3

Exodus to the Middle East

The next stage in the development of the Polish Army in exile took place under British patronage as part of the broader Allied front in the Middle East. Persia provided a perfectly sited interface between Britain and the USSR where the handover of the Polish troops could be effected both quickly and cheaply – no expensive shipping or aircraft would be required. More amiable relations with the Persians were cemented by the January 1942 Treaty of Alliance between Britain, USSR and Persia, which secured Persian support for the development of supply lines to the USSR, whilst the Allies agreed to defend Persia from German assault. To safeguard the overland supply route more troops were needed in the Middle East to bolster the already massively over-stretched British Troops in Iraq whose commander, Lieutenant General Quinan, was asking for urgent reinforcements. He was offered a surprising solution – the Polish Army in the USSR would provide his manpower.

On 23 March, the Chiefs of Staff Committee discussed a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, General Claude Auchinleck, who recommended that ‘all Poles evacuated from Russia should be retained in the Middle East, with the exception of navy and air force personnel and that a Polish Division, to include the present Polish Brigade Group, should be formed in the Middle East.’1 In response to Auchinleck’s proposal the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Alan Brooke, drafted a communiqué for Churchill to dispatch to General Sikorski recommending that the majority of the Polish forces evacuated from the Soviet Union should be retained and re-equipped in the Middle East.

Practical planning could now commence for the Poles’ reception and onward passage to the extensive training facilities established in Palestine. The Polish evacuees were to be shipped from Krasnovodsk, on the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea, to Bandar Pahlevi, a rudimentary seaside resort with a shallow harbour on the Persian shore that had been utilized by the Soviets during the invasion of Persia. It was arranged that the reception and accommodation of the evacuees should be managed largely by a Polish staff headed by Colonel Okulicki and the Chief Medical Officer, Lieutenant General Szarecki, under the direction of a small British staff and with other British Army assistance. The evacuees were scheduled to arrive at the rate of 2,500 a week, and small parties were sent to Pahlevi to reconnoitre on that basis, including an advanced party of Polish officers from the USSR accompanied by Colonel Hulls. There was however an unfortunate hold-up in communication between the Soviet authorities in Tehran and Moscow. It was not until 24 March that the former were able to tell the British that the first transport of Poles would be arriving in three days’ time, with the additional information that the rate of arrival, instead of being 2,500 a week, would be 6,000 a day.

The port of Krasnovodsk worked around the clock loading the military and civilian evacuees on to all available cargo vessels. The Soviet authorities made careful checks of everyone’s paperwork to ensure that only Polish nationals boarded the vessels, but the embarkation itself was chaotic. With the Poles desperate to board the ships they had for so long dreamed of, in the bustle to mount the gangways several people were knocked overboard into the oily dock. Once aboard, the vast majority made the voyage across the Caspian Sea on the open decks of coal merchants and oil tankers with no protection from the elements, so tightly packed they could barely move and with no sanitary provision. The effects of bad weather and dysentery in such conditions must have been miserable and indeed many died during the two-day voyage, their bodies being cast into the sea. Though they were aware in advance of the dangers, the lure of freedom from the Soviet Union was so great that everyone who could possibly make the port crowded to gain passage. The loaded passengers, keen to bring their countrymen with them, sacrificed all comforts to enable as many as possible to make the crossing to Pahlevi. Upon arrival the ships anchored off the harbour, the limited depth of which curtailed the berthing of the convoys. Instead a host of tenders and lighters proceeded out to the ships to carry the disembarked Poles to the shore.

The commander of the British Base Evacuation Staff, Lieutenant Colonel A. Ross of the Highland Light Infantry, arrived on 25 March to find Pahlevi thickly carpeted with snow and the first transport, carrying 1,387 evacuees already lying off the harbour. The first meeting of the British and Poles took place when ‘A grinning Polish major with a close-clipped beard, wearing a British battle-dress buttoned tightly around him, stepped ashore from a Russian lighter at Pahlevi, on the Caspian Sea, and saluted a high British officer waiting on shore. “Polish officer from Russia reporting, sir” he said in perfect English, “and waiting further orders.”’2 The landing of this soldier was accompanied by an almighty cheer, as thousands of Polish troops aboard the Soviet ship filled the decks to witness these first steps to freedom.

In the first eight days over 29,000 evacuees arrived. The ships came without notice at all hours of the night and day, one carrying as many as 5,000. The soldiers, though underfed, were properly clothed in British battledress and equipped with British kit. The civilians, however, had received no new items of clothing and many wore old and tattered garments; almost half were infected with lice. Some of the women were heavily pregnant, and among the children were seventy orphans aged between three and twelve years. The reactions of this variegated multitude who had survived so much in the USSR and now at last gained freedom in the Middle East were predominantly shock and disbelief. Once disembarked on to the wharf they spilled over on to the beach, standing in huddled groups or in the roadway; many sat down in the soiled snow, where curious Persian children gathered round them. Many were silent, others voluble. Some, excited by freedom and feverish with typhus, wandered off into the town. A few lay down and died. It was impossible in the first days to make a proper register of these people, impossible even to number them, for they strayed and eddied from the first moment of stepping ashore.

