Appendix C
Mr. President:
SUBJECT: Decision to Halt the Bombing
This memorandum traces the origins of the decision to halt most of the bombing of North Vietnam on March 31, 1968, with special reference to the roles of Secretaries Rusk and Clifford. It touches on other elements as well, which the President took into account; namely, evidence of some communist interest in negotiations, post-Tet; other proposals for a peace initiative; and the improving military and political position in Vietnam during March, which made a peace initiative more palatable in Saigon, possibly more appealing in Hanoi. It is based on the written record available to us.
Background.
The notion of a peace initiative involving some kind of bombing halt or reduction was widespread in official circles and, more important, in your mind through the fall of 1967 and up to March 31.
For example, the special Vietnam group that met regularly on Thursday afternoons in Under Secretary Katzenbach’s office (Katzenbach, Rostow, Nitze, and others) discussed this matter on many occasions. The President was also getting opinions from those not directly involved in the Vietnam problem. For example, on October 27, 1967, Harry McPherson sent the President a memorandum in which he said he thought “we should give new consideration to bombing the area fifty or a hundred miles north of South Vietnam, and indefinitely postponing further bombing around Hanoi and Haiphong.”
The most serious bombing halt proposal during that period came on November 1, 1967, from Secretary of Defense McNamara. He made three basic recommendations: 1) stabilize the U.S. ground effort at existing levels; 2) plan a bombing halt before the end of the year; 3) in the South, try to (a) reduce U.S. casualties; (b) turn over increasing responsibility to the South Vietnamese; (c) steps to reduce destruction of property and lives.
The President asked Rostow to get reactions to the proposal from a number of advisers and officials, without naming the author of the plan. The reactions were heavily negative, except for Secretary Rusk who thought it wise to cut back on bombing in the Hanoi-Haiphong area, and Katzenbach who favored a qualified pause. Reactions to the McNamara plan are summarized in the Table [not reprinted here]. Detailed reactions were as follows: Rusk; Bunker; Westmoreland; Katzenbach; Fortas; General Taylor; Bundy (before McNamara proposal but on same subject); Rostow; and Clifford.
On December 18, 1967, after studying carefully the proposal and the views of all his advisers, the President took the unusual step of writing a memorandum for the file setting forth his own views on the bombing pause and other proposals. He opposed a total bombing cessation at that time on grounds that it would be read both in Hanoi and at home as a sign of weakening will. He added, however, that: “I would not, of course, rule out playing our bombing card under circumstances where there is reason for confidence that it would move us toward peace.”
During this period, October to December 1967, the President was getting a growing body of intelligence describing Hanoi’s plans for an all-out Winter-Spring offensive. He became increasingly convinced that any peace gestures at that time would have no effect on Hanoi, except the negative effect of convincing them that the United States was weakening in its resolve as regards Vietnam. This was a major thought in his talks with the Australian Cabinet in Canberra. He stated that Hanoi would not be interested in talks until it came to recognize it could not win militarily in the South. In Rome on December 23, 1967, in his meeting with the Pope the President had said in an aide memoir that a bombing pause would not be effective then. He added: “I would not exclude the possibility that it may again appear wise at some point.”
This strand of thought was strengthened by much evidence that the enemy intended to use the offensive to increase his bargaining leverage. As Westmoreland said on January 22, 1968, (a week before the Tet offensive): “Enemy documents increasingly talk of the possibility of negotiations and of a coalition government.”
Meanwhile, discussions were going forward on this matter in a variety of circles. In the Katzenbach Group, mentioned earlier, the idea of a bombing pause once the Winter-Spring offensive had been defeated took definite shape. This accounts for memos written by Rostow on March 4, March 6, March 16, March 21, and March 25, in which he foresaw a possible bombing pause in May if we used the intervening time to strengthen our military position in the field. Nitze mentioned this possibility at the March 4, 1968 meeting with the President.
Role of Secretary Rusk
The first reference in the written record to Secretary Rusk’s interest in a bombing halt is at a meeting of February 27, 1968. These notes, taken by Harry McPherson, have McNamara reporting on alternatives in Vietnam. He spoke of accelerated military and economic programs combined with a “new peace offensive” as one alternative. Rust at that point is quoted as saying:
“basis for peace in Southeast Asia: ending of Communist assaults in Laos, Thailand; we will stop bombing North of 20th parallel if NVN withdraws from Quang Tri province; or stop altogether in that event; or some other specific proposal.”
