18
Three months less ten days had now elapsed since the start of the Battle of Britain, but for all the German effort there was little to set against the loss of 1,653 aircraft. Germany had not established the superiority she needed in the air. To avoid further bomber losses, Göring resorted to the use of fighter-bombers operating at high altitude.
These tactics were difficult to counter because of the height at which the German fighters flew. Above 25,000 feet the Me 109 with a two-stage supercharger had a better performance than even the Mk. II Hurricanes and Spitfires then coming into service. Moreover, raids approaching at 20,000 feet or more had a good chance of minimising the effect of radar observation and were difficult for the Observer Corps to track, especially when there were clouds about. Secondly, the speed at which the formations, unencumbered by long-range bombers, flew was so great that at best the radar chain could not give much more than twenty minutes warning before they released their bombs. Thirdly, Park and his controllers had no way of telling which of the several approaching formations contained bomb-carrying aircraft and should therefore be given preference.
A step towards the solution of the second and third problems was taken at the end of September when No. 421 Flight (later No. 91 Squadron) was formed to spot approaching formations and report their height and strength to Uxbridge by R/T. Although told to fly high and avoid combat, pilots so employed were sometimes at a disadvantage. After four had been shot down in the first ten days of October they began to work in pairs, a practice generally adopted later. But in any case their efforts were not sufficient answer to the problem of intercepting raiders which flew too high for detection by the radar chain.
Compared with its efficiency as an instrument of defence in daylight Fighter Command was woefully weak at night. The R.D.F. chain still only covered the coastal areas and inland there were only a handful of gun-laying radars, sound locators and the Observer Corps. In the darkness of this cloudy autumn the Observer Corps’ binoculars were, so to speak, hors de combat.
Six Blenheim and two Defiant squadrons strengthened by a flight of Hurricanes were available for night fighting in October 1940, but none of the aircraft was designed or equipped for the purpose. The planes were gradually being fitted with Air Interception radar which at that time was no more than promising.
Between September and November, therefore, the number of interceptions was disappointingly few. Improved equipment, including the Bristol Beau-fighter specially suited to night operations, was coming into service, but local ground-control radar was needed to put the planes within operating limits of A.I. It was to be some time before these local ground-control radar stations were installed.
It was not until 1941 that the night-fighter squadrons began to have telling effects on the Luftwaffe.
In the meantime some of the more experienced Hurricane and Spitfite pilots attempted to convert themselves to night fighting without being trained for the job or even having the basic essentials for approach and landing at their airfields. It is doubtful whether the risks they took in bad weather justified their courageous efforts, for they had little success, even on bright moonlit nights.
The Germans therefore had little opposition to contend with. What there was of it came from the antiaircraft defences. But even this was ineffective owing to the inadequacy of the sound locators and the lack of gun-laying radar sets.
There is evidence to show, however, that the antiaircraft guns did force the Germans to fly higher and some of the half-hearted crews to turn back. For the Londoners at least the guns were comforting.
Searchlights were even more limited than guns. They could not penetrate cloud or hold a bomber in their beams long enough to help the artillery or the night fighters, and by flying above 12,000 feet the bombers escaped their pointing fingers altogether.
October 1st
Day London raids. Southampton and Portsmouth also targets.
Night London, Liverpool, Manchester main targets.
Weather Mainly fair but generally cloudy.
German patrols began to appear between Beachy Head and Southwold from about seven in the morning. They gave no trouble but at 10.45 a force of 100 aircraft operating from Caen attempted to bomb Southampton and Portsmouth. They met stiff opposition.
There was a marked difference in the composition of this raid. The machines were mostly Me 109s and Me 110s, some of them carrying bombs. The Germans were beginning to reserve their bombers for night operations and place the whole burden for the daylight offensive on the fighter arm which had converted one Staffel of each gruppe or one gruppe of each geschwader to fighter-bomber duties.
Hit by British anti-aircraft fire, this Heinkel 111 of KG 55 force-landed in Holland in October
A third of the German fighters—250 aircraft—were so converted, Me 109s to carry a 250 kg. bomb and Me nos a total bomb-load of 700 kg.
Flying at great height and taking every advantage of the cloudy weather, these aircraft set Fighter Command new and difficult problems and imposed many fruitless hours of climb and chase upon the British pilots. But they did little else and Fighter Command continued the recovery which had started on September 7th.
From 1 to 3 p.m. a steady stream of aircraft crossed the coast between Deal and Selsey Bill. The first three waves, consisting of fifty Me 109s, reached Maidstone before 2 p.m.
Forty minutes later about seventy-five planes flew in from Calais and split some thirty miles inland. The raiders were intercepted and retired towards Maidstone but bombs landed at Brixton, Wandsworth, Camberwell and Lambeth.
The third attack was a half-hearted effort to penetrate over Dungeness and the Germans turned back before the R.A.F. could reach them.
In the north three raids were plotted over Aberdeenshire and three in the Moray Firth. One of these, a single aircraft, was seen returning to Brittany across Wales and Devon.
At 5 p.m. more than fifty aircraft assembled over Cap Gris Nez at 20,000 feet. No sooner had they crossed the coast than Luftflotte 2 massed for a follow-through with another thirty to fifty Me 109s and Me nos. For each attack the R.A.F. were up in force.
Night raiders started coming in just after 7.30 p.m. mainly over the Isle of Wight, Beachy Head and Dungeness, 175 of them weaving and turning in the general direction of London. Liverpool and Manchester were visited by a further twenty-five, while Glasgow and Swansea had two raiders each. Bombs dropped on the Mersey side of Manchester and Grantham. In the course of 723 sorties during the day the R.A.F. lost four aircraft. Luftwaffe casualties were six machines.
A variety of weapons was tried out at this period against enemy bombers. One device was an airborne adaptation of the rocket-fired parachute and cable which was supposed to form a barrier to German bombers. Known as ‘Mutton’, this weapon consisted of a parachute with a bomb dangling at the end of 2,000 feet of piano wire.
The idea was to launch these in the path of an approaching enemy formation. The bomb would be brought up to explode near the aircraft—at least in theory.
No. 420 Flight was formed to use the equipment and on October 1st Flight Lieutenant Burke, the commanding officer, collected the first Harrow bomber equipped to use it from the Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough.
Although several ‘Mutton’ sorties were flown it was difficult in practice to make effective use of the weapon.
October 2nd
Day High-flying and fighter sweeps on south-east London and Biggin Hill.
A crippled Me 109E, one undercarriage leg hanging down, descending into the sea off Folkestone Harbour in October. The Spitfire that shot it down circles above. An army officer jumped off the jetty and rescued the German pilot
Night London main target. Manchester, Usworth and Aberdeen also attacked.
Weather Brilliant blue skies during the day, turning to cloudy later.
The first warning came through at 8.30 a.m. when aircraft of Luftflotte 2 began to mass over Cap Gris Nez. Climbing to between 20,000 and 30,000 feet the German machines attacked Biggin Hill and south-east London from 9 a.m. until lunch-time. Seventeen formations, ranging from one aircraft to more than fifty, penetrated inland in a continuous stream. They were back in smaller numbers during the afternoon, a few of them penetrating as far as the centre of London. Eight of the day’s raiders fell in combat to some of the 154 patrols sent up by Fighter Command. Altogether seventeen German aircraft were lost against only one British fighter.
Between 7.15 p.m. and 6.15 the next morning 180 bombers came over. More than 100 attacked London, dropping bombs on Willesden, Woolwich, Fenchurch Street, Rotherhithe, Stanmore and the districts near airfields like Northolt, Kenley, Walton, Hendon, Brooklands, Redhill, Eastchurch, Hornchurch and Duxford. Manchester, Usworth and Aberdeen were also hit. Thirty-three night fighters were scrambled during the night but they were unable to intercept.
Pilots of No. 303 (Polish) Squadron at Northolt in October 1940. Second from the left is Flight Lieutenant (later Group Captain) J. A. Kent commanding A flight. In the background is his Hurricane which bears the ‘Kosciuszko’ crest just below the aerial on the fuselage. A flight carried on the traditions of the Polish 111 Kosciuszko squadron while B flight did the same for 112 Salamander squadron.
The crest includes a Polish hat and thirteen stars and stripes for the original States of the U.S.A. Kosciuszko had been Washington’s adjutant in the War of Independence and subsequently became Dictator of Poland. Thus it was that the Stars and Stripes flew to war in the skies over Britain long before December 7th, 1941
October 3rd
Day Scattered raids on East Anglian and southern England targets.
Night London and suburbs attacked.
Weather Rain and drizzle in the Channel. Visibility in England reduced to 500 yards.
