Chapter 4
The main enemy of the Greek independence had been the Persian monarch Darius I, third or rather fourth monarch of the Persian imperial throne and first of his name. He was a pure eastern despot, cruel, efficient, capable, greedy and insatiable, who changed thoroughly the character of the empire he acquired and initiated the renowned dynasty of Achaemenids (Burn 1962). ‘Acquisition’ is the term to cover the double event of inheriting and usurping the throne, while ‘initiation’ implies that the Dynasty, contrary to Darius’ allegations, had not been the same before him.
The Persian past
Briefly, the empire was founded by Cyrus II, born a petty noble, son of a Persian aristocrat, probably named Cambyses and possibly a vassal king to the Median emperor; and of the daughter of the Median Emperor Astyages (Her I.107 & 113). The Median kingdom, in tandem with the (neo)Babylonian one, emerged from the cinders of the Assyrian Empire (Her I.106) and had been weakened by a Scythian invasion (Her J.104). Thus Cyrus, leading a persistent rebellion campaign beset with reverses (Polyaen VII.6,1 & 9), finally overthrew the ruling emperor – his grandfather Astyages – and inverted the tribal social status quo, making the Median Empire Persian (Her I.127 &130 & 210). This might have been a bit more complicated. Unobserved by Herodotus, there was another, third ethnicity in the hard nucleus of the Persian Empire. It was the ancient Elam, in Greek usually called Cissia or Susiana, which was only one half of it. Its importance is obvious, in context, by the fact that one of the three imperial capitals under Darius and his successors, Susa, was here. The others were Ecbatana in Media, and Persepolis in Persis.
Elam’s two main areas were divided by the Zagros range; Anshan east of Zagros, an area roughly surrounding the city Anshan; and Susiana (Shushan) west, around the city of Susa (Potts 2005; Waters 2011). The western part was in close contact with Babylon and was fairly recently crushed by Assur-banipal, Emperor of Assyria. This allowed the Persians, an Aryan race who were quietly living further east from the Zagros as vassals or rather subjects of different distant overlords, such as Assyria, to eventually veer to independence after the destruction and division of Assyria between Media and Babylon. Subsequently, with Babylon ruling – or suppressing – Susiana, the Persians assimilated the eastern Elam, the Anshan, by infiltration and intermingling and aryanized it. Cyrus II, the Great, had an Elamite name, from his father an Anshanite (Potts 2005; Waters 2004) and the first royal robe was used to signify his rule over the Persian Empire was the old elamite robe of days past (Sekunda & Chew 1992). By a velvet assimilation, the Persian-Elamite factor, which was vassal to the Medes after the fall of Assyria, eventually rebelled and defeated the Medes and then incorporated them (Llewellyn-Jones 2012; Henkelman 2011a), but never quite assimilated them. The lack of evidence regarding the religious beliefs of Cyrus II implies either a milder Mithraistic (Soudavar 2012) or a non-Zoroastrian, Elamite set of religious beliefs (Farahmand 2015; Henkelman 2011a), in stark contrast with Darius’ vehement Mazdaic Zoroastrianism (Soudavar 2012).
Subsequently, Cyrus furthered his acquisitions and not only met head-on the invasion of his western neighbour, Croesus of Lydia, who ruled central and western Asia Minor and stopped him cold, (Her I.76) but with a brilliant out-of-season campaign invaded the Lydian territory (Her I.79), defeated the limited number of Home Troops Croesus was able to muster on the spot (ibid) and occupied the Lydian Capital, Sardis (Her I.84). Subsequently, he also conquered the subjects to the Lydian throne, the Greek cities of Asia Minor, while some of the nearby islands, which were not subjects of the Lydians, succumbed voluntarily, without suffering any assault, utterly terrified (Her I.161 & 169).
Cyrus then turned his attention to the other powerful state of the area: Babylon. The Median alliance with Babylon and the bad blood between Mesopotamia and Elam made the clash between Cyrus and Babylon a geopolitical necessity if observed in retrospect. Babylon succumbed after a relatively brief campaign (Her I.191), proving more vulnerable from within (Lazenby 1993) than Lydia, possibly due to the Jewish community allegedly assimilated by the Babylonians due to the Babylonian Exile. This aspect of the conquest, important though not unique for the success of the Persians, may be substantiated by the extreme generosity, seemingly unwarranted, of Cyrus to the Jews (Holland 2005; Lazenby 1993), who pronounced him Chosen and Marked by Jehovah (Isaiah 45,1). This interaction brought about the massive Jewish return to Palestine (Ezra 4,1–2). The issue was to have several new episodes; the term Marked is the one translated to Greek as Christos–Christ, while the pompous statements that Jehovah would open the gates of enemy cities for Cyrus to enter and level everything before him (Isaiah 45,2–3) read rather as a reminder than as a promise. In the cruel and real world, emperors do not grant wishes to their subjects for the expectation of their assistance (in person, by proxy, through influence or by their deities). The emperors simply grant rewards for solid accomplishments in their name. It is no surprise that this debt was finally settled by Darius I, an emperor advertising rewards to be expected for good services (DB 63), who saw the task of the Jewish repatriation fulfilled (Ezra 4,24) despite his open enmity to Cyrus II (Soudavar 2012); this may imply a repeat performance of service to the throne, possibly for the recapture of the city.
After Babylon, Cyrus was to engage the third and final hostile empire, the Egyptians. But first, he turned to the east, either to expand or to stabilize his rule in Bactria and Sogdiana, along with other areas of central Asia (Her I.153). There, despite his success, death struck him down while fighting against the indomitable Scythians (Her I.214). His son and heir Cambyses, after a viceroyal sojourn and actual training in administrative tasks in Babylon, turned his head west. Under his rule the Persians for the first time delivered submission by conquest (not by convention) across the sea, sacking the Greek island of Samos (Her III.139). A result of the initiative and greed of the local Satrap of Sardis, the rather mutinous Oreites (Her III.125 & 126) and of the brewing internal strife within the island (Her III.140 & 143), it was no small feat.
Samos, under the autocrat Polycrates, was a wealthy and prosperous pirate state (Her III.39) ruling the waves, excelling in eastern trade and Aegean commerce and achieving some illustrious feats of engineering: such as the magnificent aqueduct of Eupalinus, the temple of Hera (Her III.60) and the great breakwater; all leading to a school of exceptional engineers, one of whom was to build the bridges over the Bosporus for Darius’ invasion to Scythia (Her IV.87) in mid-510s BC.
