VIII
We have a story in Texas about Ford automobiles carrying a slogan on the trunk of each car that said, “Made in Texas by Texans for Texans.” My motto now is, “Peace in South Vietnam for South Vietnam and by South Vietnamese.”
President Lyndon Johnson’s private remarks to the Pope, December 22, 1967. The Vatican
The events of mid-November help cast Johnson’s political strategies in their proper light. After McNamara’s November 1 memorandum, and the responses from his advisors following it, it was evident to Johnson that Secretary McNamara could no longer adequately represent the president’s policy and that key changes needed to be made in the composition of the principals. Heeding the counsel of Bundy, Fortas, and Clifford, the president took control of the campaign to dramatize progress to the American public but in ways that grossly exaggerated future military prospects. This campaign to accentuate the positive became a massive administration effort to exaggerate U.S. prospects for a favorable outcome in the war. This campaign was more than just self-deception by the principal players involved in policy making; it was an active effort by the government toconvince the American Congress and the American people that progress was being made in the war in Vietnam beyond what actually was the case.
Richard Moose, who worked as Walt Rostow’s assistant in the west wing from late 1966 until March 1968, later confessed that he “resigned quietly, but in frustration and dismay.” He came to realize that there were many games going on with numbers during the war—one set was presented to the public via the press and “the second set of numbers were what some of us worried about.”1
Westmoreland, Bunker, and Wheeler returned to Washington in November to help squash any public pessimism concerning progress in Vietnam. At a November 13 press conference, Ambassador Bunker told newsmen that he had just told the president, “In my view we are making steady progress in Vietnam, not only militarily, but in other ways as well: In the evolution of the constitutional process, in the pacification program, which is, in my view, equally as important as the military situation.” Bunker projected that, “There is every prospect, too, that the progress will accelerate.”
For the next two weeks virtually every official statement bearing on the war was framed optimistically in a concerted effort to stabilize public support for U.S. policy in Vietnam. During a November 17 press conference, President Johnson was asked to assess U.S. progress and prospects in Vietnam. He used the opportunity to take direct aim at the administration’s number one target: “Our American people, when we get in a contest of any kind—whether it is in a war, an election, a football game, or whatever it is—want it decided and decided quickly; get in or get out. They like that curve to rise like this (indicating a sharp rise) and they like the opposition to go down like this (indicating a sharply declining line). That is not the kind of war we are fighting in Vietnam. . . . We don’t march out and have a big battle each day in a guerrilla war. It is a new kind of war for us. So it doesn’t move that fast .... We are making progress. We are pleased with the results that we are getting. We are inflicting greater losses than we are taking.” Rostow wrote the president that the press conference “made big strides” in its “projection of confidence, moderate progress, and a will to sustain the efforts.”
In an address to the National Press Club, General Westmoreland continued to emphasize that VC strength was “declining at a steady rate.” The general noted that the war had entered a new phase “when the end begins to come into view.” Westmoreland’s remarks received wide circulation. “In the past two and one-half years I have seen the progressive commitment of United States troops in support of the Vietnamese. I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is certainly losing. There are indications that the Vietcong and even Hanoi know this. ... It is significant that the enemy has not won a major battle in more than a year.”
On November 19, Westmoreland and Bunker appeared jointly on “Meet the Press.” Ambassador Bunker again emphasized, “We are making steady not spectacular, progress. ... We are at the point now not only of being able to continue, but to accelerate the rate of progress.” Westmoreland explained that the United States was “winning a war of attrition now,” basing his claim on MACV’s new Order of Battle. Westmoreland stated that it was “conceivable that within 2 years or less the enemy will be so weakened that the Vietnamese will be able to cope with a greater share of the war burden. We will be able to phase down the level of our military effort, withdraw some troops ...”
