IX
War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest: the decayed and degraded state of moral and patriotic feeling which thinks nothing worth a war is worse. ... A man who has nothing which he cares about more than his personal safety is a miserable creature who has no chance of being free, unless made and kept so by the exertions of better men than himself.
On February 8, 1968 President Johnson sent this quotation from John Stuart Mill to Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, Clark Clifford, and the Joint Chiefs.
I just don’t understand it. Am I that far off? Am I wrong? Has something happened to me? My wife said, I think so. But she said you don’t know what year you are living in. This is ‘68.
Remarks by President Lyndon Johnson to a Congressional delegation in the White House, January 30, 1968.
Khe Sanh
On January 11, 1968, U.S. intelligence detected a buildup of forces in the Laotian panhandle west of the demilitarized zone, threatening the Marine base at Khe Sanh in western Quang Tri province of South Vietnam. Khe Sanh was located eight miles east of Laos and eighteen miles south of the DMZ. The base occupied a strategically important location for the purposes of hindering enemy infiltration down the Ho Chi Minh Trail as well as providing a staging post for possible operations into Laos.
The enemy force buildup of two additional North Vietnamese divisions was incontrovertible; but Hanoi’s motives were wildly disputed. Prisoner reports and captured documents revealed that a massive winter-spring offensive was being planned. Truck traffic down the Ho Chi Minh Trail had reached massive proportions and major North Vietnamese troop reinforcements were in the border areas. Was Hanoi merely setting the stage for negotiations or was the offensive intended to topple the government of South Vietnam? What was the enemy up to? General Westmoreland believed a maximum military effort was underway, possibly to improve chances of achieving an end to the war through negotiations that would lead to a coalition government involving the NLF. A major offensive by Hanoi might also be aimed at achieving one major psychological victory in the United States prior to the start of the presidential campaign.
The enemy was finally coming to Westmoreland for battle. This would not be search and destroy in the jungle. Years of waiting for the enemy were almost over, and even though U.S. forces were significantly out-numbered, Westmoreland cabled Wheeler on January 12 that a withdrawal from Khe Sanh was unthinkable. “I consider this area critical to us from a tactical standpoint as a launch base for Special Operations Group teams and as flank security for the strong point obstacle system; it is even more critical from a psychological viewpoint. To relinquish this area would be a major propaganda victory for the enemy. Its loss would seriously affect Vietnamese and US morale. In short, withdrawal would be a tremendous step backwards.”
With 15–20,000 North Vietnamese reinforcements circling Khe Sanh, Westmoreland bit the lure by ordering the 6000 Marine troops to defend the garrison. General Westmoreland also set in motion plans for implementing Operation Niagara (evoking an image of cascading bombs and shells), which became the most intense and successful application of aerial firepower yet seen in the war.
During the predawn hours of January 21, 1968, Khe Sanh came under constant rocket and mortar fire from the North Vietnamese. The battle was on, and it appeared to President Johnson and his principal advisors that the North Vietnamese envisioned Khe Sanh as a potential Dien Bien Phu. During a January 23 White House meeting with members of the Democratic leadership, the president reported that “intelligence reports show a great similarity between what is happening at Khe Sanh and what happened at Dien Bien Phu.” Johnson became preoccupied with the analogy and had a table model made of sand of the Khe Sanh plateau constructed in the bunker-like Situation Room of the White House. He feared that Khe Sanh would be his “Dinbinphoo,” as LBJ was prone to pronounce it.
The Khe Sanh-Dien Bien Phu analogy was fraught with historical misapplication. The actual siege by the Viet Minh of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 had lasted 56 days. The French forces included Montagnards, North Africans, Vietnamese, and Foreign Legionnaires. The total force was about 13,000 and casualties amounted to 1100 killed, 1600 missing, and 4400 wounded. The Viet Minh totaled 49,500 combat troops plus 55,000 support troops. At Khe Sanh, U.S. forces numbered 6000 against an enemy strength of about 20,000. The enemy’s advantage was less than 4 to 1 rather than 8 to 1 (including support troops) as it had been at Dien Bien Phu. Moreover, usable supplies parachuted into Dien Bien Phu had averaged about 100 tons per day; General Westmoreland had a capability of 600 tons per day. The French had possessed 75 combat aircraft and 100 supply and reconnaissance aircraft. By comparison, the United States had more than 2000 aircraft and 3300 helicopters.
Uncertainty about the military situation at Khe Sanh led LBJ to question the Joint Chiefs. At a meeting on January 29, the president requested that each member submit “his views concerning the validity of the strategy now pursued in South Vietnam by the Free World Forces.” The declassified meeting notes show that LBJ had asked the chiefs “if they were completely in agreement that everything has been done to assure that General Westmoreland can take care of the expected enemy offensive against Khesanh.” General Wheeler and the Joint Chiefs “agreed that everything which had been asked for had been granted and that they were confident that General Westmoreland and the troops were prepared to cope with any contingency.”
It was during this period that Johnson, finding it difficult to sleep, would walk the halls of the White House or call down to the Situation Room for a report on Khe Sanh. Secretary of State Dean Rusk recalled that, “We couldn’t break him of the habit, even for health reasons, of getting up at 4:30 or 5:00 every morning to go down to the operations room and check on the casualties from Vietnam, each one of which took a little piece out of him.”1
NSC staff assistant, Colonel Robert Ginsburgh, frequently found himself on night watch at the Situation Room in the basement of the White House. The Situation Room was actually two rooms—one a windowless room with a long table for private meetings; the other an active hub of communications with AP, UPI, and Reuter teletypes. Four clocks were mounted on the wall—Washington, GMT, Saigon, and the official presidential time which was set to follow LBJ’s travels. The room also contained three television sets and other forms of technology befitting a White House communications center—especially a telephone. Ginsburgh recalled that during the battle for Khe Sanh, “I had the night-time watch. And so, every two hours I was either in touch with the President on the phone, that is, he would call me or I would have sent him a message, a little memo to try and preclude his calling. He wanted to know, ‘How is it going, what is happening?’”2
Johnson wanted to know how things were going because he was running out of trust for those who had brought him to this point. Johnson later denied pressuring the chiefs, but the declassified record contradicts his position. Meeting on February 2 with White House correspondents, the president discussed the JCS assurances about Khe Sanh. In the meeting notes he is recorded as saying, “I asked the JCS to give me a letter saying that they were ready for the offensive at Khesanh.” Yet, when reporters wrote that Johnson had obtained these letters from the chiefs, the president vehemently denied the claim.
The president then asked his assistant Tom Johnson to review all meeting notes to see whether there was any proof to the press reports. Tom Johnson wrote the president, “I have reviewed all of the notes of meetings held during the past two weeks. In addition, I have searched my memory thoroughly ... At no time do my notes show, or my memory recall, an incident when the President said: ‘I do not want any Damn Dien Bien Phu.’ The President said we wanted to make sure we had done everything here and the JCS had done everything to make certain there is not another Dien Bien Phu. The word “damn” was not used in any meeting I attended in this context. Never did the President say he had “made each chief sign a paper stating that he believed Khe Sanh could be defended.” LBJ could thus claim that he had not said either “damn” or “each chief”; but he had made the Dien Bien Phu analogy and he had at least told members of Congress that the chiefs had signed a paper.3
During a particularly contentious morning meeting on January 30 with the Democratic congressional leaders, Senator Robert Byrd remarked, “I am very concerned about the buildup at Khesanh. I have been told that we have 5,000 troops there compared with 40,000 enemy troops. Are we prepared for this attack?” The president responded, “This has been a matter of great concern to me. I met with the Joint Chiefs yesterday. I went around the table and got their answer to these questions. In addition, I have it in writing that they are prepared. I asked, ‘Have we done all we should do?’ They said yes. I asked, ‘Are we convinced our forces are adequate?’ They said yes. I asked, ‘Should we withdraw [troops to be used in Vietnam] from Korea?’ They said no, that Khesanh is important to us militarily and psychologically. ...”
