Appendix B
March 14, 1968
Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT: The Infeasibility of Military Victory in Vietnam
As a contribution to current deliberations and to your own ongoing review of the situation, this memorandum argues the case that the idea of military victory in Vietnam is a dangerous illusion, at any price that would be compatible with US interests, the interests of the people of South Vietnam, or the cause of world peace. Secretary Brown agrees that it should be forwarded for your consideration.
Military victory—that is, the destruction or ejection of NVN forces and the reduction of VC guerrilla forces to impotence or at least to a level that is manageable by ARVN alone—has been the implicit (though not always clearly recognized) goal of US policy at least since the decision to build up American manpower in 1965. It continues to be the unexamined assumption of General Westmoreland’s strategy, of his request for additional forces, of the JCS support for his strategy and his requests, and of all other proposals for intensifying or enlarging our war effort in Vietnam.
Moreover, military victory (as defined above) appears to be a necessary precondition for the realization of a US political objective which defines “free choice” for the people of SVN as a process necessarily excluding NLF/VC from participation in either elections or government. Whether or not this definition reflects the true US intent, it is clearly the position of the GVN and has not been rejected by the USG. As is known, even non-communist politicians are now being jailed by the GVN out of fear that they will open a dialogue with the NLF. These facts suggest that if military victory is not feasible, the US political objective must be redefined.
One’s assumption about the necessity or feasibility of military victory is therefore a critical fork in the road. Reaffirmation will lead in the direction of a larger and wider war effort aimed at destroying the NVN/VC forces. Refutation will lead to adoption of a far less ambitious strategy, aimed at protecting the people of South Vietnam, permitting a stabilization of the US resource commitment at tolerable levels, and followed by a prompt, utterly serious effort to achieve a compromise settlement of the war that reflects the enduring political and military realities in Vietnam. It is imperative, at this watershed in our Vietnam experience, to subject the assumption to the most searching re-examination. Our future ability to formulate rational policies for VN depends on this.
The history of our involvement in Vietnam, particularly since 1965, has been marked by repeated miscalculations as to the force and time required to “defeat the aggression,” pacify the countryside, and make the GVN and the ARVN viable without massive US support. Each fresh increment of American power has been justified as the last one needed to do the job. Responsible political and military officials have consistently underestimated NVN/VC strength and tenacity, have promoted uncritical notions of what US military power can accomplish in the political and geographical environment of SEA, and have indulged in persistently wishful thinking as regards the present capacity and real potential of the GVN and the ARVN. It is important that these misjudgments be kept in mind as we weigh the alternatives that now lie before us.
The following points contain some material that may already have come to your attention. The purpose here is to combine all of the relevant arguments and bring them to focus on the root question of whether military victory is feasible.
The Political Factors
1. The GVN is a narrowly based military clique. While it is systematically corrupt, this fact does not particularly distinguish it from other military governments in Asia ______________* What does distinguish the GVN are its inefficiency, lack of popular support, and inability to protect or govern large areas of SVN. These deficiencies are interrelated and mutually reinforcing; they are also, of course, gravely aggravated by the powerful challenge of the NVN/VC on both the political and military levels. For better or worse, it is Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi who have harnessed nationalism to their cause and who have demonstrated superior determination, organization, and fighting qualities. To survive without permanent massive US support, the GVN must win broader allegiance and extend its effective authority. Yet its will and ability to do either of these things have never been in greater doubt.
2. About 80% of the people of SVN (13.7 of 17.2 million) live in the principal cities, the province and district capitals, and the adjacent countryside. The effectiveness and survival of any political system in SVN requires that it exercise primary influence in these areas. Prior to the Tet offensive our public position was that 67% of the people were under GVN control; in fact, however, all evaluators recognized that the “C category” hamlets (comprising 31% of the rural population) were subject to considerable VC influence. At the end of 1967, therefore, the GVN actually had dominant influence over only about 30% of the population; pacification was on a tenuous and fragile footing, and heavily dependent on US/GVN military presence, even though the pacification effort had been greatly expanded during the year.
