19
By November the Battle of Britain was over. It petered out as the Luftwaffe withdrew from the daylight assault and winter set in.
Losses during the Battle were heavy and German and British crews suffered severely from physical and nervous strain. The Luftwaffe, which was a tactical air force, for four months fought a strategic battle but had little to show for its all-out effort. Britain was not invaded and Fighter Command, though weary and battered, was undefeated.
Early in November Göring issued new orders for the attack on Britain, by night. They showed a clear-cut change of policy with the whole weight of the offensive concentrated on bombing major cities, industries and ports.
The Luftwaffe and the R.A.F. began to rebuild and reorganise. In Britain there was continued expansion for the rest of the war while the German Air Force was brought back to the operational strength it enjoyed before France was invaded.
The High Command made no changes in the structure of the air force or its equipment. If Germany had learned the lessons of the Battle radical changes would have been made. The fighter force would have been doubled and four-engined planes would have replaced the medium bombers such as the Do 17 and He 111. As winter set in Hitler focused his attention on the invasion of Russia. The problems presented by Britain and the R.A.F. were pigeon-holed.
In the final analysis the outcome was dependent on political systems and personalities. In Germany the Nazi party was all-powerful. Hitler considered himself a military genius but his knowledge of air warfare was extremely limited. He disliked aircraft and air weapons. The direction of air warfare he left to Göring who as a commander and strategist had few qualifications. His flying knowledge was out of date and his understanding of technical subjects non-existent. The correct application of the air force which Milch built up was more than he could grasp.
The Luftwaffe lacked any long-term directive on economic warfare or any real guidance from above. After Colonel Wever’s death in 1936 battle planning became a hand-to-mouth affair. The whole organisation was bedevilled with petty jealousies and intrigues arising from the haphazard way in which officials acquired senior jobs. Instead of providing central direction and efficiency the totalitarian state produced only rigidity of thought and disorganisation on a grand scale.
Göring’s commanders, Kesselring and Sperrle, who bore the brunt of the air war against Britain, also lacked a positive strategic plan of action. They committed the errors of underestimating the enemy and being inflexible in their thinking.
The prime example of German inflexibility occurred over radar. Nothing was done to provide an operational system to work with the warning stations. German equipment was brilliantly conceived but laboratory instruments took years to develop. In a country noted for scientific achievement the application of radar was strangely disregarded.
The R.A.F.’s radar may have lacked polish and refinement but it worked and was appreciated. By improvisation, co-operation and experiment British radar remained one step ahead of Germany’s throughout the war. Through what was little short of German naivety and conceit the integration of radar into the British defence system remained undetected.
Britain was an easy-going democracy where central direction and concise planning might have appeared illogical. Sufficient work on rearmament and expansion was done, however, by such men as Lord Swinton to ensure a fair chance of survival. From 1935 to 1940 money and effort were directed towards combating the menace of the bomber.
With the arrival in power of Winston Churchill overall direction of the war effort was obtained without the loss of democratic freedom. The British system was sufficiently flexible to allow for improvisation and rapid changes of plan where necessary.
Churchill trusted Dowding and left the task of air defence almost entirely to him in the summer of 1940. Churchill interfered only where he thought assistance could be given to Fighter Command’s efforts. Such an instance occurred in July when he directed a memorandum to the three services calling for fighter-pilot reinforcements.
He drew the reins of High Command together and above all raised public morale and instilled a sense of purpose into a country bored and depressed by Chamberlain and the ‘phoney war’.
Dowding was comewhat of an enigma. To the outside world he carried the air of a University don. This was misleading. He was dedicated to the task of defending Britain against air attack and he would go to any lengths to ensure that the forces were matched to the task. From 1936 he nursed the ‘system’ into a working entity’
Dowding was not a familiar figure to the pilots he commanded. He was seldom seen in the squadrons and he did not mix easily with his subordinates. There was, in fact, an extraordinary contrast between the A.O.C.-in-C. and the pilots of Fighter Command.
The pilots cultivated a rakish and light-hearted approach to life. They affected to despise the external manifestations of service discipline and disregarded the more pompous conventions of King’s Regulations whenever possible.
Dowding did not fit their ideal at all. He was withdrawn and aloof. He had distinguished himself more as a staff officer than as a pilot and wild parties were certainly not in his line.