General Westmoreland’s public comments were questioned during a meeting of the Joint Chiefs the next day. General Westmoreland first reviewed the impact of U.S. military strategy on enemy activity in the South and emphasized that the guerrilla forces had undergone serious attrition. Enemy recruits were hard to come by. “We estimate that a year ago he recruited 7,000 a month and that he is now down to 3,500.” Future prospects looked even better. “The present trends should continue at an accelerated rate, providing we keep up the pressure, to include the bombing of the north. I might say parenthetically that I know of no better way to prolong the war than to stop the bombing of the north. In approximately two years or less the Vietnamese Armed Forces should be ready to take over an increasing share of our effort.”
Westmoreland’s briefing of the JCS was interrupted when General James L. Holloway interjected, “By when?” General Westmoreland repeated, “In approximately two years or less the Vietnamese Armed Forces should be ready to take over an increasing share of the war thereby permitting us to start phasing down the level of our effort. ... In summary, we have the capacity to progressively weaken the enemy and strengthen GVN so that our commitment can be gradually reduced in time.”2 Following the meeting Rostow wrote the president that he was buoyed “by Westmoreland’s vision of a U.S. troop withdrawal within two years as the ARVN build up.”3
Amidst this optimism arrived a rather distressing assessment from Under-Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach who shared McNamara’s and Bundy’s reservations that the bombing program exacted too great a price at home and abroad with very little to show for it in South Vietnam. “Indeed, the very fact that those who have access to all relevant intelligence continually disagree about its value should be proof at least that its value is dubious. . . . Nobody really believes that the war can be won with bombs in the North.”
In retrospect, Katzenbach’s memo was one of the most cogent analyses made of a stalemated military situation. “Hanoi uses time the way Russians used terrain before Napoleon’s advance on Moscow, always retreating, losing every battle, but eventually creating conditions in which the enemy can no longer function. For Napoleon it was his long supply lines and the cold Russian winter; Hanoi hopes that for us it will be the mounting dissension, impatience, and frustration caused by a protracted war without fronts or other visible signs of success; a growing need to choose between guns and butter; and an increasing American repugnance of finding, for the first time, their country cast as ‘the heavy’ with massive fire power brought to bear against a ‘small Asian nation.’”
Katzenbach proposed two strategic options available to Johnson. The president could reduce restrictions on the military and go for a quick knock-out of enemy forces. But Katzenbach knew the president did not believe military power could destroy the enemy’s forces, eliminate its infrastructure, or destroy its will to persist. The alternative to an all-out military assault would be to pursue a strategy with the principal purpose of restoring the political center in the United States. Devising a strategy for strengthening the center at home meant making a precise statement of U.S. objectives in Vietnam; the very objectives for which Secretary McNamara had long maintained there was no consensus among the advisors. “Our objective should be to provide the military cover and non-military assistance needed to enable the GVN to grow in capacity and popular support to the point where it can survive and, over a period of years, deal with what will be a continuing and very serious communist problem.” Katzenbach pointed out that “We must make clear to the American people that our objective is defined in a way that can be attained without massive destruction of North Viet-Nam, without significant ground operations in any of the present sanctuary areas, and without any further increase in troop strength.”
Katzenbach imaginatively phrased an important problem facing the administration: “Can the tortoise of progress in Vietnam stay ahead of the hare of dissent at home?” The rate of U.S. disenchantment with the war was growing rapidly, and Katzenbach warned Johnson that “even a rapid acceleration of progress would not bring the light at the end of the tunnel.” The principal battle for the war was being waged with the minds of the American people, and escalation would bring rejection of the war.4
The administration’s game plan for swaying public opinion had only mixed results with the press. The New York Times of November 19 referred to a “new chorus of official optimism, apparently designed to refute the spreading wave of national pessimism over the prospects in Vietnam.” On November 24, Hedrick Smith, in his Times article “Accounts by Bunker and Westmoreland Stirring Unease” reported, “For the last 10 days or so, the American people have heard the most optimistic reports in years about the progress of the war in Vietnam from the ranking American officials in the field.” In the Washington Post, Don Oberdorfer, using the headline “Statistics on War Fail to Prove Real Progress,” concluded that “in no case is there a clear, direct or broadly-accepted relationship between the statistical progress and the end of the war. Government analysts concede that most of the progress curves could climb right off the charts and still leave half-a-million or more U.S. troops in Vietnam, bloody fighting continuing and no end to that in sight. In almost every chart and column of figures, the trend is favorable. This upward trend in the statistics is almost universally accepted. It is the sweeping conclusions being drawn from the figures that are in doubt.”