Routine patrols and reconnaissance flights off the east coast opened the action for the day. Later raiders coming singly or in pairs, mostly from Belgian and Dutch bases, attacked targets over a widespread area. These included Thameshaven, Cosford, Cambridge, Cardington, Bedford, Leamington, Worcester, Reading, Harrow and Tangmere. The weather was too bad to intercept successfully, or to protect a convoy in the Channel at 5.20 p.m.
One raider, however, reached the de Havilland works at Hatfield. At 50 feet altitude a Ju 88 of KG77 machine-gunned workers as they ran for the trenches and bounced four bombs into a sheet metal shop and the Technical School—killing 21 people and wounding 70. The 88 was hit by 40 mm. Bofors shells, 303 machine-gun bullets from an R.A.F. detachment and even rounds from a Hotchkiss manned by the Home Guard. The burning aircraft crashed at Hertingfordbury.
Low cloud during the night hampered the Luftwaffe but not enough to prevent sixty bombers getting through, for the most part singly, at 10,000 feet and penetrating the inner artillery zone. Bombs were dropped mainly in the suburbs, and at Feltham, Middlesex, the General Aircraft Company was hit. No R.A.F. aircraft were lost during 173 sorties but the Luftwaffe suffered nine casualties.
October 4th
Day Single raiders in stream on London and south-east.
Night London again main target, with Liverpool as subsidiary target.
Weather Mist, rain and poor visibility throughout the day. Fog at night.
Seelöwe was still very much in Hitler’s mind, but he was reluctant to come to a decision despite Army and Navy recommendations to call it off altogether. Holding troops on the Channel coast ‘under constant British air attack’, they pointed out, ‘led to continual casualties’.
Remarked the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Galeazzi Ciano, in his diary, after the Hitler-Mussolini meeting at the Brenner Pass on October 4th, ‘there is no longer any talk about a landing in the British Isles’.
Pilots of No. 616 Squadron relax in the ready hut at Kirton-in-Lindsey on October 15th, 1940
After two attacks on convoys at 9 a.m. German fighters and fighter-bombers flying singly for the most part headed for London in an almost continuous stream. Altogether sixty to seventy crossed the coast, and at 1 p.m. twelve penetrated the inner artillery zone to drop bombs on London. Canterbury, Folkestone, Hythe and Reigate were also hit. Later in the afternoon R.A.F. fighters made interceptions and brought down two Ju 88s, making a total of twelve for the day against three British machines lost.
To counteract the Luftwaffe’s latest tactics Park issued new instructions:
HEIGHT OF FIGHTER PATROLS
1. With the prevailing cloudy skies and inaccurate heights given by the R.D.F. the group controllers’ most difficult problem is to know the height of incoming enemy raids. Occasionally reconnaissance Spitfires from Hornchurch or Biggin Hill are able to sight and report the height and other particulars of enemy formations. Moreover the special fighter reconnaissance flight is now being formed at Gravesend (attached 66 Squadron) for the purpose of getting information about approaching enemy raids.
2. Because of the above-mentioned lack of height reports and the delay in the receipt of R.D.F. and Observer Corps reports at group plus longer time recently taken by squadrons to take off, pairs and wings of squadrons are meeting enemy formations above, before they get to height ordered by group.
3. Tip-and-run raids across Kent by Me 110s carrying bombs or small formations of long-range bombers escorted by fighters give such short notice that the group controller is sometimes compelled to detail even single fighter squadrons that happen to be in the air to intercept the enemy bombers before they attack aircraft factories, sector aerodromes, or other vital points such as the docks, Woolwich, etc. Normally, however, group controller has sufficient time to detail from one to three pairs (two to six squadrons) to intercept raids heading for bombing targets in the vicinity of London.
4. Whenever time permits I wish group controllers to get the readiness squadrons in company over sector aerodromes, Spitfires 25,000 feet, Hurricanes 20,000 feet, and wait until they report they are in good position before sending them to patrol lines or to intercept raids having a good track in fairly clear weather.
5. This does not mean that the controller is to allow raids reported as bombers to approach our sector aerodromes or other bombing targets unengaged because pairs or wings of squadrons have not reported they have reached the height ordered in the vicinity of sector aerodromes or other rendezvous.
6. I am sending a copy of this instruction to all sector commanders and controllers also squadron commanders in order that they may understand why their squadrons have sometimes to be sent off to intercept approaching bombers before they have reached the height originally ordered or perhaps have joined up with the other squadron or pair of squadrons of a wing. Our constant aim is to detail one or more pairs of squadrons against incoming bomb raids, but the warning received at group is sometimes not sufficient and our first and primary task is to intercept and break up bombers before they can deliver a bombing attack against aircraft factories, sector aerodromes, docks, etc.
7. Circumstances beyond the control of group or sector controllers sometimes demand that the squadrons engage enemy bombers before they have gained height advantage and got comfortably set with the other squadrons detailed by group.
Leader of the ‘Big wig’ protagonists, Squadron Leader Bader is shown here with some of his pilots from 242 Squadron on October 4th, 1940. The other photograph shows the whole of 242 Squadron airborne from Coltishall
A 19 Squadron Spitfire is refuelled from a petrol bowser at Duxford on October 9th, 1940
8. I wish the squadron commanders and sector controllers to know everything humanly possible is being done by group to increase the warning received of incoming enemy raids. Meanwhile squadrons can help by shortening the time of take-off, assembly and rendezvous with other squadrons to which they are detailed as pairs or wings.
It was Luftflotte 2’s turn to mount the night raids on the 4th and between 8 and 9 p.m. over 100 raiders passed over Dieppe and Le Havre steering for London. The weather made night interception impossible and so the anti-aircraft guns were given permission to fire at unseen targets.
Despite fog and intermittent rain a further 200 machines crossed the coast heading for London later that night. One-third of the formation split from the main assembly and steered for Liverpool. Parachute mines were dropped on Woolwich and Enfield.
October 5th
Day Targets in Kent and Southampton attacked.
Night London and East Anglian aerodromes raided.
Weather Local showers in most districts. Bright periods. Winds light and variable.
Thirty raiders flying singly at 10,000–15,000 feet were plotted off the coast before 9 a.m. Half an hour later another raid began to boil up at Calais and by 10 a.m. two raids of twenty and fifteen bombers and fighters were tracked inland by the Observer Corps to West Mailing and Detling airfields.
At 11 a.m. a forceful attack developed on Kent. Raids of 40, 30, 50, and 12 machines crossed the coast near Lympne and fanned out over southern England to attack Detling and Folkestone. The third attack came at 1 p.m. with a fighter sweep of twenty-five Me 109s which were followed by a wave of a further 100 machines, thirty of which carried bombs. Fifty aircraft reached the centre of London. Simultaneously two formations of fifty and thirty aircraft set course from Cherbourg to attack Southampton.
With no further need to go for bombers at all costs the Spitfires and Hurricanes were now free to fight directly with the Messerschmitts. The fighter-bombers, almost helpless with their awkward loads, usually let their bombs go the moment they were engaged. The fighters on the other hand took on the British machines in spirited fashion. There were bitter dog-fights, and in clear weather the people of London and the Home Counties watched the great swirls and streaks of vapour trailing across the pale blue of the autumn sky.
In the fourth attack at 3.30 p.m. on Kent and East Sussex a mixed force of fifty bombers and fighters from Luftflotte 3 flew in over Ashford and Tonbridge. They were met by Spitfires and Hurricanes which split them up and drove them off. Hostile operations ended with an attack in the Selsey/Southampton area at 5 p.m. by two formations of thirty aircraft each, mainly Me nos. By sunset Fighter Command had flown 1,175 sorties and lost nine aircraft. Nine German planes were also destroyed.
Flying under cover of darkness, cloud and rain, over 200 bombers went for south London and East Anglian aerodromes during the night. Fires flared up in the London docks and the East End districts.
The view from one of Winston Churchill’s windows at No. 10 Downing Street, on the morning of October 18th after single night raiders had penetrated to the heart of London. The wrecked building was part of the Treasury offices.
A full squadron turn-out by Hurricanes of No. 85 Squadron on October 23rd, 1940
Day Single raiders or small formations attacked London and East Anglia.
Night Very quiet.
Weather Dull with continuous rain all day.
Early in the morning a large raid formed up across the Straits, but whatever the Luftwaffe’s original intention the weather did not lend itself to serious business. Only single raiders and small formations dashed to the London airfields in the morning.
An entry in Biggin Hill’s operations book recorded ‘a low-flying attack by single enemy bomber. Three barrack blocks destroyed. No. 1 parachute and cable post came into action, and hit an enemy aircraft, but failed to bring it down. One aircraft was damaged, slight damage to the aerodrome surface’.
