Chapter 6
The return of Darius I back home was not uneventful. He had his fleet following his steps but did not cross the Bosporus back to Asia, nor from anywhere in Propontis. He took his battered and hungry army all the way to the Hellespont to make the crossing (Her IV.143,1). This means one thing only: that the more suitable areas for such crossing were in revolt – a revolt possibly engulfing some Asian territories, such as the ones inhabited by Thracians and close to the Hellespontine region (sensu lato). This assumption fits well with Megabazus’ first target, Perinthus (Her V.1,1) which lies very near Byzantium and had been left unconquered at the rear of the expeditionary force, while the Hellespont is also explicitly mentioned as not entirely docile and conquered by him (Her IV.144,3). Similarly, the proclamations of his replacement, Otanes, when (re)conquering Byzantium and Chalcedon, that they harassed the royal army during its return from Scythia (Her V.26) also indicates a revolt.
Miltiades’ proposal to entrap Darius and his army in Scythia might have been brought about by news or advance knowledge of such events; alternatively, it might have triggered them. There is no question though that the situation was clearly critical, so critical that Darius spends quite some time in Sardis; there was ample time to grant Histiaeus his wish about Myrcinus and for the latter to go there and start organizing his fief (Her V.23,1). Darius relocated himself and his court at Susa only when the situation was firmly under control (Her V.25,1). The time sequence is a bit lacking and unsure, but it is certain that once he moved to Susa, he had filled the two satrapal seats in western Anatolia that were vacant after the elimination of the treacherous Satrap Oreites (Her III.128,5), who had been established at Sardis by Cambyses. The satrapy of Dascylium was presented to Megabazus, probably after his triumphant return to Sardis with his prizes, the Paeonian captives being prominent amongst them (Her V.23,1). That this triumphant return was through the Hellespont might imply that Byzantium and the whole area around the Bosporus was still in revolt.
The satrapy of Sardis was assigned to Darius’ brother Artaphrenes (Her V.25,1). And it is exactly then, between Darius’ departure for Susa and the eruption of the Ionian Revolt, that ten whole years are missing from the account of Herodotus. Trying to fill the lacuna, one may suppose that Darius undertook his pharaonic projects in Egypt and Persia and additional conquests to the East, especially in India, during this time. Such a timeline would have accounted for a successful kingship, overcoming the adverse results of the Scythian expedition and establishing firmly the realm before the eruption of the Ionian revolt. The latter was to initiate a spiral decline of the empire; a long and torturing spiral. The missing decade accounts well for the creation of the shiny empire inherited by Xerxes, which was much more than the one Darius appropriated from Cambyses and Bardiya/Smerdis.
Histiaeus was dwelling at Susa, in a golden cage for ten years, enjoying sincere respect and privileges; he also understood he was never to see the sea and his fief at Myrcinus. Aristagoras, his lieutenant, is comfortably seated in Miletus and develops aspirations for his own kingdom within the empire. The Athenians depose their tyrant, Hippias, who eventually flees to Persia, adding the last missing part in NW Asia Minor, Sigeum, to the king’s estates; last, after the campaign of Otanes, which resulted in the subjugation of two islands, Lemnos and Imbros and most of NW Asia Minor under the pretext they opposed the Persian endeavour against the Scythians (Her V.27,2). This pretext for invading Lemnos could only mean that the Lemnians were officially bound to participate and thus under an already established Athenian overlordship. Miltiades was also participating in the endeavour and there is no other context explaining the Lemnians’ duty to this end.
The role and status of this Otanes (son of Sisamnes) is very crucial as he has evidently nothing to do with his namesake, Otanes, son of Pharnaspes (Her III.68,1). The latter had probably been uncle and assuredly father-in-law to and older than Cambyses (Her III.2,2 & 68,3 respectively). He partook in the Coup of the Seven and then conquered Samos (Her III.147,1). The former Otanes is explicitly mentioned as the replacement of Megabazus (Her V.26), but his title is General of the Coast (Her V.25,1), not of the Hellespont (Her IV.144,3), Thrace (Her V.14,1) or Europe (Her IV.143,1), as was Megabazus. The variability of the latter’s titles prompted an elaborate reshuffling of the timeline of events (Boteva 2011) but may be explained by different Greek translations of the Persian concept of Skudra and the latter’s evolution and transformation within the Achaemenid administration. Otanes, on the other hand, is never mentioned as operating in Europe, except for the two aforementioned islands (Her V.26), which are quite accessible from the NW Asian shore and less so from the peninsula of Helle. He also subdues Byzantium, just across the straits. This implies a different area of responsibility than Megabazus, despite Herodotus’ understanding that he was the replacement of the latter. Neither his area of operations nor his title seem to confirm the statement of Herodotus (V.26) and are much more compatible with his performance during the first phases of the Ionian Revolt (Her V.116 & 123).
