Chapter 2
To Hitler’s senior military commanders, the true gravity of the situation in Europe did not become apparent until a matter of days before Germany’s planned invasion of Poland, which finally took place during the early hours of 1 September 1939. Hitler had categorically forbidden any action in the west because he knew that the French Army would outnumber Germany’s forces on that front while he concentrated on the east and the invasion of Poland. The plan for the attack on Poland, essentially a pincer movement involving Army Group North and Army Group South, was to see an invasion on a huge scale with more than a million soldiers on the ground supported by 1,300 aircraft, nearly 70 per cent of which were bombers.
The Luftwaffe was initially tasked with destroying the three opposing Polish air divisions on the ground, by a series of attacks against airfields, after which it would support the Army; Luftflotte 1, commanded by Albert Kesselring, was to support Army Group North, while Alexander Löhr’s Luftflotte 4 would support Army Group South.6
The Polish Air Force consisted of less than a thousand aircraft with a large number being obsolete types. The Poles lacked any centralized command and control for their air assets, and the wide dispersal of the 150 or so fighters available meant that Poland’s major cities and key industrial areas were poorly defended with only fifty fighters available to defend Warsaw.
Not only did the Polish Air Force lack quantity but it also lacked quality. Its main fighter aircraft, the PZL P.11, was outdated and would prove no match for the Bf 109, of which more than 150 would be used by Luftflotten 1 and 4 during the campaign. The Poles had, however, seen war coming and their precautionary aircraft dispersal plan, while not ideal, meant that their assets were not located at the main airfields but were instead tactically dispersed around a hundred temporary locations. This in itself led to communications issues, which in turn would cause the Poles huge command and control problems but, contrary to popular belief, the Luftwaffe would be unable to destroy the Polish air divisions in just a matter of hours.
Early morning fog on the opening day of the invasion disrupted the German plan considerably, particularly in the northern part of Poland where most of the Luftwaffe’s air power was concentrated. Few of Kesselring’s combat units could get airborne at the right time and so the large-scale and synchronized all-out air assault could not take place, and it would not be until the weather improved during the afternoon that Luftflotte 1 could commit more forces. The weather was slightly better in the south, allowing Löhr’s units to operate much as planned and there were many successful raids against Polish airfields and ground installations.
The first air-to-air combat occurred when some thirty P.7 and P.11 fighters of the Polish Pursuit Brigade intercepted a force of nearly a hundred He 111s of Luftflotte 1 attacking an airfield at Okęcie near Warsaw. The He 111s were being escorted by Bf 110s of I(Z)./LG I, led by Major Walter Grabmann, which were slow to react but eventually the Zerstörer pilots accounted for at least two of the Polish fighters.7 The Bf 110s were in action again later in the day but this time performed considerably better against the same opposition and accounted for five Polish fighters, although Grabmann was wounded during the encounter when his aircraft was hit by a P.11.
The lack of a cohesive defence by the Poles had meant that only half of the Luftwaffe’s combat missions on the first day had encountered the Polish Air Force. The rest had been flown in direct support of the Army on the ground and so the most noticeable successes of the first day of fighting belonged to the close air support units.
The following day the Bf 110 pilots learnt the harsh lesson of why not to stay and enter combat with the more agile P.11. Even though the Zerstörer pilots had a numerical advantage of some three to one, six P.11 pilots were able to put up a most credible performance and shoot down three of the Bf 110s, although two of the P.11s were also destroyed.
After the second day of fighting, Kesselring was left to conclude that the Polish Air Force had been only partially neutralized. Nonetheless, he was satisfied that the Poles had effectively been paralysed as a result of the speed of the campaign.8 From now on operational sorties in support of the ground forces would be given his highest priority with most of the bomber-escort missions being flown by the Bf 110s, leaving the Bf 109s to operate at shorter range. Kesselring was now able to transfer some of his units to Löhr’s air fleet in the south to support the main advance on Warsaw, after which Luftflotte 1 would gradually phase out of the battle.
Hitler had clearly not reckoned with Britain and France fulfilling their guarantee of Poland’s sovereignty, and on 3 September Britain and France declared war on Germany. A British Expeditionary Force was sent to France along with a token force of RAF aircraft, including army co-operation Blenheim and Battle light bombers, and four Hurricane fighter squadrons.
Although there was little in the way of action undertaken by Allied forces on the ground, there were early aerial clashes over France and Germany. Göring now became increasingly anxious about Germany’s western borders and within days transferred more fighter units to the protection of its interior. Meanwhile, in Poland, the land battle was starting to reach its climax as the Polish capital came increasingly under attack with Warsaw eventually falling; Poland’s last sporadic resistance ended on 6 October. The campaign had lasted just thirty-six days during which the Polish Army of more than a million men had been annihilated.
The close air support tactics that had been perfected in Spain had now been vindicated on a much larger scale. Furthermore, the Luftwaffe had lost fewer than 300 aircraft during the Polish campaign and had emerged from it in total glory, justifiably so as this was the first time in the history of air warfare that an independent air force had played such a decisive role in a land campaign. The speed of the campaign had meant that Britain and France were unable to provide any military assistance to Poland, leaving the Polish fighter pilots, in their inadequate aircraft, to face the might of the Luftwaffe, although many Poles had performed well. They had proved skilful in aircraft handling, often making them difficult to shoot down, and their aircraft’s dark camouflage scheme made them difficult to see when at low level where they blended in with the natural terrain and woodland of Poland.