By midday there were again signs of a big concentration at Cap Gris Nez. This resolved into smaller units, some of which attacked Middle Wallop with high-explosive and oil-bombs. Northolt and Uxbridge were also targets for small formations.
An intercepted German wireless message made it clear, however, that Luftwaffe operations were more or less cancelled for the day owing to the continuous rain and low cloud. In spite of German tactics and the weather the R.A.F. lost one plane only. German losses were six aircraft.
Considering the weather German bombing was remarkably accurate that night. A powder factory was hit at Waltham Abbey, Hertfordshire, and de Havilland’s aircraft works had a narrow escape. Disturbed by no more than seven bombers, however, Londoners slept well.
A typical anti-aircraft gun site during the Battle. These mobile 3.7 inch guns are shown on October 23rd 1940. In the background flies a barrage balloon. As air attack over Britain intensified in the summer months, the accuracy of AA increased and the Luftwaffe developed considerable respect for British guns
October 7th
Day Mixed force of bombers and fighters attacked Yeovil.
Night Main targets London and Merseyside, otherwise raids scattered from Harwich to Newcastle and the Firth of Forth.
Weather Occasional showers. Visibility fair. Variable cloud.
In the morning 127 German planes were engaged by eighteen No. 11 Group squadrons over Kent and Sussex.
The attack resumed at 12.30 when Luftflotte 2 again sent over a series of small waves from Calais to Dover. More than 150 Me 109s flew in and No. 11 Group had to call upon No. 12 Group to stand by. For the third attack at 3.30 p.m. the Luftwaffe again used Me 109s and sent in fifty via Dymchurch.
These machines made for Biggin Hill and London. At the same time a mixed force of Ju 88s, Me 109s and Me nos from Cherbourg in formations stepped up to 26,000 feet delivered an attack with eighty high-explosive and six oil-bombs on the Westland air-craft works at Yeovil.
Between 5 and 9 p.m. seven raids were plotted from Cherbourg to Swansea, eleven from Le Havre to Selsey Bill, twenty-seven from Dieppe to Beachy Head, two from Cap Gris Nez to Dungeness, twenty-six from Holland to Harwich, Newcastle and Spurn Head, and seven from Denmark to the Firth of Forth. Hostile efforts were mainly concentrated on London and Merseyside although bombs on Hatfield damaged three Lysanders belonging to No. 239 Squadron, an aircraft was destroyed at Ford and other bombs fell on West-hampnett, Tangmere, Eastleigh and Lee-on-Solent. Bomber Command countered the flow of traffic with a raid of 147 bombers on the German capital and the invasion ports.
In Berlin, meanwhile, Göring put a new five-point plan for the war against Britain. In it he frankly admitted that the demoralisation of London and the provinces was one aim and he described the air operations against the islands as ‘merely an initial phase’.
The plan he outlined demanded:
A Heinkel 111 H brought down over Britain and put back into flying condition by the R.A.F. The aircraft was from KG 26 ‘Löwen–Geschwader’
1 Absolute control of the Channel and the English coastal areas.
2 Progressive and complete annihilation of London, with all its military objectives and industrial production.
3 A steady paralysing of Britain’s technical, commercial, industrial and civil life.
4 Demoralisation of the civil population of London and its provinces.
5 Progressive weakening of Britain’s forces.
Far from being progressively weakened, the R.A.F. was fighting back with increased strength. On the 7th Fighter Command flew 825 sorties and lost 17 planes to the Luftwaffe’s 21 one of which was an He 115 seaplane.
Examination of eight Me 109s shot down on the 7th revealed that they were from LG2 and each carried a 250 kg. bomb. They were operating in small formations of 6–18 aircraft and flying 2–3 sorties per day.
October 8th
Day London.
Night Widespread raids on London and the suburbs.
Weather Cloudy in the south-east but fair. Winds high.
After the usual morning patrols and reconnaissance flights, two formations of fifty and 100 aircraft penetrated inland from Dymchurch and approached London via Kenley and Biggin Hill at 8.30 a.m. Bombs fell on Charing Cross Underground Station, Horse Guards Parade, the War Office and the Air Ministry’s Adastral House. Tower Bridge was also hit and so was the B.B.C.’s Bush House. Two hours later a second attack with thirty aircraft developed on London. An hour later another twenty attacked and at 12.30 two formations of twelve took up where the others left off. Fighter Command scrambled 639 sorties and lost four machines. Fourteen German aircraft were destroyed.
From Uxbridge came another order from Park:
When a Spitfire squadron is ordered to readiness patrol on the Maidstone line its function is to cover the area Biggin Hill-Maidstone–Gravesend, while the other squadrons are gaining their height, and protect them from the enemy fighter screen. The form of attack which should be adopted on the high enemy fighters is to dive repeatedly on them and climb up again each time to regain height.
The squadron is not to be ordered to intercept a raid during the early stages of the engagement, but the sector controller must keep the squadron commander informed as to the height and direction of approaching raids.
The object of ordering the squadron to patrol at 15,000 feet while waiting on the patrol line for raids to come inland is to conserve oxygen and to keep the pilots at a comfortable height. Pilots must watch this point most carefully so that they have ample in hand when they are subsequently ordered to 30,000 feet which is to be done immediately enemy raids appear to be about to cross our coast.
Ju 88 A-4 dive bombers of KG 51. The aircraft in the foreground and in the distance have had swastika, cross and code markings painted out in black for night operations. It is curious that wing crosses have been retained.
When other squadrons have gained their height and the course of the engagement is clear, the group controller will take a suitable opportunity to put this Spitfire squadron on to enemy raids where its height can be used to advantage.
It was a rough and windy night but aircraft from Cherbourg, Le Havre, Calais and Holland converged on Britain. Over 100 raids were entered in the Fighter Command controller’s log which shows that the stream did not cease until four o’clock the next morning. The main objectives were again London and the suburbs, and as on previous nights anti-aircraft batteries were given permission to fire at unseen targets. A formidable barrage was put up.
October 9th
Day London and airfields attacked.
Night Heavy raid on London.
Weather Cloudy in Channel with rain in northern France and the Straits. Winds high. Squalls.
Targets in Kent and London were again on the Luftwaffe’s agenda and from 11 a.m. until 1.15 p.m. 120 Me 109s flew in. By 2.20 p.m. they had returned in greater numbers.
Between 160 and 180 aircraft were involved and the damage they did to some of the airfields was as serious as that inflicted during August and September.
Over 400 Hurricane and Spitfire sorties were flown. Nine German planes were destroyed for the loss of one British fighter.
In Berlin, meanwhile, Göring had consulted the calendar. As his Luftflotten were preparing for their night raids on Britain he issued directives for heavy attacks on London during the next full moon. The moon was then in its first quarter, which meant London could expect some exceptionally noisy nights from about October 15th.
October 10th
Day Hostile operations over east Kent, London suburbs and Weymouth.
Night London, Liverpool, Manchester and fifteen airfields also attacked.
Weather Showery with bright intervals. Haze in the Thames Estuary and East Anglia.
Having failed to get through en masse the Luftwaffe was now infiltrating in continuous streams. These tactics were difficult to combat and the decrease in the rate of German loss was worrying Fighter Command.
In the course of 754 sorties the R.A.F. lost five machines, against the Luftwaffe’s four.
Manchester, London and Liverpool were again assailed, and following up on Göring’s directive, fifteen R.A.F. airfields were bombed.
Because of bomber losses the Luftwaffe turned to fighter bombers for the assault. Initially standard Me 109s were converted to carry bombs as 109E-4/B, but later aircraft were delivered from the factory fully equipped as fighter bombers. On this 109E-4/B the bomb is just being attached to the belly rack
October 11th
Day Targets in Kent, Sussex and Weymouth attacked.
Night Main objectives London, Liverpool, Manchester and Tyne and Tees.
Weather Mainly fair apart from showers chiefly in coastal areas. Mist in Straits and Estuary early, clearing later. Fog developed in the night.
Four fighter sweeps over Kent and Sussex and two over Weymouth by Me 109s flying at heights of up to 33,000 feet occupied the southern sector fighters throughout the day.
At 10 a.m. 100 Me 109s assembled at Cap Gris Nez and crossed the coast at Hastings. They attacked Folkestone, Deal, Canterbury and Ashford. An hour later another stream went for Biggin Hill and Kenley. At 2.15 p.m. about 100 aircraft reached Southend and by 4 p.m. a similar number penetrated as far as Maidstone and Tonbridge.
No. 611 West Lancashire Squadron, based at Ternhill, Shropshire, had a lively evening. Their terse combat report tells the story.