Nevertheless there existed between these two extremes a close bond of mutual respect and admiration. Nothing was too good for Dowding’s pilots. He would fight any opposition and risk the displeasure of the highest authorities to get them what they needed. Churchill once called them his chicks.
In turn the pilots called him ‘Stuffy’, not in contempt but rather affection for a trusted ‘father figure’.
Dowding and Park received scant recognition for their efforts. After the Battle Dowding was retired and asked to do various mediocre jobs including the investigating of service waste and touring the United States.
For Park there were only brickbats. Archibald Sinclair and Leigh-Mallory, supported by Sholto Douglas, decided that much greater losses could have been inflicted on the Luftwaffe if the ‘big wing’ theories had been adopted in No. 11 Group.
At one meeting Park was subjected to criticism for his handling of the Battle and Squadron Leader D. Bader was called in to give his views. The presence of a squadron leader among such senior officers was unprecedented.
The meeting had already made up its mind about the outcome and from this time forward the big wings held sway. Park was posted to Flying Training Command, Leigh-Mallory took over No. 11 Group and Sholto Douglas became Air Officer Commanding Fighter Command in place of Dowding.
In retrospect it is clear that Park was correct in his handling of No. 11 Group and that the full-scale introduction of wing tactics into the southern battle would have been disastrous. In most cases the wings would have become unmanageable as the squadrons were on different radio frequencies and could not communicate with one another.
To allow the Germans to destroy vital targets at will was the complete negation of air defence regardless of the number of aircraft shot down afterwards. If such tactics had been pursued in 1940, the whole sector airfield and control system would have been reduced to a shambles by the Luftwaffe.
With control gone and airfields scarce, the big wings would have been hard put to it to get airborne or find the enemy. The obvious choice for the German Air Force if such tactics were used would have been to disperse the bombers immediately after the attack and fly in further waves of fighters to meet the wings.
Throughout the Battle of Britain the Germans were mainly concerned by their failure to attract enough British fighters into action at one time to make a real impression on Fighter Command. Park’s forward interception caused fighter and bomber formations to be broken up before they reached the target and in many cases the fighter escort became involved at such an early stage that bombers flew on alone and vulnerable.
Big wings would have suited the Luftwaffe far better. Its plans were laid in the hope that Park would put up large formations to deal with one mass attack over one area while another equally large force attacked another.
If Park had succumbed to the big wing theories he would have had one pitched battle with serious casualties on both sides while in a different area one or two major raids would have got through inscathed. As it was, a very high proportion of all raids were intercepted on the way in despite feints and attacks on a broad front. The classic example of this occurred on August 15th.
The essence of the controversy between Nos. 11 and 12 Groups lay in personalities. Park was a brilliant defensive tactician while Leigh-Mallory had leanings towards offence. The two were incompatible.
The objects of a fighter force in 1940 were twofold (a) Defence and (b) Offence.
The first task of a fighter force commander in defence was to prevent an enemy bombing force hitting its assigned targets. To do this he had often to forgo tactics which would involve heavier enemy losses in order to concentrate on preventing hostile bombers achieving their objectives.
A fighter commander had to consider the number of serviceable fighters he possessed and could maintain from day to day as compared with enemy bomber forces, the time available based on geography and the performance of his fighter aircraft, between warning of approach of enemy bombers and the point of interception, and the width of front to be covered.
The number of serviceable fighters determined the deployment in width of front while the time required for interception determined the deployment of squadrons in depth. Formation size was a function of time available for forming up. This was usually very little.
In the initial stages and for most of the Battle the ratio of serviceable R.A.F. fighters to the known size of the German bomber force prevented Park from using other than small formations, often single squadrons. The time required for interception made the rapid deployment of the first-line squadrons south of the Thames imperative and the extensive width of front ruled out the employment of large formations.
Towards the end of the Battle Park was able to employ wings of two, three or more squadrons more often, but this was only made possible by the changed tactics of the Luftwaffe.
In offence the primary task of Fighter Command was to destroy as many enemy aircraft as possible. In these circumstances large fighter formations were more economical than small ones.
In the ‘trailing the coat’ campaign over France 1941 to 1944 Fighter Command was not faced with the problem of interception. It was therefore able to use the distance from British fighter bases to the south coast to form up. Moreover, the ‘width of front’ problem vanished together with the paramount requirement for preventing enemy bombers flying in unimpeded.
