Chapter Five
Making the most of Hitler’s difficulties around Moscow, Stalin struck his positions south of Kharkov in Ukraine along the Northern Donets near Izyum on 18 January 1942. The German defences were overwhelmed and Soviet ski troops, infantry and cavalry poured into the Germans’ rear areas, taking the rail junctions at Lozovaya and Barvenkovo. German mobility, though, meant that they were able to successfully contain the bridgehead, which stretched west from the Northern Donets towards the Donbas in the south and Kharkov to the north.
While Timoshenko and his South Western Front were preparing to liberate Kharkov, von Bock’s Army Group South was aiming to destroy the Lozovaya pocket stretching southwest from Izyum beyond the Donets. General Friedrich Paulus to the north deployed his forces between Belgorod and Balakleya, while von Kleist to the south was at Pavlograd. Their intention was to cut off and destroy the Soviet salient, straighten the German line along the Donets and then launch their main offensive. Ironically Timoshenko obliged von Bock by effectively putting his neck in the noose.
Disastrously, two-thirds of the Soviet armour, along with General Kharitonov’s 9th Army and General Gorodnyanski’s 6th Army, moved into the salient ready to liberate Krasnograd southwest of Kharkov. This was to be followed by a push on Kharkov and Poltava way to the west. Their attack was to be supported by the Soviet 28th and 57th Armies north of Kharkov in the Volchansk bridgehead.
If von Bock had struck first he would have had to contend with nearly 600 Soviet tanks, but instead Timoshenko beat him to the post by attacking a week earlier on 12 May 1942. Those forces launched from Volchansk made little impression against Paulus’ 14 divisions. In the south Romanian forces could not prevent the fall of Krasnograd and Kharkov seemed within Timoshenko’s grasp. The Soviet 9th Army rolled on to Karlovka west of Kharkov. Worryingly, though, the Red Army was unable to widen the breach south of Izyum and Barvenkovo, which meant the pocket was getting bigger but not the breach.
If both the Soviet 6th and 9th Armies had struck towards Merefa south of Kharkov things might have gone differently, but with Kharitonov heading west on the 17th warning signs began to appear. This was the Soviets’ first attempt at an armoured offensive on this scale and it had clearly not brought to battle the Germans’ main combat strength, which was now identified as lying on their southern flank. Timoshenko prudently contacted Stalin to ask permission to slow down the offensive while he secured his flanks. In response Stalin was adamant that Kharkov was to be liberated.
With the noose tightening, Timoshenko dispatched his deputy General Kostenko to try to save the 6th and 9th Armies. When Paulus’ panzers arrived at Balakleya on 23 May, linking up with those of von Kleist, the trap was snapped shut. Less than 25 per cent of the two Soviet armies got away, and all their heavy equipment was left littering the west bank of the Donets.
Officially the Soviets acknowledged 5,000 men killed, 70,000 missing and 300 tanks lost. The Germans claimed to have captured 240,000 men and taken or destroyed 1,200 tanks. Timoshenko only had 845 tanks in total, but the German figure may include all armoured fighting vehicles. It is doubtful whether any Soviet armour escaped the southern pocket, though the 28th Army may have saved a few in the north.
Stalin acknowledged Kharkov as a defeat, but not its magnitude – how could he after the humiliation of the previous summer? At the time the Red Army General Staff reported it had lost 266,927 men, 652 tanks and 4,924 guns and mortars. Of these, 13,556 dead lay in German-occupied soil while 46,314 sick and wounded had been successfully evacuated. The rest of this total had been captured.
The cost of the failed Kharkov offensive to the Red Army had been considerable, and while the tank ratio during 1942 had stood at 5:1 in their favour, it was now 10:1 against them, which did not bode well in light of the coming German summer offensive.
Stalin and his commanders had also learned the lesson that their pre-war mechanised corps were unwieldy and inflexible. Similarly the Barvenkovo operation had also taught them that their light mobile forces consisting of tank brigades and cavalry corps were simply not effective enough against German mechanised units or indeed, once behind enemy lines, against hastily assembled battle groups. The net result was that in the spring of 1942 the Red Army was ordered to create first mechanised and then tank corps that would be able to tackle the panzers on equal terms.
That summer von Bock launched the general German offensive with Operation Blue. This was to push east of Kursk against the Soviet South West Front to a line on the River Don between Livny and Rossosh, capturing Voronezh. Conducted by General von Weichs’ 2nd Army and Hoth’s 4th Panzer Army, the plan was to create left flank protection for the ‘Donets Corridor’ along which Paulus’ 6th Army could advance to Stalingrad.
German officers watch a burning Model 1940 T-34. Despite the Soviet Union’s massive losses, it had 7,700 tanks by the beginning of 1942 and 20,600 by the following year. Stalin’s relocated tank factories were churning out 2,000 a month, rising to almost 3,000 by the end of 1943. (Author’s Collection)
On 28 June the Germans struck from the Kursk area in the direction of Voronezh, attacking the Bryansk Front’s 13th and 40th Armies. From the start the Soviets were outgunned and outnumbered. In the face of Hoth’s panzers the Soviet 40th Army disintegrated within 48 hours and the 13th Army was obliged to withdraw northwards. On the 30th the German 6th Army attacked Ostrogozhsk, penetrating the defences of the 21st and 28th Armies (the latter having been mauled at Volchansk in May) and both were caught in the open by German firepower. Two days later the Germans struck below Kharkov, with Kleist leading the 1st Panzer Army over the Donets. Once again Stalin’s armoured forces were in disarray.