The reception staff could aim at two things only: to supply their immediate needs and to keep under some control the disease that they brought with them. The Polish and British reception staffs soon organized a great camp to house the newcomers, and although it was after dark and they had arrived days before they were expected, beds and food were soon ready for the most vulnerable. These were the first beds and hot meals they had had for many a long day, and they showed high appreciation. Pahlevi’s only cinema and other suitable buildings were organized to house them, while others for whom accommodation could not be found and who were in a better physical state were given three heavy blankets and caddies filled with hot tea, then placed under tarpaulins among the sand dunes of the beach overnight. Next morning the local bathhouses were taken over as medical inspection centres and the troops began passing through at the rate of 4,000 a day. The Polish soldiers had spent their first night bedding down, and on their second attended a great concert at which Polish battle songs were sung by a choir of many thousands. Morale amongst the soldiers was high and at the top of their agenda was establishing their issue of equipment and entry into battle against the Germans.

A scouring of the town yielded provisions, notably 2,000lb of Government flour, and also the bakers to turn it into loaves. Disinfection centres were improvised. Tents arrived sufficient to shelter 8,000, and three companies of Polish sappers got to work on camp construction. There was a ‘dirty’ camp for new arrivals at one side of the town and a ‘clean’ camp at the other. These were operational by 28 March, three days after Ross’s arrival. Medical facilities were provided by the 34 British Commonwealth General Hospital (BCGH) and the staff were Indians, together with a dozen senior medical personnel from Queen Alexandra’s Royal Army Nursing Service. The nurses were appalled by the state of the incoming Poles – the majority were emaciated and skeletal in appearance, malaria, typhus and dysentery were epidemic and all were encrusted in mud, blood and excrement; the stench was unbearable. What these people must have been through was unimaginable. The evacuees, soldiers and civilians alike, were dying around them at an alarming rate, the local carpentry firm was producing fifty coffins a day and could not keep up with demand, guards had to be posted at the mass grave that was hastily dug, as wild animals were beginning to devour the corpses.

The processing of the Polish evacuees was conducted at high tempo, the numbers arriving at Pahlevi being so great that any delay would have led to disaster for these soldiers and civilians, already exhausted and demoralized by their long ordeal and most of whom required medical care. It was essential to bring order to the proceedings and maintain a professional military approach to both the evacuation and reception. With the arrival of Lieutenant General Józef Zając on 31 March, the very able Colonel Bolesławicz was appointed to take charge of the Polish staff, having previously commanded the Polish 9th Infantry Division in the USSR.

By 6 April, 19,000 Poles had already been moved on from Pahlevi, and Lieutenant General Zając paid a second visit, emphasizing to all concerned that things would only go smoothly if the arrangements made by the British were faithfully followed. Improvements were accelerated. More than 5,000 a day were now being put through the disinfection centres, and the hospital was coping successfully with a population that had risen to above 200. The final convoy departed Pahlevi on 25 April, scooping up a few stragglers who emerged at the last moment from unknown retreats in the town, many suffering the effects of arak, the local moonshine. Altogether, nearly 44,000 had gone through the evacuation centres. Although the majority of personnel were ethnic Poles, there were also some other nationalities who had managed to join the units of the Polish Army, most notably Belarusians and Ukrainians. Evacuation convoys had been organized to take the soldiers towards Iraq, whilst the civilians travelled to Tehran. The very poor physical condition of these men had not been anticipated by the British and the Polish soldiers would not be fit enough to serve in the defence of the region for the foreseeable future. Instead of gaining deployable military formations, the British were confronted with the prospect of providing lengthy convalescence for a great many ill soldiers.

With the ranks of the Polish Army under the command of the exile government in London now swelling rapidly, General Sikorski called a meeting of the senior Polish military leaders, including Anders, in London to discuss the future structure and disposition of the Polish Armed Forces. On his journey to London Anders stopped off in Cairo, where he met General Auchinleck and the resident British Minister, Richard Casey. Anders made full use of his stopover to lobby for the evacuation of all remaining Polish Army formations from the USSR to the Middle East. Anders convinced the General that the remaining troops were in far better condition than those currently arriving in Persia and would be ready for military action. Anders undoubtedly made a good impression upon Middle East Command and Auchinleck recommended Anders’ proposals strongly to the War Office on 4 April, doubtless keen to receive as many additional infantry divisions as could be mustered.