The skill and courage of the Polish pilots provided an early reminder there were harsh battles to be won. Furthermore, many Polish airmen would manage to escape their homeland and make their way across Europe to continue their fight against the Nazis. Ultimately, though, while the Polish P.11 pilots did enjoy some successes in the air, accounting for more than half of the losses suffered by the Luftwaffe, they were no match against the overwhelming superiority faced.
The brief campaign in Poland had seen the two latest variants of the Bf 109 perform very well. The Bf 109D, with a maximum speed of more than 320 mph and a greater rate of climb and higher ceiling than previous models, retained the armament of four MG 17 machine guns (two mounted in the nose and one in each wing) as an attempt to fit a 20 mm cannon that was capable of firing through the propeller hub had, at that time, proved unsuccessful. The Bf 109E, with the improved DB 601 engine, had an even greater performance and was capable of 350 mph at 12,000 feet and boasted an initial rate of climb of more than 3,000 feet per minute and a service ceiling of over 34,000 feet. It had retained the two nose-mounted machine guns but the wing-mounted machine guns were replaced by an MG FF 20 mm cannon in each wing to give the aircraft a great increase in firepower.
The tactics used by the Luftwaffe in Poland had proved most successful. They were often based on either the dive and zoom tactic or high-speed slashing attacks. The idea of staying and entering combat with the opposition was resisted and the campaign also saw the decoy tactic being successfully employed. The idea was that one aircraft would fly alone and look vulnerable to the opposition but this lone aircraft was protected from above. Any attempt by the opposition to get on to the tail of the decoy was acted upon immediately by the rest of the formation who would quickly swoop on the attacker.
The top scoring fighter pilot of the campaign was Hauptmann Hannes Gentzen, the Kommandeur of Jagdgruppe 102 equipped with Bf 109Ds. Gentzen was the only pilot to achieve more than five victories during the campaign, eventually being credited with seven (five bombers and two fighters), but many other 109 pilots scored their first successes during the campaign, including Leutnant Gustav Rödel of 2./JG 21, Leutnant Hans Philipp of I./JG 76, Feldwebel Erwin Clausen and Feldwebel Friedrich Geisshardt, both of I(J)./LG 2. A number of Bf 110 pilots also achieved success in Poland including Oberleutnant Gordon Gollob of 3./ZG 76 and Hauptmann Wolfgang Falck who led 2./ZG 76. But despite the successes in Poland, the Bf 109 had only played a peripheral part in the campaign as it had essentially been held back by the High Command in case British and French bombers carried out retaliatory attacks against German cities.
While the Luftwaffe’s leadership basked in the glory of their overwhelming victory, there remained deficiencies in their strategies and in the training methodologies, which had all come about because of the rapid build-up for war when the emphasis had been on quantity rather than quality. Full of confidence from his success against Poland, Hitler now turned his attention to the west and by November the aerial clashes on the Western Front had intensified.
With more than a thousand combat aircraft, the French Armée de l’Air looked impressive in terms of numbers but its force was unbalanced in terms of capability with fewer than 500 modern single-engine fighters available. The French had two main fighter types. One was the Morane Saulnier MS.406, a fairly agile fighter and capable of speeds of up to 300 mph. Although its speed and rate of climb were inferior to the Bf 109, its wing loading was comparable and in the hands of the right pilot the MS.406 would prove to be a very capable adversary for the Bf 109D or even the Bf 109E. The other French fighter, the American-built Curtiss Hawk 75, would perform even better against the Bf 109 because its rate of climb and overall handling qualities were better than the MS.406 and its wing loading was lower than the Bf 109. Again, in the hands of a good pilot, the Hawk 75 would prove to be far more capable than some of the Luftwaffe pilots had been led to believe.
An example of how hard the French pilots resisted occurred on 9 November when Bf 109Ds of JGr 102, led by Hannes Gentzen, attacked a French reconnaissance aircraft being escorted by nine Hawk 75s over the Maginot and Siegfried Lines. Despite everything being in Gentzen’s favour as he led the 109s into attack, including height and numerical advantage, the French pilots had spotted their attackers and fought back fiercely with four Bf 109s being shot down and another four forced to land; only one Hawk 75 was damaged.
Not all encounters would turn out this way but it did teach some harsh lessons. Although the 109s had entered the fight with a clear advantage, there may have been a degree of arrogance amongst the pilots and rather than taking on their French opponents in a turning fight they may have been better off sticking to the less risky dive and zoom tactic.
The Luftwaffe’s first fighter-to-fighter encounter with the Royal Air Force is believed to have taken place on 22 December when Bf 109s of III./JG 53 encountered a number of Hurricanes. Two Hurricanes were shot down, one of which was claimed by Werner Mölders. Again the 109 pilots had been happy to enter a turning fight against their opponents rather than adopting the dive and zoom tactic, which would more likely have resulted in greater success.
