Chapter Seven
In early 1943 Stalin was pressing forwards to the Oskol, Donets and Don rivers. As well as thrusting southwest to Kharkov, he also opted to punch west towards Kursk in order to exploit the 200-mile gap torn between von Kluge’s Army Group Centre and Army Group Don (shortly to be renamed South). On 1 February he launched Operation Star, employing the Voronezh Front supported by the 3rd Tank Army. In the meantime the South West Front swung southwest to take Mariupol on the Sea of Azov, cutting Army Group Don’s communications with Army Group A in the Caucasus.
By 5 February, three days after the last pocket in Stalingrad surrendered, General Rybalko’s 3rd Tank Army had reached the Donets east of Kharkov. The Voronezh Front liberated Volchansk, Belgorod, Oboyan and Kursk and by the 11th was on the outskirts of Kharkov itself. The South West Front was soon deep in Army Group Don’s rear. Stalin had every prospect of trapping the 1st and 4th Panzer Armies and Armygruppe Hollidt against the Sea of Azov. Only after the personal intervention of von Kluge and von Manstein did Hitler agree to allow a withdrawal to the River Mius.
At Kharkov the newly arrived I SS Panzer Corps was pushed back. Paul Hausser, its commander, fearing Kharkov could become another Stalingrad, disobeyed Hitler and evacuated the city on 15 February. In the meantime the main Soviet threat was a salient thrusting towards Dnepropetrovsk. While the Germans held the Red Army west of Kharkov, von Manstein orchestrated a counter-attack on 19 February, using I SS Panzer Corps striking south from Krasnograd southwest of Kharkov towards Pavlograd. Three days later Hoth’s 4th Panzer Army linked up with the SS.
On the southern side of the salient, the 1st Panzer Army’s XL Panzer Corps joined the attack, defeating Group Popov near Krasnoarmeysk. The Soviets saw this operation as a means of covering the 1st Panzer Army and Armygruppe Hollidt’s withdrawal from the Mius to the Dnepr. In response the South West Front was instructed to hold the Germans on the Mius. However, von Manstein’s success at Pavlograd enabled him to push forwards some 150 miles, thereby threatening the recently liberated Kharkov. Indeed, he unhinged the junction of the Soviet South West and Voronezh Fronts and the Soviet advances were stopped. The Red Army lost 23,000 men dead and 9,000 captured, as well 615 tanks knocked out.
Rybalko’s 3rd Tank Army swung south to take on the I SS Panzer Corps on 24 February. The SS withdrew to lure Rybalko into a trap, which resulted in the Red Army losing another 9,000 dead and 61 tanks. The 3rd Tank Army had to fight its way from the Kharkov area and Stalin agreed to a withdrawal to the Donets. Rybalko’s defeat left Kharkov open to von Manstein once more.
Following the Soviet victory at Stalingrad, Stavka planned an offensive to capitalise on the successes of the Bryansk and Voronezh Fronts along the Voronezh–Kursk axis and support the South Western Front’s push through the Donbas to the Dnepr and the Sea of Azov. This was scheduled to begin on 12 February when the Western and Bryansk Fronts were to surround the Germans’ Orel salient. The two fronts supported by the Central Front were to clear the Bryansk region and gain bridgeheads over the Desna between the 17th and 25th. Afterwards the Kalinin and Western Fronts were to take Smolensk and help destroy Army Group Centre in the Rzhev–Vyazma salient.
However, in the Donbas von Manstein threw back the South Western Front and the Western Front failed in the Zhizdra area. Also Rokossovsky’s offensive was delayed to 25 February; his Don Front (renamed the Central Front) was to be spearheaded by the 2nd Tank Army. Within two weeks it had gained Sevsk, while the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps reached Trubchevsk and Novgorod-Severskii. However, south of Orel progress was slow and on the left flank the Soviets were tied up trying to turn the German 2nd Army’s left flank.
Rokossovsky was denied victory by the delayed arrival from Stalingrad of the 21st Army (subsequently diverted to Oboyan to counter von Manstein’s move on Belgorod), bad weather and by von Manstein’s counter-stroke that smashed the Voronezh Front south of Kharkov. The fighting continued until 23 March, but Rokossovsky’s troops gave up Sevsk to take up positions that would become the northern and central faces of the Kursk salient.
Field Marshal von Manstein launched the second phase of his powerful counter offensive on 6 March and by the 14th was back in control of Kharkov. The Germans claimed to have killed another 50,000 men and captured 19,594 as well as destroying 1,140 tanks. The recapture of Kharkov was a bitter affair. In just over two months the SS Panzer Corps alone sustained over 11,000 casualties, the 1st SS Panzer Division losing 4,500 of these during the recapture of Kharkov.
Stalin had already decided to dispatch reinforcements, including the 1st Tank Army, to the Belgorod area, but they were not in place quickly enough to save the city, which fell to von Manstein on the 18th. Nonetheless, two armies were able to move into blocking positions northeast of Belgorod and this thwarted von Manstein’s attempt on Kursk. Zhukov managed to stabilise matters by 26 March and the spring thaw brought the mobile warfare to a halt.