Anders arrived in London on 21 April and met with Sikorski and Churchill before briefing Lieutenant General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, on the Polish experiences with Germany and the USSR. The following day the Defence Committee and the Chiefs of Staff agreed to support the proposal to evacuate all Polish troops from the USSR to the Middle East. The specification of the area of deployment was influenced by Auchinleck’s memo stating that ‘Stalin favoured concentration of the Poles in the Middle East and if he heard they were going elsewhere he might close doors on further evacuation.’3 A notion that was doubtless conveyed to him most strongly by Anders.

Two days later on 23 April, Sikorski held an afternoon reception at the Dorchester Hotel for 300 Allied representatives including Sir Alan Brooke, in honour of General Anders who was invested with the Order of Militari Virtuti, Fourth Class for his actions during the defensive campaign of 1939. There followed the planned Anglo-Polish meeting on the future of the Polish Armed Forces. The most important senior officers in attendance were Lieutenant General Anders (General Officer Commanding Polish Troops in the USSR), Lieutenant General Józef Zając (General Officer Commanding Polish Troops in the Middle East), Lieutenant General Marian Kukiel (General Officer Commanding the 1st Polish Army Corps in Scotland), Major General Tadeusz Klimecki (Chief of Staff), Major General Stanisław Ujecki (Inspector General of the Polish Air Force) and Admiral Jerzy Swinski (Commander of the Polish Navy). A number of other senior generals also attended including Major General Stanisław Kopański (General Officer Commanding the Polish Carpathian Rifle Brigade which was being moved from Libya to Palestine before being fleshed out to division size by increments from the USSR).

The agenda at this meeting was the future growth and distribution of the Polish Armed Forces. Sikorski presented his organizational plan that focused on the need for Polish troops to be as widely dispersed as possible to exploit any opportunity to strike towards Poland. With Polish forces now in the USSR, Middle East and Britain, the troops would be able to advance into Poland through the Ukraine, Balkans and France respectively. The Army was to comprise three principle formations: I Corps in Scotland, II Corps in the Middle East and III Corps in the Soviet Union. Manpower for this organization would be provided by the soldiers evacuated from the USSR in April, 14,000 were to be transferred to Britain to create I Corps, and the remaining soldiers from the evacuation would be used to bolster Middle East forces to form II Corps.

Generals Klimecki and Kukiel favoured the concentration of all Polish troops in the United Kingdom, arguing that this was essential as the future liberation of Europe would, in their opinion, be most likely launched from England. Major General Ujecki urged the need for replacements for his squadrons and concurred with the view that Britain offered the best location for retraining and re-equipping the army. Anders, supported by Zając, argued that all Polish troops should be concentrated in the Middle East, including the Air Force, since it was the Balkans that provided the most direct route to the Polish homeland. Anders also suggested that deployment in the Middle East would enable the Poles to fight on the Soviet front if ever required, at the same time highlighting that the Soviets would be certain to suspend recruitment if evacuated Poles left the Middle East for Britain en masse.

The two opposing camps were now clearly evident to the British; Sir Alan Brooke noted in his diary that from this meeting he was ‘in favour of the latter. Any forces in the Middle East this summer will be a Godsend to us.’4 Alan Brooke’s favourable opinion of Anders was reinforced by a personal meeting between himself and Anders the following day, where he ‘found Anders most interesting. Luckily he is a strong supporter of leaving as many Poles as possible in the Middle East.’5 Following these discussions in London, Anders took the opportunity to review the Polish troops based in Scotland for a week. These forces were undergoing reorganization and training along British lines; Anders was most impressed by the soldiers, in particular the parachute brigade, and was delighted to be reacquainted with many familiar faces.

Sikorski collected the various elements of the discussion together and on 24 April wrote a letter to Churchill outlining his proposal for the use of Polish manpower evacuated from the USSR. The decisions were not easy, Sikorski had to take into account the various wishes of his commanders, the plans of General Auchinleck and Britain’s strategic planning and available transport resources. The latter were gearing towards the major cross-Channel invasion of Europe which made the British reluctant to dispatch much-needed extra manpower to the Middle East – it was felt the deployment of the evacuated Poles in that region would answer that problem as previously highlighted by General Auchinleck. Sikorski had to abandon his plans for the large-scale expansion of his forces in Scotland, instead having to adopt the British focus on the Middle East. Sikorski’s letter read:

After having given prolonged and deep consideration to the problem of the Middle East and the future of the Polish Forces in all theatres of war I have come to the following conclusion:

Although it is against the opinion of some of my collaborators I have decided that in the interests of the Allied cause – as seen as a whole – and in that of Poland herself, the main Polish Forces which have been and I hope will continue to be evacuated from Russia should remain in the Middle East.