This island had at the time a sizable and ultra-modern navy (Her III.39 & 44), following an established tradition in matters concerning naval innovation (Thuc I.13,3). Moreover, a massive archer corps (for Greek standards) of 1,000, recruited among Samians themselves (Her III.45) was available to enforce the sovereign’s will at home and assist in war, topping the massive mercenary contingents (Her III.45). The powerful island had spectacularly endured a Spartan-led siege (Her III.56), possibly undertaken to tear off a maritime vassal from the grasp of the Persian throne. Sparta had opened an account with the latter during Cyrus’ reign. Incidentally, this endeavour – and intention – was falling in line with Sparta’s attempts to expel tyrants (Thuc I.18,1); at least the ones prone to incubate problems in the future, especially if combined with Persian imperialism or interventionism. Still, with the head of state removed in Cambyses’ time, Samos fell to the Persians and a bloody fall it was (Her III.147). It was also swift and final, taking place during the early reign of Darius I (Her III.140), with strife claiming a role (Her III.142–144) and a toll (Her III.143).
But Cambyses’ sights were set S-SW. The Phoenician states submitted willingly, providing him with a fleet, followed by Cyprus (Her III.19), which seceded from the brief Egyptian rule (Her II.182) and turned happily against the previous master. After striking a pact with the Arabs to the S-SE of Phoenicia (Her III.4 & III.7), Cambyses was able to invade Egypt and occupy it with less difficulty than expected (Her III.11–13). Making Memphis his base of operations (Her III.25), he ventured westwards and southwards.
His westward expeditionary force was eliminated, swallowed by the desert while trying to reach and raze Siwa (Her III.26). Still, he accepted the capitulation of Libya and Cyrene (Her III.13 & IV.165) making of them vassals by convention. There, his westward progress stopped. His voluntary Phoenician subjects flatly declined to campaign against Carthage; and, despite his terrible temper, Cambyses accepted such gross insubordination, to the point of mutiny, and delivered no punishment whatsoever (Her III.19).
In here lies a little problem: the Phoenician squadrons were by no means the only fleet of Cambyses, even with the addition of the Cypriot ones. Herodotus knows it and scolds the balance of the imperial navy as incapable of serious endeavours (Her III.19). This might not be so. Cambyses had the whole of Asia Minor under his command and fleets from the Hellespont and the whole Mediterranean coast up to and including Cilicia could have been mustered. It is true that the main Ionian and Aeolian fleets were coming from the islands and less so from the east shore of the Aegean, but this was a later development (Her IV.97 & IV.138 & VI.8). And this did not apply to Lycians, Pamphylians, Cilicians, nor to Carians and Hellespontines (Her VII.91–2 &95). Moreover, the islanders, either under a pact with Cambyses or still under the provisions of the Convention with Cyrus, did furnish ships: Polycrates’ contribution of 40 triremes (a staggering 8,000 citizens) was an example of the former, and the massacred Lesbian messenger ship at Memphis an example of the latter (Her III.44 &14 respectively). Under Xerxes, the Phoenician and Egyptian squadrons were less than half the fleet; with Cypriot squadrons added, they were just over half, 650 out of 1207 ships of the line (Her VII.89–90). Thus Cambyses should have had considerable naval resources without the Phoenicians. It must have been their wrath, touching on some leverage unknown to us, not their essentiality, that made him abort the campaign against Carthage without extracting vengeance.
Whatever the reasons for aborting the campaign against Carthage, Cambyses himself pushed south towards Ethiopia with a substantial part of his army, but met with a bloody failure (Her III.25). Or that is what Herodotus says. Persian sources imply a limited but important Nubian conquest with the Cushites (Cush being the Nubia of the Greeks) mentioned as a subject people and an outpost established at Elephantine (Klotz 2015; Holland 2005). More importantly, Herodotus’ account of the host of Xerxes clearly includes the Nubian Ethiopians (Her VII.69) and assigning their conquest to Xerxes’ campaign of 484 BC to quell the Egyptian rebellion (Her VII.7) is a bit far-fetched. Finally, and most importantly, the annual tribute to Darius as described by Herodotus himself (III.97) mentions the tax quota of Nubian Ethiopians (tax payable in kind) and obviously refers to their subjugation by Cambyses.
The failure story, an Egyptian view no doubt, but accepted as a lore by Darius I, records a disaster a little after covering the 20–25 per cent of the distance from Thebes to Ethiopia (Her III.25). Thus, the correct reading is of a bloody failure in terms of objectives but with considerable territorial gains southward, gains expensive in troops, morale and treasure.
And at this point, things all started going wrong for Cambyses. Herodotus states that he misunderstood a religious festival in Egypt as jubilation for his defeat and commited atrocities against the population (III.27–30). But Cambyses’ ill-fame obviously came through the Persian aristocracy down to the days of Herodotus, and may have something to do with his social programme of forswearing taxation throughout the empire, possibly – or rather probably – extended to include the recently occupied Egypt (Klotz 2015), or, less probably, starting from there. This was a fatal blow to the Egyptian clergy and Theocracy, definitively strongly contested by them and possibly harshly imposed by Cambyses, who wished to sap and disprove them (Her III.37). Violent measures might have been taken indeed, but to a lesser extent, and in a targeted manner against the clergy. As Holland (2005) points out, some sources disprove the popular story about his patent lack of respect for the Apis bull, while he admittedly paid all due respect to Neith, (the Egyptian Goddess related to Greek Athena), patron of the city of Sais and of the last native dynasty emerging (Klotz 2015).
It was not a matter of romanticism; Cambyses had fewer quarrels with the Egyptian religion than anticipated; one indication is that he had taken to heart an oracle by such source (Her III.64). His quarrel had been with the clergy that guided the population spiritually and politically and was capable of instigating resistance or rebellion; it was also absorbing vast state resources, and so could cause popular dissent against the ruler with the proper manipulation. The worst: the clergy paid no taxes to the throne, but collected dues from the population and possibly demanded donations from the sovereign as well. If the clergy could be disproved, taxes from its vast resources would be collected without dissension from the populace, which would breathe and pay its own, much lowered, taxes to the Persian throne without too much fuss. The balance would be excellent for both Egyptian people and Cambyses; not for the Egyptian clergy, which took on the holy mission of tainting his memory for all eternity (Klotz 2015).
The Persian aristocracy who served in the army of the Egyptian campaign and beyond was already dissatisfied due to failure, absence and casualties and must have been furious, since taxation was the basis of their income as overlords; the same applied to the Egyptian clergy, for the same reasons. On top of that, the lore of Cambyses killing without reason or trial high-class Persians (Her III.35), or killing them to confiscate their fortunes, sounds suspicious. It is a repetitive motto in historiography, whenever taxes are levied from higher classes that attempt with all their might (and might they usually have) to shirk paying. Among tax evasion, corruption and high treason, such attitudes are harshly dealt with, as an example to others. The story of Robin Hood, the story of a disenchanted aristocrat persecuted by a tax-imposing, control-minded sovereign, should be brought to mind. Cambyses might have had a double policy of taxing the Persian aristocracy – incidentally, Darius, the ultimate tax-hunter, exempted Persia proper from taxation (Her III.97) – and of relaxing taxation and recruitment of subject peoples. Had he implemented it, he would have preceded Alexander the Great in provisioning for his subjects. He did precede him in suffering from slander and probably in suffering attempts against his life. The Persian aristocracy, by default speaking for the Persian nation not necessarily with the latter’s sanctioning, did not like this concept at all (Malye 2007).