General Wheeler, who was also at the meeting, sought to provide clarification for Byrd’s queries: “On the matter of your question, Senator Byrd, about 5,000 U.S. troops versus 40,000 enemy troops. Khesanh is in very rugged areas. There are 5,900 U.S. troops in the Khesanh Garrison. There are support troops including 26th Marines and a battalion of the ARVN. . . . There are 39,968 friendly forces versus 38,590 enemy forces. Roughly, there are 40,000 allied troops to match the 40,000 enemy. We think we are ready to take on any contingency. In addition, there are 40 B-52 sorties and 500 tactical air sorties in the area Niagara each day hitting the enemy. ... General Westmoreland is confident he can hold the position. To abandon it would be to step backward. The Joint Chiefs agree with General Westmoreland. The Joint Chiefs believe that he can hold and that he should hold. General Westmoreland considers it an opportunity to inflict heavy casualties on North Vietnam. We have 6,000 men there, and 34,000 available. It is 40,000 versus 40,000.”
A week later during a White House meeting of the principals the president again asked Wheeler, “Are you as confident today as you were yesterday that we can handle the situation at Khesanh? General Wheeler answered, “I do not think the enemy is capable of doing what they have set out to do. General Westmoreland has strengthened his position. He has contingency plans and can meet any contingency. There is nothing he has asked for that he has not been given. Khesanh is important to us militarily and psychologically. It is the anchor of our defensive situation along the DMZ.” Johnson again asked General Wheeler, “Are you sure that you have everything that is needed to take care of the situation in Khesanh?” Wheeler responded, “Yes, we are. General Westmoreland has been given everything he has requested.”
Prometheus Bound
The enemy build up at Khe Sanh was followed on January 23, 1968, by North Korea’s capture of the U.S. Navy Intelligence ship Pueblo on grounds of espionage. Seized in international waters some 26 miles off the coast of Japan, the 906-ton USS Pueblo was on its first electronic surveillance mission. The crew of 83, captained by Lloyd Bucher, was forced into the North Korean port at Wonsan, the first U.S. naval vessel captured since the USS Chesepeake in 1807—during the Napoleonic wars.
Had the seizure been a pre-planned effort to provoke a U.S. response and to exert pressure on the United States in Vietnam? Were the North Koreans supporting their Communist allies in North Vietnam and trying to create fear in South Korea? “Prometheus Bound,” proclaimed a Newsweekarticle in describing how “a tenth-rate country” had “abruptly confronted Lyndon B. Johnson with one of the most delicate and intractable emergencies of his crisis-wracked Administration.”4 Secretary of State Dean Rusk declared publicly, “I would not object to designating this an act of war in terms of the category of actions to be so construed. My strong advice to North Korea is to cool it.” But North Korea had no intention of cooling it; instead, it released a confession signed by thePueblo’s skipper, Commander Bucher, obviously obtained under duress, which contained alleged admissions of CIA contacts and proposed aggression against Korea.
Ironically, the seizure allowed Johnson to mobilize 15,000 Air Force and Navy Reservists as well as 370 inactive aircraft. Johnson also convened a “crisis” meeting of an informal planning committee which included all of the principal advisors to the president, somewhat like President Kennedy’s Executive Committee (ExComm) during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The president was determined not to act hastily and to do everything possible diplomatically to get the crew returned safely. (Which succeeded only after a protracted period of eleven months.)
The seizure raised difficult problems for Johnson’s political leadership. The president could hardly afford a second war front in Asia, yet he was being pressured at home to retaliate against what Massachusetts congressman William Bates, senior Republican on the House Armed Services Committee, called, “a dastardly act of piracy.” Hawks were not the only ones pressuring Johnson. Democratic senator Frank Church of Idaho, one of the Senate’s most outspoken doves on Vietnam, derided the Pueblo’s seizure as “an act of war,” in which the honor of the United States was at stake.
Tet: Move Forward to Achieve Final Victory
During the early morning hours of January 31 (the Vietnamese New Year, Tet) approximately 80,000 North Vietnamese regulars and guerrillas attacked over 100 cities throughout South Vietnam. Tet involved enemy attacks on 35 of 44 province capitals, 36 district towns and many villages and hamlets. For weeks prior to the offensive, enemy forces had been infiltrating into Saigon in civilian clothes in preparation for a well-planned campaign of terror. The goal was to achieve a popular uprising against the GVN and to show the American public that the very notion of security in the South was null and void.
Communist forces had been given the general order “Move forward to achieve final victory.” Combat orders had urged the assaulters to do everything possible to completely liberate the people of South Vietnam. The orders found on captured guerrillas described the Tet strategy as one that would be “the greatest battle ever fought throughout the history of our country.” The infiltrators were exhorted to “move forward aggressively to carry out decisive and repeated attacks in order to annihilate as many American, Satellite and Puppet troops as possible in conjunction with political struggles and military proselyting activities.... Display to the utmost your revolutionary heroism by surmounting all hardships and difficulties and making sacrifices as to be able to fight continually and aggressively. Be prepared to smash all enemy counter attacks and maintain your revolutionary standpoint under all circumstances. Be resolute in achieving continuous victories and secure the final victory at all costs.”
While the attack itself did not surprise the principals, its timing during the Tet holiday phase-down did. In Washington, Walt Rostow was called away from a foreign-affairs advisors’ luncheon to receive news of the offensive. Rostow quickly returned to report, “We have just been informed we are being heavily mortared in Saigon. The Presidential Palace, . . . the Embassy and the city itself have been hit.” General Wheeler did not seem very alarmed: “It was the same type of thing before. You will remember that during the inauguration that the MACV headquarters was hit. In a city like Saigon people can infiltrate easily. They carry in rounds of ammunition and mortars. They fire and run. It is impossible to stop this in its entirety. This is about as tough to stop as it is to protect against an individual mugging in Washington, D.C. We have got to pacify all of this area and get rid of the Viet Cong infrastructure. They are making a major effort to mount a series of these actions to make a big splurge at TET.”5
But General Westmoreland quickly cabled Admiral Sharp that the enemy attacks constituted more than a D.C. mugging. The enemy “appears to be [using] desperation tactics, using NVA troops to terrorize populated areas. He attempted to achieve surprise by attacking during the truce period. The reaction of Vietnamese, US and Free World Forces to the situation has been generally good. Since the enemy has exposed himself, he has suffered many casualities. As of now, they add up to almost 700. When the dust settles, there will probably be more. All my subordinate commanders report the situation well in hand.”
From a military assessment, the VC suffered a major defeat at Tet. Over half of their committed force was lost and perhaps a quarter of their whole regular force. Moreover, the Communists failed to bring about the diversion of U.S. forces from Khe Sanh or elsewhere. Nevertheless, the psychological impact of Tet was demoralizing to the American public. The enemy had demonstrated a capability to enter and attack cities and towns and had employed terrorism for doing vast damage. Bunker cabled Johnson on February 8, “Hanoi may well have reasoned that in the event that the TET attacks did not bring the outright victory they hoped for, they could still hope for political and psychological gains of such dimensions that they could come to the negotiating table with a greatly strengthened hand. They may have very well estimated that the impact of the TET attacks would at the very least greatly discourage the United States and cause other countries to put more pressure on us to negotiate on Hanoi’s terms.”
The impact on the American public was indeed great. A front-page photograph on the New York Times February 1 edition showed three military policemen, rifles in hand, seeking protection behind a wall outside the consular section of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. The bodies of two American soldiers slain by guerrillas who had raided the compound, lay nearby. All 19 guerrillas had been killed, but not until they had blasted their way into the embassy and had held part of the grounds for six hours. Four MPs, a Marine Guard, and a South Vietnamese employee were killed in the attack. President Thieu declared a state of martial law, yet during a news conference from the Cabinet room, President Johnson likened Tet to the Detroit riots, asserting “a few bandits can do that in any city.”
Meeting with key congressional leaders in the evening of January 31, LBJ reviewed the events preceding Tet as well as Khe Sanh. “The Joint Chiefs, and all the Joint Chiefs, met with me the day before yesterday and assured me that they had reviewed the plans and they thought they were adequate. I told them I thought I almost had to have them sign up in blood because if my poll goes where it has gone, with all the victories, I imagine what it would do if we had a good major defeat. So General Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are sure that we are not anticipating some major activity there that we have not heard about.”