In accordance with the wishes of General Auchinleck these troops will form the nucleus of the Polish Corps and, I hope, an Army in the future. I must ask, however, that arrangements should be made to bring over the following reinforcements which are urgently needed for the Polish Air Force and the Polish Navy which are fighting in England;

1,200 men for the Navy,

1,500 men for the Air Force,

who may be partly selected from the younger men of about 16 years of age, who are now in civilian organisations of semi-military nature. In fact I would like all of them (about 1,500) to be transferred to Great Britain where they could be taken care of.

In addition I am most anxious that the armoured division now being formed in Scotland should be reinforced by a minimum of 5,500 soldiers. I should mention that in order to help with the reorganization I have decided, if absolutely necessary, to disband the 1st Polish Brigade and incorporate its soldiers with the armoured division.

These decisions have not been easy for me to take – and they may be subject to considerable criticism on the part of some of my countrymen.

I have taken my decision in this matter and wish to inform you of it at once.6

Sikorski forwarded his organizational plan to the Polish Government. The Polish forces of all services in Britain would be bolstered by the arrival of over 8,000 men taken from those evacuated from the Soviet Union. In the USSR, III Corps would comprise the existing 5th, 6th and 7th Infantry Divisions of 44,000 men under the command of Lieutenant General Anders, assembled along Soviet organizational plans. The Middle Eastern force would be assembled by amalgamating the 35,000 evacuated soldiers along with the Polish Independent Carpathian Brigade to form the 3rd Carpathian Rifle Division and the 4th Rifle Division, thus creating II Polish Rifle Corps under the command of Lieutenant General Zając. The Corps was to fight in the Middle East under British command and organization, comprising two infantry divisions each of two brigades and a tank brigade of two tank battalions, corps artillery and other corps level formations. Sikorski highlighted that this army distribution was essential so that Polish manpower remained dispersed, to exploit success on as many fronts as possible. At the same time Anders stressed to Sikorski most strongly that he felt every effort should be made to secure the evacuation of the remaining Polish soldiers in the USSR, an event Anders saw as inevitable given the Soviets’ proven inability to supply the arms and equipment necessary to bring the remaining divisions to a combat-ready state.

Sikorski was growing ever more annoyed with Anders’ contrary stance and made the shrewd move of offering him the choice of a position in London or command of the troops in the Middle East. However, Anders accepted neither, instead insisting on returning to the USSR to complete his work evacuating the remainder of the Polish Army. Acceptance of either position would have effectively led to the termination of Anders’ command in the Soviet Union, allowing Sikorski to appoint a general of his choice to implement his organizational plans. Command of the Polish troops assembling in Persia and Iraq was thus to remain with Zając, for as long as Anders remained in the USSR, whilst Anders was awarded the largely ceremonial title of Inspector of the Troops in the Middle East.

Concern was expressed by some Polish commanders at the conference (notably by Major General Gustaw Paszkiewicz commanding 1 Infantry Brigade in Scotland), that if Polish units were brought up to full operational strength they would inevitably be deployed by the British, who would do so for their own ends and manpower would be rapidly depleted. Whereas if formations were maintained at cadre strength the units would not be readily deployable, preserving Polish manpower for concentration and deployment as and when the Polish Government deemed advantageous. Sikorski disagreed, aware that it was vital to Poland’s position in the Alliance to be an active, fighting participant in the war, and therefore decided to bring all Polish formations in Britain up to full strength through the transfer of personnel from the Soviet Union via the Middle East. Major General Paszkiewicz took up command of the 4th Rifle Division in Palestine during May.

The London conference decided the fate of the troops from the first evacuation, but those remaining in the USSR were still to be fought over between Anders and Sikorski, who continued firm in their convictions – Anders in his drive to evacuate the whole army to the Middle East and Sikorski wishing the recruitment of Polish soldiers to continue in the USSR and insisting that any new formations raised should remain in the Soviet Union. On 1 May, Sikorski wrote to Anders articulating overall Polish military goals and strategies. In his instructions to the General, Sikorski demanded he follow the decisions of the Polish Government, and Anders was categorically forbidden to plan for a possible single command for Polish troops in the Middle East and the USSR: the two corps were not to be brought together unless in the event of the collapse of the Soviet Union. This distribution of manpower would, Sikorski proposed, prevent Polish troops being concentrated in one theatre alone which could lead to their severe depletion in combat. It was therefore necessary for Anders and his men to hang tough in the USSR. The only issue the two agreed upon was that recruitment into the Polish Army be resumed immediately. Anders’ early reservations about the ability of the Soviets to supply the Poles appeared to be confirmed by the Soviets when Molotov wrote to the Polish ambassador on 14 May stating that, as the limit of 44,000 troops had been reached no further recruiting would be permitted and that no further evacuation out of the USSR would be possible due to transport difficulties.7

While Sikorski was formulating broad strategic goals for the future, the British were hard at work trying to secure the movement of the Poles out of the USSR to bolster their forces in the Middle East, a plan that appealed greatly to the Polish troops themselves. Anders’ willingness to fight alongside the British Army made him the obvious focal point for Churchill, a position that was tacitly acknowledged by the Foreign Office as Colonel Leslie Hulls had begun introducing General Anders to British officials in the Middle East for discussions on future plans for the Polish Army. These developments led to growing resentment amongst the Polish leadership in London, as the British would only accept Polish propositions if they coincided with their own. If there was a divergence Poland had to follow Britain’s preferences, and if the Polish Government’s agenda did not fit operational demands then other Polish figures would be favoured instead. Thus Lieutenant General Anders’ standing with British commanders and politicians steadily grew whilst their government’s position weakened.

