.
REMARKS
1.This casualty presents the Board unique investigative challenges which delayed the submission of the report. Since there were no survivors or witnesses to be questioned, the Board went to considerable lengths to examine wreckage located soon after the casualty. In the spring of 1976, an underwater examination of the wreckage, utilizing highly sophisticated remotely controlled TV and photographic record of the structural damage and position of the wreckage. The sketches of the wreckage in the Board’s report, showing the inverted stern section, loose hatch covers, and bow section, were made from this video tape and photographic record.
A further delay in the completion of the final report was due to the time needed to complete the sounding survey, conducted by Canadian authorities, of the water between Michipicoten Island and Caribou Island and adjacent waters.
2.The Commandant concurs with the Board that the most probable cause of the sinking was the loss of buoyancy resulting from massive flooding of the cargo hold. This flooding most likely took place through ineffective hatch closures. As the boarding seas rolled over the spar deck, the flooding was probably concentrated forward. The vessel dove into a wall of water and never recovered, with the breaking up of the ship occurring as it plunged or as the ship struck bottom. The sinking was so rapid and unexpected that no one was able to successfully abandon ship.
With regard to opinions as to the cause of damage and the final sequence of events, an analysis has been made which demonstrates a possibility of capsizing and/or foundering. The analysis of various stages of flooding indicates that bending moment magnitudes and distribution would not support a conclusion of general structural failure as a primary cause of the casualty.
ACTIONS CONCERNING THE RECOMMENDATIONS
1.The following Board recommendations relate to load line regulations and watertight integrity and are addressed jointly.
Action: Assignments of freeboard are based upon, among other things, a presumption of the ability to achieve the watertight integrity necessary to prevent significant flooding.
The mutually dependent areas of safety which are an integral part of all Load Line Regulations are:
a.That the hull is strong enough for all anticipated seaways;
b.That the ship is designed and operated with proper stability;
c.That the hull is watertight to the freeboard deck;
d.That the hull has sufficient reserve buoyancy for seaworthiness;
e.That the topside area is properly fitted so as to be capable of being made weathertight for all anticipated seaways; and,
f.That protection for the movement of the crew on the weather decks at sea is provided.
None of these can be eliminated by additions to freeboard within practical limits. Freeboard, or its increase, is not by itself an adequate substitute for properly designed, maintained and operated hatches, coamings, gaskets, and securing attachments. Such substitution unduly penalizes good design, maintenance, and operations. Since the fall season of 1976, the Coast Guard has been conducting a Great Lakes Coast Guard ship-rider program to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the combination of freeboard, hatch closure, and ventilator closure effectiveness during the Intermediate (Oct 1–31) and Winter (November 1–March 31) freeboard seasons. This program has confirmed the evidence found by the Board of Investigation indicating that it is not a singular occurrence that the hatch covers on the EDMUND FITZGERALD may not have been properly secured. Several ships have been found to suffer in varying degrees from a lack of weathertight integrity due to the inability to make hatch covers watertight and due to the inattention to ventilator covers prior to a winter season voyage.
Accordingly, the Commandant is initiating action to:
a.Continue the ship-rider program in 1977 and in succeeding years as necessary in order to prevent sailing or severely restrict the voyage weather limits of any ship found to lack sufficient watertight integrity. Extra seasonal freeboard requirements may also be assigned to supplemental weather limitations by the Commander, Ninth Coast Guard District to vessels on an individual basis.
b.Bring to the attention of the owners and operators the fact that weathertight closures which are not effective when battened down void both the LOAD LINE CERTIFICATE and the CERTIFICATE of INSPECTION.
c.Firmly bring to the attention of the ships’ masters their operational responsibilities for weathertight integrity before and during weather conditions as outlined in operational regulations in 46 CFR 97.
d.Direct the Merchant Marine Technical Division at Coast Guard Headquarters, in cooperation with Commander, Ninth Coast Guard District, to immediately undertake a critical evaluation of the effectiveness of these hatch closures presently in use on Great Lakes bulk carriers utilizing information from the shipboard Coast Guard inspections. If requiring such maintenance as to be difficult to assure weathertight integrity, regulatory notices will be published stating their design or maintenance shortcomings and include a requirement that ships modify or change hatch covers to correct the deficiencies.
e.Direct the Merchant Marine Technical Division to reassess the existing INTERMEDIATE and WINTER Season freeboard corrections utilizing wave analysis information on Great Lakes wave spectra to be gathered during an ongoing research program (1977–1979).
Source: “The Marine Board of Investigation convened to investigate the circumstances surrounding the sinking of the SS EDMUND FITZGERALD in Lake Superior on 10 November 1975 with loss of life.” 26 July 1977. Available online at The U.S. Coast Guard. http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg545/docs/boards/edmundfitz.pdf.