In his report of this meeting to the Ranch on February 27, Rostow notes that the following, among other key questions, were raised: “What sort of peace proposals, if any, should be included in the Presidential statement?”
On March 4, 1968, at a meeting in the Cabinet Room on the Wheeler-Westmoreland proposal, the question of getting into negotiations was raised. Rusk said:
“We would stop the bombing during the rainy period in the North.”
The President replied: “Really get on your horses on that.”
The next day, March 5, there was another meeting, the Tuesday Lunch group.
The President asked: “What about the suggestion of last night?”
Rusk said: “There is one idea which would throw additional responsibility on Hanoi.”
He then read the following proposed statement that the President might use or that might be released:
“After consultation with our allies, the President has directed that U.S. bombing attacks on North Vietnam be limited to those areas which are integrally related with the battlefield. No normal person could expect us to fail to provide maximum support for our men in combat. Whether this stage can be a step toward peace is for Hanoi to determine. We shall watch the situation carefully.”
______________
At mid-March, Ambassador Goldberg wrote to the President suggesting a total bombing halt. That proposal was sent to the President at the Ranch on March 16.
At the President’s instruction, Secretary Rusk went out to Saigon with an “Eyes Only” cable for Ambassador Bunker. In the message the Secretary asked for Bunker’s estimate of likely South Vietnamese reaction to both his (Rusk’s and Goldberg’s proposal—a partial, or total, bombing pause.
Bunker answered Rusk on March 20. Bunker said the Goldberg plan “would create the greatest difficulties for us here.” He said, “I recommend strongly that we not pursue this course. ...”
The second plan (Rusk’s) would have most of the negative effects, he thought, but “it would be easier to obtain GVN concurrence.”
At a meeting with the President in the Cabinet Room on March 20, 1968, there was a length discussion of Vietnam and the President’s speech.
Rusk is quoted as saying: “Major peace proposals aren’t promising unless there is a cessation of bombing. There are serious political and military risks to a bombing halt. We have been exploring bombing limitations in the North, leaving open the bombing above the DMZ.
Rusk is also reported in the notes as reading a statement on bombing that he proposed the President make. The notes do not include the text of Rusk’s statement, however.
At this meeting Clifford spoke of stopping bombing north of the 20th parallel “if the enemy would stop artillery, mortars and rockets in the DMZ area.”
M. Bundy opposed the idea of making it a “trade.” Rusk agreed with him. He said we should just do it and say: “Whether or not this is a step toward peace is up to Hanoi.”
On October 23, Harry McPherson sent the President a memo on bombing limitation. The President asked immediately for comments from Rusk, Clifford and Rostow.
Rusk sent the President a memorandum in reply on March 25. He had been thinking along the same lines, of course. He included, again, a paragraph stating the case as he wanted to see it made. The language is very close to the proposal he made on March 5, almost identical. Rusk also set forth his comments on the proposed partial halt and how he thought it should be handled. He defined “related to the battlefield” as meaning “up to Vinh.”
Rusk had long since made up his mind that a partial bombing halt was feasible if the President wished to make a peace offer. His position was consistent from February 27 right down to March 31.
At a meeting at State on March 28, Rusk, Clifford, Rostow, McPherson and Possibly Bill Bundy, discussed the latest draft of the proposed speech. Clifford pointed out that it still contained nothing on a bombing pause. Rusk then dictated proposed language along the same lines as his earlier memoranda. He also instructed Bundy to summarize all the proposals in the draft speech—including the limited bombing halt—for transmission to Bunker for Thieu. It was agreed that McPherson would incorporate the bombing halt proposal in a draft and get it to the President immediately. That was done by 6 p.m. and it was discussed with the President in the Cabinet Room from 6:37 to 7:27 p.m. that day. The President then cleared the draft for transmission to Bunker. It went out shortly after 8:00 p.m. Sec. Rusk left for the Wellington, New Zealand, meeting of SEATO.
After the meeting with the President, McPherson did a complete redraft of the full speech, including the bombing pause, at 9:00 p.m.
Sec. Rusk sent a cable to Ambassador Bunker outlining the proposal and asking him to get the approval of the South Vietnamese leaders. Bunker’s affirmative reply went up to the President at 8:05 a.m. Sunday, March 30th. The President then instructed us to seek the agreement of other allied leaders.
The Role of Secretary Clifford
At the February 27, 1968, meeting Secretary-designate Clifford did not speak of any peace proposals or comment on Rusk’s suggestion.