Cambyses was away from home for too long and decided to return as omens were not very favourable. If a social reshuffle was attempted in Egypt, it was his idea and making. If another was intended for the empire, it might have been his idea. It is a bit difficult to locate the site of all the atrocities cited by Herodotus (III.30–5). When in Memphis, with brewing resistance and some failed campaigns, did he have time to spare, not just to commit murders of noblemen – that might have been so – but to indulge in marital dramas (Her III.31–2)? Had he carried through the desert his wife and household in Egypt? Where did he have the Persian nobles executed? In Memphis? Herodotus never states it; we are left to our own devices and suppose so. Our argument for Memphis is that he had no chance to see his capital(s) again, according to Herodotus; Ktesias, though, has him dying in Babylon (Ktesias 14).
On his way home, in Syria, under mysterious conditions the monarch was wounded; a self-inflicted wound due to a spontaneous failure of the sheath of his dirk, which festered and became fatal, reeking pus and, most of all, conspiracy: a clean, accidental wound by a sheathed weapon (Her III.64) had no real reason to fester. There is no mention of an official second-in-command, nor of anyone stepping up to lead the decapitated army home. But a second-rate aristocrat and guardsman emerged: Darius, son of a certain Hystaspes (DB 2; Her I.209 & III.70), a somewhat important nobleman (Hyland 2018), probably of a priestly family (Soudavar 2012) and without any claim to the throne of Cyrus himself. He was the spawn of another, distant branch of the royal family, ruling the Parsa province of the Persian kingdom (Cyrus’ branch had been lording over Anshan). Darius somehow was found to command the support of the expeditionary force of the Egyptian campaign (Holland 2005). An innovative interpretation of the Iranian sources explains the facts by actually adopting Darius’ claims and interpreting the dynastic orthodoxy among the Persians as being basically Achaemenid, with Cyrus II being a digression (Soudavar 2012) and Darius achieving a re-alignment. This explains well the devotion of the conscripted nobles of the army, whose factual support is never mentioned, nor ever recited, but becomes evident in the eradication of the massive wave of nine rebellions which followed Darius’ coronation. It took 19 battles fought victoriously either in person or by proxies in just two years (DB 52; Sekunda 1989).
Herodotus’ storyline has Darius and the army vanish for some months after the demise of Cambyses; the former went home and after some months, for no special reason, left Persia, the seat of his father (Her III.70), and reached Susa in western Elam (Sushan). Smerdis, or Bardiya by DB 10, or Tanyoxarces as by Ktesias (Photius Bibl LXXII), the younger brother of Cambyses, had been declared king by succession and was enforcing the programme of easing taxation and forfeiting recruitment for three years (Her III.67). As already said, that may have been his brother’s idea, or his own. Darius found some other partisans, Persian aristocrats (Her III.70, DB 68), of course, of the highest order. He tempted them, possibly by the triple motive of foregoing the taxation imposed on their class by (Pseudo) Smerdis (DB 14); of participating in a greater conspiracy organized by their class to get rid of the two kingly siblings, a conspiracy brewed within the army in Egypt; and of following someone who had either a mandate from that very army, or a hand in the death of Cambyses, or, most probably, both, plus a certain claim to the throne (Soudavar 2012).
The notional number Seven is a religious choice (i.e. number of days in a week) and the actual number of conspirators would have been managed to satisfy it and provide a sense of divine providence to the coup retrospectively. As Ahura mazda had six divine sparks /archangels, the Amesha Spenta, to fight the Darkness (Boyce 1983) so did his human representative. Darius had six lieutenants (DB 68) – not comrades, the distinction is very crucial – to help him conquer the Darkness of the imposter and fulfill his divine mission (DB 5). It might be of some significance that in his all-out effort to subjugate Greece and purge the daemons nesting in there (Holland 2005), Xerxes was commander-in-chief (Karana) over a panel of six marshals (Her VII.82).
Regarding the Seven Conspirators, whom Herodotus’ names, i.e. Otanes, Intaphrenes, Gobryas, Megabyzus, Aspathines, Hydarnes (Her III.70) are very similar to the ones inscribed by Darius’ order at the cliffs of the passage of Behistun, the Gate of Zagros: Otanes [Utâna], son of Thukhra [Thuxra]; Intaphrenes [Vidafarnâ], son of Vayâspâra; Gobryas [Gaubaruva], son of Mardonius [Marduniya]; Megabyzus [Bagabuxša], son of Dâtuvahya; Ardumaniš, son of Vakauka; Hydarnes [Vidarna], son of Bagâbigna (DB 68). There are only two obvious anomalies: the name of only one of the conspirators is not easily identifiable, Aspathines in Her III.70 and Ardumaniš in DB 68. Moreover, the name of the father of Otanes is given as Pharnaspes (Her III.70), and as Thukhra (DB 68). Contrary to this, the account of Ktesias (16) which names Onophas, Idernes, Norondabates, Mardonius, Barisses, Artaphernes, and Darius has only two names directly attributable, Idernes (Hydarnes) and Artaphrenes (Idaphrenes) plus one with a temporal error of a generation: Ktesias mentions Mardonius instead of his son Gobryas.
These details hide an important fact: the father of Otanes as declared by Herodotus (Her III.68,1) is the same as the father-in-law of Cyrus II the Great (Her II.1,1) making Otanes uncle of Cambyses. Furthermore, Otanes subsequently became Cambyses’ father-in-law (Her III.68,3). Additionally, it was Otanes who exposed the usurper (Her III.69), and assembled the other conspirators (Her III.70 & III.84,1), which made him the natural leader of the coup and probably justified his aspiration to kingship. Darius was the last to join, and in Herodotus, he brushes Otanes aside in two key instances: the timing of the attack (Her III.71,2 & III.76,1) – practically meaning the whole operational planning – and the decision on the Persian constitution and statesmanship (Her III.83). As a result, Otanes resigned from any claim to the throne, in exchange for a less heavy yoke than the one prepared for the bandaka/subjects of the future King (Her III.83,2). The Behistun version was designed to cover up all such details and launch the official Darius story: the Chosen One of Ahura Mazda with his lieutenants killed the usurper and brought order and justice.
The group of conspirators, amounting to seven (Her III.70; BD 68), attempted a most daring and formidable coup. Herodotus does not mention where the conspirators intercepted the King’s Court because his sources were not that explicit. He understands a royal residence, but the security described in both his own (Her III.76–8) and Ktesias’ (Ktesias 16) accounts of the murder is lax at the very least. Thus, residence in a formal capital is not very plausible. Darius himself declares it was in a stronghold called Sikayauvatis, in Nisaia of Media (DB 13). One cannot conclude whether the King had been there to keep clear of his disgruntled Persian noblemen, or because the fortress was a station along the itinerary of his seasonal travel (Holland 2005), from Ecbatana to Persia (Parsagadae, most probably) or Babylon; Susa was not a royal capital yet and Persepolis had not even been planned.
