On his own initiative, Gen. Renya Mutaguchi, commander of the Japanese Fifteenth Army, expanded the scope of Operation U-Go far beyond the original objectives, which had been agreed with his superiors to encompass a major attack far deeper into India. Mutaguchi’s staff and immediate subordinates – the commanders of 15th, 31st and 33rd Divisions – were strongly opposed to the expansion of the operation for several reasons. In their opinion the available Japanese forces were not sufficiently strong to take on the Commonwealth forces, the terrain was too difficult and the logistical arrangements too fragile to have much hope of victory. They were aware that the campaigns of 1943 had been successful, albeit at a heavy cost, and that the general quality of the combat units had declined markedly since the invasions of Burma, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia) and the Philippines in 1942. They were also aware that the Commonwealth forces opposing them had increased markedly in number and that their training, confidence and equipment had improved considerably since the beginning of the conflict.
27 A captured Japanese artillery piece. (AB/AWH)
A major barrier to bringing the operation to a successful conclusion was the logistical challenge. The problems posed by the terrain were enormous and, in many cases, the advancing formations would have to rely on animal transport for supplies of food and ammunition and there would be very limited capacity for evacuating the wounded. General Mutaguchi brushed these objections aside, believing that the fighting spirit of Japanese troops would be enough to sweep the Commonwealth forces before them and capture ample supplies from the vast Commonwealth stockpiles of stores at Dimapur. In his view, the defeat of the enemy would allow a relatively easy passage into India. Despite the misgivings of his subordinates and his own staff officers, however, the operation was eventually accepted by the supreme headquarters in Japan and authorised by Prime Minister Gen. Hideki Tojo.
The major thrust of the campaign would be carried out by 15th and 33rd Division, whose troops would start to move westwards in March. At the same time, 31st Division under Lt Gen. Kotoku Sato would move through the hills and jungles to seize the town of Kohima and then advance to take Dimapur, thus cutting off the only surface resupply route to Imphal. If successful, the Allied forces in Burma would be starved of materiel and reinforcements, but even if the operation failed to reach its objectives in good time, the Allied command would be obliged to deploy forces away from the main battle at Imphal.
General Sato was far from happy about the plan: he saw it as being hopelessly optimistic and based on an unrealistic assessment of the terrain, the capacities of a single division and of the ability and strength of Allied forces. In Sato’s opinion, the days when Japanese troops could be confident of always defeating British and Indian troops in battle at little cost were long past. The jungle warfare schools that had been set up under Gen. Slim’s command had given Indian and British troops a far greater degree of confidence, and the Chindit operations, though very costly, had demonstrated that Japanese soldiers were not invincible. Sato also had no confidence in his commander, Gen. Mutaguchi, believing him to be petty, unrealistic and unintelligent. He also felt that he had good reason to suspect Mutaguchi’s motives in assigning the Kohima operation to 31st Division.
The two men had been members of rival political movements in the 1930s and Sato was sure that Mutaguchi was sending him on a hopeless venture. If the mission was unsuccessful it would not simply be a matter of defeat and retirement, as would be the case in most armies: if Sato failed to achieve his objectives there would be an expectation that he would be shamed and feel obliged to take his own life. Sato could hardly refuse to undertake the operation once it had been sanctioned by Tokyo, but he was sufficiently confident that the initiative would be a failure and warned his own staff that they would very likely not return from the campaign. Sato was particularly concerned about the supply situation and went so far as to warn his staff that they might all die of hunger if they encountered stiff resistance.