On his return journey to the Soviet Union, Anders travelled via Cairo, meeting General Auchinleck on 20 May for a lengthy conference on how the organization of the Polish forces in the Middle East would be affected by the arrival of more units from the USSR. Anders conducted these talks without the prior knowledge of or consent from Sikorski or the government and obtained from Auchinleck what he interpreted as British approval and support for a full evacuation from the USSR. In Cairo Anders also met Major General Mason-MacFarlane whose tour in the Soviet Union had drawn to a close and who was heading for his next assignment, commanding the garrison at Gibraltar. Mason-MacFarlane had come from the USSR via Tehran, where he received a hero’s welcome from the Poles he encountered. Mason-MacFarlane considered his contribution in securing the release of the Poles as one of his most important and satisfying contributions to the Allied cause.

Towards the end of May Anders returned to Soviet soil, where the lot of the Poles had not improved by any measure; arms and equipment were not forthcoming. Anders convened a meeting of Polish unit commanders to appraise the situation and their findings were dire: the army was starving. Frustrated that Sikorski’s partial evacuation had not improved the lot of the Polish formations, just as he had foreseen, Anders pursued with renewed vigour the possibility of evacuating the entire army, even if that meant going against Sikorski’s instructions. Pursuant with this agenda Anders sought an audience with Stalin in June to discuss the possibility of moving the whole army to the Middle East, though the talks proceeded no further than his preliminary discussion with NKVD Colonel Tishkov. As well as gaining Soviet consent, Anders also had to convince Sikorski that the only possible option remaining to the Polish Army in the USSR was to evacuate and he wrote to the latter on 7 June stating that he considered the wholesale evacuation of the Polish Army was inevitable in the near future. Sikorski refuted Anders’ claims in a letter dated 11 June and ordered Anders to follow government policy. But Anders understood that the Poles’ time in the USSR was drawing to a close; it was clear the Soviets held them in no great esteem and he proceeded to press for the evacuation without further reference to London, confident he would enjoy full support from the British and the eventual agreement of the Soviets.

Anders would not have to wait long; Molotov met with Churchill and British officials in London from 20 May to 9 June, during which talks Churchill commented that if there were any surplus Polish troops in the USSR, the British would gladly take them over. Stalin made the final decision on evacuation without reference to the Polish Government. Sikorski’s plans for a Polish Army to be left in the Soviet Union were thwarted by the utter determination of the Poles there to get out, the British requirement for manpower and the willing cooperation of Stalin, who wanted rid of the Poles in a manner which would not upset the major Allies. Stalin officially proclaimed his solution on 30 June to Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, the British Ambassador to the USSR. Stalin instructed Molotov to issue the statement referred to below by the British War Cabinet:

The Soviet government had been watching with concern the developments of the military situation in Egypt leading up to the fall of Mersa Matruh. He had recalled that the Prime Minister had told him in London that if there were in Russia any Polish soldiers over and above the needs of the Soviet Government, His Majesty’s Government would be glad to take them over and equip them for use in the Middle East. There were in Russia three Polish divisions, well trained but not fully armed. While the Soviet Government were loathe to weaken their own front, and while the transfer of these Polish troops therefore presented some difficulty, they were ready to place them at the disposal of His Majesty’s Government in order to fill the gaps caused by recent severe fighting.8

Churchill responded to Stalin, writing: ‘I am sure it would be in our common interest, premier Stalin, to have the three divisions of Poles you so kindly offered join their compatriots in Palestine, where we can arm them fully…if we do not get the Poles, we should have to fill their places by drawing on the preparations going forward on a vast scale for the Anglo-American invasion of the continent.’9 In the same letter Churchill also grudgingly acknowledged that Britain would accept Polish civilian refugees along with the soldiers and that Britain would somehow endeavour to support them, but that the success of the evacuation of the Polish Army depended on keeping the numbers of civilians to an absolute minimum.

