ON THE MORNING OF JUNE 22 THE LENINGRAD MILITARY Command was housed, as it had been for more than a century, in the grandiose ensemble of the Russian General Staff building, ten years in construction —from 1819 to 1829—probably the finest of Rossi’s architectural achievements. Placed at the head of Nevsky Prospekt, opposite the Winter Palace, the General Staff building was formed of two wings, joined by an arch dedicated to the Russian victory over Napoleon in 1812. The central entrance was 40 feet wide and towered 75 feet high. Some 768 windows sparkled from three tierlike stories.
A week ago, on June 15, Colonel (now Lieutenant General) B. V. Bychevsky, chief of the Leningrad District Engineers, had returned to this monument to Russian military glory from a trip to inspect the fortified zone being built to protect Russia’s newly leased Hangö military base from attack from the Finnish mainland. He found the work progressing fairly well and, as he drove back to Leningrad, was happy to see that the Pioneer camps and children’s homes in Karelia were beginning to fill up with summer guests. The forest seemed particularly green and fresh after the cold, wet spring.
Bychevsky, young, vigorous, blue-iyed and slightly balding, knew that Leningrad had received disturbing intelligence, particularly from naval units and points along the Finnish border, of the arrival of German troops in Finland. However, the tempo of activity in the General Staff building did not seem to have quickened. Lieutenant General Markian M. Popov had gone off on a field trip, as scheduled. His departure left the building half-empty since most of the senior aides and lieutenants had accompanied him. When Bychevsky arrived at headquarters on Monday morning, June 16, he had never seen it more peaceful. His own deputy had gone off with General Popov. The weekend war news from Western Europe could not have been more dull. About the only item of passing note was an announcement by the U. S. State Department of the sinking of the freighter Robin Moore by a German submarine off the Brazilian coast.
What had eased the atmosphere in Leningrad (and throughout the Soviet Union) had been the publication in Saturday’s papers of an official statement by Tass, dated Friday, June 13.
The statement (given in advance to the German Embassy for transmission to Berlin) denied rumors of impending war between Russia and Germany. It said such rumors had been current before the recent departure from Moscow of the British Ambassador, Sir Stafford Cripps, and had become especially widespread since his arrival in London. The implication was that the rumors had been inspired by Cripps or the British.
The reports, Tass continued, alleged that Germany had made various territorial and economic demands on Russia; that Russia had rejected the demands; that as a result Germany had begun to concentrate troops on the Soviet frontier and that now Soviet troops were being gathered on the German frontier.
“Despite the obvious absurdity of these rumors,” Tass declared, “responsible circles in Moscow have thought it necessary, in view of the persistent spread of these rumors, to authorize Tass to state that they are a clumsy propaganda maneuver of the forces arrayed against the Soviet Union and Germany which are interested in the spread and intensification of the war.”
The statement added that
in the opinion of Soviet circles the rumors of the intention of Germany to break the [Nonaggression] Pact and to launch an attack against the Soviet Union are completely without foundation, while the recent movements of German troops which have completed their operations in the Balkans to the eastern and northern parts of Germany must be explained by other motives which have no connection with Soviet-German relations . . . as a result all the rumors according to which the Soviet Union is preparing for a war with Germany are false and provocative.
In the face of this declaration the worries of many commanders had been allayed. “Moscow knows what it’s doing,” some said. Others insisted that Stalin must be right because Stalin always had all the facts in his possession. Especially comforting was the circumstance that not even in the secret meetings of the Party elite had there been any mention, any warning, any suggestion that war might be near.
The atmosphere in Leningrad eased even more when word spread that Party Secretary Andrei A. Zhdanov, chief of both the Leningrad City and the Leningrad Regional Party organizations, member of the Military Council of the Leningrad District, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and right-hand man of Stalin himself, was leaving for his summer vacation.
On Thursday, June 19, Zhdanov left by train for his favorite holiday spot, Sochi on the Caucasian Black Sea coast. Sochi, a resort of white villas, semi-tropical shrubbery and a rather stony beach, was also Stalin’s retreat. Zhdanov often joined him there for two or three weeks at a time. The fact that Zhdanov had gone to Sochi seemed to many a guarantee that nothing of consequence would happen. This view was supported by the press. The only news from Berlin in Thursday’s Leningradskay a Fravda was an announcement of the signing of a German-Turkish friendship pact.
Bychevsky drove out to Karelia every day to check on fortifications work. He was there on Friday when he got a call from Major General Dmitri N. Nikishev, Leningrad Chief of Staff.