General Wheeler then explained that Hanoi’s military purpose in the Tet offensive had been to draw forces away from the Khe Sanh area. The second objective seemed to have been more political, to demonstrate to the South Vietnamese people and the world, that the Communists still possessed a considerable strength in the country and thereby shake the confidence of the Vietnamese people in the ability of their government to provide them security, even when they were within areas held by government and U.S. troops. “A significant thing about this attack,” Wheeler said, “is that in many areas, particularly in Saigon, and at Bien Hoa, the attackers were dressed in one of three types of clothing: Civilian clothes, military, ARVN military police uniforms, or national police uniforms. Apparently, they gave no attention at all to whether or not they killed civilians. This is a sort of an unusual action for them because they have posed as the protectors of the civilian populace. Apparently this is the effort to reestablish by terror a degree of control over the population.”
The meeting of congressional leaders was followed by a Cabinet meeting which Johnson opened by acknowledging, “There is a lot of stress and plenty of overtime for us all.” President Johnson then engaged in a series of free-flowing remarks in which he came close to blaming the pope for Tet:
I think I admired President Kennedy most during the Bay of Pigs when he said ‘no one is to blame but me.’ know that wasn’t true. ... We went into Rome at night and we could have been faced with two million Red demonstrators. The Pope appealed to me. We had no differences, no quarrels. He said ‘I want to do something, anything for peace—can’t you give us one extra day of the holiday truce?’ General Westmoreland told me how many American lives it would cost, but we did give the Pope his extra day. Now it’s hard not to regret the number of boys who were killed. It is now so much worse after the Tet truce. Westmoreland cancelled the Tet truce because the house was on fire. So you look at Pueblo, Khe Sanh, Saigon and you see them all as part of the Communist effort to defeat us out there. We can dodge it by being weak-kneed if we want to. I said at San Antonio that we have gone as far as we could—farther, I might add, than the military wanted. We made it clear how much we want to talk and not bomb, just so long as there is some prompt and productive response. But if you sneak in the night and hit us, we can’t stop bombing. Now we have their answer with this new offensive. It just should satisfy every dove who loves peace as much as any mother does.
The president then read excerpts from a memorandum received from Ambassador Bunker, calling particular attention to a passage recalling Thomas Paine’s remark, “These are the times that try men’s souls. . . . What we attain too cheaply, we esteem too lightly.”
Attending the annual presidential prayer breakfast at the Shoreham Hotel, the president sounded weary and burdened by events. “The nights are very long. The winds are very chill. Our spirits grow weary and restive as the springtime of man seems farther and farther away. I can, and I do, tell you that in these long nights your President prays.” Indeed, as these personal pressures grew, LBJ sought private solace in late-night prayer at St. Dominic’s Church, in southwest Washington. Accompanied only by the secret service, the president and his “little monks” would read scriptures, psalms, and sing hymns.6
On February 1, Wheeler cabled Sharp and Westmoreland raising the possibility of “whether tactical nuclear weapons should be used if the situation in Khe Sanh should become that desperate.” While Wheeler considered that eventuality unlikely, he requested a list of susceptible targets in the areas “which lend themselves to nuclear strikes, whether some contingency nuclear planning would be in order, and what you would consider to be some of the more significant pros and cons of using tac [tactical] nukes in such a contingency.”
Westmoreland responded, “The use of tactical nuclear weapons should not be required in the present situation.” However, should the situation change, “I visualize that either tactical nuclear weapons or chemical agents would be active candidates for employment.” During an emotional February 16 news conference, Johnson vehemently denied that nuclear weapons had ever been considered, adding even more fuel to the credibility gap fire. LBJ stated that it was “against the national interest to carry on discussions about the employment of nuclear weapons with respect to Khesanh.”
While Wheeler and Westmoreland privately discussed tactical nukes, Walt Rostow privately drew charts for his wife Elspeth. “Responding to a question from Elspeth last night,” Rostow wrote Johnson, “I explained events in Vietnam as follows. The war had been proceeding in 1967 on an attritional basis with our side gradually improving its position, the Communists gradually running down. [See Figure 1.] Behind these curves were pools of military forces and fire power which represented the working capital available to the two sides. As the documents forecast, the Communists decided to take a large part of their capital and put it into: an attack on the cities; a frontier attack at Khe Sanh and elsewhere. In the one case their objective was the believed vulnerability of the GVN and the believed latent popular support for the Viet Cong. In the other case, the believed vulnerability of the U.S. public opinion to discouragement about the war. So the curves actually moved like this [see Figure 2].
Figure 1
Figure 2
The dotted portions indicate the potentiality if: the cities are cleared up and held against possible follow-on attacks; the GVN demonstrate effective political and relief capacity; we hold Khe Sanh; we keep U.S. opinion steady on course. In short, if all on our side do their job well, the net effect could be a shortening of the war.”
But administration critics weren’t convinced. Satirist Art Buchwald likened administration optimism to another historical event: “‘We have the enemy on the run,’ says General Custer at Big Horn. ‘It’s a desperation move on the part of Sitting Bull and his last death rattle.’” Senator George Aiken wryly remarked, “If this is a failure, I hope the Viet Cong never have a major success.” Yet Rostow again wrote Johnson that the degree of Communist terrorism during the Tet period would actually strengthen the South Vietnamese resolve to get even with these terrorists. “There is a chance that South Viet Nam will emerge in the weeks and months ahead with stronger political institutions and a greater sense of nationhood and common destiny than before.”
More Troops
General Wheeler understood the severity of Westmoreland’s military position. Allied forces were stretched to their maximum extent and effectiveness. On February 3, Wheeler cabled Westmoreland, “The President asks me if there is any reinforcement or help that we can give you?” Receiving no answer, Wheeler tried again on February 8: “Query: Do you need reinforcements? Our capabilities are limited—However, if you consider reinforcements imperative, you should not be bound by earlier agreements. ... United States government is not prepared to accept defeat in Vietnam. In summary, if you need more troops, ask for them.”
Westmoreland now cabled Wheeler that there was cause for alarm. “From a realistic point of view we must accept the fact that the enemy has dealt the GVN a severe blow. He has brought the war to the towns and the cities and has inflicted damage and casualties on the population, Homes have been destroyed, distribution of the necessities of life has been interrupted. Damage has been inflicted to the LOC’s [Lines of communication] and the economy has been decimated. Martial law has been invoked, with stringent curfews in the cities. The people have felt directly the impact of the war.”
While U.S. forces had repelled the Communist onslaught and inflicted major losses on the enemy manpower pool, Tet revealed the enemy’s great skill in planning, coordination, and courage. The enemy had infiltrated previously secure population centers and exploited the GVN claim of security from attack. But there had been no general uprising, and the enemy did not hold a single city, although enemy units had waged a fierce three-week battle at the ancient city of Hué where they had occupied the Citadel—a nineteenth-century fortress which shielded the nation’s historic imperial palace. Hué, a city of 100,000, was also the traditional center of religious and intellectual life in Vietnam. After weeks of fighting, U.S. and ARVN forces secured Hué, but not until some of the worst carnage of the war had been unleashed on its civilian inhabitants.
Westmoreland cabled Wheeler that enemy activity at Hué and elsewhere had helped Hanoi to score “a psychological blow, possibly greater in Washington than in South Vietnam, since there are tentative signs that the populace is turning against the Viet Cong as a result of these attacks.” The enemy had also succeeded in temporarily disrupting South Vietnam’s economy, and Westmoreland believed the enemy would continue to strain the will of the people by maintaining pressure on the populated areas with his forces already committed. The general also expected another major offensive in the Saigon area, commencing in mid-February.
Meeting with the Democratic congressional leadership at breakfast on February 6, 1968, the president once again faced tough questions from Senator Robert Byrd. “I am concerned about: 1. That we had poor intelligence; 2. That we were not prepared for these attacks; 3. We underestimated the morale and vitality of the Viet Cong; 4. We over-estimated the support of the South Vietnamese government and its people.” Johnson shot back at Byrd: “I don’t agree with any of that. We knew that they planned a general uprising around TET. Our intelligence showed there was a winter-spring offensive planned. We did not know the precise places that were going to be hit. General Abrams said the Vietnamese are doing their best. There was no military victory for the Communists. Just look at the casualties and the killed in action.”