3. Although our information is still gragmentary, it appears that the recent NVN/VC offensive has achieved the takeover of a large part of the populated countryside. ARVN forces have pulled back to defensive positions around towns and cities, and many of the RD cadres have similarly withdrawn (according to CIA, at least half of the RD teams have left the countryside together with 23 of 51 ARVN battalions directly earmarked for pacification support. On the other hand, Robert Komer has given his personal estimate that 75% of the RD cadres are still in place). The status of RF and PF posts outside of cities and towns is mostly unknown, but there are scattered reports of units withdrawing or being overrun. It is probable that, in those areas where the NVA/VC have regained access to populations formerly under GVN control, they will quickly destroy the GVN structure by eliminating those individuals identified as agents and servants of the GVN.
4. Although again the information is inconclusive, reports indicate that ARVN and US forces in the towns and cities are now responding to mortar fire from nearby villages by the liberal use of artillery and air strikes. This response is causing wide-spread destruction and heavy civilian casualties—among people who were considered only a few weeks ago to be secure elements of the GVN constituency. If this evidence is confirmed, it will be another example of our conceptions of military necessity working to undermine our political objective.
5. The present mode and tempo of operations in SVN is already destroying cities, villages and crops, and is creating civilian casualties at an increasing rate. Recent statistics suggest that perhaps 5% of the people of SVN are now homeless refugees. While this is not of course deliberate, US and ARVN forces are contributing heavily to the destruction and dislocation, and the people of SVN are aware of this. We are progressively tearing the country apart in order to win “the hearts and minds” of its people. Unfortunately, the end and the means are mutually exclusive.
The Bombing Campaign
6. The bombing campaign against North Vietnam has now entered its fourth year. Since the beginning of the air strikes in 1965, the flow of men and material from NVN to SVN has definitely increased. The bombing has inflicted heavy damage on NVN’s economy and society as a whole ($370 million of measurable damage and the diversion of up to 400,000 people from agriculture to road repair, transport and air defenses). But Russia and China have provided economic and military aid substantially in excess of the damage, and the cost of the manpower diversion may be quite small, owing to the considerable slack in NVN’s underemployed agricultural labor force. In addition, the manpower situation is eased by the presence of an estimated 50,000 Chinese support troops. China is no doubt prepared to send more forces than NVN would find comfortable politically.
7. US bombing operations against the North did not notably hinder the recent NVN/VC attacks on the cities during the Tet offensive, nor have they prevented the current buildup of forces at Khe Sanh, Hue and other points in I Corps. The NVN regular army, the VC main forces, the VC local forces now have better equipment and more effective weapons than in 1965, and the Soviets could provide them with even more sophisticated weapons.
8. NVN has gone over to decentralized, dispersed and protected modes of producing and handling essential goods and safeguarding the people. It has made a durable adjustment to the bombing. On balance, NVN is a stronger military power today than before the bombing began.
9. The air war in the North (route packages V and VI), and over Hanoi and Haiphong in particular, seems increasingly a techno-electronic contest between the US and the Soviet Union with diminishing relevance to the struggle in the South.
10. It may be possible to reduce the present infiltration capability by concentrating a greater bombing effort south of the Red River, especially by augmenting the currently productive attack against trucks in Laos. New technology, new tactics, and particularly such systems as the AC-130 gunship show promise of producing measurable improvement. However, to cut off the required minimal supply flow (50–150 tons per day) to SVN, we would have to improve our present effectiveness by a factor of four or more. Such an improvement is possible in principle.
Relative Ground Force Strengths
11. NVN has about 1.2 million fit males in the prime military age groups (17–35) which only about 20% have thus far been inducted into the armed forces. This pool is enriched each year by about 120,000 physically fit males turning 17.
12. North Vietnam has present military forces of about 460,000. CIA has estimated that Hanoi intends to hold 225,000 to defend against invasion. Not more than 85,000 have been committed to SVN. NVA/VC pre-Tet strength in SVN was estimated to be about 145,000; but when guerrilla, administrative, infrastructure and special assaults squads are added, the total insurgency base in SVN is believed to approximate 450,000 men. This estimate does not consider heavy enemy losses since the end of January, but neither does it include additions or potential additions to the VC forces through recruitment and impressment immediately prior to Tet or in the ensuing weeks. The winter-spring offensive has given the VC access to a substantially larger proportion of both the urban and rural population.