The Coast is a puzzle: mentioned by Herodotus again as under Artaphrenes in circa 500 BC and under Hydarnes in circa 483 BC (Her V.30,5 and VII.135 respectively) and present in the Behistun engraving (DB 6), it cannot be identified properly. Herodotus defines it as a proper satrapy, a view supported by the tribute list (Her III.90,1) and its border with Cilicia to the SE of Asia Minor. This description little adheres to Behistun (DB 6), where it is a different entity than Ionia and the Islands. Moreover, a capital for it, a satrapal seat, is never mentioned, nor a satrap; the overlord reigning over it is the satrap of Lydia, Artaphrenes, who is specifically mentioned by Herodotus to be in command of the Coast (Her V.30,5). He handles all issues in the near Aegean and treats Aristagoras in Miletus as his direct subordinate (Her V.31,1 & 4). As the satrapy of Artaphrenes provided land forces under Xerxes (Her VII.74), forces led by his son, Artaphrenes the Younger, the vessels of Ionians, Carians etc., by any account, should have been the quotum of another satrapy. Still, it is Artaphrenes the Elder who authorizes and prepares 200 vessels for the campaign against Naxos engineered by Aristagoras (Her V.31,4).
The contributions of ships to the Grand Fleet of Xerxes show that Sardis may still claim 200 from the coast of Lydia, inhabited by Ionians, Dorians and Carians (Her VII.93–4). Another 160, probably brigaded with the aforementioned 200 towards a regional fleet of a Naval District were furnished by coastal communities attached to Dascylium. These would be Aeolians and Hellespontines (Her VII.95). This arrangement might apply to the Scythian campaign and/or to that of Marathon. It must be noted that the satrapy of Dascylium (at least as inferred in Her III.90,2) provided land forces to Xerxes (Her VII.72–3) as well.
Similarly, the seat of Dascylium had been assigned to Megabazus and then to his offspring (Her VI.33,3). The Coast nominally extends to his shores as well, and Otanes operated there, including Byzantium (Her V.26,1). It is more than obvious that the new conquests in Europe are assigned to Megabazus not to any other satrap or governor, as nothing of the kind is mentioned. Megabazus conquered such lands for the crown and his bloodline remained active in the region. His son Bubares was investigating the disappearance of an embassy to Macedon (Her V.21,2) and became betrothed to the daughter of the King of Macedon, Amyntas (Ibid). His exact status is not declared in Herodotus, but he oversees the digging of the Athos canal (Her VII.22). One could surmise that the invasion project of Xerxes was assigned, at least for its local preparations module, to Dascylium and that Bubares was not an overseer, but the lord of the European lands in whose territory the work was taking place.
Artaphrenes, possibly jealous of the conquests of Megabazus and Otanes but also clearly attuned to the insatiable appetite of his brother Darius for conquests and loot, induces the Athenians into voluntary submission (Her V.73,2) and sanctions an amphibious campaign to conquer Naxos (Her V.31,1 & 4) and ostensibly the other nearby Cyclades islands (Her V.31,2) with a clear view to Euboea, the door to central, mainland Greece (Her V.31,3). These arguments, presented to him by Aristagoras the Milesian by 500 BC but wholeheartedly accepted both by him and by Darius, show that the preying eye of the monarch was set due west before any provocation. This corroborates the intentions behind and the implications of the reconnaissance mission of Democides (Her III.135,1–2) and the perverted longing of the Queen for Greek slaves (Her III.134,5); perversions too familiar in the context of the Roman Empire and later European monarchies.
The last and capital figure is Miltiades. Being the last from a line of imported sovereigns both invited by the locals and sanctioned by the Athenian government under Peisistratus and his sons (Her VI.34–6 & 140), he rules over the Thracian Chersonese, a strategic area which forms the European shore of the Hellespont. This dynasty tried to extend their hold both to the Asian coast (Her VI.37,1), being on excellent terms with Lydia and Croesus (ibid), and to the nearby islands (Her VI.140). The latter issue is open to speculation, as Herodotus’ wording may imply that the actual inhabitants of the island of Lemnos were independent both when attacked and subdued by Miltiades (Her VI.140) and when attacked and subdued by Otanes the Persian (Her V.26–7). Necessarily, one subjugation predated the other. It is more believable that Miltiades was first there as a conqueror in the name of Athens (Her VI.136,2). After Darius’ return from the Scythian Expedition, such lands of Miltiades were attacked and seized by the empire, most probably by Otanes as he had been declared its enemy (Her IV.144,3). The islanders, left to their own devices, offered stiff resistance against the oriental terror (Her V.27). The Athenians had allegedly driven away the original inhabitants, but that was only for the ones that did abide by the convention; the ones declining and finally subdued by force (Her VI.140,2) were most probably reduced to vassalage if not servitude and thus must have been present when Otanes landed (Her V.26–7).