‘A’ Flight took off from Ternhill at 17.30 hrs. to patrol Anglesey. At about 18.20 hrs. at 17,000 feet, three enemy aircraft, Do 17s, were sighted about twelve miles away approaching from the south-west. Yellow section attacked out of sun, meeting fire from enemy leader. E/A broke formation and were attacked by both sections. Yellow leader opened fire at 15 degrees deflection and hit E/A’s starboard engine and return fire ceased. Yellow 3 followed with No. 3 and then No. 1 attack, and Yellow 1 from above attacked causing E/A to lose height but return fire had recommenced.
Yellow 1 saw E/A jettison five bombs into the sea and then crash into the water. Yellow 3 received an explosive bullet or shell in the bottom of his cockpit, making his airspeed indicator unserviceable.
Red section carried out two No. 1 attacks on another E/A whose starboard engine stopped, and he finally crashed in the hills south of Caernarvon. They then attacked E/A leader and on the third attack saw two crew bale out and both engines on fire. Aircraft glided down and crashed in flames near Capel Curig.
Altogether seven German aircraft were destroyed. Fighter Command squadrons, which flew 949 sorties, lost nine machines, but only three pilots. Six pilots were wounded.
October 12th
Day London and suburbs again main target.
Night Fairly quiet but National Gallery damaged.
Weather Widespread mist and fog during the day, clearing with light winds off the North Sea.
The point had now been reached where Hitler had to decide on his next course of action. It was evident towards the end of September that Seelöwe could not be accomplished before the end of the year. Bomber Command had sunk 214 barges and twenty-one transports of the invasion fleet which in any case had been forced to disperse. He was thus compelled in October to choose between stopping this dispersal or postponing the whole project indefinitely.
As the bombs fell on Biggin Hill, Chatham and Piccadilly, Keitel circulated Hitler’s decision:
The Führer [he wrote] has decided that from now until the spring, preparations for Sealion shall be continued solely for the purpose of maintaining political and military pressure on England.
Should the Invasion be reconsidered in the spring or early summer of 1941, orders for a renewal of operational readiness will be issued later. In the meantime military conditions for a later invasion are to be improved.
The significance of this memorandum was not to be realised at the War Office, damaged at nine o’clock that evening by a direct hit, nor at Bentley Priory, until very much later. Hitler had admitted defeat nineteen days before the Battle of Britain officially came to a close.
Despite mist and fog, October 12th was a day of almost uninterrupted German activity the R.A.F. did not find easy to counter. Raids on London and the south-east started at 8.45 a.m. and went on until late afternoon.
Met in force by the British, who flew 797 sorties, the Germans had difficulty reaching their objectives. They lost eleven planes. British aircraft destroyed numbered ten.
October 13th
Day Targets in London and Kent attacked.
Night London, Bristol, Wales, Liverpool, Birmingham and Birkenhead raided.
Weather Almost cloudless but foggy early. Fine in the morning. Fair at midday, clouding over later.
Although Hitler had unofficially conceded victory to Fighter Command, Park, still striving to work out effective counter-measures to the Germans’ high-flying tactics, could certainly not have agreed that the Luftwaffe was defeated. The Germans had simply been prevented from achieving their objectives but they were still taking every opportunity to harass the R.A.F.
The first threats on this day were small and they developed off the east coast where a convoy was attacked. London was then selected for the next three raids which began at 12.30 a.m. when a force of fifty Me 109s reached Woolwich. An hour later a slightly larger force fanned out over Kent and made its way to the capital. The third formation of twenty-five Me 109s got to the centre of London at 4 p.m. in spite of spirited opposition.
The all-clear had not long sounded when 100 night raiders flew in. Assisted by a waxing moon they were better placed to find their targets, including Stanmore, where a bomb undoubtedly intended for the heart of Britain’s air defence organisation landed plumb in the middle of the railway station.
About thirty bombers were tracked by the Observer Corps to Bristol, Wales, Liverpool, Birmingham and Birkenhead; also to Dundee.
The moon did not prove to be much of an asset to the twenty-two night fighters scrambled to intercept the raiders. They were singularly unsuccessful, but they brought the number of sorties for the day to 591. German planes destroyed totalled five. The British lost two.
October 14th
Day Widespread small attacks.
Night Widespread and serious damage in London. Coventry also damaged.
Weather Occasional rain or drizzle spreading to the southeast. Rain in the Channel, misty in the Straits and the Estuary. Cloudy in the North Sea.
It was 10.15 a.m. before the Germans showed signs of serious business. Fifty small raids were then picked up heading for the south-east and the south midlands. Some passed over north London aerodromes, including North Weald, which was by now showing the effects of nearly 400 accurately aimed bombs. Hardly a building had escaped so that dispersal and improvisation were necessary to keep the four squadrons going.
More than 100 patrols involving 272 fighters were flown. They neither scored nor lost. Three German aircraft were destroyed, nevertheless, in accidents.
Although the East End of London bore the main burden of the early German attacks, it was not long before the West End was sharing its bombing experiences with the poorer sections of the capital.
From the clear moonlight skies of October 14th there rained a load of high explosives and incendiaries which caused widespread and serious damage to many parts of the city. More than 220 members of the Conservative Carlton Club were in the building when it was destroyed by a direct hit. By some miracle they all crawled out from beneath the rubble unhurt. A Labour M.P. remarked rather cynically: ‘The devil looks after his own’.
Other Londoners were not so lucky. Five hundred were killed and 2,000 seriously injured. This was a foretaste of even worse things to come and marked the beginning of the blitz which is outside the scope of this book.
October 15th
Day Hostile elements penetrate to London targets and targets in Kent and the Estuary.
Night Unusually heavy attack on London and Birmingham.
Weather Fair but cloudy in the Straits. Winds southerly and variable. Moonlit night.
Sector controllers on the early shift had hardly had time to read Park’s latest instructions when the first signs of trouble showed on the radar screens as a buildup over Cap Gris Nez. It soon faded and for an hour they were able to assimilate and discuss the orders their group commander had penned the previous day.
Said Park:
Owing to the very short warning given nowadays by the R.D.F. stations, enemy fighter formations (some carrying bombs) can be over London within twenty minutes of the first R.D.F. plot, and have on occasion dropped bombs on south-east London seventeen minutes after the first R.D.F. plots.
By day and night the attack went on with Luftflotte 3 being concentrated on British cities during the hours of darkness. Here a Heinkel 111 on a French airfield prepares for take-off for a British target.
Under these circumstances, the only squadrons that can intercept the enemy fighters before they reach London or sector aerodromes are the squadrons in the air on readiness patrol, or remaining in the air after an attack, plus one or two squadrons at stand-by at sectors on the east and south-east of London.
In these circumstances it is vitally important for the group controllers, also sector controllers, to keep clearly in mind the time taken for squadrons and other formations to climb from ground level to operating height. The following times are those for a good average squadron of the types stated:
|
(a) Spitfire (Mark 1) |
13 minutes to 20,000 feet. |
|
18 minutes to 25,000 feet. |
|
|
27 minutes to 30,000 feet. |
|
|
(b) Hurricane (Mark 1) |
16 minutes to 20,000 feet. |
|
21 minutes to 25,000 feet. |
|
Pairs: |
The rate of climb for a pair of squadrons in company will be 10 per cent to 12 per cent greater than the time given above. |
|
Wings: |
The rate of climb of wings of three squadrons is between 15 per cent and 18 per cent greater than the times given above. |
Rendezvous:
In view of the above, controllers will see the importance of ordering pairs or wings to rendezvous over a point at operating height in order that they climb quickly, singly, and not hold one another back by trying to climb in an unwieldy mass. Bitter experience has proved time and again that it is better to intercept the enemy with one squadron above him than by a whole wing crawling up below, probably after the enemy has dropped his bombs.
At 9 p.m. thirty Messerschmitts were heading for Hornchurch and central London. They hit Waterloo Station and blocked all but two of the lines. At 9.45 another fifty went for the city and at 11.20 more came in to attack points in Kent and the Estuary. By 12.20 a.m. 110 were plotted in the Straits but these did not mature into a full-scale attack.
At 6.30 p.m. Göring’s plans to use the full moon were developing. The attack on London was heavy and the destruction of two bombers by night fighters did little to compensate for the serious and widespread damage inflicted on the city. Train services were stopped at the five main stations. Traffic from others was cut by more than two-thirds. The city’s Underground railway system was severed at five places. Roads were blocked throughout the city and a reservoir, three gasworks, two power stations and three important docks were hit. There were 900 fires in London that night. Over 400 people were killed and more than 800 badly wounded.
In the day and night operations of Fighter Command 643 sorties were flown against the Luftwaffe, whose units lost fourteen machines—one less than the number lost by the R.A.F.