A November 26, 1967, Washington Post article by Ward Just reported that the high-level review of the war “ended up being a high-level campaign to convince the American people that the war was being won and that the United States had reached the point where, as General William C. Westmoreland put it, the end ‘comes into view.’”
Despite the misgivings in the press, the end of November brought excellent, if not dramatic, results in the presidential approval index. For the first time in months the polls in both Gallup and Harris indexes showed dramatic increases for Johnson’s handling of the war. The improvement was so marked that for the first time since July 1967 (and the summer riots) the president’s approval ratings were higher than disapproval. Johnson concluded that the hard sell had been successful. The American people had rallied behind their president who seemed visibly to be taking charge of the war.
Yet, the signs of strategic and political discontent were mounting. On November 28, former-president Eisenhower publicly called for a limited invasion of North Vietnam, and on November 30, Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota announced his intent to challenge President Johnson in several Democratic primaries.
Order of Battle, Again
On November 21 Rostow provided LBJ with a list of issues likely to confront the administration in the weeks ahead; included on the list was the problem of “How we present order of battle statistics.” The president was reminded that “MACV is completing retroactive estimate, including previous understatement of guerilla forces.” Rostow warned that “the danger is press will latch on to previous underestimate and revive credibility gap talk. My recommendation is that Gen. Westmoreland present new order of battle statistics in context of year-end review in Saigon by changing course of the war in 1967 as opposed to 1966—removing emphasis from statistics themselves.”
During a November 22 press briefing at the Pentagon, General Westmoreland could not escape questions on the new and old statistics. Westmoreland listed enemy strength at 242,000—about 55,000 below the 297,000 figure used in previous MACV estimates. When questioned about the drop Westmoreland explained, “Well, what I have on this strength is armed strength. The political infrastructure is not included. Now, if you include the political infrastructure, that figure is still a good one. I might say that this matter is under constant study. It’s been studied during the last several months actually in considerable depth and there may be some readjustment in this in due time, but there’s no inconsistency in the figures because I have talked about armed strength. I have excluded the political infrastructure.” Westmoreland emphasized that the new figures on enemy strength in all areas except regular forces “must not be considered increases or decreases from old figures. Since they are based on new data, they logically cannot be used in conjunction with old data for any firm comparisons of past and present enemy strengths.”5 A New York Times headline the next day quoted Westmoreland as being “Sure of Victory,” calling the battle at Dakto a “Great Defeat for Foe.”
On November 26, 1967, Westmoreland cabled his deputy commander, General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., with a distillation of what he had told the president, nationwide television programs, the National Press Club, and the on-the-record press conference in the Pentagon. “On each occasion, I presented in full or in part the following concept: We are grinding down the Communist enemy in South Vietnam, and there is evidence that manpower problems are emerging in North Vietnam. Our forces are growing stronger and becoming more proficient in the environment. The Vietnamese armed forces are getting stronger and becoming more effective on the battlefield. The Vietnamese armed forces are being provided with more modern equipment. These trends should continue, with the enemy becoming weaker and the GVN becoming stronger to the point where conceivably in two years or less the Vietnamese can shoulder a larger share of the war and thereby permit the US to begin phasing down the level of its commitment.” Westmoreland then explained that this concept was “compatible with the evolution of the war since our initial commitment and portrays to the American people ‘some light at the end of the tunnel.’” Of equal importance, “the concept straddles the presidential election of November 1968, implying that the election is not a bench mark from a military point of view.”6 Thus, if LBJ needed more time, he would not get it from the military.