The news was a complete surprise to the Polish Government who were informed of the decision on 2 July. Sikorski responded with a letter to the British Government the following day giving his conditional support to the scheme, and stipulating the need to gain consent from the Kremlin for the continued evacuation of Polish civilians capable of bearing arms, along with the families of service personnel. The British Ambassador in Kuibyshev, Sir Alan Clark-Kerr, on 7 July informed Anders of the news that the Soviets had proposed the evacuation of the remaining three Polish infantry divisions. During the briefing Anders was delighted when the meeting was interrupted by the arrival of a telegram for the Ambassador, requesting he gain permission from the Soviets for the evacuation of families and children alongside the soldiers. Three weeks of negotiations ensued whereby the Poles attempted to secure the further recruitment of new soldiers in the USSR and evacuation of as many civilians as possible. To facilitate this they proposed creating a dedicated recruitment and reserve centre to remain in the USSR following the Army’s departure to be headed by Major General Bohusz-Szyszko. No progress was achieved on these issues.

The Soviets officially informed Anders of the evacuation through a telegram issued by Zhukov on 26 July: ‘The Government of the USSR agrees to satisfy the efforts of the commander of the Polish Army in the USSR, General Anders, for the evacuation of Polish forces from the USSR to the Middle East and has no intention of placing any obstacles in realizing their immediate evacuation.’10 The Soviets carefully worded the announcement to state that they were granting the Polish commander’s request to evacuate from the USSR and in so doing they transformed Anders from a General into a legend, a position which afforded him considerable clout in the Polish émigré community. Conversely, Anders and the Polish Government could be held responsible by the Soviets for the evacuation and ensuing political ramifications, which in due course they were.

Stalin now embarked on the creation of a new, communist Polish Army to fight as part of the Red Army that was to be raised from former prisoners of war who accepted communism and service in the Soviet forces. The Soviets thus had no further requirement for dealings with the Polish Government or for their recruiting of soldiers. To this end Zhukov informed Anders during a discussion on 31 July, ‘The Soviet Government cannot agree to the further formation of Polish units in the USSR…because the Polish Government, contrary to the agreement between the USSR and Poland, does not consider it possible to use such forces recruited in the USSR on the Soviet-German front.’11 Further difficulties continued as regards the evacuation of Polish Jews, with Anders holding a conference with Jewish leaders on 3 August to allay their concerns that the Polish authorities were cooperating with the Soviets to leave them behind in the Soviet Union. A deep mistrust of the Polish authorities’ intentions persisted amongst the Jewish community, who felt deeply betrayed.

That a Polish Army was formed in the USSR at all was due solely to the dire situation the Soviets found themselves in following the German invasion. The perennial difficulties of any Polish-Soviet cooperation stemmed from the Soviets’ requirement for the rapid deployment of combat forces on the Eastern Front while paying little attention to the fact the Poles had been taken prisoner by them, had lost their families and had no desire to embrace the harsh authoritarianism of wartime Soviet communism. These factors led repeatedly to obstacles and conditions being attached by both sides to almost every suggestion; there was a total absence of trust. Had the evacuation of the Army not been agreed many thought it likely that the Soviets would have eliminated the Poles, in the same way that other anti-communist elements were purged from Soviet society – as highlighted by Anders in his memoirs they lacked only the means to immediately ‘destroy and annihilate these army groups themselves.’12 General Mason-MacFarlane drew similar conclusions from his experiences: ‘[The] Russians have an oriental contempt for the value of human life which is almost beyond the understanding of westerners and to them the killing of a few thousand Poles, quite apart from the fact the victims were “class enemies” who had contemptuously rejected all attempts at Marxist indoctrination, was a matter of little moment.’13

The situation was more civilly summarized by the Foreign Office: ‘These preoccupations, coupled with traditional antipathies, naturally made it difficult for the two sides to co-operate whole heartedly… The truth of the matter was perhaps that General Sikorski’s agreements of 1941 with Premier Stalin attempted too much. Events showed that it was not possible for enemies to become fully co-operating allies overnight, especially at time of such serious strain and stringency as obtained in Soviet Russia in 1942.’14

The British Chiefs of Staff were not so surprised by the announcement of the full evacuation – they had envisaged such an event earlier and the British authorities in Iraq had already heard news of a possible second evacuation from the USSR later in 1942, but permission was only given for skeleton staffs, British and Polish, to remain behind at Pahlevi. Confirmation of this second evacuation came on 10 July and the first transport actually arrived on 10 August, affording the staffs exactly one month to make their preparations. Five reception camps were constructed along the eastern beach, stretching – with a special children’s camp added later – over a distance of four and a half miles and having a total capacity of 44,000. Separate camps were built for the staffs. By the time the first transport arrived there was shelter ready for 12,000, with cookhouses for 20,000. An additional 2,000 beds were provided by 18 Indian General Hospital, which was also assigned to bolster 34 BCGH. A special jetty had been allotted for disembarkation, repaired by the Soviet port authority and equipped with floodlighting and a first-aid post.