The discussion then moved to a more general level of political analysis:
SENATOR BYRD: I have never caused you any trouble in this matter on the Hill. But I do have very serious concerns about Vietnam. I think this is the place to raise these questions, here in the family.
CONGRESSMAN HALE BOGGS: What about Bob Byrd’s charge that we are under-estimating the strength of the VC? I personally do not agree with that.
THE PRESIDENT: I have never under-estimated the Viet Cong. They are not push-overs. I do not think we have bad intelligence or have underestimated the Viet Cong morale.
SENATOR BYRD: Something is wrong over there.
THE PRESIDENT: The intelligence wasn’t bad.
SENATOR BYRD: That does not mean the Viet Cong did not succeed in their efforts. Their objective was to show that they could attack all over the country and they did.
THE PRESIDENT: That was not their objective at all.
SENATOR BYRD: You have been saying the situation with the Viet Cong was one of diminishing morale. When I say you, I mean the Administration.
THE PRESIDENT: I personally never said anything of the sort. I am not aware that anyone else has been saying that. What do you think the American people would have done if we had sent in troops and had lost 21,000 of them as the enemy has?
SENATOR RUSSELL LONG: If we had planned to have an up-rising in Cuba and you had caused 21,000 men to be lost as the Viet Cong did, I am sure you would have been impeached.
THE PRESIDENT: I am of the opinion that criticism is not worth much. I look at all these speeches that are in the [congressional] Record. I look at all the people who are going around the country saying our policy is wrong. Where do they get us? Nowhere. The popular thing now is to stress the mis-management to Vietnam. I think there has been very little. I wish Mike (Senator Mansfield) would make a speech on Ho Chi Minh. Nothing is as dirty as to violate a truce during the holidays. But nobody says anything bad about Ho. They call me a murderer. But Ho has a great image.
SENATOR BYRD: I don’t want the President to think that I oppose you. I am just raising these matters.
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t agree with what you say.
SENATOR LONG: I am happy you raised the point, Bob.
THE PRESIDENT: Everybody should say and do what they want to. But we have put our very best men that we have out there. I believe that our military and diplomatic men in the field know more than many of our Congressmen and Senators back here. Anybody can kick a barn down. It takes a good carpenter to build one. I just wish all of you would expose the Viet Cong and Ho. We have got some very crucial decisions coming up. Personally, I think they suffered a severe defeat. But we knew there would be a general uprising, and they did not win any victory. It seems to be an American trait to ask why. I just hope that we don’t divert our energies and our talents by criticizing unnecessarily. We’ve got all we can of this “What’s wrong with our country?” Fulbright, Young and Gruening haven’t helped one bit.
SENATOR BYRD: I do not want to argue with the President. But I am going to stick by my convictions.
The Tuesday luncheon following Tet revealed frustration amongst the advisors. For the departing Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the Tet offensive demonstrated that Hanoi had “more power than we credit them with. I do not think it was a last-gasp’ action. I do think that it represents a maximum effort in the sense that they poured on all of their assets and my guess is that we will inflict a very heavy loss both in terms of personnel and material and this will set them back some but that after they absorb the losses they will remain a substantial force. I do not anticipate that we will hit them so hard that they will be knocked out for an extended period or forced to drop way back in level of effort against us. I do think that it is such a well-coordinated, such an obviously advanced planned operation, that it probably relates to negotiations in some way. I would expect that were they successful here they would then move forward more forcibly on the negotiation front and they are thinking they have a stronger position from which to bargain.”
Johnson wanted to know what should be done militarily to punish the enemy? McNamara argued that the Joint Chiefs had no answer. “I have talked to the Chiefs about some kind of a reciprocal action—retaliation for their attack on our Embassy or in retaliation for their attack across the country. There just isn’t anything the Chiefs have come up with that is worth trying. They talk about an area-bombing attack over Hanoi but the weather is terrible. You can’t get in there with pinpoint targeting. The only way you could bomb it at all at the present time is area bombing and I would not recommend that to you under any circumstances. They have just not been able to think of retaliation that means anything. My own feeling is that we ought to be able to depend upon our ability to inflict very heavy casualties on them as our proper response and as the message we give to our people.”
But the chiefs did have an answer. In a meeting with the president on February 5, they proposed removing the restrictions around Hanoi and Haiphong, reducing the circles to three miles around Hanoi and one-and-one-half miles around Haiphong. Secretary of State Rusk feared that the proposed action “opens up the possibility of large civilian casualties and leads to extensive devastation of the area. From what we have seen in other areas this leads to almost total devastation. What to hit is up to the pilot.” Wheeler responded, “We do not advocate attacking the population centers. We never have before, and we don’t ask for that now. I admit there will be more civilian destruction, but we will be going after trucks and water craft. They are secure now, but represent genuine military targets.”
Secretary McNamara challenged Wheeler’s logic. “Any attack of this type is very expensive both in the number of U.S. aircraft lost and in civilian destruction. I do not recommend this. The military effect is small and our night time attack capability is small. Civilian casualties will be high. In my judgment, the price is high and the gain is low. The military commanders will dispute all the points I have made except aircraft loss.”
Wheeler directly contradicted Secretary McNamara: “I do not think the effects on the civilian population will be that high. As you know, they have an excellent warning system and most of them go to shelters and tunnels. From that standpoint, civilian loss could be lower than it is in other areas. We have had nothing like the civilian destruction that took place in World War II and Korea. But the targets which are there are military targets of military value. Frankly, this (civilian casualties which might result) does not bother me when I compare it with the organized death and butchery by the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong during the last two weeks in South Vietnam. All of this relates to the matter of pressure.”
Choices had to be made. The president told the chiefs, “I believe somebody in government should say something. I do not share the view that many people have that we took a great defeat. Our version is not being put to the American people properly. . . . What are we going to do now on these bombing targets?” It was the incoming secretary of defense, Clark Clifford, who recommended accepting the chiefs’ proposal. Clifford believed that the Tet offensive was Hanoi’s answer to the San Antonio formula. “I am inclined to resume the bombing in North Vietnam and go ahead with the suggested three-mile and one-and-a-half mile limits. As long as the enemy has demonstrated that they are not going to respond positively we should go ahead with this.”
When Rusk and McNamara warned about the need to distinguish restricted from authorized targets, Wheeler showed his discontent: “I am fed up to the teeth with the activities of the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. We apply rigid restrictions to ourselves and try to operate in a humanitarian manner with concern for civilians at all times. They apply a double standard. Look at what they did in South Vietnam last week. In addition, they place their munitions inside of populated areas because they think they are safe there.”
The discussion between the principals in the February 7 National Security Council meeting reveals their continuing uncertainty concerning enemy capabilities and U.S. military strategy:
SECRETARY RUSK: What about the possibility of the MIGs attacking a carrier?
GENERAL WHEELER: No, I do not think this is likely. The carriers do have air caps and are distant from the MIG bases.
THE PRESIDENT: Go in and get those MIGs at Phuc Yen.
GENERAL WHEELER: We will as soon as the weather permits.
SECRETARY MCNAMARA: The MIGs would have negligible military effects but they would have spectacular psychological impact. We do get the feeling that something big is ahead. We do not exactly know what it is, but our commanders are on alert.
THE PRESIDENT: I want all of you to make whatever preparations are necessary. Let’s know where we can get more people if we need to move additional ones in.
GENERAL WHEELER: I have a preliminary list on my desk. I am not satisfied with it.
SECRETARY MCNAMARA: This would include Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine units.
THE PRESIDENT: What about the allies?
GENERAL WHEELER: The Australians are incapable of providing more troops. The problems in Korea are such that it will be hard to get the South Koreans to even send the light division they had promised. The Thai troops are in training and to move them in now would be more detrimental than helpful.
THE PRESIDENT: So it would be only Americans? Well, I want you to know exactly where you could get them, where they are located now and what we need to do. Get whatever emergency actions ready that will be necessary.
SECRETARY MCNAMARA: All we would recommend at this time are the three items we had discussed earlier. There may be some increase in draft calls but this would have no immediate effect.
THE PRESIDENT: Do we have adequate hospitals and medical personnel?