The alternative is that Miltiades attacked the island much later, while it was officially Persian during the Ionian Revolt (Burn 1962). This means he had to overcome the resistance of the locals, after their rebelling and disposing of the stranger (Samian) Lycaretus, who had been installed as a tyrant by the Persians under Otanes (Her V.27). Under such circumstances, the need for an ages-old pretext by Miltiades sounds unconvincing (Her VI.139–40). Even more perplexing is the issue of how this new territory, hitherto an Achaemenid fiefdom, was found under Athenian sovereignty (Her VI.136,2) while Athens had decided to desist from any further hostilities with the empire after the battle of Ephesus (Her V.193,1).
With the Thracian Chersonese as his personal fiefdom, Miltiades is situated opposite Sigium, the personal estate of the Peisistratids (Her V.91,1 & V.94–5). In this way, between themselves they established an Athenian gate to the Euxine despite some reverses when trying to expand and consolidate it (Her VI.37,1.). Thus, Miltiades was comfortable as long as the Persians were occupied elsewhere, despite the more autocratic turn of the Athenian government under Hippias. But he participates in the Scythian expedition with Darius I (Her IV.137), and this makes him either an ally, probably by fear to be invaded eventually, since at this age the Persians do have fleets, or a vassal. The latter might have been the case if Darius’ campaign in Scythia had been preceded by a limited local campaign of establishing a bridgehead in Europe, possibly by Megabazus (Boteva 2011).
However, much more probable is that his participation in the Persian expedition was part of an extended network of loose dependencies built by the Persians in times of war. The similarity with European Thracians flocking under the standards of Xerxes in 480 BC to participate in a looting excursion to the south, to Greece (Her VIII.116) is telling. Last, but not least, an understanding between Athens and Persia might have been established early on, as the Athenian fiefs in Asia Minor seem to be almost autonomous if not independent areas just next to the realm of the King of Kings and more specifically, next to an area subdued duly a generation earlier by Harpagus the Mede (Her I.174,1). If this was the case, Miltiades, a vassal of Athens, joined the massive campaign of Darius against the Scythians as the allied contribution of Athens to an all-powerful neighbour, and was thus subject to the Persian High Command (Her IV.98) and military law.
Darius’ opting for the Hellespont implies that during this epic retreat, Perinthus was closed to the Persians, harbour and shores. Either it was steadily defiant from the beginning of their invasion, or it probably rose in revolt along with Byzantium, Chalcedon and a great part of Thrace.
In the Scythian campaign, Miltiades deliberated to cut off the Persian royal army at Scythia, so as to destroy the empire with one swift blow (Her IV.137,1). It might have been something more than an idea. As Darius returns, a revolt seems to have been triggered, making him return to Asia through Sestos in the Hellespont (Her IV.143,1) and provoking a retaliation and suppression campaign by Otanes (Her V.26–7). Miltiades’ hand in the uprising cannot be assessed, confirmed or rejected as a possibility. Still, he is not a major player; Darius’ chose to cross to Asia from within Miltiades’ own fiefdom in Chersonese (Her IV.137,1). Thus, it was considered suitable and rather safe. Due to the sheer size of the royal army? Or because Miltiades was still with the royal fleet, a hostage for all practical purposes, but evidently before his hostile intentions were brought to Darius attention? Herodotus’ narrative for the conquest and suppression campaigns of both Megabazus and Otanes mentions nothing concerning Miltiades, which implies that formally he remained a subject and thus actual operations against him were not undertaken; but such operations are mentioned against (some of) his territories, certain Hellespontine cities (Her IV.144,3).
But knowing Herodotus’ bias against this family, due to his sponsor Pericles, it is possible to notice that Otanes attacked and subjugated Lemnos during his punitive expedition (Her V.26); this colours the island as either a neutral or a rebellious state during the ebb of the Scythian campaign (Her V.27,2). This detail is important; Herodotus clearly mentions that Lemnos had been brought under Athenian sovereignty thanks to Miltiades (Her VI.34–6 & 140) and this cannot have happened, according to the story, after it had been invaded and conquered by the Persians (Her V.26) as already discussed. It seems it was considered enemy territory (specifically by Miltiades) and was invaded as such.
