Chapter 16

In This Chapter

The Army of the Potomac gets a new commander

Lincoln’s new plan to win the war

Rosecrans takes on Bragg

Two winter tragedies take place on riverbanks

I n the Eastern Theater, McClellan had just barely defeated Lee’s invading Confederate army at Antietam but at a frightful cost. In the Western Theater, the Confederate invasion into Kentucky had been turned back at Perryville, but General Braxton Bragg and his Confederate army of Tennessee remained a threat. All the fighting and all the losses had amounted to nothing. The elections had gone badly for the Republicans. Morale in the North sagged. How long could either side take such punishment? The last months of 1862 and the first month of 1863 would be bitter times for the Union; new Union army commanders and new offensives would bring more horrific casualties, but neither would bring the war any closer to a conclusion.

The Confederacy had survived 1862. The Army of Northern Virginia finished that terrible year with another brilliant, but unsatisfying, victory in the Eastern Theater. In the Western Theater, it was more of the same — one step forward and two steps backward for the Army of Tennessee. But the bottom line was that the Confederate armies were still in the field, and the Union was no closer to victory than it had been at the beginning of the year.

A New Start in the East

After Antietam, Union General McClellan and his beloved Army of the Potomac rested, refitted, and trained, apparently not eager to use the last months of autumn for any campaigning before entering into camp for the winter. Lincoln arrived at the camp, spent time with the troops, whose morale was good, and had several long discussions with his general. Lincoln was trying to cure what he called “the slows,” a condition he believed McClellan had that prevented him from energetically engaging the enemy. McClellan had no problem making the president aware of all the reasons why he was not yet ready to move. After Lincoln’s departure — certainly the Young Napoleon (as McClellan was known) breathed a great sigh of relief to be rid of the silly civilian pest and rank amateur — an order arrived from General-in-Chief Halleck in Washington instructing him to move his army across the Potomac and begin combat operations. McClellan took nearly three weeks to get going. Meanwhile General Jeb Stuart and his Confederate horsemen reprised their celebrated ride around the Union Army in front of Richmond before the Seven Days battles. This time Stuart rode into Pennsylvania, captured Chambersburg, took hundreds of horses and wagons, and then rode behind McClellan’s force, returning to Virginia unmolested. Even though McClellan had promised Washington that he would take vigorous action, nothing happened. Once again, the Confederates had mocked McClellan’s immobility, and Stuart added an even greater aura to his reputation as a dashing cavalryman.

McClellan set out with the Army of the Potomac, about 120,000 men. He took his time crossing the Potomac in nine days. Lee’s army, brought up to 68,000 with new draftees and men who had rejoined their units, was resting and refitting in Winchester. After crossing the Potomac, the Union Army was actually closer to Richmond than Lee’s army. A rapid movement south would place Lee in a disadvantageous position, forcing him to attack McClellan to protect the capital. McClellan, believing Lee had 130,000 men, set his usual creeping pace. This enabled Lee to shift the bulk of his army eastward and easily position it squarely in McClellan’s path. Buell’s fate should have alerted the Young Napoleon that a slow pursuit of the enemy would get him fired by President Lincoln. The end came quickly. A courier delivered the message on November 7, relieving McClellan and putting the reluctant Ambrose E. Burnside in command of the Army of the Potomac. See Figure 16-1.

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Burnside/sideburns

Ambrose Burnside was a Rhode Islander and a West Point graduate. He was also an entrepreneur, inventing a breech-loading (a cartridge is loaded from the rear of the weapon) carbine that was one of the most advanced weapons of his time. He had fought with the Army of the Potomac since First Bull Run, and had a moderate success as an independent commander, capturing Roanoke Island off North Carolina early in the war. At Antietam, he had shown tenacity, if nothing else, and impressed the politicos in Washington with his apparent aggressiveness. Burnside had a distinctive appearance, having a large, bald head, deep-set eyes, and a flourish of enormously bushy whiskers that stretched from his ears and down his jaw line, crossing below his nose in an elaborate sweeping mustache. His facial hair was so unique that his name, somewhat corrupted by wags, became the word for any hair that extends down the side of a man’s face — sideburns. Burnside has come down to posterity as one more famous for his hairstyle than his generalship.