The fall of Kharkov and Belgorod marked the conclusion of the Army Group’s second counter-blow, as the increasing muddiness of the ground did not permit further operations. While Manstein had achieved a remarkable reversal of fortunes at Kharkov, he lost the opportunity to move against the Soviets’ Kursk salient to shorten the German front. This scheme had to be abandoned, as Army Group Centre was unable to cooperate. As a result the salient continued to mark a troublesome dent in the German line.
The Germans were sufficiently impressed by the T-34 to warrant reusing it. In the case of the 2nd SS Panzer Division, Das Reich, it captured T-34s straight off the factory line in Kharkov. One battalion within the division’s 2nd Panzer Regiment was equipped entirely with them. (Author’s Collection)
Luftwaffe officers examine a captured British Matilda III CS armed with a 3in howitzer. Britain supplied Stalin with Churchill, Matilda and Valentine tanks, while America provided the M3 Lee and M4 Sherman. By 1943 20 per cent of Soviet tank brigades were using Lend-lease armour and over 10 per cent were entirely equipped with them. During 1941 and 1942 Britain and the Commonwealth supplied Russia with 3,270 tanks and America supplied another 7,000 from then until the end of the war. (Author’s Collection)
The T-26 was obsolete even in 1940; while its 45mm gun could destroy all German armoured vehicles except the Panzer IV, it suffered from problems common among Russian tanks: mechanical unreliability and thin armour. By 1943 Stalin’s tank factories were working hard to replace the remaining T-26 and BT-7 tanks with the proven T-34. (Author’s Collection)
After the T-34 the SU-76 light self-propelled gun was the most widely produced Soviet armoured vehicle during the Second World War. Using a T-70 chassis mounting a 76.2mm anti-tank gun, it appeared in 1943. It was later replaced by the SU-85 tank destroyer as an anti-tank platform and switched to an infantry support role. (K14)
The crews hated the SU-76 because of its open fighting compartment and thin armour, which gained it the nickname Suka (‘Bitch’). This photo shows just how exposed they were – both to the elements and to enemy fire. (Author’s Collection)
The Panzer III was kept in production until August 1943 with the Ausf M armed with a 50mm gun and the Ausf N with a short 75mm gun (155 of the latter were deployed at the battle of Kursk). This looks to be an earlier J model. (Scott Pick Collection)
A blurry shot of an advancing Grille 150mm self-propelled gun. This was another German stopgap using the Czech 38(t) chassis. Only 90 of this particular variant were produced in early 1943, some of which saw action on the Eastern Front. (Author’s Collection)
By 11 February 1943 the Red Army had fought its way to the gates of Ukraine’s second city Kharkov. This poor quality Soviet propaganda shot shows a group of infantry armed with submachine guns dislodging the Germans from an inhabited district on the outskirts of Kharkov. (Author’s Collection)
A Panzer III armed with a 50mm gun and its support vehicles are dwarfed by the vast expanse of Kharkov’s Red Square. General Hausser, fearing another Stalingrad, evacuated his forces four days after the Soviet attack commenced. Retreating ensured that his panzers regained the initiative. (Scott Pick Collection)
Soviet T-34/76Ds liberated Kharkov on 15 February 1943; because the Germans had withdrawn in such haste, the Red Square remained largely undamaged. The reoccupation lasted just a month. (K78)
A new Model 1943 T-34, having caught a Tiger by surprise on a raised causeway, moves in for a closer look. The Tiger proved to be far from invincible. (BA18)
A Red Army anti-aircraft battery installed in Kharkov’s Red Square to guard against Luftwaffe reprisals in mid-February 1943. (Author’s Collection)
A hulled-down StuG III Ausf G, identifiable by the cupola and the slanted superstructure. Later Ausf Gs from November 1943 were fitted with the Topfblende or pot (often erroneously called Saukopf or ‘pig’s head’) gun mantlet without coaxial mount. However, the original box mantlet also continued to be produced. The G variant was the final, and by far the most common, of the series with almost 8,000 manufactured. (WH190)
Barely pausing for breath, von Manstein counter-attacked at Kharkov on 19 February 1943 using the tough II SS Panzer Corps, which linked up with the 4th Panzer Army at Pavlograd. The second phase of his counter-stroke was launched on 6 March and within a week he was back in possession of Kharkov, much to the dismay of the population. (Scott Pick Collection)
German infantry examining the charred remains of T-34 tank crews, who escaped their blazing tanks only to be mown down in the snow by machine-gun fire. In the face of Manstein’s counter-attack, the Red Army lost 32,000 men and 615 tanks. (Scott Pick Collection)
By the summer of 1943 the T-34/76 had overcome its initial teething problems and was well battle proven, causing an acceleration in German tank designs to try to counter it. Ironically, the German Panther, about to make its debut at Kursk, was to suffer the same problems. (K5)
The 85mm M39 anti-aircraft gun provided the solution to up-gunning the T-34. It was one of the best gun designs to come out of Russia and its dual anti-aircraft/anti-tank capability made it an ideal candidate to equip the T-34 and SU-85. The initial T-34/85-I that appeared in 1943 was basically an up-gunned T-34 using a turret originally designed for the KV-85 and armed with an 85mm D-5T gun. (Author’s Collection)