The performance of the Hurricane made it a match for the Bf 109, but the RAF’s tactics during the early days of the Second World War had been based on engaging large numbers of unescorted German bombers flying in close formation, rather than being based on how best to counter a formation of modern fighters. The British assumption had always been that any attack would be made from bases in Germany and that the enemy fighters would not have the range to provide any escort. The likelihood of Germany acquiring bases closer to Britain had not been seriously considered and this concept had led to the RAF developing just three main fighter tactics, all of which involved a number of fighters attacking a single bomber; either from line astern or line abreast, or for three fighters to attack a single bomber simultaneously from the rear and beam. All three tactics relied on the bomber not carrying out any evading manoeuvres, which had been presumed most likely given there was little difference between the top speed of the bombers and fighters at the time, but these somewhat rigid tactics meant that the RAF fighter pilots had to spend more time worrying about their own positioning and formation, rather than looking out for the Luftwaffe.
With poor weather during much of the winter of 1939–40, the air war on the Western Front had produced little more than a few skirmishes with both sides now locked into what became known as the Phoney War, or Sitzkrieg (sitting down war). There were, however, encounters over north-west Europe during this period, particularly over the northern corner of the Franco-German border where Allied reconnaissance aircraft often ventured, and a number of future Experten opened their accounts during the winter months. These included Rolf Pingel, Hans von Hahn, Heinz Bär, Anton Hackl, Max Stotz, Wolf-Dietrich Wilcke, Joachim Müncheberg and Erich Leie; all would later go on to exceed a century of victories during the war.
Keen to make a further move in Europe, Hitler launched his offensive against Norway and Denmark, called Operation Weserübung, during the early hours of 9 April 1940 under the pretence of protecting Denmark’s and Norway’s neutrality against Franco-British aggression. Denmark was overrun in just a matter of hours, although the invasion of Norway proved far more difficult. Britain and French forces intervened but the Luftwaffe’s X. Fliegerkorps – which specialized in coastal operations and consisted of more than 250 bombers and a hundred fighters under the command Hans Ferdinand Geisler – played a decisive role in the occupation of Norway, which was completed in early June when the British evacuated their forces at Narvik.
The extended period of inactivity on the Western Front had given France valuable time to prepare for war and two new fighter types entered service during the early months of 1940. The better of the two was the Dewoitine D.520 with a top speed of 330 mph and an operational ceiling of 33,000 feet, and the second was the Bloch MB.152 with similar performance. Most of the fighters were based in the northern and eastern parts of France but the French air-defence system was generally ineffective. It relied on a series of observer posts using telephone to communicate to the command centres; there were only a handful of mobile radio direction-finding sets, later known as radar, located in France during early 1940.
Rumours in France of a German invasion were now rife while in Germany Göring and his senior commanders had every reason to be full of confidence. The Luftwaffe now possessed more than 5,000 aircraft (a thousand more than at the outbreak of the war), including more than 1,700 bombers and 1,600 fighters. Kesselring, now in command of Luftflotte 2, had just over 800 fighters; 630 Bf 109Es (serving with JG 1, 2, 3, 20, 21, 26, 27, 51, TrGr 186 and LG 2), thirty Bf 109Ds of JG 2 and 145 Bf 110C/Ds of ZG 1 and 26. Of similar strength was Luftflotte 3, led by Hugo Sperrle, with 775 fighters; 600 Bf 109Es (JG 2, 51, 52, 53, 54, 76 and 77) and 175 Bf 110C/Ds (ZG 2, 26, 52, 76 and LG 1).9
With more than 3,000 modern combat aircraft available to Luftflotten 2 and 3, and with Germany’s proven successes in Spain and Poland, only modest resistance from Allied fighters, the majority of which were considered inferior to the Bf 109, was expected over north-west Europe. Nonetheless, almost all of the Luftwaffe’s fighters were brought together for Hitler’s new offensive against France and the Low Countries with twenty-seven Jagdgruppen moving forward to airfields along Germany’s western border.
The plan was based on speed and simultaneous assaults on Germany’s neighbouring countries in the west. In the north, Army Group B would invade the Netherlands and Belgium to draw the Allies into believing that this was the main attack, while Army Group A would deliver the main blow through the Ardennes and Luxembourg to bypass the Maginot Line, France’s most valuable line of defence. The plan would open up the whole of northern France to the advancing German Army but it clearly violated the neutrality of Belgium and the Netherlands with neither country having a modern air force. The Aeronautique Militaire Belge, the air component of the Belgian military, was equipped with fewer than 200 aircraft, of which the vast majority were obsolete biplanes, and the Nederlandse Militaire Luchtvaart, the air division of the Royal Netherlands Army, was a small indigenous force of less than a hundred aircraft of various types, none of which could be considered very capable.
Just as in Poland, the Luftwaffe would support the Army. Kesselring and Sperrle were assured that the British, French, Belgian and Dutch air forces could amass little more than a thousand fighters and a thousand bombers between them. Even allowing for the British providing another thousand aircraft from their bases in southern England, the High Command was extremely confident and would focus fighter operations on preventing the Allied air forces from hindering the offensive by destroying key targets such as bridges over the various rivers to slow down the rapid advance by the German Panzers.