GENERAL WHEELER: We have ample space, ample supplies, and enough doctors for the present.
SECRETARY mcnamara: There are 6,400 military beds, Of that, 2900 are occupied by U.S. troops and 1100 by Vietnamese civilians. So we have an additional capacity of about 2400.
THE PRESIDENT: Look at this situation carefully. If we have another week like this one, you may need more.
SECRETARY RUSK: How do you interpret their use of tanks?
GENERAL WHEELER: They had to bring them all the way from Hanoi. This shows that this plan has been in staging since September. It represents a real logistic feat. They want to create maximum disruption.
USIA DIRECTOR LEONARD MARKS: Could they do anything at Cam Ranh Bay?
GENERAL WHEELER: They could. On this last attack, we caught frogmen in there. They could put rockets in the hills and fire on to the base.
THE PRESIDENT: How many of the 25,000 killed were North Vietnamese Regulars?
GENERAL WHEELER: Approximately 18,000 were of a mixed variety of South Vietnamese enemy. Approximately 6,000 to 7,000 were North Vietnamese.
THE PRESIDENT: How do things look at Khesanh? Would you expect to have to move out of Lang Vie?
GENERAL WHEELER: It was not planned that we would hole some of these outposts. We may have to move back that company on Hill 861.
THE PRESIDENT: Bob, are you worried?
SECRETARY MCNAMARA: I am not worried about a true military defeat.
GENERAL WHEELER: Mr. President, this is not a situation to take lightly. This is of great military concern to us. I do think that Khesanh is an important position which can and should be defended. It is important to us tactically and it is very important to us psychologically. But the fighting will be very heavy, and the losses may be high. General Westmoreland will set up the forward field headquarters as quickly as possible. He told me this morning that he has his cables and his communications gear in. He is sending a list of his needs, including light aircraft. We are responding to this request.
THE PRESIDENT: Let’s get everybody involved on this as quickly as possible. Everything he wants, let’s get it to him.
Senator Clark’s Report
In early February the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations published Senator Joseph Clark’s report based on a recent study mission to South Vietnam. “Stalemate in Vietnam” was a singularly powerful indictment of U.S. policy. The report concluded, “The war in Vietnam is at a stalemate which neither side can convert into a military victory without leaving the country—and perhaps the world—in ruins.” America’s national unity was threatened by the divisiveness of convictions on the war creating a condition whereby “the political fabric of our society is at the tearing point.” Senator Clark believed that Vietnam had become “a cancer” which threatened to destroy the country. “Never, never again,” concluded the Senator, “should we commit a ground army on the mainland of Asia.”
In his analysis of the effect Tet could have on the polls, and thus, on the election, Rostow warned the president: “There is a widespread assumption in the country, even among those who support our policy, that peace requires only that the right button can be found to push—the right gimmick discovered. This is, of course, naive. But it furnishes the basis for what will probably be a growing issue as the year proceeds. The serious opposition will not call for a pull-out from Vietnam. They will, instead, promise to do it better. They will say you cannot find the right button—and they will imply they can. We can defuse this issue by saying plainly that there can be no peace because the enemy still wants war. And those who talk of peace only cause the enemy to redouble his attacks on our men in Vietnam.”
The president, now fearing he could lose both Vietnam and his political credibility, confronted his advisors, “Well, it looks as if all of you have counseled, advised, consulted and then—as usual—placed the monkey on my back again.... I do not like what I am smelling from those cables from Vietnam and my discussions with outside advisers. We know the enemy is likely to hit the cities again. They will likely have another big attack and there undoubtedly will be surprises. I want you to lay out for me what we should do in the minimum time to meet a crisis request from Vietnam if one comes. Let’s assume we have to have more troops. I think we should now tell the allies that we could lose Southeast Asia without their help.”
The president’s meeting on February 8 with the Joint Chiefs revealed perceptions of a deteriorating military situation. Westmoreland needed an immediate deployment of 45,000 men to meet a similar increase in enemy strength. The president first asked, “What is the ARVN strength?” General Wheeler responded, “Approximately 360,000 men now. Total forces about 600,000.” The discussion then turned to the enemy’s strength since it appeared that few North Vietnamese regular forces had been utilized for the Tet attack, the question now raised was how many guerrillas and irregulars (recently removed from the OB) were still available as reserves or replacements.
LBJ instructed the chiefs to “work up all the options and let’s review them together. I want you to hope for the best and plan for the worst. Let’s consider the extensions, call ups, and use of specialists. Dean, should we have more than the Tonkin Gulf resolution in going into this? Should we ask for a declaration of war?” The secretary answered, “Congressional action on individual items would avoid the problems inherent in a generalized declaration. I do not recommend a declaration of war. I will see what items we might ask the Congress to look at.” President Johnson persisted, “What would be the impact internationally on a declaration of war?” Rusk responded, “It might be a direct challenge to Moscow and Peking in a way we have never challenged them before. There would be very severe international effects.”
At this point in the meeting, Clark Clifford interjected with a series of troubling questions: “There is a very strong contradiction in what we are saying and doing. On one hand, we are saying that we have known of this build up. We now know the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong launched this type of effort in the cities. We have publicly told the American people that the communist offensive was (a) not a victory, (b) produced no uprising among the Vietnamese in support of the enemy, and (c) cost the enemy between 20,000 and 25,000 of his combat troops. Now our reaction to all of that is to say that the situation is more dangerous today than it was before all of this. We are saying that we need more troops, that we need more ammunition and that we need to call up the reserves. I think we should give some very serious thought to how we explain saying on one hand the enemy did not take a victory and yet we are in need of many more troops and possibly an emergency call up.”
The president was shaken by Clifford’s remarks and offered the following observation, “The only explanation I can see is that the enemy has changed its tactics. They are putting all of their stack in now. We have to be prepared for all that we might face. Our front structure is based on estimates of their front structure. Our intelligence shows that they have changed and added about 15,000 men. In response to that, we must do likewise. That is the only explanation I see.”
The meeting ended with Secretary Rusk pointing out another contradiction in U.S. strategy. “In the past, we have said the problem really was finding the enemy. Now the enemy has come to us. I am sure many will ask why aren’t we doing better under these circumstances, now that we know where they are.”
Johnson’s own frustrations were evident during his next meeting with the Joint Chiefs. In this instance LBJ appears close to the caricature of an embattled and unyielding president:
THE PRESIDENT: All last week I asked two questions. The first was “Did Westmoreland have what he needed?” (You answered yes.) The second question was, “Can Westmoreland take care of the situation with what he has there now?” The answer was yes. Tell me what has happened to change the situation between then and now?
GENERAL WHEELER: I have a chart which was completed today based on a very complete intelligence analysis. It relates to all of South Vietnam, Laos and the area around the DMZ. It shows the following: Since December the North Vietnamese infantry has increased from 78 battalions to 105 battalions. Estimating there are 600 men per battalion that is approximately 15,000 men. This represents a substantial change in the combat ratios of U.S. troops to enemy troops. This ratio was 1.7 to 1 in December. It is 1.4 to 1 today. In the DMZ and I Corps area, there is a 1 to 1 ratio. There are 79 enemy battalions in the 1st Corps area (60 North Vietnamese and 19 Viet Cong). In the same area there are 82 Free World battalions (42 U.S.; 4 Free World; and 36 ARVN). This is about 1 to 1.
THE PRESIDENT: What you are saying is this. Since last week we have information we did not know about earlier. This is the addition of 15,000 North Vietnamese in the northern part of the country. Because of that, do we need 15 U.S. battalions?
GENERAL WHEELER: General Westmoreland told me what he was going to put in tonight’s telegram. This is the first time he has addressed the matter of additional troops. . . . The last report was that there was approximately 15,000 enemy near and around Khesanh. As of today, our estimates range between 16,000 and 25,000. Their infantry has been built up.