Once again thousands of Polish evacuees travelled from their encampments in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to the port of Krasnovodsk. The summer heat was intense and the rail transports taking two days were stifling hot. Arrival at Krasnovodsk brought no relief; there was no cool sea breeze, only baking hot, stifling air filled with the odour of oil from the Baku oilfields; it was impossible to reach the shoreline and sea as both were covered in thick crude oil. The fleet of cargo ships was supplemented by many fishing vessels and livestock carriers and the crammed conditions prevailed again, this time exacerbated by the relentless sun making the sea passage even more uncomfortable. This, combined with a lack of drinking water led to yet further weakening of the evacuees.

The reception of the second evacuation was quite different from the first, being properly organized well in advance. The British team was much the same, with Lieutenant Colonel Ross again in command. The Polish staff had profited greatly from experience; the actual disembarkation was now controlled by Polish officers with admirable efficiency and without any assistance at all. The Persian officials were extremely kind and helpful. There were troubles of course, the greatest being the effects of torrid heat and little food on men who were already far from well. The sickness rate was about five times that of the first evacuation, the most prevalent complaints being dysentery, malaria, typhoid and deficiency diseases. Thanks to the warm weather there was no typhus. The need for a great quantity of medical supplies had been foreseen, the hospitals were clean and aseptic, suitable food for cases of malnutrition was also procured. Again, the pace of processing the evacuees was conducted as fast as possible for, as well as there being a great number to help, the German Army was advancing so quickly into the Caucasus Mountains that the sound of their artillery fire could be heard clearly in Pahlevi. The threat of German invasion was imminent, all British and Commonwealth forces were pulling out and heading south, away from the Soviet occupation zone of northern Persia.

Several days after the last convoy of evacuees had arrived, a lone ship was spotted heading for Pahlevi. The worst was immediately suspected, that the German invasion fleet was on its way across the Caspian Sea. However, on its arrival, it was a dilapidated Soviet livestock carrier that anchored off the harbour, and the stench of excrement and decaying bodies could be smelt from the shore – it was no invasion but the last straggling transport of Poles and it was to prove the most harrowing for the evacuation base staff. The cattle pens were crammed with 1,000 orphaned children and babies. No food or water had been provided for them and no one was assigned to their care, 200 babies had died on the crossing and in the heat their bodies were fast decomposing; the conditions were beyond dreadful. The surviving children were in such a state of terror they could not even cry, and none could speak for several days. A special children’s camp was established for them and Polish women with previous healthcare experience volunteered to help in any way possible. Thankfully the vast majority of the children were nursed back to physical health, though the emotional and psychological damage they suffered could never be undone. The evacuated soldiers and civilians also showed a power of physical recuperation that amazed the doctors; their recovery of spirit was not less astounding. Some seemed to pass straight from the deepest depression into gaiety; the most emaciated, after a few days of decent feeding, recovered their individuality. They were human beings once more. The base evacuation staff could only wonder in horror as to what the Poles had been subjected to in the USSR.

Although the military evacuation had turned into a humanitarian relief effort, the business of fighting the war remained preeminent, with Churchill travelling to the Middle East in August 1942, determined that Allied strategy should become more aggressive in its efforts to route Rommel’s Afrika Korps. Churchill wrote, ‘The Levant-Caspian front is almost bare. If General Auchinleck wins the Battle of Egypt we could no doubt build up a force of perhaps eight divisions which with the four Polish divisions when trained, would play a strong part in delaying a German southward advance.’15 Churchill’s questioning of Auchinleck’s ability to win the day was telling – he and the Imperial General Staff had decided that changes of command were required to instil new vigour into the Army. General Alexander replaced General Auchinleck and Montgomery now became head of the Eighth Army. Alexander was not a man of intellectual pretensions but was adept at grasping problems and working out a solution intuitively. His charm and common-sense approach won him many advocates. On 18 August, Churchill announced the creation of Persia and Iraq Command to cover the region’s northern flank and take some of the pressure off Middle East Command. The territories of Iraq and Persia were initially administered by the Tenth Army, but the combined task of operational planning and overseeing the vast lines of communications proved too great for the Tenth alone. Middle East Command assigned an Inspector-General of Communications, while an area command known as PI-Base was formed in Basra to deal with internal security and local administration in the base and lines of communication areas. These elements were combined into Persia and Iraq Command from 21 August, with General Sir Henry Maitland-Wilson at the helm, his headquarters based in Baghdad opening on 15 September 1942. The Tenth Army with its headquarters at Arāk, Persia, was now able to concentrate on the tasks of securing the oil fields, supply lines and defending the northern flank of the Middle East region from possible German assault.