This perspective leads to some interesting conclusions and suppositions. It is possible – if not a matter of fact – that Darius eventually heard of Miltiades’ plot and treated his territory as hostile ground. Miltiades might have resisted against both Megabazus and Otanes; thus the former’s campaign against the Hellespontine cities (Her IV.144,3), and the latter’s against Lemnos (Her V.26). Herodotus does not report it; even if he knew he would avoid glorifying Miltiades and thus displeasing Pericles. Miltiades might have failed to defend the land border of the Chersonese, but keeping (most of) its cities out of any direct Persian control, and the rural areas inhospitable for casual Persian presence and use, would have been quite a feat and plausible at that. Incursions for plundering and transition of major armies would have been possible and perhaps probable, given the limited resources of the region. This may explain Megabazus’ passage back to Asia from this area, even if it were not fully pacified. Another alternative is that Megabazus crossed back to Asia from the Hellespont (Her V.23), which in this case must be understood to include Propontis, thus making Perinthus the obvious choice.
The heart of the problem is this: Darius must have learnt of Miltiades’ attempt the moment he set foot – or hoof – on the south bank of the Ister, not some time later. Otherwise, his debt of gratitude to Histiaeus (Her V.11,1 & V.23–4) is a mystery. He would have been, in Persian eyes, a mere vassal who did well in a not too demanding task (Her IV.98), along with many others. If Darius had indeed been informed early enough, how did he not follow his first impulse, which would have been, according to the reading of the inscription of Behistun, to flay, gut, crucify or at the very least decapitate Miltiades on the spot? Not only that, but he travels to the latter’s territory and crosses from there (Her IV.143).
The only logical recreation of the events is that Darius heard of Miltiades’ attempt at high treason once south of the Ister, and Miltiades took flight promptly – or had already done so the moment he understood that Darius’ return was imminent and the bridge would be thrown back into position and function. The informer was obviously Lysagoras the Parian, whom Miltiades so loathed that he led the Athenian punitive expedition against Paros after Marathon (Her VI.133), an endeavour which proved fatal for him (Her VI.136). The Scythian disaster caused a revolt, which erupted in the vicinity of the Bosporus (Byzantium, Chalcedon) if not throughout Thrace and culminated in the destruction of the bridge over the Bosporus (Ktesias 25) but this must be taken sensu lato, as the bridge might have been dismantled already. Furthermore, it made the area unsuitable or even pernicious for the Persians to cast another bridge or embark to cross back to Asia. Accordingly, Darius had to board somewhere else, preferably with a small width of sea to cross. Thus, Darius and his troops advanced to the Hellespont, the fiefdom of the now renegade Miltiades, and crossed from there as fast as possible, confident in the size of their army, but without thoroughly (re)establishing control over the region. Megabazus was left behind to reinstate the Pax Persia by subduing rebels and independent states and tribes, especially the Thracians to the west, among whom must have been the father-in-law of Miltiades, where he must have found refuge and a base for his machinations. But the first task of Megabazus was to sack Perinthus (Her V.1,1) in order to acquire a suitable port on the European side so as to establish a proper, effective and secure line of communications with Asia.
Megabazus campaigned successfully all the way to Macedon (Her V.18,1), which he made tributary but not vassal, secured his hold there through matrimony (Her V.21,2), and returned to Sardis, to be presented with the satrapy of Dascylium (Her VI.33,3). Only then did Darius feel comfortable enough to move back to Susa (Her V.23–5). As Megabazus had made a tributary out of Macedon, or at the very least an ‘ally’ by matrimony (Her V.21,2) the empire had established a narrow but continuous land corridor leading to the northern gate of Greece (Map 5.2).
Otanes’ operations developed behind the theatre where Megabazus had been active and this raises some questions. It probably implies that Darius had no other army at his disposal when he crossed back to Asia and assigned priority to the campaign in Thrace as a means of stabilizing the frontier (Her V.2,2) and the border territories. Quelling all sparks of the revolt in Asia Minor was left for a later time, at ease, once the situation had been stabilized and was assigned to Otanes.
Otanes was named general (Her V.25,1). He must have been Spadapathis, foremost military commander in a theatre. Once confirmed, Otanes operates in Troad, off Troad, to the nearby islands including the Athenian outpost of Lemnos and in the vicinity of the Bosporus, bringing into line the revolting or unruly cities (Her V.26; Ktesias 25); his jurisdiction is usually understood to have been both sides of the Straits. This is a most definite indication of a massive loss of imperial prestige and power, directly attributable to a major reverse (Grundy 1901; Burn 1962).