The Battle of Britain and the ‘trailing the coat’ campaign were two entirely different ‘wars’.
At all costs Park, in 1940, had to preserve the physical well being of his pilots. To assist this he laid down State of Preparedness whereby at each station there was one squadron at Readiness and two other squadrons at 15 and 30 minutes Available respectively.
It was found under this scheme that the two Readiness squadrons (from Biggin Hill and Hornchurch) had to make a very rushed air rendezvous.
The states were therefore modified so that, in the morning, there were two Readiness squadrons at Hornchurch and one at 15 minutes, while Biggin Hill had one squadron at Readiness and two at 15 minutes Available. The positions were reversed in the afternoon. The three Hurricane squadrons at Kenley and North Weald maintained similar states.
The essence of all this was to get a high flying pair of Spitfire squadrons up above the danger spot at an early stage in the proceedings.
Leigh Mallory at 12 Group was well clear of the main bombing area and was obsessed with wing formations.
His task was to come to the assistance of 11 Group when enemy raids had built up to about 150 aircraft. A 12 Group wing was thereupon supposed to assist in attacking later enemy formations and guard 11 Group airfields while refuelling and rearming was going on.
In the event the 12 Group wings never seemed to appear when the need was desperate. Park became suspicious and called for close plotting by the Observer Corps. The Observer tracks thus produced often showed the 12 Group wing looking for the enemy in the Thames Estuary or beyond when they should have been back around Tilbury.
Park was furious and expressed his feelings in a very strong letter to Fighter Command. A copy of this letter is understood to have reached Leigh Mallory, which only served to increase the enmity between the two Group commanders.
The vindication of Park’s basic theories came in 1941. Leigh Mallory, by then at 11 Group, decided to run a paper battle exercise using the actual attacks which took place on one day in September 1940.
He controlled the ‘battle’ using big wing tactics. To his chagrin the Luftwaffe hit his three main airfields while the fighters were still on the ground. Leigh Mallory found himself trying to order wings of three squadrons off each station when one was at Readiness, the second at 15 minutes and the third at 30 minutes Available. Needless to say such paper exercises were not repeated.
British fighter pilots had no fear whatsoever of the German bombers which were easy prey for the Hurricanes and Spitfires. The He 111s, Do 17s and 215s and the Ju 88s were not fast enough, particularly when operating in formation. Moreover, they were indifferently armed. They could rarely bring more than one gun to bear on an attacking fighter.
The attitude towards the Me 109 was different. This type was very effective and accounted for most of the losses suffered by Fighter Command during the battle. It was as fast as the Spitfire, considerably faster than the Hurricane and it would out-dive and out-climb either. Its armament was formidable. Half a dozen explosive shells from its cannon could do far more damage than the equivalent length of burst of Browning rounds. On the other hand, the firing rate of the Brownings was much higher, which gave the British pilots a better chance of scoring with a short burst.
In one vital respect the Me 109 was at a disadvantage. It could be out-turned by the Spitfire and the Hurricane. This was a serious handicap to the Luftwaffe pilots assigned to escorting bombers. Their freedom of action was curtailed. They were therefore unable to pursue the tactics best suited to their aircraft. They never found a way round this problem and their difficulties were aggravated when Göring, infuriated by the losses inflicted on his bombers, ordered the fighters to stay closer still to their charges.
At the beginning of the battle the German fighters used their speed to advantage which, coupled with their more recently evolved tactics, played havoc with the antiquated practices of Fighter Command.
British tactics were completely wrong when the Battle began, but steadily improved. Fighter Command squadrons at the outset flew in tidy tight formation, so close that only the leader could see where he was going and what was going on. The other members of the formation concentrated on keeping station.
This was a hand-over from peacetime. It looked good at an air display but in combat formation of aircraft is easier to see. The result was that many unsuspecting pilots were ‘bounced’.
Since the Battle the importance of the Hurricane to victory has been slowly undermined. The Spitfire tends to hold pride of place to the extent that a fallacy runs the risk of becoming accepted as historical fact.