This change of command personnel brought with it two men who were to accompany the Poles for the remainder of their wartime exploits; Generals Alexander and Wilson. Alexander had served in Eastern Europe following the First World War, where his experience of commanding the multi-national Baltic Landeswehr stood him in good stead for the challenges of command in the Middle East and Italy. Alexander was utterly committed to his lifelong calling of soldiery; his personality lacked any trace of self-doubt or inner conflict. He possessed a character abounding in good humour and was renowned for his tolerance and common sense, which gave him the qualities of compromise and compassion and through which he attributed great worth to an individual’s character, the element that he saw as the measure of the man. He could not help but be impressed by Anders. Alexander’s appreciation of the arts and his personal friendships with many painters led him to having his friend the landscape painter Edward Seago appointed to his headquarters as camouflage officer. The prominent Polish art critic and then head of II Corps public relations department, Major Józef Czapski must have been a welcome visitor to his headquarters, as the General always enjoyed the company of painters and those who appreciated art. Anders’ appointment of Czapski to this role demonstrates his thorough grasp of politics.

The arrival of General Wilson greatly improved things for the Poles, his energy and enthusiasm accelerated the reorganization and re-equipping of the Polish Army. Wilson was a jaunty, individual fellow with an amiable sense of humour, combined with a formidable intellect, capable of tackling complex and varied problems with decisiveness. Very much the soldiers’ soldier, he had amassed a great deal of military knowledge and experience by the outbreak of war, whereupon proving himself an exceptional staff and training officer. General Wilson provided Persia and Iraq Command with a stalwart commander of whom it was said in the command’s official history, ‘it was beyond imagination that the Nazis could seriously interfere with a man like this’.16 A fascinating insight into the command’s operation can be gained from the diary of Wilson’s secretary, the Countess of Ranfurly, who described Anders as possessing ‘a fine, handsome but rather sad face and great charm.’17 Lieutenant General Carton de Wiart made a similar observation of the Poles in general, they were ‘vivacious and gay, especially the women, but they all seem possessed by a racial sadness that knows little joy or even contentment.’18 Their recent ordeals would have done nothing to lift that mood.

Following the meeting in Cairo Anders departed to oversee the second evacuation at Pahlevi, General Wilson requesting his presence afterwards at his headquarters in Baghdad. Anders returned to Tehran via Qizil Ribat in Iraq, inspecting the area earmarked to become the centre of the Polish Army. Upon his arrival at Pahlevi on 28 August, Anders visited the evacuation station. He inspected the camps and addressed both soldiers and civilians, and 15,000 Polish soldiers and women of the auxiliary service marched past the general, many still weak, but all erect and proud. The convoys ran until late August when German planes had begun bombing the ships, so the remaining evacuees were directed overland, to the Persian railheads of Bandar Shah and Sharud and thence by train to Teheran. A number of civilians crossed over the border on foot, arriving at Meshed and onwards finally to Tehran.

The evacuation camp at Pahlevi separated those likely to become fit enough for military service from the unfit, old men, women and children. General Wilson noted that in selecting the Polish families and individuals for removal from Poland the better educated had been chosen, which meant that many of the civilian men had previously served in the Polish Army as officers in the interwar period. These men were sent to Iraq along with the Army and, although their numbers were too great to be readily absorbed at that time a special Officers Reserve unit was created.

The departure of civilians from Pahlevi was very different and led to a worldwide dispersal. At Kavzin the military and civilian convoys had parted, and women who had lost country, homes and possessions had also to say farewell to their men. Their destination was Tehran, where the Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare had from 1 April been readying a special ‘concentration camp’ as the British authorities referred to it. General Wilson visited the non-combatants’ encampments around Tehran and was most impressed by the way in which the Poles had organized themselves and were relying on their own efforts to provide clothing and amenities, as well as education, without relying on the staff of the camps to do everything. As the numbers increased the overflow was moved to Ahwaz and when they regained a reasonable level of medical fitness a great number sailed on to areas of the British Commonwealth which had offered to receive them, in India and East Africa. Some settled in Palestine and others remained in Tehran and other towns in Persia and Iraq. These Polish civilians became receptionists in officers’ clubs, assistants in canteens, hospital nurses, clerks in offices – a lucky few women were reunited with their men after the war, having moved to Britain along with the demobilized combat forces.

The emigration of Poles out of the USSR finally ceased on 1 September, the Soviets having closed the border between the USSR and Persia, ending any further attempts to evacuate those Poles who remained behind. The Soviet Union declared that all Poles resident on Russian soil after 1939 were now Soviet citizens effective from January 1943, citing Anders’ withdrawal of the Polish forces to Persia as a breach of the military agreement of 14 August 1941. This had the effect of hindering the development of the Polish Army, as the source of further recruits and reinforcements was now cut off. In all over 100,000 Poles were evacuated from the USSR into Persia, including a great many civilians, and such a movement of people was only permitted by the Soviets thanks to intense personal negotiations by Lieutenant General Anders at the highest level of Soviet authority.