On March 4, in his report to you on the Wheeler-Westmoreland proposal, Clifford said flatly that there should be “no new peace initiative on Vietnam.”
On March 20, at the meeting with Goldberg, Clifford vigorously opposed a total bombing pause. He did favor some kind of limited bombing halt but thought we should make it conditional on Hanoi’s doing something in return. Rusk said that would not work.
There is nothing immediately available on Clifford’s reaction to the McPherson memorandum of March 23.
As noted earlier, at the meeting of March 28 Clifford argued strongly for inclusion in the President’s statement of a partial bombing halt as a peace overture. In other words, his earlier opposition to a peace initiative (March 4) and then his advocacy of a qualified bombing pause insisting on reciprocity, had shifted by March 28 to the position Rusk had taken four weeks earlier. Clifford agreed to Secretary Rusk’s draft passage for the speech.
Analysis of the Various Drafts of the March 31 Speech.
The speech drafts run from February 5, 1968, to March 31.
They begin with the concept of reporting to the nation the Tet offensive, the Pueblo affair, and the Blue House attack; putting them into perspective; and steadying the nation. The February 5 draft has no reference to peace initiatives. It does put forward certain measures to strengthen our forces in Vietnam, but it is clear the President decided to send Wheeler to Saigon before making any such recommendations to Congress.
The February 25 draft reasserts San Antonio, but goes no further. There is, however, a peace passage.
The February 27 draft (with Wheeler about to return) is the same; but that is the day Sec. Rusk is first recorded in the post-Tet period as mentioning a bombing stoppage at the 20th parallel.
Speech-drafting obviously stopped on Wheeler’s return. The review began on February 28 of the toop [sic] proposals.
Then follow: Rusk’s suggestion of March 4; proposal of March 5; cable to Bunker of March 16 (after the Goldberg proposal which went to the Ranch the same day); the Bunker reply of March 20; meeting with the President after Bunker’s reply.
The March 20 draft I has the first new proposals: to announce a bombing limitation specified distances from Hanoi to Haiphong and to assert a U.S. and South Vietnamese willingness to negotiate a ceasefire. (McPherson’s notes of meeting he dates March 19, but should be March 20, are in his speech file: at the meeting where Goldberg’s proposition was debated, Rusk and Mac Bundy argued for an unconditional limited bombing halt.)
The March 20 draft II has that passage removed and returns, in effect, to San Antonio.
March 21 draft is, in this respect, like March 20 draft II. (On March 22 Bill Bundy proposed an elaborate restatement of San Antonio.)
The March 25 draft sticks with San Antonio; but on that day, at the President’s instruction, Rostow sent the McPherson memorandum of March 23 to Clifford (12:38 p.m.). Sec. Rusk must have received it earlier, because his response went to the President at 2:25 p.m. on the 25th. In the speech file of the March 25 draft is some language consistent with Sec. Rusk’s memo and McPherson’s. It is marked “from Clark Clifford”; but the draft of March 26 (12:30 a.m.) incorporating “Clark Clifford’s redraft of the military section” does not contain the section; and the March 26 redraft stays with San Antonio. The copy of the March 26 redraft marked “from Clark Clifford” has no notations on the San Antonio passage. (From intema\ evidence documents left behind at speech-draft meetings were apparently marked by Harry McPherson’s secretary with the name of the man who left them; for example, a State Department cable drafted by Bill Bundy is also marked “from Clark Clifford”)
On March 28 at Sec. Rusk’s office, Sec. Clifford expressed his dissatisfaction with the existing draft on, essentially, political grounds: “It offers nothing—neither hope nor plan for either military victory or negotiated settlement.” With Sec. Rusk and Bill Bundy participating, Sec. Rusk’s proposal of February 27, March 4, March 5, and March 25, was put into language for an alternative draft to be submitted to the President. By 9:00 p.m. March 28, Harry McPherson had redrafted the whole speech, with the peace proposal as the lead-off. (Rostow, who was present, recalls no serious debate or disagreement about submitting this now-familiar proposal in writing to the President.) At Sec. Rusk’s instruction, Bill Bundy drafted a summary of the proposal (and other elements in the draft of the 28th) for Bunker’s comment. It was despatched (obviously with the President’s approval) March 29. The President’s decision to move forward was almost certainly taken at a meeting on March 28 in the Cabinet Room at 6:37–7:37 p.m. Rostow had called Jim Jones at 2:45 p.m. stating that “Rusk, Clifford, Rostow, and McPherson have completed their discussions and Harry is now working on an alternate text. They would like to meet with the President for direction late this afternoon or early tonight.” Harry had a draft by 6:00 p.m., and another at 9:00 p.m., after the session with the President.