During a February 10 meeting of foreign policy advisors, Secretary Rusk was still puzzled about enemy strength. “I can’t find out where they say those 15,000 extra enemy troops came from. They say that these battalions came in between December and January,” Rusk noted to the group. The president responded, “The chiefs see a basic change in the strategy of the war. They say the enemy has escalated from guerrilla tactics to more conventional warfare.” Clark Clifford added another perspective, “All we have heard is about the preparation the North Vietnamese have made for the attack at Khesanh. I have a feeling that the North Vietnamese are going to do something different. I believe our people were surprised by the 24 attacks on the cities last week. God knows the South Vietnamese were surprised with half of their men on holiday. There may be a feint and a surprise coming up for us.”
Order of Battle, Again
Westmoreland cabled Wheeler and Sharp concerning the high number of enemy casualties during Tet. The high figures had caused a great deal of consternation for MACV. How, for example, could the enemy have absorbed such a high number in light of their manpower shortages? “The enemy committed virtually every VC unit in the country regardless of combat effectiveness and regardless of normal area of operations,” Westmoreland answered. “They were committed with do-or-die orders, forbidden to retreat, and with no withdrawal or rallying plans. The enemy attacks might be described as a country-wide series of ‘Loc Ninhs.’ The very high casualties are not strange in this light. We cannot, of course, provide a very precise breakdown of casualties by type of enemy force.” Westmoreland then tried to deflect any insinuation that irregulars might have been involved. “I do not doubt that some of the enemy’s casualties were guerrillas, porters, and such, but the percentage will probably be small. Thus, the enemy obviously banked heavily on surprise in its TET offensive. This may account for minimal participation by guerrillas.”
In a chilling analysis of the enemy manpower situation, Major General W.E. DePuy wrote to Wheeler: “It seems that [the enemy] is pushing all his chips into the middle of the table. Ours are there also. It is not credible to think in terms of a peak of effort followed by subsidence and a return to the status quo ante. Vietnam will never be the same again.”
On February u, 1968, Rostow forwarded the most recent Order of Battle estimates to President Johnson. MACV’s figures for the December-January period reflected “no significant change” in the confirmed strength of main-force and local-force combat units. Rostow explained to LBJ that changes had occurred in the listing of non-combat elements such as combat support and administrative support which involved “a bookkeeping character which do not really reflect changes in the enemy’s combat potential.”
Once again, MACV’s statistics proved the United States was winning the war. At this time Sam Adams wrote George Carver requesting a transfer from the department of Southeast Asia-Vietnamese Affairs (SAVA). “I do not feel that SAVA has been sufficiently diligent in bringing to the attention of the intelligence community the numerical and organizational strength of our adversaries in Vietnam. ... I feel we (the CIA in general and SAVA in particular) have basically misinformed policy-makers of the strength of the enemy. The pressures on the CIA and on SAVA, I realize, have been enormous, Many Qf the pressures—but not all—have originated from MACV, whose Order of Battle is a monument of deceit. The Agency’s and the office’s failing concerning Viet Cong manpower, I feel, has been its acquiescence to MACV half-truths, distortions, and sometimes outright falsehoods. We have occasionally protested, but neither long enough, nor loud enough.”7
Carver shared Adams’s viewpoint, and he now recommended reopening the OB debate in order to realistically reassess the enemy’s over-all capabilities. Excluding main and local force, administrative service, and guerillas from the numerical military order of battle had been an error. CIA analysts strongly suspected that many of the Communist forces at Tet were drawn from secret self-defense components, perhaps the assault youth, and other elements written out of the Order of Battle because they were thought to have no military significance by MACV.
A CIA Directorate of Intelligence memorandum of February 21, which analyzed the Communist units participating in attacks during the Tet offensive, concluded that if MACV’s latest estimates were correct, the enemy would have committed over 50 percent of their regular force to battle. “If the reported losses of 32,500 killed in action and 5,500 detained applied solely to the VC/NVA regular forces, the commands would have lost more than 65% of the forces committed to the Tet offensive. This would have been a devastating blow. However, there are a number of pieces of evidence which suggest that such an interpretation would overstate the Communist manpower drain.” According to the CIA, the VC/NVA forces participating at Tet were augmented by large numbers of guerrillas operating in independent units or integrated into local-force units. Moreover, prior to Tet, the VC had actively recruited additional laborers and civilians who almost certainly constituted the higher proportion of casualties during the offensive.
Wheeler’s Ploy for More Troops and Mobilization
In the wake of Tet, Wheeler had twice asked Westmoreland if he needed more troops. On February 12, 1968, Westmoreland cabled Sharp and Wheeler with his assessment of the military situation and force requirements in Vietnam. Westmoreland emphasized that the enemy “had launched a major campaign signaling a change of strategy of protracted war to one of quick military/political victory during the American election year.” Yet the enemy had failed to secure the border areas or to initiate a public uprising.
Westmoreland now argued that since the enemy has changed his strategy, “We are now in a new ball game where we face a determined, highly disciplined enemy, fully mobilized to achieve a quick victory. He is in the process of throwing in all his ‘military chips to go for broke.’ We cannot permit this. ... I have approximately 500,000 US troops and 60,981 free world military assistance troops. Further contributions from the Thais and Koreans are months away. I have been promised 525,000 troops, which according to present programs will not materialize until 1969.1 need these 525,000 troops now. It should be noted that this ceiling assumed the substantial replacement of military by civilians, which now appears impractical. I need reinforcements in terms of combat elements. . . . Time is of the essence. ... I must stress equally that we face a situation of great opportunity as well as heightened risk. However, time is of the essence here, too. I do not see how the enemy can long sustain the heavy losses which his new strategy is enabling us to inflict on him. Therefore, adequate reinforcements should permit me not only to contain his I Corps offensive but also to capitalize on his losses by seizing the initiative in other areas. Exploiting this opportunity could materially shorten the war.”
In addition to the previously authorized 525,000, Westmoreland requested an additional six battalions (10,500) for resuming offensive operations against a weakened enemy. Wheeler wrote to President Johnson that Westmoreland “does not know how sacrosanct that (525,000) figure is. ... He does not anticipate ‘defeat,’ but he desperately needs the troop elements requested in order to capitalize on opportunities available to him.... If requested troops are not made available, he would have to undertake an unacceptably risky course of drawing additional forces from elsewhere in South Vietnam.”
As Chairman of the JCS, Wheeler was required to take a broad look at the war’s impact on world-wide U.S. military capabilities. For nearly three years Wheeler had pushed unsuccessfully for a mobilization of the strategic Reserve so that the United States could meet these commitments. By forcing Westmoreland to make his troop request Wheeler knew a priori that acceptance would be harmful to U.S. deployments throughout the world. Wheeler hoped that the rejection would wake LBJ up to the necessity for mobilization.
The Joint Chiefs rejected Westmoreland’s request for the additional 10,500 on grounds that United States military manpower requirements were at its limit; any further authorizations without a mobilization of Reserves might erase even minimal levels of readiness for other military contingencies. Wheeler had hoped to use the Tet crisis as a justification for reconstituting the strategic reserve. The 10,500 was a minor issued compared to mobilization. Having encouraged Westmoreland to make the request, Wheeler then rejected it on grounds that U.S. forces were already pushed to their limits. Johnson would now be forced into accepting a Reserve call-up. Wheeler’s plan backfired; the Commander in Chief rejected the JCS recommendation for mobilizing the Reserves and directed the deployment of the 10,500 troops to South Vietnam.
President Johnson was very worried about the political costs of mobilizing the Reserves. Would the new units be used as reinforcements in Vietnam; for contingencies outside Vietnam; or to reassure NATO allies that the United States would meet its military commitments? Johnson worried about the size of the call-up and whether it could be diminished by reducing overseas garrisons in Europe or Korea? What were the budgetary implications of these actions? Before making any decisions, the president ordered Wheeler to Vietnam for an on-the-spot report of Westmoreland’s manpower needs, but the general’s visit was delayed one week because the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was holding hearings on the 1964 Tonkin Gulf incident, and Wheeler was needed in Washington.
President Johnson’s political standing was now plummeting. A Gallup poll conducted in early February showed that only 41 percent of the nation’s adults approved of the president’s handling of his job. This represented a seven point decline from the January survey and the first such decline in the three months since November’s big sell.