The calm and uncertainty of the Phoney War came to a sudden end during the early hours of 10 May 1940 when Germany invaded France and the Low Countries. More than 300 He 111s and Do 17s of Luftflotte 2 carried out a series of devastating attacks against twenty enemy airfields, while German airborne forces and fast-moving armoured columns advanced into Holland and Belgium. The opening day was all about the speed of the German advance and the success of the Luftwaffe’s bombers against Allied airfields and major lines of communication such as roads and rail centres. By the end of the first day the Dutch and Belgian air forces had effectively been eliminated and the French and British forces had suffered considerably. Aerial activity had mainly involved Allied fighters intercepting German bombers, with many claims being made on both sides, but there had been no air-to-air combat of note between fighters on the opening day.
The following day saw more attacks against airfields in northern France as the RAF committed more fighters from southern England. The Luftwaffe now commenced a more tactical campaign, for which it was best trained and equipped, with the first significant air-to-air combat with Allied fighters as the Messerschmitts entered the fray. Over Belgium and northern France the Bf 109s of III./JG 1 and Bf 110s of II./ZG 1 were patrolling the Albert Canal and Maastricht area at first light and gained an early success when they spotted RAF Blenheims carrying out a reconnaissance patrol of the area; four Blenheims were shot down. There were further successes for the Bf 109s of I./JG 1 and I./JG 27 while engaging nine Belgian Battles tasked with attacking the bridges over the Albert Canal. The Battles were escorted by six Gladiators but they were no match for the 109s; six Battles and four Gladiators were shot down.
The second day had started well for the Luftwaffe as its Messerschmitts carried out numerous strafing attacks against Allied airfields in Belgium and northern France, achievinging the destruction of many Allied aircraft on the ground. But there were already ominous signs for the Bf 110 when pitched against a very capable opponent such as the Hurricane. One example was during a mid-afternoon encounter over Mourmelon when RAF Hurricanes intercepted a force of thirty He 111s escorted by Bf 110s of I./ZG 2. The initial interception was carried out by three Hurricanes but they were soon joined by seven more, and then even more Hurricanes joined in having been patrolling in the area; four of the Bf 110s were shot down, as were two of the He 111s, for the loss of just one Hurricane.
Later that afternoon, Bf 109s of I./JG 51 were patrolling the area from The Hague to Rotterdam when they spotted twelve Hurricanes. Having gained the early advantage, the 109s attacked the Hurricanes from high and line astern but once they had been spotted one of the Hurricane sections was able to react. The fight lasted several minutes and resulted in five Hurricanes being shot down for the loss of three 109s. Two of the Hurricanes were claimed by Leutnant Ernst Terry, two by Oberleutnant Heinrich Krafft and the other by Unteroffizier Franz Schild.
In the early evening the French Armée de l’Air carried out its first bombing mission of the war against strategically important bridges. The raid was carried out by twelve LeO 451 medium bombers that were being escorted by eighteen MS.406s but the formation was intercepted by Bf 109s of I./JG 1. During the fierce fighting that followed, the French fighter pilots fought bravely and the encounter ended up even, with a handful of victories claimed on both sides.
It had been a hard day of aerial fighting with the Bf 109s generally causing havoc amongst the Allies. Until that day very few Allied pilots had experienced air combat and persisted in flying around in formations that proved unwieldy in combat with there being several cases where the 109s managed to carry out attacks unseen. The Jagdflieger had an excellent aircraft, he had been well trained and his tactics were fluid and flexible enough to react to the dynamism of aerial combat.
While the Allied fighter pilots suffered against the Bf 109s, they continued to enjoy success against the bombers and Bf 110s. The Bf 110 Zerstörer pilots were now fully aware of their vulnerability to the Allied single-seat fighters and had to adopt more defensive tactics, the main one being to form a defensive circle so that the rear of each aircraft was protected by the guns from the aircraft behind it.10 The large circle, often more than a mile in diameter, gave the 110 a commanding position in the sky and made it difficult for the Allied pilots to attack while it retained the option for the Zerstörer pilot to counter-attack should the opportunity arise. Even if the 110s chose to remain in a defensive circle during any lengthy engagement, the Allied pilots could never take their eyes off the Zerstörers for one moment and so the Bf 110s were often able to influence an aerial exchange indirectly.
While this tactic did offer some protection, particularly if the circle was kept from becoming too large, it did not prevent an attack from above or from the beam but this in itself caused the Allied pilots some difficulty because they were now presented with higher deflection angles that required a greater degree of accuracy on the part of the attacker. The key moment would come when the Zerstörers had to break from their defensive circle and this would often provide the Allied fighter pilot with an opportunity to pick off any stragglers. The Zerstörer pilot had also learned to zoom into a near vertical climb to enable his gunner to shoot at a pursuing fighter. Although this technique made it extremely hard for the gunner to try and hit an attacking fighter, it also gave the attacker a problem; any return fire from the Bf 110 would occupy the attacking pilot’s mind and give the Zerstörer a chance to make its escape, particularly if there was any cloud cover above.