Hurry Up and Wait at Rappahannock

Burnside reorganized the army to improve the command structure. He lumped two corps into an organization he called a Grand Division. Each Grand Division had its own cavalry and artillery. The Army of the Potomac now had three Grand Divisions, each commanded by a Major General: Edwin Sumner commanded the right division, William Franklin commanded the left division, and Joseph Hooker commanded the center division.

My kingdom for a pontoon

Burnside proposed to Halleck and President Lincoln that the army be moved to Fredericksburg, a prosperous large town on the banks of the Rappahannock River. The main road to Richmond passed through Fredericksburg, and if the president wanted to capture the Confederate capital, this was the most direct way. He got approval and moved Sumner’s Grand Division rapidly to Falmouth, a town directly across the river from Fredericksburg. There he waited while Burnside brought the rest of the army up. As part of his plan, Burnside ordered pontoon bridges to arrive at Falmouth when his troops did, so they could cross the river without delay. But Burnside’s orders were vague, and he relied on Halleck, of all people, to provide the pontoons. On top of that, Burnside forgot to tell Sumner to check to see if the river was fordable anywhere. Burnside had a knack for focusing on only one thing at a time. He could not take the next step in a plan without completing the previous step. At the time Sumner’s troops arrived at Falmouth, not only was Lee’s army far away, but also the Rappahannock River was easily fordable at several points. His men could have been on the road to Richmond — but Sumner had no orders to do anything other than wait for the pontoons. This he did. Another precious week of waiting went by. Burnside assembled his army, finally got his pontoons, and could now focus on step two of his plan. Unfortunately for him, heavy rain had fallen, making the 400-foot wide river impassable. To make matters worse, Lee’s army, reinforced to 78,000 men, had raced to Fredericksburg and entrenched along a low ridge above the town. The position gave them a half-mile stretch of open plain to sight their guns.

Burnside spent another two weeks taking care of step two: Engineers would lay down five pontoon bridges across the river. Three would be set up in front of Fredericksburg; two would be set up downstream. Sumner’s Grand Division would move into the town and attack the Confederates defending the ridge. Franklin’s Grand Division would cross the river downstream and attack the enemy defenses there. Hooker’s Grand Division would remain in reserve to support either attack.

On December 11, Burnside’s engineers began to place the pontoon bridges. The downstream bridges were set up with no resistance. The bridges in front of Fredericksburg were another story. Unwilling to make the crossing easy, Lee had sent a brigade of troops to shoot the engineers as they worked. Hidden in and around the buildings, the Confederate sharpshooters drove the intrepid engineers back for cover again and again. The entire attack was stalled by a handful of riflemen. Eventually Union artillery went into action and fired over 9,000 shells into the town to drive out the Confederates. When this failed, four brigades of Union infantry crossed the river and drove the rebels out. As soon as the opposite shore was secure, the bridges were rapidly built and thousands of men moved into the town. At the same time, Union troops recrossed the bridges downstream. The frustrated troops had crossed unopposed earlier in the morning, but had been ordered back across the river because the other bridges had not yet been set up. Now they marched over again. Just as he had been at Antietam, Burnside was fixated on bridges. There had been nothing to stop him from ordering his army to move to the bridges that were already in place in the morning and beginning the attack from there. But that was not in the plan.

Lee awaits

Lee used well the time given to him. His entire army of 78,000 men was stretched along an only 7-mile front — Longstreet had one soldier for every yard of terrain. Jackson’s men were spread along wooded hills on the Confederate right flank, with the responsibility to shift troops to any threatened sector of the line. It was clear to Lee that Burnside intended to attack straight on.

The Battle of Fredericksburg

Fredericksburg was the wrong battle at the wrong time at the wrong place for the Army of the Potomac. The time for taking advantage of Lee at the Rappahannock had long since passed. Yet Burnside considered no other option to his plan. The attack would proceed as ordered. There is no more difficult attack to conduct in military operations — cross a major river and move through a built-up area to assault an enemy defending high ground. Generals avoid such attacks because they are too costly. Burnside would prove just how costly.

Franklin’s Grand Division initiated the attack against Jackson’s troops hidden on the wooded ridge above the river bottom. Heavy fog concealed the Union movements until late morning. Delayed and harassed by artillery fire, they finally made their approach in the early afternoon. Although the initial units had some success, actually penetrating part of the Confederate line, the Union attack was too weak and not supported by any follow-on forces. The units took heavy casualties and accomplished nothing. The focus of the battle shifted to the right of the Union line.