“Come back immediately,” Nikishev said. “Hurry.”
“I’m glad I found you,” Nikishev said, when Bychevsky arrived at the General Staff building three hours later. “The situation, my friend, is getting a little complicated. The Finns along the Karelian isthmus are beginning to get ready for action. We have got to begin military protection of the frontier. Is that clear?”
“Not exactly.”
“Prepare your engineers to lay mine fields along the frontier.”
Bychevsky protested that his personnel were occupied in work on fortifications.
“Take them off that!”
“And do you have orders from Moscow to that effect?” Bychevsky rejoined. “I don’t see how I can halt work on the fortifications.”
“I don’t care what you think,” Nikishev snapped. “There’s no time to wait for orders. Just plain work is what’s needed. Collect all the mines there are in the stores and issue them to the troops. Meanwhile, we’ll write the orders to the army.”
Nikishev stalked off and locked himself in his office with his intelligence staff and operational chiefs. Bychevsky pulled out of his files the contingency plans for mining the frontier and began to draft orders for the Fourteenth, Seventh and Twenty-third armies. These were the forces of the Leningrad Military District which were deployed along the eight-hundred-mile Finnish frontier from the Barents Sea to the Gulf of Finland. It was no small task to mine this long border.
Meantime, Nikishev ordered Lieutenant General P. S. Pshennikov, commanding the Twenty-third Army, which covered the Karelian isthmus just north of Leningrad, to move one division from the rear to a forward position at Vyborg on the Finnish frontier.
The southern and western approaches to Leningrad Province were not the defensive responsibility of the Leningrad Military District. When the Baltic states were incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940, these areas had been split off from the Leningrad Command and put under the new Special Baltic Military District with headquarters at Riga. The Leningrad Command had no troops south or west of the city except for some artillery units that had gone to summer training camps.
In recent weeks, however, on orders from the General Staff, Bychevsky had been concentrating his attention on building a fortified zone in the region of Pskov-Ostrov for the Special Baltic District. These fortifications lay about 180 miles southwest of Leningrad along the Velikaya River. The zone was designed as a defense in depth against attack on Leningrad from the southwest.
All day Friday Bychevsky worked on plans for the new mine fields on the Finnish frontier. Although he ordinarily kept in touch with Major General V. F. Zotov, chief of engineers of the Baltic District, he was too busy on Saturday to telephone him. Later Zotov told him that on Saturday he, too, was working on mine fields. He started to lay mines along part of the East Prussian border and mobilized some of the local populace to dig trenches and dugouts. However, he was compelled to halt when cows from a collective farm got into the fields and started touching off mines. He was told to quit for fear of spreading panic.
Bychevsky did not leave the General Staff building until late on Saturday. He had been home hardly an hour when the duty officer telephoned and said an alert had been announced. Back at General Staff, Bychevsky found officers milling around, trying to find the reason for the call. No one seemed to know. Nikishev made no announcement. Bychevsky did manage to learn that it was connected with an alarming situation on the frontier. He told his engineering aides to hold themselves ready to leave at a moment’s notice to join the units along the frontier.
What was going on behind the scenes?
With the Leningrad Military Commander, Lieutenant General Popov, in the field (along with most of his top commanders) and Party Secretary Zhdanov on vacation, the situation was difficult. No second- or third-echelon Soviet official was accustomed to acting without precise instructions from above. These had not been forthcoming.
The man in chargé of Leningrad on June 22 was Zhdanov’s deputy, Party Secretary Aleksei A. Kuznetsov, a thin intense man with dark, deep-set blue eyes. Intelligent and alert, Secretary Kuznetsov had become aware in the course of Saturday that a possibly dangerous situation was building up on the frontiers. He knew that for weeks the Germans had been continuously violating the air frontiers. He knew that the Soviet base at Hangö had reported landings of German troops in Finland. He knew that all German freighters to the last ship had cleared out of Leningrad, many of them not even waiting to load cargo. He had been consulted by the Baltic Merchant Shipping Administration about the apparent detention of Soviet ships in German waters, and it was he who had quietly approached the chief officials of the Leningrad Party as they left the meeting at Smolny on Saturday evening and warned them to stay close to their telephones in case of an emergency. He also went to Colonel Ye. S. Lagutkin, Chief of Antiaircraft Defense, and asked him where he was planning to be on Sunday.
“What’s the matter?” Lagutkin asked.
“We’ve got to be alert,” Secretary Kuznetsov replied. “The situation on the frontier is alarming.”