McNamara Resigns
On November 29, 1967, after seven years as secretary of defense, Secretary McNamara announced his decision to accept the presidency of the World Bank. A Harris poll taken at the time of McNamara’s resignation revealed that 45 percent of the population gave the secretary a negative rating for his handling of the job compared to 42 percent positive rating. In contrast, General Westmoreland received a 68 percent positive to a 16 percent negative rating for his job as commanding general in Vietnam. Writing on the front page of the Washington Post, pollster Louis Harris reported that it “is clear from the results that the American people are not particularly concerned at this juncture over keeping a strong civilian authority in the Pentagon.” Harris reported his key results as: By 53 to 36 percent, the public felt that in wartime “civilian government leaders should let the military take over running the war.” By a decisive 73 to 10 percent, Americans believed that “when civilians tell the military what to do, too often politics rather than military action results.” By 65 to 10 percent, Americans felt “in Vietnam the military has been handicapped by civilians who won’t let them go all out.”
The secretary’s resignation reflected the end of his long personal battle to get the president to stabilize the military commitment. McNamara later recalled, “I didn’t believe we had reached a crossover point. I didn’t believe the strength would decline. I didn’t believe that the bombing would prevent North Vietnam from supplying the forces in South Vietnam with whatever strength North Vietnam wished to have there.”
McNamara also held in his possession a secret study which revealed why the bombing of North Vietnam had played such a negligible role in Hanoi’s ability to support operations in the South. The top-secret study conducted by the Jason division of the Washington-based think-tank, Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA),* charged that those who expected bombing to erode the determination of Hanoi and its people had clearly “overestimated the persuasive and disruptive effects of the bombing and, correspondingly, underestimated the tenacity and recuperative capabilities of the North Vietnamese.” Moreover, bombing had not achieved its anticipated goals because its advocates failed to appreciate the fact, “well-documented in the historical and social scientific literature, that a direct, frontal attack on society tends to strengthen the social fabric of the nation, to increase popular support of the existing government, to improve the determination of both the leadership and the populace to fight back, to induce a variety of protective measures that reduce the society’s vulnerability to future attack and to develop an increased capacity for quick repairs and restoration of essential functions.” In their examination of alternate campaigns and optimal attack strategies the ad hoc group was “unable to devise a bombing campaign in the North to reduce the flow of infiltrating personnel into SVN.’”7
Lyndon Johnson’s Private Doubts
President Johnson was now having personal doubts and contemplating not seeking reelection. During his Washington visit in November, General Westmoreland learned that Secretary McNamara would be leaving the Defense Department and would be replaced by Clark Clifford. Westmoreland spent an evening in the White House, and alone with the president, he soon realized that LBJ had already decided on the exit. “The President suddenly became intensely serious,” Westmoreland later wrote. “‘What would my men in Vietnam think,’ he asked, if he failed to run for re-election in 1968? Would they consider that their Commander in Chief had let them down? Although taken aback, I responded that if the troops knew why he made such a decision, I was certain they would understand. His health, he said, was ‘not good,’ and he was weary. Lady Bird and his two daughters wanted him to retire. They had discussed the possibility of four more years in the White House at length and were against it. Noting that the Constitution made no provision for an invalid president, he alluded to the illnesses of Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Eisenhower. Those were not the words of a man feeling his way, using his companion as a sounding board before making his decision, as some who would claim to have driven him from the White House would later profess. The President was tired; his wife was tired; he was concerned about his health. He had obviously made up his mind.”8
Around the World with LBJ
In December 1967 President Johnson’s personal friend and staunch ally, Australia’s prime minister Harold Holt, disappeared while swimming off the coast of Australia. The president decided to personally attend the memorial services which were scheduled for December 23. President Johnson travelled to Australia’s capital, Canberra, where he first held a series of meetings, the most important with South Vietnam President Nguyen Van Thieu, who used the memorial services to meet with Johnson on the question of the Government of South Vietnam’s negotiations with the National Liberation Front (NLF)—the political arm of the Viet Cong. President Johnson and Ambassador Bunker had been urging Thieu to open discussions with “representatives” of the NLF, but Thieu had publicly rejected the idea, stating he would only talk with “defectors” from the NLF. A December 21 front-page headline in the New York Times had stated “Thieu, Disputing Johnson, Rejectes Talks with Foe.” A Thieu-Johnson rift now threatened the credibility of the U.S. commitment and the two presidents met privately in Canberra to iron out their differences.