13. If we should decide to meet General Westmoreland’s requests for additional manpower, in whole or in part, the probably NVN response would be to offset our advantage by adding proportionate forces from NVN. Based on the relative manpower ratios that have existed over the past three years (during which time the fighting has ebbed and flowed, but has remained inconclusive), it appears that NVN could neutralize a 206,000 US augmentation by adding less than 50,000 men (a ratio of about 1 to 4).
14. On the basis of the untapped manpower resources enumerated above, and in view of the newly gained access to a greater portion of the SVN population, it seems evident that NVN could go on making offsets of this kind for an indefinite period. Nor is there anything to suggest that Hanoi lacks the will. However, even if we assume that additional US measures (e.g., closing Haiphong) were to reduce the infiltration capability, NVN would retain the option of reverting to a lower scale of warfare, and could take additional casualty-limiting actions to preserve its political and military organization in SVN if that were necessary (there is however nothing in the present situation to indicate that Hanoi is worried about attrition).
15. Assuming we continue to pursue the present strategy of attrition, we would have to expect that US casualties would increase in roughly direct proportion to the higher level of effort. This could mean 1300–1400 KJA per month. Yet it would soon be evident that the increase in casualties had not altered the fundamental condition of stalemate in SVN.
16. There is accordingly no foreseeable military resolution of the conflict at either the present level of US forces (plus ARVN and other friendly forces) or with a full 206,000-man augmentation as requested by General Westmoreland. Nothing that we know of Hanoi’s determination, manpower reserves, and available weapons supply, and nothing in the past record, gives us any basis for a confident judgment that we could attrite the enemy, drive him from SVN, or destroy his will to fight as a result of fully meeting General Westmoreland’s new requests. What is called into question by these facts is the US strategy of attrition in SVN—the strategy of attempting to wear down the enemy by inflicting more casualties than he can cumulatively bear. Recognizing not only NVN’s available manpower resources, but also China’s endless millions in the background, the question arises whether a US strategy of attrition in SVN was ever in touch with reality.
Impact of the Westmoreland Requests
17. The further augmentation of US forces as proposed by General Westmoreland would entail very substantial costs in South Vietnam, in the United States, and elsewhere in the world.
18. In South Vietnam, the presence of more than 700,000 US forces would add to the already crushing weight of the American presence on that small country. Worst of all, it would encourage the GVN to believe that the US was prepared to go on fighting its war without making enforceable demands for either administrative efficiency or economic and social reform. It would further relieve pressure on ARVN to achieve a viable effectiveness. It would definitely weaken US leverage on the political situation.
19. A decision to provide 206,000 additional men in the next 12 months would also have a profound impact in the United States. It would require mobilizing 250,000 reserves, increasing draft calls, and facing up to substantially increased costs (the annual cost of the VN war would rise from about $25 billion to about $35 billion). Our balance of payments situation would be considerably worsened, and the run on remaining US gold reserves might strain the international monetary system to the breaking point. There would be need for a larger tax increase and possibly wage and price controls.
20. The need for public and Congressional support (both authority and money) of this further force buildup would almost certainly require political rhetoric designed to create an atmosphere of national crisis; yet, barring further dramatic reverses in SVN, the crisis would look synthetic to both war critics and impartial observers (in the sense that the case for larger forces had to be justified by the existence of a situation decisively different from the situation prevailing over the past three years). Extremists in Congress would probably demand, as the price of their support, elimination of all restrictions on bombing of the North, and some might advocate measures designed deliberately to provoke a US confrontation with China or the USSR. There would also be pressures to expand the war into Laos and Cambodia, which, if yielded to, would only serve to spread thinner the US forces in SVN.
21. At the present level the war is eroding the moral fibre of the nation, demoralizing its politics, and paralyzing its foreign policy. A further manpower commitment to SVN would intensify the domestic disaffection, which would be reflected in increased defiance of the draft and widespread unrest in the cities. Welfare programs on which our domestic tranquility might depend would be eliminated or deeply cut. It is possible that well-placed dissenters in Congress could paralyze the legislative process.