The conspirators seized the moment by deciding among themselves for the next form of government, ensuring that it would be, forever, a proprietary issue between the seven through exclusive intermarriages. After some fuss, Darius became king as Darius I, introducing the dynasty of Achaemenids. Although his father’s name was Hystaspes (Her I.209; DB I) and should have been used for the dynasty, Achaemenes was the ancestral link with the line of Cyrus and provided legitimacy (DB 2–4), although other, religious aspects have been proposed to explain the issue (Soudavar 2012).
Further legitimacy was provided by a fabulous story about overthrowing not the brother of Cambyses, named Smerdis, but a usurper Magus pretending to be Smerdis and of the same name. The latter was assisted by his brother Patizeithes, who was the substitute left by Cambyses in his stead (Her III.63)! The propaganda line heaped upon Cambyses the early murder of his true brother, thus besmirching his memory even more and exonerating the conspirators of regicide. The person of the King was sanctified after enthroning, but Magus had not been enthroned properly as he projected a fake and stolen identity. Consequently, in this case, there was no regicide….
Herodotus’ account is one of many, the primary being the inscription at Behistun. It is no simple inscription, as it was carved in stone, read in the presence of Darius I (who obviously had been illiterate), copied in parchment and sent (to be proclaimed) throughout the empire (DB 70). The different accounts, with Herodotus’ being in many details irreconcilable to the later account of Ktesias, the physician of the Persian court and thus with much better access to archives, say a lot about a fabricated story. The conspirators could not decide on the number and name of the alleged usurpers; Behistun mentions one, Gaumata (DB 11), Herodotus mentions two, Smerdis and his brother Patizeithes (Her III.61) and Ktesias gives the name Sphendadates. Nor on their own numbers, roles and names: the brother of Darius, Artaphrenes, later to play a most significant role in dealings with the Greeks, is omitted by Herodotus who names Darius as the killer (III.78). Herodotus’ account is bolstered by the Behistun inscription (DB 13). But Artaphrenes is mentioned by other sources, and considered moreover the one who delivered the coup de grace to the alleged usurper (Aesch Persai 776), thus keeping Darius unblemished from any notion of regicide.
The whole thing has an Egyptian aftertaste, reminiscent of the struggle of Akenaton, a legitimate but rebellious Pharaoh, who came to blows with the then established clergies, especially that of Ammun, as he had changed his name from Ammun-hotep IV to Akenaton (EB Akhenaton 2018). Similarly, Darius’ own clergy, the Aryan fire priests of Zoroaster, of whom he might have been a member (Soudavar 2012) must have come off the deepest Bactrian valleys to supplant the established guild of Magi (Magu). The latter practised a Mithraistic dualism and were obviously pro-Median, as they were the official clergy of the Median empire, but were also one of the six tribes of the Medes (Her I.101). This detail of the double character of the Magi, priests and tribesmen, is reminiscent of the issue of Levites, the priestly tribe of Moses’ Israelites.
There was a clandestine note on Cambyses. Cyrus was the Father of the Persians, but he was half a Mede, and of royal stock at that. Moreover, his claim to Persia was as the son of the ruler of Anshan, not of Parsa. Anshan had been conquered from Elam by one Persian ancestor of Cyrus a century earlier and given to one of his two sons to rule – the other took Parsa, which is Persia proper (Holland 2005). The alternative is a Median infiltration in Anshan, which would explain the Herodotean account and the conspicuous lack of any mention of Anshan in Greek historic literature. It also fits well with the picture drawn by the Greek historians: Cyrus’ realm was a vassal of the Median emperor, not at any point subjugated or conquered by the Medians (Soudavar 2012). Under this light, Cyrus continued to use and honour Median officials, the new status quo being rather a dynastic change than anything else. Cambyses might have acted, felt or been more Mede than Persian. Herodotus reveals, mostly haphazardly, at least two indications, and Diodorus adds a third.
Firstly, according to Herodotus, Cambyses, just before passing away, recited a nefarious omen he received when in Egypt. His death was foretold to occur at Ecbatana, and he erroneously understood death by old age at Ecbatana, Media. The story has problems concerning Cambyses’ whereabouts at that point, but reveals that as an emperor, son of Cyrus II, he was settled in Media, not Persia nor Elam. True, Cyrus removed the Median treasure from Ecbatana and took it to Anshan, without specifics as to the city of destination. The only one fitting the puzzle is Parsagadae. This city must have been founded by Cyrus (Soudavar 2012) and there Cyrus was taking refuge from his reverses (Polyaen XII.6,9). Alexander III found the treasure there (Arr Anab III.18,10) and Cyrus’ tomb was located nearby (Arr Anab VI.29,4).
The second indication is the story of Herodotus, reciting that Cambyses became aware of the coup committed by the two Magi and the Medes behind them; the pretext of the usurpation is not clear, as he was alive and kicking and with an army on the way home. When he was disabled by the accident with his dirk, he cursed the Persians should they not reclaim the supremacy and lordship. The disbelief and suspicion attested by the nobles (Her III.73) amply shows not only the strained relations between king and aristocrats, a good substrate for conspiracy and usurpation, but the likelihood of actual foul play by the nobles, so as to justify vindictiveness by the dying monarch. This prerogative, privy to a close circle of Persian nobles of the army, including the spear-bearer Darius, was a constitutional blank cheque and a notion that even Cambyses declared against the Median component of the state and the respective ‘church’/clergy, the Magi. Given the affiliations of Cambyses, as already mentioned, this story actually implies that he did not.
The indication hidden in Diodorus (XI.6,3) lies in his statement that in Thermopylae Xerxes sent as a first wave the Medes, so as to have them slaughtered and thus punished; this possibly referred to the Revolt of Phraortes, suppressed by Hydarnes and Darius (DB 24, 25, 31, 32). Additionally, a good Spartan beating would humiliate and neutralize them as a potential future threat, since the House of Darius, contrary to Cyrus, had no affiliation with Media. The suicidal order to take the Greeks alive, mentioned by Herodotus (VII.210), fits nicely; according to Herodotus (ibid), the Susians (Cissians) were part of this assault wave. Not accidentally, they had been amongst the first to rebel against Darius’ coronation, refused Ahura Mazda as their deity and lord (DB 72, 75) and were smitten by the new Persian acolytes, who expected earthly but also after-death rewards (DB 73, 76) during a holy war against the infidels.