The speed and strength of the German advance on the ground resulted in the capture of the main bridges over the River Maas and the Albert Canal, allowing two Panzer divisions to cross into Belgium. The Germans were determined to hold the bridges and allocated Bf 109Es of JG 27 to protect them. In one encounter over Maastricht on 12 May, nine Blenheims were intercepted by two Gruppen of 109s from JG 1, led by Hauptmann Joachim Schlichting, Kommandeur of I./JG 1 and a veteran of the Legion Condor. Six Blenheims were shot down and the third Gruppe of JG 1, which had been patrolling over Liége, accounted for two more as the Blenheims attempted to make an escape.
An indication of the achievements enjoyed by the Messerschmitts that day was that of JG 27, which had flown nearly 350 sorties and claimed twenty-eight victories for the loss of just four of its own Bf 109Es. One pilot to enjoy success that day was Hauptmann Adolf Galland. After serving with the Legion Condor, Galland had returned to Germany in 1938 where he was employed in the RLM writing technical manuals and devising doctrine based on his experience as a ground-attack pilot in Spain; these ideas were later developed for dive-bomber tactics used by the Ju 87 Stuka. During the early days of the Second World War he flew the Henschel Hs 123 biplane but having briefly flown the Bf 109 in Spain he had remained determined to become a fighter pilot and had now been given his chance as the operations staff officer of JG 27.
While serving with JG 27, Galland had been able to meet up again with Werner Mölders, now Kommandeur of III./JG 53, and Mölders offered him the opportunity to fly with his unit to gain experience of the Bf 109E. These sorties proved invaluable for Galland and he quickly learned new tactics such as giving a Staffel the freedom to operate as an effective unit so that it could seize the initiative by using a single spotter aircraft to mark the position of an enemy formation; a visual type of early warning system. On occasions Galland was given the opportunity to act as Gruppenkommandeur and he quickly gained even further experience as a combat leader. He was even able to pass on new tactics to his own Kommodore of JG 27, Max Ibel, who agreed to adopt Galland’s ideas.
During the morning of 12 May, Galland was flying with his wingman, Leutnant Gustav Rödel. While patrolling to the west of Liége at just over 12,000 feet Galland spotted eight Hurricanes about 3,000 feet below. The Hurricanes were escorting Blenheim bombers tasked with attacking bridges in Holland. As the Bf 109s had not been spotted, Galland immediately attacked from an advantageous position of high and astern. As he pressed home his attack he found himself willing his opponent to defend himself, almost hoping that someone would warn him, but the Hurricane took no evasive action. Galland’s first burst was fired from too great a range but at last the Hurricane pilot reacted, although his avoiding action only succeeded in taking the Hurricane towards Rödel who now made his attack. With the other Hurricanes making off in all directions, Galland pressed home a second attack and the Hurricane was seen spinning down with its rudder missing and parts of the wing breaking off. Galland knew that the Hurricane was finished and decided against wasting any more ammunition and went off instead to look for another. One tried to escape by diving but Galland was soon on its tail and closing at a distance of just a hundred yards. The Hurricane was seen entering a half-roll into some cloud as Galland attacked again from very close quarters at a height of 1,500 feet. The Hurricane zoomed for a second, then stalled and dived vertically into the ground.
Both Hurricanes had crashed to the north of Liége and had there have been more Bf 109s on the scene at the time then the outcome could have been even worse for the Hurricanes. It had been a classic attack by Galland and Rödel, who had used height and the sun to gain their advantage, enabling them to carry out their attack unseen. Galland claimed his third victory later that day and would go on to achieve twelve victories during the battle for France.
One young pilot to score his first success of the war during the opening days of the French campaign was 22-year-old Leutnant Günther Rall of 8./JG 52. The son of a businessman, Rall had been raised in the Black Forest region of Germany and joined the Army in 1936. Having been persuaded by a friend to transfer to the Luftwaffe, Rall qualified as a pilot in 1938 and joined JG 52. On 12 May 1940 he was amongst a number of Bf 109s escorting a reconnaissance aircraft when it was attacked by three French Hawk 75s that had failed to notice the escorting 109s. Rall was quick to pounce and claimed one of the Hawks. He was understandably delighted to have joined the exclusive list of those who had shot down an enemy aircraft. The first victory could often prove elusive for any fighter pilot and many would never achieve a single victory but Rall would never look back and would go on to become the Luftwaffe’s third highest-ranking Experte of the war.
Two days later, 14 May, turned out to be a day of heavy air fighting as the Allies fought hard to prevent a German breakthrough of the French defences at Sedan. The Jagdwaffe flew more than 800 sorties during the day and claimed to have shot down ninety British and French aircraft. It had been a good day for the Luftwaffe and would later prove to be its best day of the French campaign, becoming known as Tag der Jagdflieger (‘Day of the Fighter Pilots’).
Amongst the highest achievements that day was five victories by Oberleutnant Hans-Karl Mayer of I./JG 53. Mayer had already experienced air combat during his time with the Legion Condor and was now serving with 1./JG 53. His Staffel had been circling near Sedan during the afternoon at a height of 15,000 feet while waiting for Ju 87 Stukas tasked with bombing French positions around the town when the Bf 109s were attacked from above by six Hurricanes. Followed by his wingman, Leutnant Hans Ohly, Mayer dropped down to protect the Stukas and quickly claimed one of the Hurricanes. Mayer could now see more enemy aircraft and quickly shot down a Fairey Battle, followed by two Blenheims before claiming another Battle just a few minutes later. The day had undoubtedly belonged to the Messerschmitts and had been a disastrous one for the Allies. However, amongst I./JG 53’s losses that day was Oberfeldwebel Walter Grimmling who had been credited with JG 53’s first victory of the war.