October 16th
Day Quiet
Night Limited attack on London by single raiders.
Weather Fog widespread in Germany and France. Warm front lying the length of French coast. Wet and misty night. Fog kept all but the more confident and competent Luftwaffe pilots on the ground. Those who flew struck out for Kent and the west of England. Seven caught by the R.A.F., who flew 275 sorties, failed to return. Six were destroyed in accidents. British losses numbered one plane.
It was not much better during the evening but at least 200 bomber crews chanced the mist and drizzle to raid the British Isles. R.A.F. bombers returning from Italy met with difficulties. Eight Whitleys crashed and a Czech-crewed Wellington came down on the Fight Command headquarters’ tennis court.
October 17th
Day Fighter-bomber attacks on Kent and London.
Night Targets in No. 11 Group area, Liverpool and Birmingham.
Weather Bright intervals. Local showers.
Limited visibility did much to mask the Luftwaffe whose raids started soon after breakfast. Ninety Me 109s and Me nos raided Margate, Broadstairs and Stanmore.
They were back after lunch and throughout the afternoon appeared in large and small concentrations or in streams, feinting, weaving, splitting up and then rejoining, using cloud to maximum effect, employing every ruse to elude and confuse the defences.
At one of London’s key arteries, Waterloo Station, a bomb smashed all automatic signalling and signal telephones. Fourteen inexperienced station staff and a handful of soldiers somehow kept trains moving using flags.
British fighters enjoyed a moderate success. They destroyed five enemy aircraft and lost three of their own in combat. Luftwaffe losses for the day totalled fifteen.
The speed and height at which the Messerschmitts flew continued to trouble Park, and in yet another attempt to counter their activities he issued these instructions:
ENGAGEMENT OF HIGH FIGHTER RAIDS
The general plan is to get one or two Spitfire squadrons to engage enemy fighters from above about mid-Kent, in order to cover other Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons whilst climbing to operating height at back patrol lines east and south of London.
Preparation
Whenever the cloud conditions are favourable for high raids by fighters the following preparations will be made:
(1) Reconnaissance Aircraft: One or two reconnaissance aircraft to be kept on patrol near the Kentish coast, height depending on cloud layers.
(2) Readiness Patrol: A patrol by one or two squadrons to be maintained on Maidstone line at 15,000 feet, between 0800 hours and 1800 hours.
(3) Stand-by Squadron: One squadron at sector providing patrol at (2) to be standing-by during the peak periods— breakfast, noon and early tea-time.
(4) London and Debden Squadrons: State of readiness of Hurricane squadrons to be advanced state whenever cloud conditions are suitable for very high fighter raids.
Attack
Immediately enemy formations are plotted over the French coast or Dover Straits, the following action will be initiated:
(1) Reconnaissance Aircraft: Despatched to the area enemy raids are plotted, to locate, shadow and report.
(2) Readiness Patrol: Ordered to climb to 30,000 on the Maidstone patrol line to cover other squadrons whilst climbing over base patrol lines.
(3) Stand-by Squadrons: Despatched to operating height over base, and then to join the readiness squadrons at 30,000 feet.
(4) Readiness Squadrons: Despatched to rendezvous over base at 20,000 to 27,000 feet, and when assembled, detailed to raids or forward patrol lines.
(5) Squadrons at Available, Spitfires: To be brought to readiness, and if necessary despatched to assemble in pairs on back patrol lines at 25,000 to 30,000 feet, and then detailed to raids.
(6) Squadrons at Available, Hurricanes: Brought to readiness, and if there is a second or third wave, assembled in pairs over back patrol lines so as to protect sector aerodromes and London area whilst climbing.
(7) Hurricane Squadrons from Tangmere and Debden: Despatch in wings or pairs at 20,000 to 27,000 feet according to time and weather conditions, of one of the following purposes:
(a) To reinforce London sectors if there is a second or third wave of enemy raids;
(b) To protect sector aerodromes and London area whilst the earlier squadrons are refuelling.
(8) Close Defence of Important Bombing Objectives: If enemy raids are approaching aircraft factories, London area, sector aerodromes, etc., single Hurricane squadrons that have not been included in pairs or wings should be detailed to protective patrols between 15,000 and 18,000 feet depending on clouds.
With recollections of the Luftwaffe’s August tactics, Park felt the Germans might renew their massed bomber raids. Accordingly he ordered the engagement of the enemy’s
high fighter screen with Spitfire squadrons from Hornchurch and Biggin Hill half-way between London and the coast, and so enable Hurrican squadrons from North Weald, Kenley and Northolt to attack bomber formations plus close escort before they reach the line of fighter aerodromes east and south of London.
The squadrons from Debden and Tangmere (if disengaged) to be despatched and employed in wings or pairs so as to form a screen east and south-east of London to intercept third or fourth wave coming inland, also the retreating earlier waves.
Spitfire Squadrons:
Assembled at height in pairs on the back patrol lines, then detailed to engage high fighter screen at 30,000 feet.
Role: To protect pairs or wings of Hurricane squadrons whilst climbing up, also while attacking bombers plus escort. If the high fighter screen withdraws to the coast a proportion of the Spitfires may be detailed to attack the escorts to incoming bomb raids.
Hurricane Squadrons:
Squadrons at readiness to be despatched in pairs to back patrol lines covering line of aerodromes. Immediately pairs have reached operating height, detail to bomb raids or to forward patrol lines under Spitfires. Squadrons at available to be brought to readiness and assembled in pairs at operating height on back patrol lines covering sector aerodromes, and detailed to second wave of bomb raids.
Whilst gaining height the latter squadrons may have to be detailed to split raids by bombers that attempt to attack vital points on the flank of the mass of bombers plus escort.
Luftwaffe personnel show members of the Regia Aeronautica over a German airfield in Belgium. The subject of interest is a collection of bullet holes made by the R.A.F. in a Heinkel 111. The Italian Air Force’s participation in the Battle of Britain was extremely brief and unfortunately not very effective
Hurricane Squadrons from Flank Sectors (Debden, Tangmere, and possibly Northolt):
Despatch in pairs or wings, according to clouds, to patrol mid-Kent patrol lines at 20,000 to 25,000 feet to engage:
(i)Third or fourth wave attacks of bombers plus escort;
(ii)Retreating bomb raids of first and second waves;
(iii)To protect fighter aerodromes whilst the earlier Hurricane and Spitfire squadrons are refuelling.
Reinforcements from other Groups:
Immediately the enemy numbers appear to be more than 150, request two to three squadrons to cover the northern approaches to London, or the south-western group of vital points near London, as directed in Controllers’ Instructions No. 7, dated August 27th, 1940.
In these orders can be seen the flexibility of mind displayed by Park. He was sometimes surprised by German tactics, but they never caught him off balance. He was equal to every challenge.
October 18th
Day Relatively quiet.
Night Raids on a reduced scale.
Weather Fog in Straits of Dover and Estuary; also in North Sea. Visibility poor.
After a fairly busy night the morning was unusually quiet. Between lunch and tea thirty-five raids were counted flying high over East Anglia. Forty-five R.A.F. fighter patrols were flown. Some intercepted and shot down four Luftwaffe machines. Total German losses were fifteen. The British lost four.
Night raids were on a reduced scale also, and by 1.45 a.m. the 160 bombers counted had returned home.
It is clear from an address to his aircrews that Göring did not realise what little impression his night bombers were making on British morale.
In the past few days and nights [he said] you have caused the British world enemy disastrous losses by your uninterrupted destructive blows. Your indefatigable, courageous attacks on the heart of the British Empire, the City of London, with its eight and a half million inhabitants, have reduced British plutocracy to fear and terror. The losses which you have inflicted on the much-vaunted Royal Air Force in determined fighter engagements are irreplaceable.
October 19th
Day Isolated patrols and reconnaissance.
Night London, Liverpool, midlands and Bristol main targets.
Weather Cloudy in Channel, mist in northern France clearing later.
Swirling mists gave the Germans an easy morning but where possible they mounted some patrols. One bomber sent out was brought down over Kent.
At lunchtime it began to clear and by 2 p.m. fourteen Me 109s had assembled over the Pas de Calais for a sweep on England. They steered for London unopposed but dropped no bombs. Later, a dog-fight over Beachy Head developed and two British fighters were shot down, bringing Fighter Command’s losses to five for the day. Two Germans failed to return home.
October was the month when the attack in daylight changed over largely to fighter-bomber attacks. One of the aircraft employed was the Me 110 with a belly bomb rack. Here an Me 110 of III/ZG 26 ‘Horst Wessel’ is being loaded with a bomb prior to a raid on southern England
October 20th
Day Fighter-bomber raids on south-east and London.