Refinements of language were made on March 29 and March 30; but essentially the matter was settled on the evening of March 28.
Communist Interest in Negotiations, Post-Tet.
As noted earlier, the pre-Tet documents on the Winter-Spring offensive indicated, on balance, that it was designed to achieve a sufficient improvement in the military and political situation (the latter, via urban uprisings) to make viable a negotiation with the U.S. of a coalition government.
As early as February 4th and 8th, Bunker reported Thieu’s view that the offensive was linked to an intent to negotiate.
On February 21, Goldberg, Clifford, Katzenbach, Harriman and W. Bundy went over with U Thant reports via the French in Hanoi and others that a bombing halt would lead to immediate talks and possibly mutual de-escalation if the bombing halt were officially notified to Hanoi. Confirmed in writing by U Thant on February 22, at U.S. request.
On February 26 ______________ report that a North Vietnamese official had said: “Ho is waiting, but has insisted that the bombing be stopped first.”
On March 3 ______________ report of a Secretary of a VC District Committee, also member of a VC Province Committee, who indicated that negotiations between the NLF and the GVN might not be ruled out, while confirming that the Tet offensive might have a political objective.
______________ Sec. Rusk, on March 7th, asked that this item be called to the President’s attention. Evidently it fitted his proposal of March 4 and 5th.
On March 8th we received two reports from Paris (French and Polish sources) that Hanoi was receding from its Tet political objective in view of actual results and might settle for less than a Communist-dominated coalition government.
______________
In short, the notion of negotiations in the aftermath of Tet was built into our understanding of the Winter-Spring offensive; and the possibility was repeatedly confirmed by post-Tet intelligence placed in the hands of the President. The evidence was not firm enough to give the President or others confidence that the March 31 proposal would lead to negotiations. It was sufficient to leave open the possibility that it might succeed.
Additional Peace Proposals, From In and Outside the Executive Branch.
While the Rusk and (then) Goldberg proposals were brought to the President’s attention—discussed and debated—and while he was receiving word of various more or less forthcoming Communist hints, the President was being bombarded by a wide range of more or less pacific propositions from inside and outside the Executive Branch of the Government.
After the U Thant session, he went to Paris and the French issued a communique confirming their information from Hanoi that “an unconditional cessation of American bombardment of North Vietnam would be a necessary and sufficient condition for the opening of peace negotiations.”
On February 29th the President received word via Bill Douglas from ______________ had received rather explicit and heartening responses to clarifying questions about negotiations.
As noted earlier, Rostow, starting on March 6, kept raising the possibility of a peace offensive about May 1, after we had weathered the Winter-Spring offensive and strengthened our hand, if necessary by additional military measures.
On March 4, Sec. Rusk, via a rare personal letter, called the President’s attention ______________
On March 7, Gov. William Guy urged announcement of “our disengagement from offensive action in South Vietnam and against North Vietnam.”
On March 9th, Max Taylor, in a memorandum to the President, states, at the end of an analysis of the military situation and options, “These considerations encourage the belief that an end—or at least the start of negotiations—may not be far off and we should place ourselves in the best possible position in anticipation of such a development.”
On March 9 Rostow forwarded to the President a State Dept. document requested by the President at the previous Tuesday lunch. It was a massive compendium of “affirmative suggestions” for “Alternate Vietnam Policies by Key U.S. Public Figures and Organizations.” It covered pre-Tet as well as post-Tet suggestions.
On March 11, ______________ came in to see Rostow with a peace proposal for negotiations and “mutual de-escalation” to be initiated by a neutral country. Rostow referred ______________ Bunker was queried and responded on March 23d.
On March 11, Drew Pearson said he was leaving the President on Vietnam and filed a proposal for U.S. withdrawal to be negotiated by someone “the Russians like and trust, such as Justice William O. Douglas or Senator Bobby Kennedy.” It suggested: “It may be necessary during the course of the negotiations to stop the bombing.”
On March 12 Carl Marcy forwarded to Rostow a “late 1967 proposal, seen by Senator Fulbright, for total U.S. withdrawal from the Asian mainland over a period “not to exceed two years.” It went to the President on March 14.
On March 14, Dean Acheson proposed a study leading to a policy “looking towards progressive disengagement over whatever period of time we judge appropriate.”