As German forces advanced on the ground, the Jagdgruppen moved forwards and started to occupy Allied airfields in Belgium and northern France. These included some quite austere operating sites that were barely anything more than a farmer’s field and the Luftwaffe soon learned the importance of having a good supply line. The advance on the ground had proved so quick that fuel and aircraft supplies could not keep up and this often meant the Messerschmitts were operating on their limits as far as endurance was concerned, and often without sufficient spares.
Nonetheless, the Jagdwaffe was on top as the German advance gathered pace but the fact remained that the Bf 110 Zerstörer, despite its success as a long-range fighter during the campaign in Poland, fared badly at the hands of better fighter opposition. Even with a rear gunner to protect the aircraft from behind, the two main areas where the Bf 110 suffered were in its lack of ability to turn hard and its roll rate; this would put the Zerstörer crew at a disadvantage when encountering single-seat fighters, such as the Hurricane.
To counter the Bf 110’s disadvantage against the Hurricane, it usually enjoyed the advantage of numbers and so if a Staffel was engaged by enemy fighters then other Staffeln were often in the vicinity to provide support to the unit under attack. This often involved a tactic of using layers of Bf 110s, with a handful of formations each consisting of ten or twelve aircraft, with each formation separated in height by about 1,000 feet to provide protection from above. But even with a large formation of up to fifty or sixty Bf 110s, there were still losses amongst the Zerstörer units as the 110 continued to prove inadequate against the Hurricane.
Some of those who had enjoyed early successes in Poland and France now became victims themselves. One was Oberleutnant Werner Methfessel of V.(Z)/LG 1 who had been credited with four victories during the campaign in Poland and had added four more to his total over France. On 17 May, Methfessel and his radio operator, Unteroffizier Heinz Resener, were amongst a number of Bf 110s escorting He 111s when they were shot down by Hurricanes. Methfessel and Resener’s aircraft crashed to the west of Reims and was one of three Bf 110s shot down during the action, and one of eight successes claimed by the Allies that day. Even though the Bf 110s of V.(Z)/LG 1 had both numerical and height advantage against what appears to have been just one flight of Hurricanes, the Zerstörers were only able to account for one Hurricane shot down and could not prevent the loss of three aircraft.
The following day there were similar losses, including the loss of four Bf 110s from 5./ZG 26 near Cambrai during the afternoon. Led by the Staffelkapitän, Hauptmann Eberhard Trützschler d’Elsa, the Bf 110s were escorting He 111s at medium altitude. The weather was scattered cloud and as there was no activity at medium level d’Elsa decided to look beneath the clouds. The Staffel descended but unfortunately for the Zerstörer crews they came out of cloud in the middle of a formation of Hurricanes.
The aerial combat that followed turned out to be one of the most extensive experienced by pilots on either side with the outcome being the loss of the four Bf 110s, including that of d’Elsa. A number of Bf 110s of 6./ZG 26, led by Hauptmann Theodor Rossiwall, had been in the vicinity and had seen d’Elsa take his formation below cloud but Rossiwall’s formation had then become involved in heavy fighting above the clouds. Now back at their airfield at As in Belgium, they waited; their colleagues now overdue. Eventually an aircraft of the fifth Staffel landed. It was Oberfeldwebel Kurt Rochel, a veteran of the Legion Condor, who had to force-land as a result of damage to his aircraft. His plane had been hit but both he and his radio operator, Unteroffizier Willi Schöffler, were unhurt. A little later the damaged Bf 110 of Oberleutnant Artur Niebuhr and Unteroffizier Klaus Theissen also returned. Then there was another and then another, and slowly the survivors of 5./ZG 26 returned. But aircraft were still missing. As darkness came, and without word from other airfields, the Staffel crews feared the worst. D’Elsa had trained and led the unit for a long time and his loss would be felt hard by his men.
In fact, although wounded, d’Elsa had managed to crash-land between Douai and Cambrai. Both he and his radio operator, Unteroffizier Hermann Rossler, were captured by the French and became prisoners of war, although they would later return from captivity, but such were d’Elsa’s injuries that he would not return to flying duties. Theodor Rossiwall was now given command of the Staffel but initially he had just three serviceable aircraft available to him.
Despite some successes, the fact that thirty-five Bf 110s had already been shot down by the RAF alone, in just the first week of the campaign, did not go unnoticed on either side. These losses were 50 per cent higher than those suffered by the Bf 109s during the opening week of the campaign, a statistic made worse by the fact that the vast majority of sorties were being flown by the 109s. A total of ninety Bf 110s would be lost to enemy action by the end of the campaign (24 per cent of the Bf 110 strength) and although 169 Bf 109s were lost during the same period this figure represented just 12 per cent of the Bf 109 force.