Another relic of the previous summer’s bitter tank battles: a battered and flipped BT-5 light tank. As the holes clearly testify, its thin armour proved singularly ill suited to coping with German anti-tank guns. While both the BT and T-26 remained in service in the Soviet Far East, the BT was phased out on the Eastern Front through a simple process of attrition. (Scott Pick Collection)
The spring thaw in 1942 played havoc with both sides’ military vehicles. The steel road wheels on this T-34/76B were not ideal for such soft conditions, though the wide tracks helped. Dirt roads soon turned into seas of mud, hampering troop concentrations and the movement of vital supplies. (Scott Pick Collection)
The T-70 light tank, armed with an improved 45mm gun, went into production in March 1942, with 8,226 having been built by the end of the following year. Although the hull armour was given better angles of protection and the driver had an armoured visor, modifications to the Panzer III and IV armament and armour easily cancelled out such improvements. The Red Army deployed 261 T-70s at Kursk, where they proved unsuitable for an offensive combat role. (Author’s Collection)
The first Soviet tank armies, the 3rd and the 5th, appeared in the spring of 1942. Designed as breakthrough forces, they were blooded at Kharkov, on the Bryansk and Voronezh Fronts and on the approaches to Stalingrad. (L32)
The Panzer IV first appeared in 1937 with the L/24 gun; the up-gunned version (seen here under inspection) with the long barrel L/43 gun entered service in the spring of 1942. By the summer there were 170 examples on the Eastern Front, rising to 840 the following summer. Those Panzer IVs lost during the invasion were replaced by April 1942, but there was no increase in overall numbers. In terms of production Germany could not compete with Russia: in November 1942 the Germans managed 100 Panzer IVs compared to 1,000 Soviet T-34s. (Author’s Collection)
Soviet tankers go for a drive in a captured StuG III Ausf E (distinguishable from earlier models by the armoured side pannier). Production of this model stopped in March 1942. Such reuse was restricted by the availability of spares and ammunition. (Author’s Collection)
The arrival in 1942 of the Sturmgeschütz III Ausf F fitted with the StuK40 L/43 or L/48 long barrel 75mm gun gave the front-line troops an effective anti-tank weapon that could easily defeat the KV-1 and T-34. It was to remain in production right up until the end of the war. In December 1942 Panzer III assembly was entirely turned over to the StuG III assault gun. (Author’s Collection)
The rather top-heavy-looking 76.2mm Pak 36 mounted on the Panzer II Ausf D chassis provided a useful stopgap self-propelled anti-tank gun. Some 200 were built during 1942 and 1943, with most of them ending up on the Eastern Front with the panzerjäger units. (WH832)
In the New Year, while Hitler and his generals were distracted around Moscow, Stalin also struck south of Kharkov in Ukraine with two of his new-style Soviet tank corps. Marshal Timoshenko’s South Western Front was ordered to drive the Nazis out of Ukraine but inadvertently got caught in a trap. (BA28)
A sightseeing German officer in front of Kharkov’s main square. The city was a vital communications and logistical hub for Hitler’s operations in Ukraine. To both sides it represented a strategic and political goal that could not be ignored, and as a result it was the scene of four major engagements. (Scott Pick Collection)
In the spring of 1942 Timoshenko attempted the Red Army’s first major armoured counter-offensive, but it was ill-planned and his armour was not up to the job, and it ended with disastrous results. Only four of the fourteen tank brigades committed were combat tested; likewise only one of the two supporting tank corps had any experience. (Scott Pick Collection)
Two-thirds of Timoshenko’s tanks moved into the exposed Barvenkovo-Lozovaya salient south-east of Kharkov and counter-attacked on 12 May 1942, but in the process simply drove themselves deeper into the German noose. These abandoned BT-7s seem to have run into each other. (Scott Pick Collection)
The Soviet 9th Army with two of the inexperienced tank brigades reached Karlovka, making the pocket deeper without increasing the breach. This photo shows the smashed and smoking remains of a KV-1 and T-34. (Scott Pick Collection)
A Red Army 122mm Model 1938 howitzer surrounded by its dead crew. This gun was used widely on the Eastern Front. Attempts to marry the Model 1938 with the T-34 chassis under the designation SU-122 were not entirely successful. (Scott Pick Collection)
By 23 May 1942 two whole Soviet armies were trapped by the panzers, losing 845 tanks. All attempts to escape the ever-contracting pocket failed. This T-34 has been blown over on to its turret and seems to be a source of much interest to these German troops. (Scott Pick Collection)
With the Red Army’s armour smashed in Ukraine, Hitler’s panzers now enjoyed a 10:1 superiority. However, the LT-38 or PzKpfw 38(t) seen here was deemed no longer suitable for front-line use and production was given over to Marder self-propelled guns from April 1942. (WH492)
The now famous Tiger PzKpfw VI Ausf E went into production in mid-1942 and the first unit to be equipped with it fought in the Leningrad area in August that year. Although nothing at the time could penetrate the Tiger’s thick armour, the sheer weight of Soviet firepower resulted in some being captured. (WH881)
A German soldier cleaning the windscreen of his Mercedes-Benz LG63. Safeguarding such supply and transport vehicles from Soviet partisans tied up considerable resources. Note the chains on the rear wheels – they must have been expecting bad weather! (Author’s Collection)
A whitewashed Panzer III Ausf L. Judging by the supplies on the back, it has just redeployed. This variant was in production from mid- to late 1942 and was used to replace combat losses and equip the SS panzergrenadier divisions. (Author’s Collection)