Unknown to the President, on March 14 Bill Bundy, although opposed to a peace move “at the present time,” which would above all “alarm Saigon extremely,” said: “I do believe that your idea of a tactical cutback in the bombing justified for military reasons, is worth trying on Ambassador Bunker.” This was done on March 16th, along with the Goldberg proposal.
On March 18 the President received Chet Bowles’ proposal for a bombing cessation if various countries (including the USSR) “take responsibility” from that moment on to bring about “meaningful negotiations.”
On March 21, Dick Boiling suggested we pick up from the Rockefeller camp the idea of “an Asian settlement.”
On March 22, at the President’s instruction, Rostow forwarded a bombing halt proposal to John Walsh to be included among “the alternatives” to be examined by the outside advisers.
On March 29, in a speech on China policy, Senator Mansfield proposed to make clear we are prepared at all times to discuss the Vietnam problem with Chinese representatives.
Improvement of Military and Political Situation in Vietnam.
The President’s problem in March—with respect to troops (and, therefore, the budget and dollar)—and with respect to a negotiating initiative—was greatly eased by military and political progress beyond the expectations of the greatest immediate post-Tet optimists. This is reflected in the various reports the President received.
As a benchmark, there is Rostow’s memo to the President of February 5, indicating the potentialities for “a shortening of the war” if: “the cities are cleared up and held against possible follow-on attacks; the GVN demonstrate effective political and relief capacity; we hold the Khe Sanh; we hold U.S. opinion steady on course.”
On February 15 Bob Ginsburgh cited very tentative evidence to Rostow that North Vietnamese units might be moving away from Khe Sanh. This information was shared with the President in the Situation Room, the uncertain nature of the evidence being underlines.
In a summary of February 23, Rostow reported from Westy that “for the first time General Abrams was permitting himself to be somewhat encouraged.” But he added: “I suspect Bus will report considerable anxiety in Saigon.”
The President received Gen. Wheeler’s assessment of February 27 the next morning. It is temperately optimistic; asserts 1968 is key year; but requests a “theater reserve” of 2 divisions for Westy as a matter of prudence.
On February 29 and March 1, Wheeler and Gen. Johnson suggested the daily post-Tet phone call to Westy could be shifted to once a week, as Wheeler notes progress in opening Route 1 and at Khe Sanh. President agrees.
On March 3, Westmoreland filed a report on our “offensive operations in Vietnam.”
On March 4, Westmoreland filed a “rather heartening report” on state of U.S. and Vietnamese manpower in combat units.
On March 9, a report was forwarded to the President that enemy manpower around Khe Sanh “may have fallen to 6–8000,” ______________
On March 13 Rostow reports: “In general, the battle is in a curious phase in Vietnam: no clear enemy attack plan discernible; clock ticking on good supply weather in Laos and poor weather at Khe Sanh; our side moving slowly over to the initiative in I Corps, III Corps, and IV Corps.”
On March 14, “the first mildly hopeful report from the Delta,” as General Thang takes over, where a great deal of post-Tet anxiety centered.
On March 14, Bunker’s weekly reports progress with respect to Thieu’s leadership, relief and reconstruction, movement back into the countryside, and military manpower. “Perhaps the most negative development this week has been the obvious tendency on the part of some Vietnamese leaders to return to politics as usual.”
On March 15, Westmoreland reports his plan to go on the offensive in I Corps, about April 1.
On March 20, Bunker reports allied forces “have increasingly assumed the initiative” and that pacification damage “not nearly” as great “as we thought or the press still reports.” Enemy being pushed away from cities. Large caches uncovered. Etc.
On March 22, the tough-minded ______________ in the Delta is increasingly optimistic.
The President was forwarded on March 25th a March 19 letter from ______________ with a vivid account of high post-Tet civilian moral in Saigon—an analysis subsequently vindicated by events.
On March 27th, the President received Dr. Phan Quang Dan’s detailed, optimistic assessment of the Vietnamese people’s reaction to the Tet offensive.
On March 28th, the President receives data on sharp increase in February 1968 over February 1967 Vietnamese draftees and volunteers (totals: 17,106 versus 7,930); and instructs the figures go to McPherson for insertion in speech draft.
On March 29th, Bunker’s weekly cable shows progress on many fronts.
On April 3, Bunker reports: “... one immediate result of the speech is evidence of greater determination on the part of Vietnamese to shoulder the burdens of the war effort.”
W. W. Rostow