22. The Soviet and Chinese reactions would probably not be extreme, if our additional actions were confined to increasing ground forces and tactical air forces. But they would almost certainly step up their level of materiel support to NVN, as a means of helping Hanoi to offset our manpower increases. Soviet policy would also manifest a notable hardening toward US-USSR relations on a wide range of issues, including possibly the Nonproliferation Treaty. Moreover, if the Soviets believed that our world-wide posture had become seriously unbalanced by the heavy deployments to Vietnam, it is possible that they would test our will in Europe or at other points (e.g., new pressure on Berlin, or stimulation of the Syrians to aggravate the already uneasy Middle Eastern situation).
23. Our progressive diplomatic estrangement would continue. The Scandanavian countries, already visibly wavering, might adopt an open anti-US position. The Labor Government in the UK, which is paying an increasing domestic price for its support of US policy in Vietnam, might be less willing or able to go on paying it.
The Alternative of Intensified Bombing
24. As an independent alternative to ground force augmentation, we could greatly increase the bombing of North Vietnam. There is no doubt that an area bombing campaign, with emphasis on closing the ports of Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha, and on attacking over-the-beach deliveries, dispersed storage facilities, and the northeast and northwest rail lines leading into China could impose further serious strains on the already overstressed NVN social and economic structure. The hopeful assumption is that North Vietnam would then be forced to decide on a priority of imports—war-making goods vs. life-supporting goods—and would choose the latter.
25. Imports into North Vietnam during 1967 averaged about 4500 tons per day (400 tons of munitions, 500 tons of POL, 600 tons of other war supporting materiel, 1500 tons of manufactured goods and miscellany, and 1500 tons of food). The uninterdicted capacity for imports is about 15,000 tons per day; the US interdiction effort to-date is estimated to have reduced this to about 8,000 tons.
26. Should we undertake an expanded bombing effort, the Soviets, Chinese, and North Vietnamese could be expected to devote more effort to the movement of supplies by truck from China along the northeast and northwest routes, and to over-the-beach operations. In the face of such efforts and in the light of our Korean war experience, we could probably cut the NVN import capability in half—to 4,000 tons a day; and it is remotely possible that it would fall to 2,000 tons. But NVN could still import the required munitions and other war-supporting materiel, most of the needed POL, and anywhere from very little (at 2,000 tons) to most (at 4,000 tons) of the needed manufactured goods and food. Living standards in NVN would fall, but this would not necessarily interfere with the capability to support actions in SVN. Household handicraft and family food plots would probably sustain them.
27. Only by a bombing campaign aimed at crop destruction does it appear that food import requirements could be increased to near the interdicted import capacity (if they increased from 10% to 50% of total rice needs, the requirement would rise from 1,000 to 5,000 tons per day). Only this kind of increased food requirement could seriously impact on the current level of military imports.
28. In military terms, an intensified area bombing campaign could limit NVN actions in SVN at or near the pre-Tet level, and below the level of February 1968. But such a campaign (unless it included widespread crop destruction) would be unlikely to reduce NVN capability in SVN substantially below the 1967 level. It is possible that a more drastic reduction could be effected, but given the long season of poor bombing weather (between November and May, the weather permits an average of 5 days per month of visual bombing), the NVN transportation system would begin to be reconstituted.
29. Notwithstanding its probable inconclusiveness, an intensified area bombing campaign could have far-reaching military and diplomatic repercussions. A major effort to close Haiphong would have to accept serious risks of hitting Soviet shipping; and if Soviet ships were struck, the USSR could not fail to react. Reaction could cover a wide range of possibilities from introducing minesweepers and naval escort vessels carrying anti-aircraft guns, to providing bomber aircraft and pilots to NVN, to creating a diversionary crisis in Europe or the Middle East. We could be sure only that it would be an utterly determined reaction.