Night Heavy attacks on London and industrial centres in the midlands.
Weather Mainly cloudy in most districts. Channel and Straits cloudy, Hazy.
All was quiet until 9.35 a.m. when the first of five Messerschmitt waves were plotted on R.D.F. In the afternoon high-flying raiders again penetrated inland.
Squadrons of Fighter Command flew 475 sorties and lost four of their machines. German losses were fourteen aircraft.
Nearly 300 bombers gave London a bad night. Traffic was dislocated by severe damage to the railways. In Coventry the Armstrong-Siddeley and Singer Motor Works were hit.
Eleven night-fighter sorties were flown, but they were not successful. Dowding reported that the Beau-fighter squadrons were having trouble with their airborne interception radar equipment and their aircraft.
Quoting the case of No. 219 Squadron, Dowding said that at 4 p.m. on October 19th the unit had four Beaufighters ready for night operations. By dusk they were all unserviceable.
Although there was not a single item for which a cure would not be found, it was the aggregation of defects which hindered rapid progress.
What depressed Dowding was that the Germans could fly and bomb with considerable accuracy in weather which prevented British fighters leaving the ground.
Fighter Command’s task, he said, would not be finished until ‘we can locate, pursue and shoot down the enemy in cloud by day and by night’. The A.I. had to become a gunsight. They had a long way to go before approaching this ideal, but nothing less would suffice for the defence of the country.
Every night Dowding spent watching attempts at interception strengthened his conviction that haphazard methods would never succeed in producing more than an occasional fortunate encounter and that night interception depended on the laborious development of a system, the defects of which would have to be eliminated by means of practical trials and thoughtful analysis of the results.
While the Battle of Britain dragged on, the weapons of reprisal were being forged. The first squadron of four-engined Stirling bombers was in formation by September and trials were advanced with the Manchester and Halifax long-range bombers. One of the most potent weapons of the air war, the Mosquito, was nearing the flight test stage in an imitation barn at Salisbury Hall, five miles west of Hatfield. The picture shows the prototype de Havilland Mosquito under construction in October 1940. This prototype first flew on November 25th, 1940
October 21st
Day Sporadic raids on capital, Liverpool and West Country.
Night London, Wolverhampton, Coventry, Birmingham and Liverpool main targets.
Weather Mainly cloudy with fog and intermittent rain. Visibility poor.
Taking advantage of the overcast, single aircraft and small formations of bombers despatched by Luftflotten 2 and 3 reached widely separated targets in England.
Between 11 a.m. and 1 p.m. the number of raids increased. About sixty machines flying singly flew in from the Continent and dropped bombs on London and the suburbs. About fifteen were detected going to the West Country.
The weather clearly put the British at a disadvantage and in the course of the day Fighter Command squadrons flew only 275 sorties. They lost no aircraft whereas six German planes were destroyed. One of these, a Ju 88 which had been posing as a Blenheim and machine-gunning the airfield at Old Sarum, Hampshire, from a height of about fifty feet, was shot down by Flight Lieutenant F. J. Howell and Pilot Officer S. J. Hill.
Howell dived to decide what it was [says the No. 609 Squadron record book] and even after making sure that it was a Ju 88 with a big cross, was surprised to see the rear gunner signalling with smoke cartridges. Both pilots attacked in turn and after an unusual chase above and below the tree-tops the enemy aircraft hit the ground and blew up near Lymington.
Fog and intermittent rain did not hinder the Luftwaffe during the night. London, the midlands and Liverpool were raided. Bombs on the south-east coast temporarily affected several radar stations.
October 22nd
Day Quiet morning and afternoon.
Night London, Coventry and Liverpool main targets.
Weather Widespread fog in the south, clearing to rain later. Visibility poor.
With No. 12 Group now receiving the same indications of hostile activity as No. 11 Group, it must have been galling for the Duxford Wing to be grounded by a thick fog which closed all but Tangmere, Kenley and Biggin Hill and the airfields of No. 10 Group.
The morning was therefore quiet with the Luftwaffe content to despatch a few small fighter-bomber raids. At 2 p.m., however, a big formation began to form up over north-east France and three raids totalling thirty-six aircraft were plotted. The expected raid on London did not materialise, but a convoy off Dover and two in the Estuary were unsuccessfully attacked.
October 5th, 1940; children settle down to sleep on the platform of a London Underground station. Every night thousands of people sought shelter in this way and in the mornings climbed blinking into the daylight to resume their normal lives; many found their homes destroyed
At 4 p.m. four small raids of about thirty-three machines were plotted flying high. Convoy ‘Fruit’ off Dover called for help and Uxbridge diverted two squadrons to cover it. Six other squadrons intercepted the main German formation and a dog-fight developed over Dungeness.
The Luftwaffe lost eleven aircraft—four in combat, the rest in operational accidents. Fighter Command lost six planes.
Poor weather limited night operations, but Coventry, Liverpool and London were raided.
October 23rd
Day Mainly reconnaissance.
Night London and Glasgow raided. Minelaying off Yorkshire coast.
Weather Low cloud and drizzle. Visibility poor.
For Fighter Command this was the quietest day of the Battle of Britain. Hampered by the weather, the squadrons flew ninety sorties. They lost six planes, however. The Germans, who made some minor raids on London, the midlands and the Thames estuary, lost four machines.
London Bridge, St. Pancras Station, Victoria Docks, East Ham and Watford were hit by night raiders. In the north Glasgow was bombed by Stavanger-based aircraft. One fouled a balloon cable and crashed into the sea.
October 24th
Day Very quiet.
Night London and Birmingham main targets.
Weather Overcast and hazy in Channel, clearing to starlit sky at night.
Apart from a few reconnaissance patrols, the morning was quiet. A single raider crossed the coast at Southwold, Suffolk, and penetrated as far as the midlands. It was shot down at St. Neots, Huntingdonshire, on its return flight.
During the afternoon nuisance raids over the southeast and East Anglia kept British pilots on the alert. They flew 476 sorties without loss and shot down two hostile aircraft. The Germans, nevertheless, lost eight operational machines.
Nearly a month had now elapsed since Park and Leigh-Mallory had clashed over their respective tactics. But Dowding had been so preoccupied that he had been able to do little about the controversy. The lull on the 24th gave him an opportunity to pen a memorandum.
In it he asked Park to give Leigh-Mallory as much notice as possible of a ‘probable intention to call for assistance’, and warned Leigh-Mallory that Park would seldom be able to tell whether he needed help until preliminary symptoms indicated the manner in which an attack would develop. ‘It may often happen,’ said Dowding to his group commanders, ‘that the first raid had been met in strength by No. 11 Group and that the assistance of No. 12 Group is required when it is seen that further raids are building up over the Straits of Dover.’
The railway bridge at Blackfriars with wrecked trams and other vehicles. The picture was taken on the morning of October 25th and the cameraman himself narrowly missed injury as the bomb burst
Park, he continued, had to remember Leigh-Mallory’s requirements with regard to warning; even if there were doubts about the need for help, Dowding asked that warning should be given to enable No. 12 Group to bring units to readiness at stand-by.
Leigh-Mallory, he continued, should not send less reinforcements than asked for if he is in a position to meet the requirements, but he may send more at his discretion.
‘It may be imperatively necessary,’ Dowding went on, ‘that No. 12 Group shall keep No. 11 Group informed of the position of his formations which should not normally penetrate beyond the range of R/T control.’
To save time communications between groups were to be direct. Only in cases of inability to comply with a request for reinforcements, or a difference of opinion, was the channel of communication to be through Fighter Command’s operations room, concluded the commander-in-chief.
London was attacked again during the night. About fifty machines were over the capital. Seventy other bombers were detected heading for widely separated targets, including Bkmingham.
Only one successful interception was made—by an A.I. equipped Beaufighter of No. 219 Squadron off Beachy Head. The pilot reported damaging the enemy plane.
October 25th
Day Fighter-bomber raids on Kent and London.
Night Italian Air Force raids Harwich.
Weather Fair but overcast.
How far the Luftwaffe succeeded in reducing business and industrial output cannot be calculated. Suffice it to say that the Germans certainly succeeded in disrupting the normal industrial life of the country more often than most Britons would care to reckon.
One thing they did not succeed in doing, however, was to undermine morale. After each raid, whatever the district hit and whatever the suffering, the inhabitants cheered the Civil Defence forces, went on planting flowers round their Anderson air raid shelters and shouting defiance at Hitler and the German Air Force in the fruitiest of Cockney terms. And so they continued as on this day a sprinkling of Do 17s surrounded by fighters renewed the Luftwaffe’s assault on the capital.