Few losses had a greater impact than that of the Gruppenkommandeur of II./JG 26, Herwig Knüppel, another veteran of the Legion Condor and commander of the Gruppe for the past year. He was shot down by Hurricanes on 19 May. His 109 was one of three aircraft lost by the Gruppe during the combat and crashed to the north-west of Lille, killing Knüppel.
Despite such losses, victory in France was soon in sight. The Germans had flooded through the gap between the Allied armies in the northern and southern parts of the region and the main German advance had now reached a line between Cambrai and St-Quentin; Cambrai had fallen and Amiens was soon to follow. The Germans had also reached Péronne, leaving no Allied forces between them and the sea as more Allied airfields were evacuated. The following day the Germans successfully opened up a corridor between Arras and the Somme as advanced Panzer units reached the coast. As the Panzers closed in on Dunkirk, Göring was guilty of letting the euphoria of success cloud his military judgement. He believed that the Luftwaffe alone was capable of defeating the Allies and he managed to convince Hitler to rest the Panzers should they be needed to advance on Paris. The rest of the hierarchy, including Milch, Jeschonnek and Kesselring, did not agree.
Göring would prove to be wrong and in the context of the Second World War it was a crucial error on his part, though his units were already tired and resources were stretched after two hectic weeks of air fighting. The RAF started to withdraw across the Channel as the British evacuation of Allied soldiers at Dunkirk commenced on 26 May. Amongst his many reassurances, Göring had convinced Hitler that the Luftwaffe could prevent any evacuation but the Allies had built sufficient defences to the approaches of Dunkirk. Although the Luftwaffe did its best, the Allied evacuation could not be stopped.
It was in the vicinity of the evacuation beaches where Bf 109 pilots encountered the RAF’s Spitfire for the first time. The date of the first known aerial engagement between the two types was 23 May when Bf 109Es of I./JG 27 encountered Spitfires to the south of Calais. The similarities between these two great fighters, not only in their design but in their performance, were uncanny, almost identical.
The similarities between the Bf 109E and the Spitfire I become most evident when comparing the technical specifications of each design. The engine of each fighter – the DB 601A of the Bf 109E and the Merlin III of the Spitfire IA – produced almost identical power with each engine producing over 1,000 hp. This gave the two fighters almost identical performance when climbing to a height of 20,000 feet, which both types could reach in just under eight minutes. Although the Bf 109E had a greater ceiling than the Spitfire’s 30,000 feet, at medium level each fighter was capable of 350 mph at 15,000 feet.
There were, however, some differences in the engine design for each fighter. The fuel-injection of the Bf 109E’s DB 601 engine meant it was able to cope when unloading at zero-g – a manoeuvre used to gain maximum acceleration – and so was able to dive better than the Spitfire. If a Spitfire tried to follow then its Merlin engine, with a normal float type carburettor, would be unable to deliver fuel and so it would splutter or even stop during the manoeuvre. This meant the Spitfire pilot had to perform a half-roll before pulling towards his evading opponent by which time the Bf 109E would usually have made its escape.
There were also some design differences as well. As far as size was concerned the Bf 109E was slightly smaller than the Spitfire, although its weight was marginally greater. It was a little shorter than the Spitfire’s 30 feet and its wingspan of just over 32 feet was less than the Spitfire’s 37 feet. This gave the Spitfire a wing area of more than 240 square feet, some 40 per cent greater than the Bf 109E, meaning the Spitfire’s wing loading (and the Hurricane’s for that matter), was less than that of the Bf 109E.
Because of the Spitfire’s good rate of roll, its pilot could shake off a Bf 109E by using a flick half-roll manoeuvre and then quickly pulling out of the subsequent dive. The 109 pilot would find this defensive manoeuvre difficult to counter because of his own rapid build-up of speed in the dive, making the elevators too heavy to effect a quick pull out of a dive.11 But the relatively high wing loading of the Bf 109E was offset by its shorter and square-tipped wing design that incorporated leading edge slots, which would project forward of the wing at slow speed to increase lift and to improve its ability to turn hard. However, these were reported to operate asymmetrically at times; this would affect the lateral stability of the aircraft as well as giving the occasional problem when closing in for a kill during combat. An experienced 109 pilot would invariably get the better of an inexperienced Spitfire pilot who could be afraid to pull too hard in a turn for fear of stalling his aircraft. But on balance, and with every other parameter being the same, including the skill level of the pilots, the Spitfire was capable of turning slightly tighter than the Bf 109 at medium altitude.
Where the two fighters did differ was in their armament. The Spitfire was armed with eight wing-mounted 0.303 inch Browning machine guns whereas the Bf 109E was armed with a mix of cannon and machine guns, with two 7.9 mm machine guns immediately above its engine, slightly staggered in their location, and two wing-mounted 20 mm cannon. Although the Spitfire’s Brownings proved reliable, they lacked the punch of the Bf 109E’s cannon, the shells of which inflicted more damage than a rifle-calibre machine-gun round.
The differing armament of the two designs meant that the Bf 109E had a 25 per cent greater weight of firepower than the Spitfire and Hurricane but had a lesser rate of fire than the RAF fighters. The Spitfire and Hurricane could put more rounds in the air in any half-second or one-second burst and so the probability of a hit was greater for the Spitfire and Hurricane although their destructive power hit-for-hit was less than that of the Bf 109E.