Thus, a Median background cannot be ruled out when considering the regime of Smerdis, fake Smerdis or true Smerdis, who might have succeeded Cambyses on his throne upon his demise or usurped him while still alive. The Median tribe of Magi (Her I, 101) were the main clergy among Persians and Medes (Her I 132 & 140). They were NOT Zoroastrians (Farahmand 2015; Soudavar 2012) and were considered the Interpreters of Truth (Her VII.19). Their latter prerogative was very dangerous for a flight of conspirators and regicides and thus they were slated for termination. As the first usurpers of the throne of Cambyses were conveniently declared Magi, they instantly became enemies of the Persian people. In a pogrom making the Sicilian Vesper sound like a brawl among chaps, they were slaughtered, changing the map of the religion of the empire as the Magi were the most prominent clergy. To safeguard the outcome, Darius declared himself the Owner of Truth (DB 55–57) and Judge of it (DB 56–64), a delegate of Ahura Mazda (DB 5). A Persian theocracy had been established to cover up a possible double regicide and usurpation, similarly to later changes of state doctrine according to political necessities and dynastic whims. A theocracy based on Bactrian and Parthian hard-core Zoroastrism and the religious prerogatives of the House of Achaemenes (Soudavar 2012); after all, Zoroaster allegedly was from Bactria (Garcia-Sanchez 2014).
Resolving and deconvolution
According to the above, a more coherent version might be that Smerdis/Bardiya/Tanyoxarces had been appointed Satrap of conquered Bactria and other provinces, namely Chorasmia, Parthia, and Carmania, without paying tribute to the central government, headed by his father Cyrus (Ktesias 8). This means he was rather a viceroy, a member of the Trinity, along with Cambyses who was viceroy in Babylon and not a Satrap. Cyrus presided over all, seated either at Ecbatana or at Parsagadae. Much more important, Smerdis was the overlord of Parthia, which is explicitly mentioned by Darius as the satrapy of his father Hystaspes (DB 35), along with Hyrcania, which was usually considered a part of Parthia.
Cambyses was probably slain, perhaps in Babylon (Ktesias 14) but definitely out of the Medo-Persian plateau, before entering it through Behistun, by the hand of conspirators among the nobility of the army of the Egyptian campaign, who were both terrified by his gimmicks and furious over the bloodbaths of the westward and southward campaigns in Africa. Cambyses’ demise happened either before or after Smerdis/Bardiya/Tanyoxarces was declared king.
This ‘before or after’ makes a vast difference: if Smerdis moved to kingship before his brother had died, he would have been an imposter. Most probably the conspiring nobles had not made their move against Cambyses before Smerdis’ declaration, either due to inadequacy or to avoid being charged with regicide. When Smerdis declared, they were in a grey area; Smerdis was no king, he was usurper plain and simple. But once Cambyses had been taken care of, all was nice and set and the succession confirmed, even if in a most unorthodox way. Smerdis was officially enthroned after Cambyses died and thus the succession was legitimized.
Had Cambyses passed away first, as would have been the plot of any normal conspiracy, and Smerdis succeeded him, the implicated nobles were regicides and Smerdis totally legitimate. It is most probable that there was an agreement for the latter but the conspirators did not follow the plan, so as to remain unblemished. Still, Smerdis would be impostor for as long as Cambyses lived, a loose end that was now taken care of promptly without the nobles being regicides. Since a new king was already declared, the nobles simply took sides. The inscription of Darius in Behistun, that ‘Cambyses died his own death’ (DB 11) should be understood as ‘died, was not killed’ and although rather hazy as a narration of the past, it is perfectly compatible with both Herodotus and Ktesias, who report an accident with a short blade, possibly an akinaka: Herodotus mentions his side weapon as he leapt on his horse in Syria (Her III.64,3), Ktesias mentions an accident as he was carving a piece of wood in Babylon (Ktesias 14). Both these sources report a self-inflicted wound by accident with his own blade before he could cross to Iran.
After enthronement, Smerdis initiated the tax exemption to the conquered nations, making himself extremely disagreeable to the Persian nobility. This estrangement may have been caused by his declining to receive them in audience, which of course might have been a precautionary measure to avoid any accidents with sharp objects of his own, similar to what had happened to his brother; or due to his displeasure for their belated purging of the throne.
This estrangement and hostility would catalyze another conspiracy. Darius, according to Herodotus a royal spear-bearer (Arstibara/Guardsman) but possibly having risen to the rank of the Master of Spear in Cambyses’ court, commanded respect with the army of the Egyptian campaign. The other Persian nobles were probably positioned throughout the realm. Although Herodotus has Darius coming from Persia, the satrapy of Hystaspes, his father (probably a mistake as Hystaspes was governing Parthia), it is conceivable to imagine him with the veteran army from Egypt camped south of Zagros, meeting with the other conspirators somewhere safe. The latter brought vital information on the whereabouts of Smerdis, as Holland (2005) believes. After all, contrary to Herodotus’ hazy narration of Cambyses’ death, Ktesias exclusively says he passed away in Babylon, his former seat as viceroy.
Thus the conspirators intercepted the royal retinue at a station/stronghold on the road of Khorasan (Chorasmia of Ancient Greeks), called Sikayauvatiš (DB 13), a story perfectly matching the Herodotean account where a city and royal dwelling are mentioned but a name is never provided and the court format seems most informal and, perhaps, residual. With some of the court members so friendly, as to confirm the story of the severed head of the alleged usurper (Her III.79,1) and possibly to have been actively implicated so as to facilitate the infiltration (Ktesias 16), the conspirators had their way in terms of events and narrative.
The role of Darius had been cardinal and indispensable; thus kingship must have been his prize for his involvement which was decisive in planning, determination, execution and support. The only reason for a different official narrative, passing to Herodotus and to the realm, was to safeguard Darius from any blame of regicide, before he himself took the holiness of the king’s person to new heights.
In this, of course, the realm who loved Smerdis (and Cambyses) revolted (Malye, 2007). Darius was able to count on the army (Ktesias 15; Holland 2005; Malye 2007), of Parthia, the satrapy of his father, where rebellion was speedily quelled (DB 35, 36) and possibly on Bactria (Garcia-Sanchez 2014) and generally eastern Iran (Waters 2004). He had either embraced beforehand, or at this very instance, radical Zoroastrianism (Farahmand 2015), to promote it to be the official dogma of the new empire. This case is closely reminiscent of the ascendance of Christianity under Constantine the Great. Interestingly, Bactria never revolted against Darius, despite being the seat of a well-liked Smerdis/Bardiya who, unfortunately, might have not been a devoted Zoroastrian, being a true son of Cyrus II (Farahmand 2015).
Darius I the Achaemenid
Hystaspes, the father of Darius, must have been the ruler of Parsa (Kuhrt 2001) who resigned from his throne in favour of Cyrus; the latter, when he united the nation and overruled the Median overlordship, took his seat and perhaps granted him something to rule over in due course (Holland, 2005). This is the only plausible explanation for Darius’ very own storyline where his bloodline were kings (DB 4) until he himself became emperor, on one hand, and on the other his reference to his father Hystaspes as ruler of Parthia (DB 35). Herodotus, who reports that he had conversed with Persian scholars (Her I.1,1) and probably reads Persian (he definitely speaks it), was well-informed on the high seat of Hystaspes (Her III.70,3) in Parsa, which he confuses with Persia, the successor state of both Parsa and Anshan created by Cyrus II. But his knowledge does not include the understanding of Hystaspes with Cyrus II and the assignment of he former to Parthia.