Following two hours of discussion, Johnson and Thieu issued a joint communique that endorsed a policy of national reconciliation and stating that the GVN would be willing to talk with anyone, but that it would not be useful to talk with individuals from an organization committed to the destruction of South Vietnam’s government. Johnson’s hands were apparently tied to Thieu’s decision not to negotiate with the NLF.
The president then flew to U.S. bases at Korat in Thailand and Cam Ranh Bay in South Vietnam. The visit to Cam Ranh Bay was the president’s second in fourteen months. Dressed in a tan gaberdine shirt and brown trousers and looking relaxed, the president promised his troops that he would remain on course because the enemy had “met their master in the field.” The president then declared, “We’re not going to yield. And we’re not going to shimmy.” R.W. Apple of the New York Times reported that “the President’s lavish embrace” of his military commanders “went far beyond a routine peptalk from a Commander-in-Chief on the war front.” In presenting General Westmoreland with the Distinguished Service Medal, the president gave credit for bringing policy “from the valleys and depths of despondence to the cliffs and heights where we know now that the enemy can never win.”9
Johnson’s surprise visit to Cam Ranh Bay had buoyed the troops and sent a clear message—the president was sticking with his military leaders. Just a day earlier Johnson had privately acknowledged to the Australian cabinet, “The enemy is building his forces in the south. We must try very hard to be ready. We may face dark days ahead.” In his book Diffusion of Power, Rostow wrote that the president felt that “Hanoi was under extreme pressure to achieve some tactical victory. Northern forces were being infiltrated into the South. He foresaw Kamikaze attacks in the months ahead. That is one reason he is pressing so hard for additional power.”10
The president then flew to Rome for a private Vatican meeting with Pope Paul VI. The meeting occurred on the day before Christmas—a better day could not have been manufactured. President Johnson even presented Pope Paul with a foot-high bust of LBJ. During their private meeting in the pope’s library, the president talked bluntly. “Hanoi has great problems but they believe the U.S. will tire and fail just like France did—and then they can win by default what they lost on the battlefield,” LBJ told the pope. “We are being extremely careful not to widen the war by bringing in China and Russia. Over half of our people want to do more. Twenty percent of our people want to pull out. Thirty percent follow the moderate course of the President—thus 80% of the U.S. either follows the President or wants to do more. Twenty percent make all the noise and mislead Hanoi into believing we will give up. So I have this problem of keeping the pressure on without widening a war. My right hand keeps the pressure steady and with my left hand we seek negotiations.”
LBJ confided to the pope that direct U.S.-Hanoi negotiations would probably not work. Johnson then revealed the cleavage between President Thieu and himself. “Hanoi is simply not going to the conference table because Hanoi believes they will win this war in Washington. It will take a long time to prove but I am convinced the best avenue available to us now is in the South—talks informally between the Thieu government and representatives of the NLF.” LBJ implored the pope to intervene with President Thieu on behalf of peace. The declassified transcripts make for fascinating reading:
PRESIDENT: We must begin. It would be very useful if the Pope through his sources in South Vietnam could persuade Thieu and others to talk to the NLF informally. Anything the Holy Father can do to encourage this will be very beneficial. This would be one effective way of disengaging the NLF from Hanoi—and South Vietnam from us. I am also very hopeful the Pope will send a representative to see our prisoners in North Vietnam and to see the prisoners being held in South Vietnam. Hanoi is ignoring and violating the Geneva convention prisoner rules. If the Pope can call on both sides to accord just and humane treatment to prisoners and ask for permission to visit both sides, we would be willing to open our doors immediately. What I would hope that the Pope would do is this: Through your Apostolic Delegate or other effective channels tell Thieu and the Senate President to talk to representatives of the NLF and to do it in their own way. If the Pope would do this, I strongly believe it would offer some chance of peace.
POPE: I think I can do something.