Explaining the Unacceptable
Rostow tried to nudge Johnson towards a positive decision to use the Reserves. The enemy had shaken U.S. and world opinion with its offensive and the government of Vietnam was tottering on the brink of insolvency. “Only you can make the political assessment of what it would cost to call up the reserves,” Rostow advised the president, “but that would be the most impressive demonstration to Hanoi and its friends.” Rostow believed that the issue needed to be handled carefully, particularly with respect to explaining mobilization in terms of past statements of progress. “We are sending men to assure Westy the reserves he needs; we are calling up reserves to make sure no one gets the idea that we can’t handle our other world commitments.”
Doubts about military strategy were emerging from all quarters. In a message communicated directly to the president, former president Eisenhower expressed personal support for a Reserve call-up. The fact that Westmoreland was only asking for an additional 10,500 suggested to Eisenhower that MACV did not have enough troops to fight the kind of campaign necessary to win the war and U.S. forces were so scattered and committed that “we cannot hit the enemy when he concentrates, for example, around Khe Sanh.” Eisenhower wanted to know, “Has Westmoreland really been given the forces he is asking for; if he has asked for 525,000 men why didn’t we send them sooner, and are we going to have enough in the area to provide a ‘corps of maneuver? He said that moving a relatively small force of this size sounds as though we have been on a shoestring, suggests weakness on our part to the enemy, and gives the critics of what we are doing in Vietnam a target.”
Ambassador Taylor also possessed grave doubts on the military situation in South Vietnam, and he endorsed the Joint Chiefs’ proposal to mobilize the Reserves on grounds that the possibilities of an unpleasant surprise in Korea or elsewhere in the Far East were sufficiently acute “that it is an act of prudence to move additional ground forces to the area as rapidly as possible.” Taylor believed a call-up of Reserves was justified by the military requirement and that, in addition, it would have some political-psychological value in demonstrating to the world, including Hanoi, that the United States meant business. “It would also serve as a reminder to our people at home that, while we are not technically at war, we are in a situation of similar emergency which places on our citizens duties and responsibilities analogous to those in a state of declared war.”
General Westmoreland’s decision to hold Khe Sanh also came under careful scrutiny. The occupation of Khe Sanh had been premised on establishing a forward operating base against infiltration routes in eastern Laos. But, there had been little effect on infiltration from Laos. Moreover, General Westmoreland did not argue strongly for the defense of Khe Sanh because of its present value in relation to impeding infiltration routes or in the defense of major areas of the northern provinces. Instead, his cables stressed the difficulty of getting out of Khe Sanh and the adverse psychological effects of a withdrawal upon South Vietnam and upon the American people. What was the military importance of maintaining Khe Sanh? Why not withdraw and redeploy the troops? Maxwell Taylor wrote LBJ, “Whatever the past value of the position, it is a positive liability now. We are allowing the enemy to arrange at his leisure a set-piece attack on ground and in weather favorable to him and under conditions which will allow us little opportunity to punish him except by our air power.”
Taylor urged LBJ to have the Joint Chiefs instruct Westmoreland to pull out. Rostow then weighed in with the opinion “that Khe Sanh probably can be held but that it will be at a heavy price in terms of casualties and in terms of other ground troops necessary to support and reinforce it. I have real doubt that we can afford such a defense in view of the limited reserves which General Westmoreland is likely to have in the time frame during which these events may take place.”
It was evident that Westmoreland needed direction from Washington, and Rostow explained to LBJ, “I would feel greatly relieved if the Joint Chiefs of Staff would see fit to send General Westmoreland guidance which would provide Westmoreland with a way out of Khe Sanh.” For example, the chiefs might suggest that “it is less clear that its present value now justifies the cost of an all-out defense.” Perhaps Westmoreland could be persuaded to reassess the feasibility or desirability of withdrawing from Khe Sanh.
The president decided to stand by his field commander’s judgment. Moreover, the president instructed Clark Clifford to draft a statement of unequivocal support to General Westmoreland—but support which left Westmoreland a way out of a possible no-win situation.
The President wants General Westmoreland to know that he has freedom of action to conduct his military operations as he thinks wise from a military point of view without being inhibited by political or psychological factors originating in the United States. To the extent that such factors in South Vietnam itself are an important part of the struggle, General Westmoreland should take those into account in close consultation with Ambassador Bunker and President Thieu.
Specifically with regard to Khe Sanh, the President does not wish to inhibit General Westmoreland’s judgment as to when, where and under what circumstances he wishes to fight his battles. When the President became convinced that General Westmoreland intended to defend Khe Sanh, the President threw himself into the task of insuring that General Westmoreland had the means to do so successfully. He further sought the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff both as to the desirability and capability of defending Khe Sanh. This interest on the part of the President should not be interpreted, however, as a directive from the Commander in Chief to defend Khe Sanh under all circumstances if, in General Westmoreland’s judgment, it is better to have his battle somewhere else. The purpose of this message is not to export to General Westmoreland the responsibility for events which are inherent in the responsibilities of the Commander in Chief. The President just wants General Westmoreland to know the General has his fullest confidence and does not want his hands tied by the build up of irrelevant factors on the home front in a way that would cause General Westmoreland to make military judgments which are contrary to his best thinking. If General Westmoreland wishes to defend Khe Sanh he will be supported; if he wishes to avoid a major engagement in a fixed position which does not utilize the peculiar mobility of U.S. forces, he will also be supported.
With the Senate Foreign Relations inquiry on Tonkin done, Wheeler flew from Washington to Vietnam on February 23. In anticipation of the visit, Maxwell Taylor wrote the president, “Reflecting on the possible objectives of General Wheeler’s visit, I would hope that he would obtain answers to some of the fundamental questions which are troubling us, derived from detailed private discussions with General Westmoreland and his staff.” Taylor wanted Westmoreland to answer questions on his operational plans, force requirements, and force availabilities. In particular, “What enemy units have been identified in the attacks on the cities? What uncommitted units arc available for a second cycle? What grounds are there for the allegation of an ‘intelligence failure’ at the time of the first wave of attacks on the cities? How does General Westmoreland feel about the functioning of his own and the Vietnamese intelligence services in connection with this situation? What has been the nature of our psychological warfare activities directed at North Vietnam and the VC since January 30? These are all hard questions for which there are probably no final answers at this time but whatever [Wheeler] can bring back will be most helpful.”
On February 24, Rostow wrote LBJ that the enemy was preparing to make a total effort, “with all their capital soon. They will then try to lock us into a negotiation at their peak position before we can counter-attack.” Rostow and Taylor both agreed “with Napoleon that Providence is on the other side with the last reserves. Therefore, right now we should be moving out to Westy all the ready forces we have and calling up reserves for: A Vietnam counter-attack; Korean contingency; General purposes, for our world posture.” Rostow believed, “We face the decisive battle of the war. They will try to dissipate Westy’s reserves by simultaneous attacks at a number of places and take Khe Sanh if possible. I am uncertain about timing; but they are so obsessed with memories of 1954 I suspect they will hit soon, get a maximum position, and then force a negotiation, perhaps via the San Antonio formula before the weather opens up for us in I Corps and at Hanoi-Haiphong. The Geneva Conference of 1954 opened on April 26. Dien Bien Phu fell on May 7/8.”
While in Vietnam General Wheeler concluded that the last three years had adversely impacted the U.S. worldwide military posture. Something had to be done about the attrition of U.S. forces and the lack of progress in the military area. Wheeler cabled LBJ at his ranch with the tentative conclusions from his trip to Vietnam. The cable must have ruined Johnson’s day. Wheeler wrote that, had Westmoreland not re-deployed some of his troops from border areas to urban centers in mid-January, severe setbacks would have occurred. “I will have on my return examples of how narrow the margin was between victory and defeat in certain key areas,” Wheeler reported. “The enemy has suffered very substantially, but he still has sizeable uncommitted reserves. He displays a tenacity which we have not seen before in this war.”
Wheeler also believed that “Westy’s forces are stretched too thin. ... I believe that we must reinforce him promptly and substantially.” Wheeler’s conclusion left Johnson on uncertain ground: “In summary, the military situation continues to be fluid; the enemy is determined and tenacious; troop morale, both US and ARVN, is good; Westy’s forces are stretched thin in view of the enemy threat and the courses of action open to the enemy. I do not have any apprehension that we will be run out of the country by military action, but I do believe that to achieve victory we must expand our effort substantially and promptly.”