There were more Hurricanes in the Battle of Birtain than Spitfires. The Hurricane Alk. I, with a constant-speed propeller, was a fine fighting aircraft, an excellent gun platform and it was magnificently manoeuvrable up to 20,000 feet. It was extremely strong and could take an extraordinary amount of punishment.
As Wing Commander Roland Beamont remarks in his book ‘Phoenix into Ashes’:
The Hurricane had an altogether exceptional combination of manoeuvrability, rugged strength, stability, ease of control and gun aiming, and viceless landing characteristics which went far towards offsetting the fact that its climb, level and altitude performance were slightly lower than the Spitfire and Me 109.
This was the view of a first class most experienced combat pilot. It cannot be stressed too highly that the real key lay in the pilots themselves. Those with sharp reflexes and long experience in a Hurricane were more than a match for their average opposite numbers on Me 109s. Exactly the same situation existed in reverse.
In the winter of 1940 Luftwaffe daylight activity was limited to sneak raids and to fighter sweeps at high altitude, the latter proving very difficult to combat. Squadron Leader (now Group Captain retired) H. J. Wilson O.C. Aerodynamics Flight, Experimental Section, Royal Aircraft Establishment, was put on temporary attachment with No. 74 squadron, Biggin Hill, to study fighter requirements.
In his report Squadron Leader Wilson called for improved cannon armament and more powerful engines etc., particularly for the Spitfire. He concluded with remarks which summarise the whole position as it existed in the Battle of Britain:
It can hardly be said that the R.A.F. Spitfire squadrons have superior fighting material to the enemy, and it is my considered opinion that the only reason why we are just managing to maintain the balance of fighter power is due entirely to the outstanding flying and leadership of the pilots.
The popular picture which has grown up in Britain around the Battle is not a true one. The picture is of a small band of invincible aces, brilliant, debonair and gay, flying into battle again and again, with vapour trails across the blue skies, shooting down German after German, and occasionally falling themselves when outnumbered.
Some squadrons of course were pre-eminent, usually because they were exceptionally well led. Because of their success they were kept longest in the forefront of the battle, and scored the greatest number of successes. In such squadrons as these there existed an élite who survived longest and carried individually the heaviest burden of the Battle.
Most of the squadrons were not like that, however. Many went into action confident and gay and withdrew as a battered remnant ten days or a fortnight later.
There were the very young and over-confident and inexperienced with little idea what it was all about. There were the many thoroughly competent pilots, courageous and determined, but who lacked the speed and instinct needed to live long in action. But at the end of it they could nearly all claim that they had given a little better than they received.
Scores of humble and unknown young pilots made up the squadrons. If they succeeded in scoring a victory or two before going down themselves, it was this that set the seal of victory on the preparations made before the war.
There is no doubt that Göring and his commanders overrated the effectiveness of their own fighters in relation to the British. This may be deduced from the number of Messerschmitts assembled for the Battle. A total of nearly 1,000 against a defending force of little more than 600 gave a degree of superiority, particularly because less than two-thirds of Dowding’s aircraft were at any time within range of the battle area. But it was not a degree of superiority which a cautious commander would have accepted as sufficient for the job in hand unless he thought the defending fighters were much inferior. In this uneven proportion of fighters and bombers may be found the fundamental reason for Göring’s failure to achieve his objectives. He thought the Hurricanes and Spitfires could be quickly brushed aside. He misjudged the quality of the planes, the spirit of the pilots who flew them and the men on the ground who backed them up.
It has been suggested that Germany should have returned to the assault on Britain in the spring of 1941 and that this would have settled matters once and for all. In May of that year the Luftwaffe was operating the same aircraft as it had in 1940, with the exception of an improved fighter, the Me 109F.
Its tasks would have been exactly the same as those laid down in August 1940, the destruction of the R.A.F. and the substitution of air power for sea power.
Britain, on the other hand, had greatly increased her strength. Compared with the 708 fighters and 1,434 pilots available on August 3rd, 1940, by March 31st, 1941, there were 1,240 fighters on establishment and 1,702 pilots, with a steady flow of trained air crew from the schools in Canada, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Australia and New Zealand.
The radar coverage over Britain was greatly extended. Ground Control Interception radar was installed and operations rooms moved underground.
For a land battle the Army could muster in the same month nearly two million men. The German opportunity after Dunkirk was lost irretrievably. Never again was Britain’s margin of safety so narrow.