Signs of activity showed on the radar screens as the first business commuters were disgorging from London’s deepest shelters—the Underground railway stations. High over Kent they flew, only to be dispersed by Hurricanes and Spitfires, several of them newer and more powerful than those which had borne the brunt of the earlier battles.
Kent took the full force of the bombs released indiscriminately as the R.A.F. dived on the German bombers and fighters, although London came in for a share.
Raids continued throughout the day, during which 809 Fighter Command sorties were flown. Twenty German machines were destroyed. Ten R.A.F. machines were lost.
In Belgium, meanwhile, an excited band of Italians of the Reggia Aeronautica’s Corpo Aereo Italiano prepared for their first direct action against Britain. They were there more as a political gesture than as a serious military effort, and had been despatched by Mussolini as a reply to the embarrassing raids Bomber Command were flying against industrial targets in northern Italy.
The two Fiat BR.20 bomber units, Nos. 13 and 43 Stormos, were allocated the bases of Moelsbroek and Chievres. No. 18 Gruppo with Fiat CR.42 biplane fighters went to Moldegchen and No. 20 Gruppo with Fiat G.50 fighters was sent to Usel. A fifth unit, No. 172 Squadrillia, equipped with CZ.1007 Bis aircraft was allocated Chievres.
On this October Friday 16 BR.20S were despatched to bomb Harwich. One of them crashed on take-off and two were abandoned over the sea after running out of fuel.
According to Milch, Mussolini’s contingent was more of a liability than an asset. The men themselves were not to blame. They were excellent pilots, but they had not been trained to fight.
That their presence was unheralded is understandable. They were indistinguishable from the streams of German night bombers that crossed into Britain from bases in France, the Low Countries and Scandinavia.
October 26th
Day Fighter-bomber raids on London and Kent.
Night Targets in London, the midlands, Manchester and Liverpool.
Weather Cloudy with local showers chiefly in the north and east. Bright intervals in the west. Channel hazy. Cool.
The whole of London was now under the lash of Göring’s night blitz and as the German News Agency put it inadvertently at the time: ‘Bombs fell all over the place.’ The New York Herald Tribune summed up the situation more accurately, ‘What appears to be happening,’ it said, ‘is that the Germans have found the defences too strong for their daylight attack, permitting accurate fire, and so are putting their effort into night attack … But against a people with courage it is unlikely to prove fruitful … and there is no doubt of British courage.’
The Luftwaffe was keeping up the pressure in daylight, but now it has to reckon with a greater measure of co-ordination between Park and Leigh-Mallory.
Part outlined the arrangements made for the Duxford wing operating in the No. 11 Group area.
The No. 12 Group Controller [he instructed] will advise the A.O.C. or the Duty Controller of the hours between which the Duxford wing will be at readiness. This information will if possible be given by 0900 hours daily in order to fit the Duxford wing into the programme for the day.
As soon as the Group Controller gets a clear indication of raids building up over the French coast he is to request No. 12 Group Controller to despatch the Duxford wing to patrol east of London on approximate line north and south through Hornchurch. The arrival of the wing patrol will be communicated to No. 11 Group Controller who will indicate to the No. 12 Group Controller the best position in the Estuary or northern Kent to which the wing should be directed to effect an interception.
The No. 12 Group Controller will inform No. 11 Group immediately the Duxford wing has left the ground.
No. 11 Group Controller is then to inform Senior Controller of Hornchurch who is to fix the position of the Duxford wing. This will be possible as two aircraft of the VHF squadron in the Duxford wing are fitted with Hornchurch fixer crystals (one working, one in reserve).
On arrival on the patrol line Hornchurch will give zero to the Duxford wing on its operational frequency. Hornchurch will hold a crystal of the leading squadron’s frequency in the Duxford wing and set up a channel on air frequency with R/T facilities as indicated. Hornchurch Controller will be able to fix the Duxford wing and inform the Observer Corps liaison officer, flank sector and group operations of the position of the Duxford wing at frequent intervals.
On the 26th the Luftwaffe kept the whole of southeast England on the alert. Raids started early in the morning and began to intensify after 10 a.m. when high-flying fighter sweeps started to penetrate from the Channel. Maidstone, London and convoys in the Thames estuary were bombed, and off the north-west coast of Ireland a FW 200 bombed and set fire to the 42,000 ton liner Empress of Britain.
Fighter Command mounted 732 sorties. Ten German and two British planes were destroyed.
Although airborne in reasonable numbers British night-fighter pilots again had the galling experience of failing to intercept the raids which disturbed the Saturday-night pleasures of thousands all over Britain.
October 27th
Day Mainly fighter and fighter-bomber sweeps.
Night Widespread raids with London the principal target.
Weather Cloudy all day except for fair period in late morning.
The two Luftflotten made an early start and by 7.45 a.m. were raiding London and convoys in the estuary with a series of formations of as many as fifty aircraft.
By 9 a.m. the London suburbs had been hit and the docks damaged. Further sweeps were flown later in the morning and early in the afternoon. At 4.30 p.m. the Germans raided Southampton, London and Martlesham Heath simultaneously.
To repulse the attackers Fighter Command pilots flew 1,007 sorties. Ten British aircraft were shot down, but only five of the pilots were killed. The Germans lost fifteen machines.
Unknown to Fighter Command, however, they had driven off the penultimate major assault in the Battle of Britain.
A postman searches in vain for the residents of a smashed house in London in October. Even postmen had been issued with steel helmets and of course carried the inevitable gas mask. On the railing outside the ruin hangs a Union Jack
The night was marked by the usual attacks on London, the south-eastern counties, Liverpool and Bristol, but they differed in detail. In addition to bombing, the Germans made a point of machine-gunning aerodromes in eastern England, including Leconfield, Driffield, Coltishall, Hawkinge, Kirton-in-Lindsey, Feltwell and Honington.
October 28th
Day Convoy off Dover and shipping in the Estuary attacked. London the main afternoon target.
Night Widespread attacks throughout the country.
Weather Misty in northern France. Fog over Estuary and Straits, clearing later. Cloudy.
Mist in northern France restricted the Germans to nuisance raids by single aircraft which also attacked some ships in the Channel.
They were more active in the afternoon when two raids of twenty and one of forty aircraft flew in over Kent. At 4.30 p.m. fifty more planes crossed the coast at Folkestone and headed for London. They were followed by more than 100 German machines which flew in in four waves.
British fighters, which flew 639 sorties, fought off the Messerschmitts and lost two planes in the fighting. Eleven German aircraft were destroyed.
That night Nos. 85 and 247 squadrons intercepted and fired on two bombers caught by searchlights. The daylight battle was dying out but Fighter Command was only just beginning to get the measure of the task it had to undertake at night.
October 29th
Day London and Southampton main targets.
Night Heavy raids on the capital and midlands.
Weather Channel overcast. Haze in northern France and Dover Straits. Winds southerly.
In what seems in retrospect like a last convulsive spasm, the Luftwaffe pilots gave of their best. By 11 a.m. thirty of them were fighting it out with British fighters over Kent, although some managed to escape the net to attack Charing Cross bridge.
On the morning of October 3rd a Junkers 88 of Stab/KG 77 took off from Laon to attack Reading. Bad visibility led the aircraft astray and, by accident, Hatfield appeared. At about 60 feet the Ju 88 made two runs hitting the sheet metal shop and the technical school building, killing 21 and wounding 70. Hit by A.A. guns and small arms fire the aircraft crashed, on fire, at Hertingfordbury. The above photograph shows the damage at Hatfield while the picture below is of the burned-out Ju 88.
In the second phase of the day’s assault ninety minutes later. No. 602 City of Glasgow Squadron distinguished themselves by shooting down eight Messerschmitts in ten minutes. With three other squadrons No. 602 were given a tactical advantage by their positioning and height. Moreover, they were able to achieve greater success by working in pairs.
The encounter developed thus: No. 222 Squadron climbed to deliver an attack on the enemy from the rear. No. 602 attacked simultaneously from above, just as Nos. 615 and 229 Squadrons were climbing for height. Outmanœuvred, the invaders turned for home, whereupon No. 602 gave chase and shot a further four down into the Channel.
While Luftflotte 3 were raiding Portsmouth with two groups of fifty and twelve machines, fifteen Italian BR.20 bombers and seventy-three Fiat fighters attacked Ramsgate.
It was not until November that the first Italians were shot down on British soil. They included three Fiat CR.42 biplane fighters and three Fiat BR20 bombers, all of which came down in East Anglia. One of the bombers carried the surprisingly large crew of six. They wore tin hats and were armed with bayonets.
By the end of the day Fighter Command had recovered its old ratio of victories and destroyed nineteen of the enemy for a loss of seven of its own machines.