In his memoirs, Westmoreland recalled his meeting with General Wheeler:
As Bus Wheeler and I conferred, we did so in the expectation that there was to be a reappraisal of American policy on conducting the war, presumably a new and broadened strategy. A change in strategy almost inevitably would involve a sizable call-up of National Guard and Reserves. In view of Secretary McNamara’s coming replacement by a presumably hawkish Clark Clifford, that seemed a plausible possibility. The chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Congressman Mendel Rivers, had publicly advocated a call-up.
Although I had earlier opposed calling the Reserves in the belief that the war would last long beyond the usual one-year tour for reservists and that extended service would produce cries to bring the troops home, the situation had changed. I was in much the same position as any battlefield commander at whatever level who must choose the optimum time to influence the battle by committing his reserve force; the enemy’s losses in the Tet offensive had at last presented the right opportunity. I was convinced that with additional strength and removal of the old restrictive policy, we could deal telling blows—physically and psychologically—well within the time frame of the reservists’ one-year tour. The time had come to prepare and commit the Reserve.8
On February 27, 1968 General Wheeler sent LBJ his report, “Military Solution and Requirements in SVN.” The report was based on three days of conferences with Westmoreland and the senior American commander in each of the 4 Corps areas. (Clifford described Johnson to have been “as worried as I have ever seen him,” after he had read Wheeler’s report.) As Major Andrew Krepinevich later observed in his book The Army and Vietnam, “Wheeler’s report reflected the bankruptcy of the Army’s strategy. Although in the Tet Offensive the Army had destroyed enemy forces in far greater numbers than in any other period in the war, it had had a negligible impact on the United States’ prospects for victory.” Hanoi had demonstrated its ability to accept extraordinary losses, without reaching its breaking point. Instead, the enemy had both the capability and the will to continue the struggle indefinitely.”9
Wheeler now asked for more troops. Specifically, MACV needed a total of 206,000 additional troops to regain the strategic initiative. The troops would be allocated in three installments: 108,000 by May 1; 42,000 by September 1; and 55,000 by December 31, 1968. According to Wheeler, “The enemy has undoubtedly been hurt, but he seems determined to pursue his offensive—apparently he has the capability to do so. ... It is the consensus of responsible commanders that 1968 will be the pivotal year. The war may go on beyond 1968 but it is unlikely that the situation will return to the pre-TET condition. The forces committed and the tactics involved are such that the advantage will probably swing one way or the other, during the current year. ... In many areas the pacification program has been brought to a halt. The VC are prowling the countryside, and it is now a question of which side moves fastest to gain control. The outcome is not at all clear. I visualize much heavy fighting ahead.” Casualties would be high. Equipment losses would continue at a high level. ARVN would prove to be shaky under sustained pressure. “If the enemy synchronizes his expected major attacks with increased pressure throughout the country, General Westmoreland’s margin will be paper thin. He does not have a theatre reserve. We can expect some cliff-hangers, and with bad luck on weather or some local RVNAF [Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces] failures he may suffer some reverses. For these reasons he is asking for additional forces as soon as possible during this calendar year.”
While LBJ took a respite on his ranch, his advisors met on February 27 at the White House to discuss Westmoreland’s still-secret request for the 206,000. Clark Clifford suggested that, instead of proceeding incrementally, they should announce that the United States intends to put in 500,000 to one million men. (The following excerpt from the meeting is from Harry McPherson’s notes.)
Secretary McNamara responded, “That has virtue of clarity. Obviously we would have decided to put in enough men to accomplish the job. That and status quo both have the virtue of clarity. I do not understand what the strategy is to putting in 205,000 men. It is neither enough to do the job, nor an indication that our role must change.”
The discussion then focused on what really had happened at Tet:
BUNDY: We must also prepare for the worst. SVN is very weak. Our position may be truly untenable. Contingency planning should proceed toward possibility that we will withdraw with best possible face and defend rest of Asia. We can say truthfully that Asia is stronger because of what we have done in past few years.
Katzenbach took call from Habib in Hawaii. Reports Habib is “less optimistic” about political situation in Saigon than he was when he went out. Reports that there is various disagreement in American circles in Saigon over 205,000 request. Bunker has doubts about this.
RUSK: If we have to call up reserves, we should take some of our troops out of Europe. Europeans will have to put some more in for their defense.
MCNAMARA: Agree, if we call 400,000.
State of Military Situation:
Rusk, Rostow think enemy took beating in TET offensive. Rostow says captured documents show enemy was disappointed, may be unable to mount heavy coordinated attack on cities. Rusk reminds that enemy took 40,000 casualties. No US units out of operation. Rostow says if we can re-enforce Westy now, he should be able to handle situation until good weather comes to I Corps and NVN.
MCNAMARA: What then? Let’s not delude ourselves into thinking he cannot maintain pressure after good weather comes.
(Rostow apparently had air attacks in mind. McN: We are dropping ordnance at a higher rate than in last year of WWII in Europe. It has not stopped him.)
BUNDY: SVN forces uncertain, but almost certainly not as strong as were before.
CLIFFORD: Look at situation from point of view of American public and Vietnamese. Despite optimistic reports, our people (and world opinion) believe we have suffered a major setback. Problem is, how do we gain support for major program, defense and economic, if we have told people things are going well? How do we avoid creating feeling that we are pounding troops down rathole? What is our purpose? What is achievable? Before any decision is made, we must re-evaluate our entire posture in SVN. Unfortunately, Pres. has been at ranch with hawks.
MCNAMARA: Agreed. Decision must not be hasty. Will take a week at least to work out defense and economic measures, if we go big. Wheeler, Habib will meet with Secretaries Wednesday morning at breakfast with President. Decision should certainly not be announced that night.
GENERAL IMPRESSION: Prevailing uncertainty. Radically different proposals were offered and debated, more rejected out of hand. We are at a point of crisis. McNamara expressed grave doubts over military, economic, political, diplomatic and moral consequences of a larger force buildup in SVN. Q is whether these profound doubts will be presented to President.
The doubts would be presented to the president but in a circuitous not linear fashion. Back from his ranch, President Johnson warned Cabinet members during a meeting on February 28, 1968, “The big problem is the impression we make with the public. ... We have to be careful about statements like Westmoreland’s when he came back and said that he saw ‘light at the end of the tunnel.’ Now we have the shock of this Tet Offensive. Ho Chi Minh never got elected to anything. ... He is like Hitler in many ways. ... But we, the President and the Cabinet, are called murderers and they never say anything about Mr. Ho. The signs are all over here. They all say ‘Stop the War,’ but you never see any of them over there. Then he launches the Tet attack, breaks the truce and escalates by firing on 44 cities, all at the time that we are offering bombing pause. It is like the country lawyer who made the greatest speech of his life but they electrocuted the client. We are like that now.”
At the end of February, in his first visit to Dallas since President Kennedy’s assassination, Johnson announced that the war had reached a critical turning point. “I do not believe we will ever buckle,” he stated. Flying from his ranch near Austin to attend a convention of the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, the president spoke about the war: “There will be blood, sweat and tears shed. The weak will drop from the lines, their feet sore and their voices loud. Persevere in Vietnam we will and we must. There, too, today, we stand at a turning point.”
But Johnson had already lost his most critical support: middle America. CBS news anchor Walter Cronkite had told a national television audience on February 27 that the war was stalemated. “We have been too often disappointed by the optimism of the American leaders, both in Vietnam and Washington, to have faith any longer in the silver linings they find in the darkest clouds. ... For it seems now more certain than ever that the bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a stalemate. To say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusion.”
A television anchorman who closely mirrored public opinion had said the war was unwinnable. After watching the broadcast Johnson concluded, “Cronkite was it.”10 The weeks ahead would lead the president’s inner circle of advisors and then Lyndon Johnson to the same conclusions as Cronkite’s. The initial impetus would be pressure to meet General Westmoreland’s troop request. Should the nation’s Reserves be mobilized? The president appointed his new secretary of defense, Clark Clifford, to head a task force to evaluate General Westmoreland’s request. The president’s initial instructions to Clifford were “give me the lesser of evils.”