In Herodotus’ version Darius met the fellow-conspirators at Susa, himself coming from his residence (Her III.71,3); if this is understood to be his father’s seat, which was Parthia (DB 35) and not Persia, one may conclude that after his return from Egypt he had travelled suspiciously close to Bactria, the cradle of Zoroastrianism, to ask guidance, possibly leading to his strict authoritarian rule, and to strike deals, possibly for overthrowing the established Mithraic dogma and promoting radical Zoroastrianism. This religious mantle and support combined with a bloodline from one of the two regal houses of the Persian people and possibly an inherited religious office (Soudavar 2012). Added to these, the networking within the army of the Egyptian expedition, which in its years of absence had developed a remarkablee esprit de corps and a special identity, made him not only useful or even indispensable for the other conspirators, but also their eventual leader who brushed Otanes aside (Holland 2005) and, ultimately, became Emperor (Her III.71 & 83).
Darius I has been projected to this day (Grundy 1901; Burn 1962; Fields 2007) as a tolerant if not benevolent ruler, and the example has always been Egypt and the local religion there in sharp contrast to Cambyses and Xerxes (Her VII.7). In plain Persian, this meant that the privileges of the Egyptian clergy in taxing the populace had been restored, along with the solemn acceptance if not enforcement of the native religion to the locals (Klotz 2015). It was a nice, profitable exchange. Possible help in getting rid of Cambyses must not be ruled out, in the form of toxins, poisons or lack of medical care. Darius employed Egyptian doctors when he was emperor (Her III.129), which means he had proof of their value and dependability. When they failed him he almost had them beheaded. Since Democides, a Greek doctor, succeeded (Her III.130), Darius might have thought that the Egyptians were repeating on him the play staged for Cambyses – that they were unable to help the patient.
Thus, Egypt was instrumental in bolstering the fame and authority of Darius, in matters cultural, religious and of infrastructures. The digging of a canal to allow shipping from the Nile around the Arabian peninsula to the Persian Gulf allowed massive deportation of Egyptian workers for the building of Susa, the revamped imperial capital situated at Sushan, Elam (Klotz 2015). This was as good a reason as any to instigate rebellion later on. Herodotus casually refers to the execution of Aryandes, the Satrap appointed by Cambyses in Egypt (Her IV.166,1), under the pretext of revolting but in reality due to his regal appearances, including minting an excellent silver coin (Her IV.166). Satraps were by decree of Cyrus little kings under the King of Kings (Xen Cyrop VIII.6,10); many minted silver coins (Bodzek 2014), thus this particular crime of Darius I should be attributed to any or all of the following: the brewing of a genuine sedition, which resulted in one revolt during his first regnal years (DB21) and the revolt of 486 BC (Klotz 2015); following an erroneous or unsuccessful policy of conquest and expansion (implied in Her IV.165 & 167 & 200–4) without proper sanctioning; and/or a continuous loyalty to the memory of Cambyses, perhaps demonstrated by said campaigns.
Darius declared the forfeit of taxes void, and of course, a widespread rebellion ensued throughout the realm, including Susa and Babylon. Babylon was the home field of Cambyses, appointed by Cyrus to rule under him as viceroy, before stepping up to the throne. Herodotus does not report the name; he still criticizes the administration which allowed a rebellion to foster, while fully escaping any notice. And this surely is a Persian source besmirching Cambyses. It is worthy of our attention that Xerxes was also Satrap of Babylon before inheriting the throne (Green 1970) and Herodotus’ account of the host of Bactria during the campaign of 480 BC names as its commanding officer (CO) Hystaspes, son of Darius I and brother of Xerxes (Her VII.64), while the Satrap of Bactria was another brother, Masistes, who was appointed marshal (Her VII.82 & IX 113). His name must have been substituted by his title, as Mathista means ‘Successor’ (Garcia-Sanchez 2014).
One is tempted to presume a connection between Babylon and the heir-apparent, similar to the princedom of Wales in the English succession. Furthermore, there are signs of a Persian ruling trinity (Garcia-Sanchez 2014; Sekunda & Chew 1992) formed by the emperor and two most powerful provincial governors, one in Babylon and the other, obviously, in Bactria. This was an analogue of the Holy Trinity; Ahura mazda, Mithra, Anahita at the times of Artaxerxes (Plut Vit Artax), but the original, during the times of Cyrus and Darius, might have included another third pillar, Apam Napat, instead of Anahita (Llewellyn-Jones 2012; Soudavar 2012) or, more probably, Varuna (Heliopoulos 2020). The royal trinity is traceable during the reign of Cyrus, with Cambyses and Tanyoxarces/Smerdis in Babylon and Bactria, respectively. With Darius, the trinity included Xerxes and Masistes in Babylon and Bactra respectively. And in a much more subtle way, there are similar traces in the reign of Darius III. When the latter retreated from his last refuge, Ecbatana, it was Bessus, his relative and Satrap of Bactria who usurped the kingship with the military vote and was proclaimed king (Arr Anab III.21,4); no other satrap or general. Thus the two most important cities OUT of the Iranian nucleus, Babylon and Bactra, were under viceroys while the three capitals, one in each of the three nuclear nations, were visited within the year by the Emperor and his court who resided there; imperial quarters were situated to other provincial capitals as well, especially royal cities of subjugated nations, such as Memphis, where Cambyses spent most of his regnal years, and Sardis, where both Darius and Xerxes resided for quite some time.
Among other things, Cambyses must have nullified the directive of Cyrus which allowed a Jewish return. The biblical text of the Book of Ezra is inconsistent but speaks for an official from a province usually associated with Babylonia (Ezra 5) who seems to have been responsible for the area. The latter agrees with the concept of a hostile Cambyses when he was appointed Satrap, or viceroy of Babylon. In any case, under Darius the return was completed; possibly as one more action of spite against Cambyses or as gratitude for the second fall of Babylon, after its insurrection. A kindred religiousness, between an ardent monotheism and a semi-monotheistic ideal, must not be rejected as a contact point between Darius and his mazdaic clergy and the Judean establishment in Babylon. After all, the much more vehement Zoroastrian, Xerxes, selected Jews to post as guards in southern Egypt (Gertoux 2016; Stein 2014; Waugh 1995), meant as a trusted occupation force in a troublesome province. It must be noted, however, that the Book of Esther obviously takes place after such events and insinuates a strong Jewish presence, if not influence as well, in Babylon after the return to Palestine and the reinstatement of the Temple in Jerusalem.
It took Darius I, his supporters and his relatives two years of bitter fighting to pacify the realm (DB 52), with utmost brutality. It is obvious that the only army a self-proclaimed monarch, imposed by conspirators, would be able to count on, was an army known to him and cohesive beforehand. It was the army of the Egyptian campaign. In this endeavour, the ardent Bactrian Zoroastrianism helped him impose his rule, truth and divinity (DB 5 & 9), while Bactrian troops advanced his cause with great fervour. It was the original version of the events leading Constantine I to the Roman throne and Christianity to prominence.