PRESIDENT: You can say that President Thieu is willing to have informal discussions, why not you?
POPE: Is it possible that the truce at Christmas could be extended by a day or two? Could you not show the world that on the day of peace January 1, you will also make this a day of truce?
PRESIDENT: My problem is this: My military leaders tell me that the North Vietnamese have trucks lined up bumper to bumper and as soon as the truce begins they start them moving and those supplies and those men kill our soldiers. On August 251 told Hanoi we would draw a circle around it of three hundred miles and if we stopped bombing there could talks begin? On September 10 at San Antonio I made my speech which publicized a portion of this. I held back until October 25—and during that time they kept coming and they kept killing. Archbishop Lucey went to South Vietnam as one of my observers during the election. He told me that every time we quieted down they increase their pressure. In the 37 day bombing pause, they built up a seven months supply.
POPE: Where do they get their men, their means, their matériel?
PRESIDENT: By terror they are recruiting in the South—and they are now down to 14-year-old boys. They are getting desperate and we are certain that we are hurting them very very much. They are using Kamikaze tactics for they desperately want a victory and they are unable to achieve one.
POPE: We shall pray for you and we shall pray for your efforts for peace.
PRESIDENT: I don’t want to press the point but I did want to know if I can assume that the Pope will try to bring the South Vietnamese to informal talks—and will immediately help out the prisoner problem.
(The pope nodded.)
PRESIDENT: Would you have any objection to receiving an aide memoir from me which would set forth my views? I want you to know that we will follow the same theme as we have before. I assure you of my loyalty and devotion to the ideals that the U.S. stands for.11
In the aide memoir to the pope, Johnson conveyed his deep sense of frustration concerning the search for peace in Vietnam. He could not stop the bombing because “in every case in the past, cessation of the bombing has been used by the other side to accelerate the movement of supplies and men to the South.” Johnson again alluded to a possible massive buildup by the NVN. “Your Holiness, I have just today come from Vietnam. My responsible commanders in the field tell me that the North Vietnamese are at this moment taking steps to exploit even the very short pause agreed to for Christmas, New Year’s end and Tet. Our experience and current intelligence tell me an increased price will be paid in the blood of my men.”
Following his private meeting with the pope, President Johnson returned to the United States in time to deliver a Christmas message from the White House. The 27,000-mile, 4-day journey had been the ultimate experience in presidential tourism. As the New York Times reported, “Those who would belittle or even condemn the haste, the extravagance or the corn of some of Mr. Johnson’s performance, had best begin therefore with the new signs last week that he remains one of the most formidable political showmen in American history.” He would need these skills for the events which lay ahead.
Ambassador Bunker’s final cable of 1967 reviewed the president’s recent activities. “Your visit to Cam Ranh on December 23rd was an encouragement to all of us; that you should have added many thousands of miles to your journey to come here and to speak generous words of appreciation and support has been an inspiration to all of us who are engaged in this great task on the soil of Viet Nam. And your working session with President Thieu and other free world leaders in Canberra served to reassure the Vietnamese of our commitment here.”
Johnson’s big sell throughout November and December had raised the stakes in the game of winning public support for the war by manipulating the press and the SNIE in order to present optimistic scenarios to the public in an election year. Following Tet, the administration blamed the press for not reporting the battle as a devastating defeat of the enemy, yet to most members of the media, Tet juxtaposed with the optimism of November showed up LBJ’s public relations campaign for what it was. Although the administration and the military were aware that North Vietnam was planning a major offensive, LBJ took a gamble by distorting U.S. military prospects in the war. He had everything to lose politically, and when Hanoi called his hand it would be Johnson who was holding only “one aces.”
*This was the second Jason study. In 1966 McNamara sought an independent assessment of Rolling Thunder from America’s most prominent scientists. Meeting throughout the summer of 1966 under the auspices of IDA, the Jason report charged that the bombing “had no measurable direct effect” on the enemy’s capability to sustain the war effort. A year later, the next Jason study was similarly critical and added to McNamara’s doubts on the war’s progress.