The battle of Bannockburn was a confrontation between Scotland’s greatest warrior King and one of England’s most unsuccessful and troubled Kings, who displayed little grasp of military realities. The Lanercost chronicler had no doubt who was to blame for the humiliating defeat, nor was he alone among contemporary commentators in laying the blame squarely on Edward II.
The English wrongly assumed that their initial advance along the high road from Falkirk would brush the Scots aside and that they would camp safely below Stirling Castle. Their plans were upset when they were twice repulsed on the 23rd, leading to the cavalry camping on the boggy carse with the infantry spread further afield. In effect the English had lost the initiative and were forced to spend the night dispersed widely and in an uncomfortable position that had no place in their plans. In the morning the Scots attack exploited the situation to the full, and the battle became an attempt by the English to fight their way out of a trap of their own making.
Edward brushed advice aside and may still have thought that the Scots would avoid a pitched battle on 24 June with the resulting confusion when they attacked at dawn. Tactics that demanded combinations of horse and foot were ignored. However, such tactics rely on subordination, organisation and firm leadership and, as these qualities were not on display at Bannockburn, they were probably not an option anyway. The lack of firm leadership allowed the arrogant and insubordinate baronial cavalry to assume the role that the socially superior knights demanded, while the infantry was relegated to a lesser role that was thought to befit their status. The superior numbers of the English should have tipped the balance in Edward’s favour, but the restricted width of the battlefield where the English found themselves at dawn on the 24th, neutralised this advantage. Bruce’s army was never confronted by the whole of the English army; the Scots defeated only a part of it yet it was enough to ensure victory. Crucially, the baronial heavy cavalry was beaten and their defeat proved decisive. Despite the assumptions of the knights, their headlong charge did not carry all before it and defeat quickly followed. As they were driven from the field before the Scottish pikes, the King fled for the safety of Stirling Castle and the infantry, many of whom had not even struck a blow, followed his example and fled in confusion.
The well-drilled Scottish schiltrons of pikemen were capably led by men that Robert Bruce knew he could trust to carry out his intentions. He was well aware of the capabilities as well as the vulnerability of unsupported pikemen, and he demonstrated during the battle that he knew how to use them both in a defensive role and in attack. The ineffective English leadership, in marked contrast, displayed no tactical notions other than attempting to use the heavy cavalry, quite unsupported by the infantry, to batter a way through the ranks of the Scots.
The greatest threat to the Scottish schiltrons were the English longbowmen but once the armies were locked together in close combat they needed to occupy a flanking position in order to shoot directly into the ranks of the Scots. They found themselves jammed into a tightly packed mass of men behind the English forward ranks of horsemen unable to shoot effectively or deploy because of the narrow confines of the battlefield. Blame for defeat at Bannockburn rests with Edward II but the victory undoubtedly belongs to Robert Bruce, who by his one signal triumph ensured his place as Scotland’s greatest King.