Under Darius the previous Persian national religion, Mithraism, possibly incorporating beliefs from Media and Elam (Henkelman 2011; Waters 2004), seems to have been overthrown for the more radical Mazdaism (Henkelman 2011; Kuhrt 2007). Not a tolerant religion per se, as Ahura Mazda had to be worshipped, or, at the very least, denial of his stipulations invited retribution (DB 72–3). And this must be acknowledged, despite the efforts of some scholars to assign religious intolerance to practicalities within administrative and political framework (Kuhrt 2007). This quintessential change is evident by the discovery of the grave of Cyrus II in Parsagadae by Alexander III in 330 BC (Arr Anab VI.29,4–6), and by the funeral performed to the body of Mardonius (Her IX.84), in stark contrast to the funerary rites of Zoroastrianism (Her I.140). Possibly the mass murder of the sect of the Magi (Her III.77) corresponds to the massive slaughter recounted in the Bible, in the Book of Esther (Gertoux 2016). The ardent character of the ascended new sect of the religion deified the throne, making Darius the human representative of Ahura Mazda on earth (DB 9 & 63), similar to a Pharaoh. It was a divine monarchy, with the king protected by constitution and religion.
Thus, the absolute, if occasionally casual rule of the Median and Persian kings all the way to Cambyses became stricter; the Primus inter pares concept of the Seven Conspirators (Her III.84) evaporated. The same happened to the constitutional power of the aristocracy, with the immediate execution of Idaphrenes. Despite his distinction in stabilizing the realm (DB 50), and the fact that he simply adhered to his prerogative as one of the Seven, which allowed him to ignore palatial protocol (Her III.118) he was summarily executed with all his family and kin. A more plausible story is that Idaphrenes, who had been introduced to the circle of conspirators by Otanes (Her III.70,2), was considered loyal to the latter and prone to instigate one more coup, possibly towards the rather egalitarian constitution proposed by his mentor (Her III.80,2) and might well have been the third vote against kingship when the Seven voted for the constitution of the Empire (Her III.83,1).
It is an established fact that the power base of Darius was located to the eastern Iran (Waters 2004), as shown by the geographical distribution of the insurrections he had to confront (DB 52), with repeated risings in Media, Elam and Babylon. Cyrus, an Anshanite Persian, had befriended, embraced and promoted the elamitic constituent. He had his own capital built, Parsagadae (Llewellyn-Jones 2012), but the Median capital of Ecbatana retained quite a status, with a detachment of royal guards stationed there; the latter became implicated in the insurrection against Darius (DB 25). It is tempting to assign the Persian insurrections against Darius to the vicinity of Anshan, the birthplace of Cyrus and to a sense of duty to the true kings, who founded the empire, and his line.
Understandably Darius enforces a distancing from Anshanic tradition and elamitic influence (Waters 2004) but he obviously has ties with Elam (DB 23): his mother and his name are elamitic (Henkelman 2011; Waters 2004; Daryaee 2017) and his primary capital was established at the reformed elamitic capital of Susa. The latter is understandable; Darius furthered the role of Sushan against that of Anshan, which was devoted to Cyrus II (Daryaee 2017). For the same reason, he overlooked Parsagadae, the imperial capital of Cyrus II, and established himself at Susa (a direct insult and injury to Babylon) while he was building his own Persian capital at Persepolis (Mousavi 2005). This was a sign of utter disrespect against Cyrus, as his imperial capital is overlooked contrary to those of Media and Elam which were considered imperial capitals as well by the annual rotation of the royal household to them (Daryaee 2017).
Similarly, Darius’ religious orientation as an emperor had everything to do with the facts of the insurrection and personal, tribal devotion. Whether it was an effect of, or a cause for the support provided by Zoroastrian areas and sects remains debatable. Median and Elamite practices and beliefs were neither persecuted nor discouraged, but Ahura Mazda, an Aryan deity reminiscent of Judaism, (Henkelman 2011), became supreme in a manner similar to the introduction of the One True God upon the Israelites by Moses. At the same time the name ‘Ahura’ sounds a bit close to ‘Assur’, the main god of the Assyrians, the arch-enemies of the Medes and Babylonians.
Darius was very strict when establishing the official national Persian religion and his self-definition and introduction as a Persian and Aryan (DNa) served to differentiate the Persians from the Anshanites. These were a liability due to their attachment to Cyrus and their preferential integration to the empire by him, so as to help overthrow the Medes. But the differentiation was also directed against the Medes, a fact at the epicentre of his coup. At a second stage, by declaring Aryan, he fraternized the eastern Iranians (Aryans) such as the Parthians, and the hardcore Zoroastrian beliefs (Soudavar 2012) in stark contrast to the western parts of the nucleus of the empire (western Elamites/Susians).
Still, in foreign affairs, he was not very religious, or at least not offensively and aggressively so, as would be his son. He was rather a pragmatist, as was Cyrus II and Cambyses II (Daryaee 2017), and actually most ancient rulers in Europe and the Middle East (van der Spek 2014). In the Babylonian version of the Behistun inscription, it is the Babylonian god Bel who granted victory to Darius, not Ahura Mazda. Cyrus could not have done better; he had paid homage to the statue of Marduk and declared himself a champion of his to ‘liberate’ Babylon (Henkelman 2011) and possibly of Yahweh to reinstate the Jews.
Under Darius, the empire was divided into more satrapies, to the number of twenty (Her III.89), with additional officials reporting to the king (Her III.128) and thus sapping the autonomy, power and prestige of the satraps. The precautions on the subject are perhaps attributable to Cyrus, especially considering the ‘eyes and ears of the King’ (Xen Cyrop VIII.6,16; Lazenby 1993) and the military authorities of a satrapy (Xen Cyrop VIII.6,9). Assignment of satrapy and other positions became semi-hereditary; the spawn of a successful official could be granted his father’s seat, and an even more successful ruler or official could be promoted to a better province. Still, the seat was of the Crown to be passed to another individual for exceptional service or to be withdrawn in case of substandard performance.
Last, but not least, Darius reformed the taxation system. His taxation was systematic and heavy – with some notable exceptions and made the Empire a centralized organization producing profit for the Throne (Her III.89) and poverty for subjects and subordinates. It was worse for the Greek colonies in Asia: the flourishing civilization of Ionia died to insignificance after the loss of freedom and liberty. The Ionians, sensu lato, had been largely indifferent to the Lydian occupation and later to that of Cyrus and Cambyses, offering only token resistance if at all with few notable exceptions. But now, under Darius, they were facing bankruptcy, which was their worst fear. Trade was now a matter of the state, and the favoured subjects were the Phoenicians. Thus, the Ionians started to feel under immediate financial and then physical extermination.
After all, Darius, contrary to a concerted effort from mainly later sources to present him as an enlightened, moderate and exemplary ruler, had never been very tolerant nor anything like mild (Burn 1962). His cruelty was well-known and feared, and with good reason (Her III.159 & IV.83–4; DB 50; 43; 33; 32). Even if this had not been the case, most of his subjects would rather have had him off their backs, despite any moderation of his.