By mid-afternoon, Union brigades totaling 40,000 men had stacked up on the main road leading up the broad, 1,000-yard, open slope to the heights that dominated the town (see Figure 16-2). Just in front of the heights was a 4-foot stone wall in front of a sunken road. Longstreet’s troops from North Carolina manned this natural trench, standing in two parallel lines along the wall. As the Union brigades emerged from the town and crossed into the open, they were met with the massed destructive fire of muskets and artillery. Again and again the brave Union troops advanced, but the men were shot down in rows. Bodies were heaped on bodies in front of the stone wall where the Confederate defenders were alternating four firing lines. As soon as one line had fired, it moved back and reloaded, allowing the next line to fire. The resulting rate of fire was almost like a modern machine gun. By the end of the day, 6,300 Union soldiers lay dead or wounded in front of the wall, none getting any closer than 40 yards.

Although urged to halt, Burnside, who was far away from the action, sent orders to his commanders to continue the attack. He was following his plan, whether it conformed to reality or not. Finally Union commanders stopped the carnage on their own by refusing to follow orders from headquarters. As darkness fell on that short December day, about 13,000 Union soldiers were casualties; the Confederates had lost 5,300, mostly in the engagement on Jackson’s line. Burnside had to be convinced not to renew the attack. After a day of indecision, he withdrew the army across the Rappahannock the next day. As Lee watched the battle from a hilltop that gave him a panoramic view of the battle, he was heard to say, “It is well that war is so terrible — we should grow too fond of it!”

The Aftermath of the Battle

Fredericksburg had been heavily damaged by artillery fire from both sides and pillaged ruthlessly by Union troops. Lee had won another victory, but to him it had been a hollow one. He had not been able to exploit the Union Army’s situation with a major counterattack that would have destroyed the Union Army; neither the terrain nor the heavy artillery that protected the Union troops in and around Fredericksburg would allow such an attack. Lee had fought his army skillfully, using the natural advantages of the terrain to increase his strength. As the Army of Northern Virginia went into winter quarters, he would have to be satisfied with the results he had obtained.

Fredericksburg was the greatest defeat of the war for the Union. For Burnside, no battle could have been more poorly mismanaged. His proud army had suffered as many casualties as it did at Antietam — all for nothing. Although Burnside made no excuses for his conduct of the battle, the political ramifications for the Union cause and the president were severe. Morale among the soldiers and officers in the army collapsed, as did the morale of Northern civilians as the casualty lists arrived. Lincoln became the prime target of anger and discontent. He was called “a cowardly imbecile” (among other things), and Lincoln himself said: “It appears to me the Almighty is against us and I can hardly see a ray of light.”

Battle Captain’s Report: The Battle of Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862 Confederate Victory

Commanders: Union: Major General Ambrose E. Burnside, Army of the Potomac, 120,000 men. Confederate: General Robert E. Lee, Army of Northern Virginia, 78,000 men.

Phase I: Burnside plans to cross the Rappahannock River at Fredericksburg and threaten the Confederate capital at Richmond, forcing Lee into an open battle. But Burnside cannot get the necessary pontoon bridges in place to cross the river and loses valuable time. Lee begins to move his army into strong defensive positions in and around Fredericksburg. Delayed most of the day of 12 December by Confederate sharpshooters who prevent Union engineers from laying the pontoon bridges, Union troops finally cross in strength.

Phase II: On December 13, Burnside orders an attack with one of his Grand Divisions on the Confederate right flank, thinking Lee’s forces are not all in place. The attack meets Stonewall Jackson’s troops in the woods. Major John Pelham with two artillery pieces disrupts the attack as well. Although the Confederate line is broken, there are no Union reinforcements to exploit success. Meanwhile, Jackson’s counterattack drives Union forces back to their starting positions. Union activity on this flank ends.

Phase III: The bulk of Burnside’s troops begin an assault through Fredericksburg toward Marye’s Heights. The area they attack over is a broad plain covered by artillery and defended by masses of Confederate troops standing in a sunken road behind a stone wall. Virtually impervious to enemy fire, the Confederates wreck the dense Union formations with massed artillery and rifle fire. Again and again the Union units charge, but none come close to the wall. Burnside eventually calls off the attack as his commanders begin to disobey his orders, refusing to sacrifice their men needlessly. Quietly that night, Burnside brings the remainder of his army back across the Rappahannock.