30. If the bombing campaign included crop destruction through the use of herbicides, we would have to expect “germ warfare” and similar charges from both Russia and China. The propaganda campaigns would be broadgauged, intense, and shrill. Our moral image both abroad and at home would suffer further damage.
31. Even without attempted crop destruction, an area bombing campaign aimed at destroying dispersed stockpiles located in or near populated areas would lead unavoidably to much heavier levels of destruction and civilian casualties. NATO as a whole would be severely strained by inner division on the issue. Public opinion in Scandanavia and the UK would very probably force their governments to denounce US policy in VN. This might also happen in Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.
The Alternative of Unlimited Manpower
32. It is conceivable (but no more than that) that we could drive out or totally defeat the North Vietnamese in SVN, destroy the Viet Cong and its infrastructure, and thus provide the remaining South Vietnamese with a “free choice”—if we were to treble the number of US forces in SVN. As earlier noted, the present tempo of operations in SVN is already destroying cities, villages and crops, and is creating civilian casualties at an increasing rate. While this is not deliberate, our forces are contributing heavily to the destruction. The commitment of 1.5 million men (or any number approaching that magnitude) would inevitably produce a policy of scorched earth. Even assuming the battle could be contained without the intervention of Chinese ground forces or Soviet air forces, and without a serious Russian diversionary action in another part of the world, we could hardly avoid totally crushing the country and its people, leaving a wasteland. As was said of the Romans at Carthage, “You made a desert and called it peace.”
33. A trebling of effort would probably raise the US cost of the Vietnam War to about $85–90 billion per year. It is difficult to believe the American people would accept such a burden or such a risk. Disaffection would be rampant and bitterly deep. Large segments of our society would be totally alienated, and the processes of orderly government might be seriously disrupted by both internal dissension and public demonstrations. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to convince critics that the USG had any interest in peace talks or in settlement, or that it was not simply destroying South Vietnam in order to “save” it.
34. If there were a serious prospect (as there would be) that the NVN/VC effort would be totally defeated, China might well enter the war with large-scale combat forces. The Soviets would almost surely increase the quantity and the level of sophistication of its material support; it might introduce Russian pilots and bomber aircraft; and it would more than likely create a serious diversion in another part of the world. World opinion would totally condemn the US for a Carthaginian policy.
Conclusion
35. Anything resembling a clear-cut military victory in Vietnam appears possible only at the price of literally destroying SVN, tearing apart the social and political fabric of our own country, alienating our European friends, and gravely weakening the whole free world structure of relations and alliances. Russian or Chinese military intervention on the side of NVN, or at another geographical point in the world, would be a serious risk if we greatly increased our own effort. They clearly have the capacity, and give every evidence of having the will, to prevent the outright defeat of NVN.
36. By any rational scale of values, a military victory in Vietnam is therefore infeasible at any price consistent with US interests.
A Revised Policy and Strategy
37. What follows inexorab from the foregoing conclusion is the need for a redefinition of our political objective in Vietnam, and a basic shift in military strategy. The objective should be an honorable political settlement of the war followed by the organization of an international agreement to guarantee the military neutralization of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Our military strategy should accordingly be adjusted to give maximum support to a negotiating posture.
38. A well-coordinated program of action will of course require the detailed attention of the USG. In particular, the State Department must seriously tackle the unpleasant realities of a genuine compromise settlement to be hammered out in negotiations with a weakened, but not a beaten foe. To-date the matter has been carefully avoided, avoidance being sustained by the tacit assumption that negotiations would involve little more than ratification of the other side’s surrender, or that there would be no negotiations at all, but only a “fading away” of the Viet Cong. Negotiations will be painful and might be protracted, and they will inevitably involve severely disappointing the present GVN.
39. If, however, these unpleasant realities are faced, the essential actions required are apparent. They are a cessation of the bombing to get talks started, as soon as we have regained our military poise; a shift of our forces to protection of the population centers; willingness to talk to the NLF and to accept a coalition government; organization of the international community, including especially the Soviet Union, to guarantee the military neutralization of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; and ultimately the phased with-drawal of US forces.
Townsend Hoopes
*The black bars indicate where material was deleted by censors when the memos were declassified.