Loose ends and unfinished business
Thus, the Persian Empire Darius I both inherited and built had its weak points across the compass. Darius I was cruel (Her III.119 & 130 & 159), greedy (Her III.89), definitively embracing lies whenever needed (Her III.70), which was the worst vice for a Persian (Her I.136 & VII.209), arrogant to the extreme, buying his own myth and possibly devious (Her III.119), but by no means a fool. His main security problem was correctly identified to be the subjugated peoples still having free kin across the borders. There were four of them, at the very least. The Indians in the East, the Scythians N-NW, the Thracians W-NW and the Greeks due West. The Phoenicians, a fifth such people, were happily and voluntarily integrated, most privileged among the subjects of the Persians and rather a bridge of understanding with Carthage than a security threat. Lacking geographical continuity to Carthage, they were even less dangerous, below zero.
The Scythians, having once invaded Media (Her I.104 & IV.1) and perhaps weakened it enough for Cyrus to overthrow the Median rule, were the most formidable opponent, remaining undefeated by the Persians. Probably the shape of the earth and correct maps were some decades away and thus Darius ignored the exact size, orientation and position of the Scythian Crescent, from the western coast of the Euxine to the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea (Map 2.1). But he was able to recognize a problem when seeing it. Having invaded his lands unpunished and ruled them unopposed some generations earlier; having been defeated and expelled by vice and not by virtue (Her I.106); having slain the first Persian emperor (Cyrus II the Great) who attempted an invasion, and getting away with it (Her I.214), the Scythians were a beacon of the vulnerability of the Persian State and a mockery of the throne’s deterrence.
The Thracians were numerous both out of and within the empire (the Bithynians or Asian Thracians, Her III.90 & V.3), warlike, brave and fierce, but militarily insignificant compared to the Persian way of war. An important issue was that they were conveniently positioned to the access routes leading against both the Scythians and the Greeks, and thus killing two enemies in one campaign was an appealing prospect.
The Indians were very numerous and difficult to subjugate, by sheer weight of numbers in terms of population, resources and territory; furthermore, they posed no danger as they showed no real signs of aggression. The Achaemenid aggression against them is of dubious date; one possible date being between 519 and 515 (Darius’ pacifying the realm and the onset of the Scythian campaign). Another is between 512 and 500 BC, after the failure of the Scythian campaign and before the Ionian revolt. The empire conquered under Darius had significant areas in this direction, but eventually had problems in subduing them and keeping them docile. When Alexander invaded Persia, the Indian territories seem to have veered away from imperial control. On top of practicalities, the sheer size of the Indian nations and homeland made any concept of rounding up their conquest a dubious project (Her III.94 &101 & 106).
Thus, both by urgency, by necessity and by simple realism, the Persian sights were set on the west. By definition, the first target was the Thracians. Indeed, Darius actually subjugated the tribes between the Bosporus and Scythia (Her IV.93); Megabazus did likewise with the more westward ones, towards Greece (Her V.2 & V.10), although, most probably, in no great depth; some tens of kilometers from the north Aegean shore, to Lake Prasias in Paeonia (Map 5.2). But what direction would be pursued after the Thracians (Her III.134)? Would it be the formidable and threatening Scythians? Or would it be the fourth neighbour, the Greeks?
The Greeks, contrary to the Thracians, were not very numerous; but they were extremely dispersed throughout the Mediterranean and politically divided. The arid peninsula, their homeland, due west, seemed less formidable and even less threatening than large and populous Thrace. The problem was their dispersion and their disposition. Colonies firmly established from the western coast of Asia Minor all the way around the Euxine and then westwards to the ocean. Moreover, substantial communities were planted in other, alien areas and cities, especially in the Levant, but even amidst the Egyptians (Her II.179), despite the latter being a xenophobic and arrogant culture (Her II.79).
This meant that if only one of their independent states remained free, it could become a nucleus of opposition, sedition and dissension. Furthermore, the most ominous reality was that the mainlanders had already declared war on Persia, when the Spartans, their most prominent war tribe had dared to forbid to Cyrus infringement with the Asian Greek colonies (Her I.152) – although Sparta had sent none in Asia! This spelled problems in the making, a collective identity across the Aegean. Laughed out by a frustrated and infuriated Cyrus (Her I.153), due to his lack of a fleet to deliver punishment, it was there and vibrant. It constituted an uneasy and pernicious condition. An open matter, or rather a wound ready to fester, especially once the unwilling subjects of Cyrus, their cousins in Asia, had started spreading and fostering discontent at the edge of the empire of Darius (Lazenby 1993).
Thus, all of the Greek states had to be conquered; and to do so, powerful fleets were needed, making the Persian success dependent on seafaring subjects and accurate intelligence. But that may have still been insufficient. The first-hand intelligence coming by a spying party led by Democides, the personal physician of the Persian royal family (Her III.135–6), which made its way to southern Italy, indicated that the de-Hellenization of the Mediterranean was a gigantic endeavour. Fleets larger than the ones recently acquired by conquest might be needed. This was bringing Carthage, the mega-colony of the Phoenicians, conveniently into play, and perhaps other, like-minded peoples; the Etruscans being the best candidates.
The last and most interesting issue with the Greeks was their accomplished type of warfare, the advent of the Hoplite Phalanx, which enabled their colonial campaigns and resulted in an expanded sphere of influence, not much smaller in longitude and latitude than Darius’ own realm. It was though much less cohesive, less co-ordinated – if at all – and definitely more lax: it was the Greek World, in contrast to the Persian Empire (Map 2.1).
This military system, at least a century old and possibly close to two, was still successful and ubiquitous enough to be adopted by many of Darius’ current subjects (the Phoenicians included) while being exported or simply imitated by a significant proportion of the peoples around the Mediterranean basin, such as numerous Italian nations, tribes and cities. The Greek ilk in the form of mercenaries, colonists and allies had taken the field in Libya, Egypt, Babylon, Cyprus, and Phoenicia, roaming over extended parts of Asia Minor, Eastern Europe, France, Spain and Italy, reaching the Atlantic beyond the Pillars of Hercules. In the invasion of Egypt, Darius, a royal spear-bearer, would not have failed to notice Greek Hoplite forces fighting for both sides, as subjects of the Persians and as mercenaries for the Egyptians (Her III.1 & 11 respectively).
The Greek Hoplite was an adaptable opponent to be reckoned and respected, although not that aggressive. Still, this could change if given time to consolidate a panhellenic state. Then, the resources of the Mediterranean could be funnelled to the east, first to Asia Minor and then to the core of the empire; such concerns (named ‘prudence’) often drove Roman aggression against nations which were on the eve of forging a political identity, like the Dacians, Gauls and Germans. With the partial failure of the reconnaissance trip of Democides (Her III.138), though, a campaign was not easy to plan. Consequently, the highest priority opponents, to be dealt with right after the Thracians had been taken care of, were the Scythians.