Casualties: Union 12,600, Confederate 5,300.

The Strategic Situation in the West: September–December 1862

While Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia had been campaigning in Maryland and dealing with a new Union commander, the Army of Tennessee had also concluded an offensive campaign in Kentucky and was faced with a new Union commander also. But unlike the Eastern Theater, where Richmond was the focus of Union efforts, the Western Theater had numerous critical areas to defend — primarily the strategically important Mississippi River and the critical rail junctions in eastern Tennessee.

Both the North and the South fail in Mississippi

With the return of General Bragg’s Confederate army to eastern Tennessee, holding up in a town on Stones River called Murfreesboro, the time had come to take stock of the strategic situation. The force Bragg had left behind to watch Grant had been defeated in September by Union General William S. Rosecrans, first at Iuka, then at Corinth. Although Rosecrans commanded the troops, it was Grant who had played a large role in orchestrating the defeat, ending the last hope for a Confederate military presence in northern Mississippi. Grant followed this up with a two-pronged thrust at the strategic Confederate stronghold of Vicksburg, Mississippi. Using the pattern that had worked so well at Forts Henry and Donelson, Grant planned to send General William T. Sherman with about 30,000 men on naval ships down the Mississippi River to attack the city, while Grant himself mounted an overland march with 40,000 men along the Mississippi Central Railroad to seal off the Confederate retreat. Grant had to move first because he was, like most Union commanders in the Western Theater, entirely dependent upon the railroad for supply. He tried to circumvent this weakness by stockpiling supplies at Holly Springs, Mississippi. Soon after he began his march, Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest (see Figure 16-3) and his cavalry had a splendid time destroying Grant’s Holly Springs supply depot, then tearing up the rail lines for 60 miles. Grant found himself completely hamstrung in a hostile land without supplies or communications. Meanwhile, Sherman’s 30,000 men had landed north of Vicksburg. On December 29, he launched an attack against strong defensive positions and was driven off with 1,800 casualties. The first Union movement against Vicksburg ended in total failure.

” Bettmann/CORBIS

Rosecrans takes charge in Tennessee

Rosecrans’s success at Iuka and Corinth, Mississippi, led to his promotion and appointment as the new commander to replace Buell. Rosecrans (see Figure 16-4) had begun his rise to command with McClellan in West Virginia in 1861. Like Burnside in the Eastern Theater, he had shown the politicos in Washington some pugnacity, and therefore he was elevated to command of the 44,000 man army in Nashville and told to do something about the Confederate Army just 30 miles south. A handsome, intelligent man who looked like a General, Rosecrans had many talents. He also had an explosive temper that sometimes affected his judgment, and he lacked an appreciation for how a commander arranges units and controls the pace of battle.

” CORBIS

The Battle of Murfreesboro

The day after Christmas, Rosecrans moved his Army of the Cumberland toward Murfreesboro. Many of the troops were still hung over from the previous day’s celebrations. A cold steady rain made traveling difficult and compounded their misery. Confederate cavalry raids not only wrecked Union supply trains, but also provided Bragg with important information about the Union Army. Rosecrans approached slowly, arriving with part of his army before Murfreesboro on December 29. The rest of his army would not arrive until the next day.

Bragg was willing to occupy his portion of Tennessee and had little interest in making any aggressive moves. Murfreesboro, the important rail junction between Nashville and Chattanooga, seemed to be just the right place to stay for the winter. Accordingly, he passed orders for the army to assemble there.

Bragg deployed his army in a curious fashion, straddling his two corps across Stones River in front of the town. Although the river was small and easily fordable, it served as a barrier to maneuver and an effective defense nonetheless. Bragg planned to use his left flank to attack the Union troops in a complicated maneuver that would have worked fine on a drill fields with highly trained troops. But the terrain around Stones River was hilly, rocky, and heavily wooded, which made conducting such a maneuver very difficult. Also, his subordinate commanders had not had any time to practice such a maneuver with their units. The plan was hardly realistic.

Rosecrans also made a battle plan. Interestingly enough, it was the mirror image of Bragg’s scheme, only without the complicated maneuver thrown in. Rosecrans proposed to initiate the battle by attacking with his left flank against the Confederate right flank. If the attacks began simultaneously, the armies would conduct a giant pinwheel movement. This is just about what they did.