There were other factors that came into play during air-to-air combat. The Bf 109 canopy, with its side-hinge design and heavy metal frame, meant there were areas of visual obstruction for the pilot when compared to the sliding canopy design of the RAF fighters, and the rearward view from the 109 was poor. Also, the cockpit of the 109 was more cramped than the British designs and the seat was also lower in the Bf 109, which meant the pilot’s legs were more stretched, although this was not always a bad thing, particularly when manoeuvring hard, as the body position was more favourable for resisting g-forces.
But even when taking all of these subtle design differences between the Spitfire I and the Bf 109E into account, the fighters were essentially evenly matched and so the outcome of any duel often came down to the skill and experience of the pilots involved and the tactics used. In the right hands either aircraft was capable of outmanoeuvring the other, and victory would often be achieved by the pilot with the initial tactical advantage or with the greater knowledge of his opponent’s strengths and weaknesses in combat.
These early exchanges over the beaches at Dunkirk gave both sides a valuable insight into the capability and tactics of their main adversary, and these lessons would be taken forward into the opening exchanges of the Battle of Britain that was soon to follow. The fact that the Spitfire proved such a capable adversary had initially come as a shock to the Luftwaffe but the Bf 109 pilots usually enjoyed numerical superiority. The RAF fighters generally operated as a squadron, or even as a flight, with typically no more than a dozen or so aircraft, whereas the Messerschmitts were operating at Gruppe strength with some thirty or more aircraft, and the RAF pilots faced the additional problem of operating at considerable ranges from their home base.
During the heavy aerial fighting at the end of May and early June 1940, the Jagdwaffe flew some 2,000 sorties12 of which 80 per cent were flown by the Bf 109s. The British evacuation of Dunkirk ended on 3 June but fighting continued until the French surrender some three weeks later, by which time many of the Bf 109 units had returned to Germany for a rest and to re-equip in preparation for the planned invasion of England.
The battle for France was over. It had been a resounding victory for the Luftwaffe with the Jagdwaffe achieving success on a quite staggering scale; more than fifty pilots were credited with five victories or more. The most successful was 26-year-old Wilhelm Balthasar, Kapitän of 1./JG 1, with twenty-three victories during the campaign, including five in one day on 5 June followed by four more the next, to add to his seven victories in Spain. The second most successful was Werner Mölders of III./JG 53 who was credited with sixteen victories during the campaign to add to his fourteen successes in Spain and a further nine achieved during the opening months of the Second World War. Mölders was now the highest scoring Experte with a total of thirty-nine victories and, on 29 May, became the first Jagdflieger to be awarded the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross; two weeks later, Wilhelm Balthasar became the second.
During the later weeks of the campaign in France, Mölders had been averaging one victory for every three missions flown but even he was not invincible, despite having flown more than 130 combat missions since the outbreak of the war. During the late afternoon of 5 June he spotted six Moranes near Compiègne being attacked by other Messerschmitts before Mölders eventually got his chance. As Mölders curved towards line astern of a Morane, a favoured position for an attacker and one that allowed him to keep the nose of his aircraft on his victim, the Frenchman turned hard, resulting in Mölders briefly losing sight of his opponent. The Morane now made its escape at low level while evading further attacks by two more Messerschmitts. Mölders, at a height of 3,000 feet, suddenly heard a bang. He had been hit and quickly realized that his engine has been shot to pieces as his control column lurched forward. Mölders had no option but to bail out of his aircraft and was taken prisoner, but he was fortunate as just three weeks later, after the surrender of France, he was released. Even though he was as experienced in air combat as anyone else at the time, Mölders had been shot down by an aircraft he had not seen.
The two other top scorers of the campaign were Adolf Galland, now Kommandeur of III./JG 26, with fourteen victories during a one-month period between May and June, and 24-year-old Leutnant Helmut Wick of 3./JG 2 who achieved twelve victories over France. Galland had gone from strength to strength during the battle of France. Considering he had made the transition from ground-attack pilot to fighter pilot just a few months before, Galland had quickly become one of the most capable and highly respected pilots in the Jagdwaffe. Wick, who had joined the Luftwaffe in 1936 and was only ever considered an average pilot during training, had been fortunate to blossom under the tutelage of Werner Mölders during his time with JG 53. At the outbreak of the Second World War he was transferred to JG 2 and claimed his first victory in November 1939 flying only his sixth combat mission. During the campaign in France he had quickly added to his total and on 6 June was the first pilot of his Gruppe to complete a hundred combat missions, claiming his tenth victim on the same day. Others to achieve double figures in victories over France were Oberleutnant Lothar Keller of 1./JG 3 and Oberfeldwebel Werner Machold of 1./JG 2; both were credited with ten victories during the campaign.
The campaign against France had seen the Luftwaffe control the sky and had enabled German forces to dominate the battlefield. The Bf 109 had proved to be better than most of its Allied adversaries and its superior tactics, developed from the experiences gained during the earlier campaigns in Spain and Poland, meant the Jagdflieger now proved supreme.