October 30th
Day Nuisance raids on reduced scale.
Night Activity reduced.
Weather Low cloud and continuous drizzle in all areas.
It was not until 11.30 a.m. that the first plots began to appear on the operations rooms tables. They were comparatively small. At midday eighty raiders flew into the Estuary and at 12.15 two waves of fifty and sixty machines penetrated via Dymchurch. Ten R.A.F. squadrons were on patrol at the time, and of these six sighted the raiders. No. 81 Squadron shot down two of them.
Luftflotte 3 fighters were responsible for the next flurry of activity when they despatched a succession of raids totalling 130 machines. These started to cross the coast at 4.15 p.m. and some reached London.
Eight German planes were destroyed. The British lost five.
The first night raiders appeared soon after dark, but the weather was closing in and by midnight none was left over Britain.
October 31st
Day Fighter bomber and fighter sweeps.
Night Activity greatly reduced.
Weather Drizzle in the Channel. Haze in the Estuary and Dover Straits.
The rains came, as it were, to douse the last remaining embers of a bonfire. A few of them spat, however, into sixty half-hearted incursions across the Channel. By nightfall the Battle of Britain was over.
For all the effort put into this phase the Germans achieved singularly little of strategic value. They were no nearer invasion and the sky was no less fraught with danger for the long-range daylight bombers than it had been in earlier phases.
It would be inaccurate to suggest the Germans relaxed the pressure on Fighter Command or indeed that October was an anticlimax. On the contrary, in many ways October gave British fighter pilots one of the most severe tests of the whole Battle of Britain.
The physical strain of fighting at great heights was exacting. The continuous German fighter sweeps and rapid fighter-bomber attacks called for far greater vigilance and operational activity.
When the weather was clear and the Luftwaffe was able to multiply its attacks, British fighter squadrons of twelve aircraft averaged forty-five hours flying a day and occasionally as much as sixty hours. The volume of operational flying was also increased by the need to maintain standing patrols over Kent.
These counter-measures were an effective reply to the high-flying tactics of the Luftwaffe, but they shattered one of the basic principles of Fighter Command organisation, namely economy of effort by keeping planes grounded until they were needed.
The casualties and damage inflicted on the fighter squadrons by the night raiders were insignificant, but the bombing kept many awake and this had an effect on efficiency. Fatigue began to tell not only on the pilots but on staff in the operations rooms.
German losses in October were comparatively large— 325 planes. Fighter Command’s losses in terms of pilots were 100 killed and eighty-five wounded—more than half of them in No. 11 Group.
During the war the Air Ministry claimed that between July 10th and October 31st a total of 2,698 German aircraft had been destroyed. Actually the Germans lost 1,733. Luftwaffe’s claims were even more exaggerated. The German High Command’s figures for the period were 3,058 British planes destroyed. In fact the R.A.F. lost 915.
Both air forces were bereaved of irreplaceable men, most of them in the flower of their youth. Counting pilots alone, Britain lost 415.
In contrast it is interesting to note that 451 pilots went through the whole of the Battle and that 217 had been operational since the outbreak of war. The record for service goes to Flight Lieutenant J. C. Freeborn. He was posted to No. 74 Squadron on October 29th, 1938, and was still with the squadron at the end of November 1940.
It was estimated in the summer of the Battle that every pilot kept in action for more than six months would be shot down because he was exhausted or stale, or even because he had lost the will to fight. In terms of flying hours the fighter pilot’s life expectancy could be measured at eighty-seven.
During that crucial summer the average pilot rarely got more than twenty-four hours off in seven days, or seven days a quarter—if he could be spared from constant availability, readiness and actual fighting.
Among public figures Churchill was the first to grasp the significance of the job they had done. He summed it up in what was perhaps his most famous speech of all. ‘Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.’
FIGHTER COMMAND ORDER OF BATTLE November 3rd, 1940
|
14 GROUP, HEADQUARTERS INVERNESS |
||
|
Wick |
||
|
3 |
Hurricane† |
Castletown |
|
Dyce |
||
|
145 |
Hurricane† |
A Flight Dyce B Flight Montrose |
|
13 GROUP, HEADQUARTERS NEWCASTLE |
||
|
Turnhouse |
||
|
607 |
Hurricane† |
Turnhouse |
|
65 |
Spitfire |
Turnhouse |
|
232 |
Hurricane† |
Drem (one flight) |
|
263 |
Hurricane† |
Drem (one flight) |
|
1 |
Hurricane† |
Prestwick (R.C.A.F.) |
|
Usworth |
||
|
43 |
Hurricane† |
Usworth |
|
32 |
Hurricane† |
Acklington |
|
610 |
Spitfire† |
Acklington |
|
Catterick |
||
|
54 |
Spitfire† |
Catterick |
|
600 |
Blenheim* |
Catterick |
|
12 GROUP, HEADQUARTERS WATNALL |
||
|
Kirton-in-Lindsey |
||
|
616 |
Spitfire† |
Kirton-in-Lindsey |
|
85 |
Hurricane* |
Kirton-in-Lindsey |
|
Church Fenton |
||
|
303 |
Hurricane† |
Leconfield (Polish) |
|
Digby |
||
|
151 |
Hurricane* |
Digby |
|
Coltishall |
||
|
72 |
Spitfire† |
Coltishall |
|
64 |
Spitfire† |
Coltishall |
|
Wittering |
||
|
1 |
Hurricane† |
Wittering |
|
266 |
Spitfire† |
Wittering |
|
29 |
Blenheim* |
Wittering (one flight) |
|
Duxford |
||
|
242 |
Hurricane |
Duxford |
|
310 |
Hurricane |
Duxford (Czech) |
|
19 |
Spitfire |
Duxford |
|
11 GROUP, HEADQUARTERS UXBRIDGE |
||
|
Debden |
||
|
25 |
Blenheim |
Debden |
|
and |
||
|
Beaufighter* |
||
|
73 |
Hurricane* |
Castle Camp |
|
North Weald |
||
|
257 |
Hurricane |
North Weald |
|
249 |
Hurricane |
North Weald |
|
46 |
Hurricane |
Stapleford |
|
17 |
Hurricane |
Martlesham |
|
Hornchurch |
||
|
264 |
Defiant* |
Hornchurch |
|
41 |
Spitfire |
Hornchurch |
|
603 |
Spitfire |
Hornchurch |
|
222 |
Spitfire |
Rochford |
|
Biggin Hill |
||
|
74 |
Spitfire |
Biggin Hill |
|
92 |
Spitfire |
Biggin Hill |
|
141 |
Defiant* |
Gravesend |
|
66 |
Spitfire |
West Mailing |
|
421 |
Hurricane‡ |
West Mailing (flight) |
|
Kenley |
||
|
253 |
Hurricane |
Kenley |
|
501 |
Hurricane |
Kenley |
|
605 |
Hurricane |
Croydon |
|
219 |
Blenheim |
Redhill |
|
and |
||
|
Beaufighter* |
||
|
Northolt |
||
|
229 |
Hurricane |
Northolt |
|
615 |
Hurricane |
Northolt |
|
302 |
Hurricane |
Northolt (Polish) |
|
Tangmere |
||
|
145 |
Hurricane |
Tangmere |
|
213 |
Hurricane |
Tangmere |
|
602 |
Spitfire |
Westhampnett |
|
23 |
Blenheim* |
Ford |
|
422 |
Hurricane*‡ |
Tangmere (one flight) |
|
10 GROUP, HEADQUARTERS BOX, WILTSHIRE |
||
|
Pembrey |
||
|
79 |
Hurricane† |
Pembrey |
|
Filton |
||
|
504 |
Hurricane† |
Filton |
|
601 |
Hurricane† |
Exeter |
|
87 |
Hurricane |
Exeter |
|
St. Eval |
||
|
234 |
Spitfire† |
St. Eval |
|
247 |
Gladiator† |
Roborough (one flight) |
|
Middle Wallop |
||
|
609 |
Spitfire |
Middle Wallop |
|
604 |
Blenheim* |
Middle Wallop |
|
56 |
Hurricane |
Boscombe Down |
|
238 |
Hurricane |
Middle Wallop |
|
152 |
Spitfire |
Warmwell |
|
9 GROUP, HEADQUARTERS PRESTON |
||
|
Speke |
||
|
312 |
Hurricane† |
Speke (Czech) |
|
Ternhill |
||
|
611 |
Spitfire† |
Ternhill |
|
29 |
Blenheim* |
Ternhill (one flight) |
* Denotes Night Fighter Squadron.
† Denotes C Class Squadron.
‡ Flights during the Battle of Britain and not squadrons—which they became later with different numbers.
All other squadrons were A except for 65 and 87, which were B.