On December 31, Bragg beat Rosecrans to the punch with an attack on the Union right, smashing two divisions. Just as it happened at Shiloh, the complicated plan caused units to become entangled, lost, or to show up in the wrong places. Although the attack did not go exactly according to plan, General Pat Cleburne, adding to his already impressive reputation as a fighter and leader, was a key figure in making the attack a success. But the Confederates ran into a commander who had no intention of giving up the field. General Phil Sheridan, who had fought so well at Perryville, now blunted the Confederate attack. His men ran out of ammunition and had to pull back along with most of the Union troops to a defensive position nearly perpendicular to their original line. The entire Union Army had been forced back, but the Confederate assault lost momentum, the men too exhausted to continue. Bragg could administer a final crushing blow with his right flank, and he ordered Bishop Polk’s men into action. Polk sent his forces in a brigade at a time rather than massing them for one overwhelming attack. The result was predictable. Each individual attack was repulsed with heavy losses to the Confederates. By the end of the day, both sides had fought each other to a standstill — but the battle had decided nothing.

During the night, Rosencrans decided to stay and fight rather than retreat. Bragg, believing he had won a great victory (Bragg never thought he had ever lost a battle), simply assumed Rosecrans would retreat. The next day dawned, and Bragg was surprised to find the Union Army in a strong defensive position awaiting an attack. Bragg decided late in the afternoon to send General John C. Breckinridge’s division against the Union left the next day. Breckinridge, a Kentuckian, had been vice president of the United States under Buchanan and the Southern Democratic candidate for president in the election of 1860. Breckinridge was a senator when he resigned to join the Confederacy. Now in command of a division, he knew such an attack could not succeed. He protested, but Bragg’s stubbornness was never more pronounced, despite the facts presented to him. The attack was a grand spectacle, the men marching forward with precision and élan. The division struck hard, breaking three under strength Union brigades. The fire of 58 Union cannons and a strong counterattack soon met them, however, smashing their charge. The attack cost Breckinridge 1,500 men in about an hour of fighting — all for nothing, except that it earned Bragg the undying hatred of many his officers and men. Realizing Rosecrans was not leaving, Bragg retreated the following day.

Battle Captain’s Report: The Battle of Murfreesboro (Stones River), December 31, 1862–January 1, 1863 Confederate Victory

Commanders: Union: Major General William S. Rosecrans, Army of the Cumberland, 41,000 men. Confederate: General Braxton Bragg, Army of Tennessee, 35,000 men.

Phase I: Rosecrans advances to fight Bragg’s army and drive it from Tennessee. Rosecrans’s advance is slow, giving Bragg ample time to prepare. The two armies camp across from each other along Stones River on 29 December. The following day both commanders plan the same attack: Strike the enemy’s right flank, drive it back, and cut off its line of retreat.

Phase II: Bragg initiates his plan first, smashing into the Union right flank just before dawn. The Confederates drive the Union line back 3 miles, bending it against the Union left until the Union position forms an inverted “V.” The Union army is saved from disaster by the determined stand of general Phil Sheridan’s division, which loses one one-third of its men, but holds the line. Rosecrans, abandoning his plan of attack, shifts troops from his left to strengthen his line. At the end of the day, the Union army is battered, but is holding a strong (though awkward) defensive position. Bragg believes he has won a great victory and reports this to Richmond.

Phase III: Rosecrans is not finished; he decides to stay and fight another day. He moves a division across Stones River to lengthen his defensive line. Bragg cannot resist the temptation to attack this division and orders General Breckinridge to assault the Union position. Breckinridge argues that such an attack over open ground against such a position is suicidal. Bragg ignores the protests and orders him forward. The result is a brave, but futile attack of infantry attempting to take a position defended by 58 artillery pieces. Breckinridge loses 1,500 men in an hour. Bragg again has wasted gallant soldiers for no result. His subordinate commanders no longer trust him. With no further plan, and facing a resolute enemy, Braggs retreats on January 4.

Casualties: Union 13,000, Confederate 10,000.

The Results of the Battle

The Battle of Murfreesboro, or Stones River as the Confederates called it, was tactically indecisive. The Union could claim victory; after all, they had intended to capture the town of Murfreesboro, and they did. Bragg had never intended to fight, but did attack Rosecrans’s army when he had the opportunity and had come very close to winning, but lost heart and retreated. These were two veteran armies who had fought before. Neither side was giving in or falling back. Both armies had suffered tremendous losses as a result. Union casualties amounted to 13,000 out of 45,000 engaged. Confederate losses were 10,000 out of 38,000 engaged. Many Confederate regiments suffered 40 percent losses; most of their regimental commanders were killed also. One-quarter of the Confederate Brigade Commanders had been killed or wounded as well. If this battle was a victory, as Bragg claimed, he could not afford another such success.

Securing Tennessee: Union gains

The Battle of Murfreesboro secured the state of Tennessee for the Union (see Figure 16-5). The capture of the important rail junction set the stage for future campaigns against Chattanooga and Atlanta. The victory, such as it was, did help Lincoln’s political fortunes a bit after Fredericksburg. Lincoln sent Rosecrans a letter that reflected a profound sense of relief: “You gave us a hard-earned victory, which, had there been a defeat instead, the nation could hardly have lived over.”

Confederate losses

Strategically, the Union victory also weakened the waning support of Great Britain for the South. Worst of all for the Confederate Army of Tennessee, Braxton Bragg’s growing problems with his army would lead to fatal consequences in the year to come. All but President Davis, it seemed, had lost confidence in Bragg’s leadership. Bragg responded to this with recriminations against the poor conduct of his subordinates during the battle. This put everyone in turmoil and crippled the army’s ability to operate and fight effectively. Davis did consider replacing Bragg with Joseph E. Johnston, but Johnston decided to avoid stumbling into such a cauldron of bitterness and resentment. Bragg would remain in command for the time being. The Confederate force was named the “Army of Tennessee” after the state. A Union command was called the “Army of THE Tennessee,” named after the river.

Heroes and Goats

In both of these battles, bravery, skill, and opportunity play definite roles in the outcome. Those who can use all three of those things to their best advantage can win a battle, while the ones who don’t can lose it even more easily.

Heroes

The following are men who made their marks on both the battles of Fredericksburg and Murfreesboro:

Robert E. Lee: Almost outmaneuvered, Lee takes advantage of Burnside’s troubles and allows the enemy to attack him where he is strongest. His reputation as the most brilliant Confederate commander is solidified.

Major John Pelham: The young officer of Stuart’s command appears to hold off the entire Yankee army with two artillery pieces. His incredible bravery disrupts what may have been an overwhelming attack on the confederate flank. He becomes the symbol of the gallant young men of the South.

The Union regiments storming Marye’s Heights: Bravery itself is not enough to win battles. Faced with an impossible task, the Union troops never wavered in the assault, many of them walking forward with their heads and shoulders hunched into their overcoats as if they were facing a heavy rainstorm.

Philip H. Sheridan: Always the fighter, Sheridan is skeptical that the Confederates will allow Rosecrans to take his time in launching his attack. While other units are still wrapped in their bedrolls, Sheridan has his men up and ready for combat at 4 a.m. Luckily for the Union, he was ready. His determined stand saves the union line from collapse.

John C. Breckinridge: Battling the Yankees was not enough; he had to fight his own stubborn commander. His argument against attacking the Union defensive position on January 1 was sound. He followed orders, but knew what the cost and result would be. He never forgave Bragg.

Goats

Sometimes winning and victory can have their own problems. Here are a few personalities who could’ve expedited things a little better:

Ambrose E. Burnside: Not suited for high command, he bungles this campaign and battle badly, ignoring all the signs of impending disaster. Things become so bad that his orders are simply disobeyed.

William S. Rosecrans: Wins a questionable victory and the thanks of the President, who needed some good news from the front, but in the process loses nearly one one-fourth of his entire army. Bragg has retreated, but not too far away. His personal bravery is never at question, but does he have what it takes to be an effective army commander?

Braxton Bragg: First day claims victory, then the next day orders a retreat. What kind of commander does this? Bragg never has a concept of what to do with the result of a battle. He appears to know only one way of doing things: Make frontal attacks, then fall back and wait. His heavy-handed manner and refusal to listen to his subordinates create a growing mistrust within the army’s command. Bragg’s effectiveness is dwindling everyday.