Further than that Kuznetsov did not feel he could go without exposing himself to chargés of panic, but he did ask several top officials to join him at Smolny about midnight. It was, he thought, a pity that Zhdanov should be on vacation.
Precisely what time the Leningrad Military District received the circular telegram from Defense Commissar Timoshenko and General Zhukov ordering a combat alert is not known. The standard Soviet sources assert the telegrams were not sent out by the Defense Commissariat in Moscow until 12:30 A.M. They were dispatched to the Leningrad, Special Baltic, Western, Kiev and Odessa Military Districts. It seems likely that the alert reached the Leningrad military staff a little before 2 A.M.1
It was about 2 A.M. when Leningrad staff officers began to be recalled to the General Staff building and General Nikishev and several of his aides went to Smolny, where Party Secretary Kuznetsov had summoned a meeting of the top officials of the city.
One after another the Party chiefs arrived. They quickly mounted the stairs to Kuznetsov’s third-floor office. It was brilliantly lit, but the shutters had been carefully drawo. Here were the oblast or regional Party secretaries, the City Party leaders, the Chairman of the Leningrad City Soviet, Mayor P. S. Popkov, General Nikishev and his associates.
As each man arrived, he was motioned to a place at the long table with its cover of crimson baize. Secretary Kuznetsov sat at the head of the table smoking quietly. He said nothing until all had arrived. Then, glancing at his watch, which showed almost 3 A.M., he said, “Let’s begin, comrades.”
Nikishev read to the assembled group the telegram transmitted from Moscow. It warned of the possibility of sudden attack on the twenty-second or twenty-third in a number of border areas, including the Leningrad region. The attack, the telegram stressed, might begin with a provocative action. Soviet military forces were strictly warned against giving any provocation, but must be in full preparedness to meet the blow of the Germans.
In contrast to the brief warning given to the navy, the land and air forces received detailed orders—all to be carried out before dawn. In the case of Leningrad, of course, dawn had arrived before the orders.
The orders provided:
A. In the course of the night of 22.6.41 secretly occupy firing points in fortified regions on the state frontier.
B. Before dawn 22.6.41 disperse to field airdromes all aircraft, including military, under careful camouflage.
C. All units to be put on combat alert; troops to be dispersed and camouflaged.
D. Antiaircraft defenses to be placed on combat alert without supplemental increase in staff. Prepare all measures for blacking out cities and objectives.
Take no other measures without special authorization.
At the conclusion of the reading there was silence. Finally, someone asked, “How shall we understand the telegram? Does it mean war?”
“War—possibly,” was Secretary Kuznetsov’s cautious reply.
Obviously the Leningrad Military Command could not have carried out the orders during the 100 to 130 minutes that intervened between their receipt and the onset of German attack. The caution concerning secrecy and camouflage was made ludicrous by Leningrad’s “white nights.”
As a matter of fact, the meeting in Secretary Kuznetsov’s office was still in progress when he was called to the telephone by Moscow. The hour was close to 5 A.M.
Moscow advised him that German planes had bombed Kiev, Minsk, Sevastopol, Murmansk. Kuznetsov made the announcement with his customary complete lack of emotion.
While Smolny deliberated, the officers at General Staff remained in a state of nervous anticipation. They consulted one another and waited for orders. The same scene was enacted at other Soviet military commands, where officers, suddenly tumbled out of their beds by the word “Alert,” found themselves assembled without clear ideas of what was going on or what to do.
On Leningrad’s approaches the Special Baltic Military District, commanded by Colonel General F. I. Kuznetsov, was chargéd with guarding against attack from East Prussia. General Kuznetsov’s units were scattered over an area of hundreds of miles. Many were in summer training camps, others were moving to new assignments.
General Kuznetsov was a very senior officer with great theoretical knowledge but little practical experience in command. He had been an instructor for some years at the Frunze Military Academy. Later, he was to command the Central Front briefly and then the special Fifty-first Army participating in the defense of the Crimea. His record on all these assignments was mediocre. He was characterized by his colleagues as a man of indecision, a poor organizer who was gifted with such aplomb that he was almost impervious to suggestion and incapable of swift reaction in an emergency. It would have been difficult to find a man less competent to deal with the fluid and chaotic situation which began to unfold on the morning of June 22.
The situation in the Baltic Military District reflected Kuznetsov’s weaknesses. One of his officers, Major General M. M. Ivanovr commander of the 16th Rifle Corps, had quietly instructed his corps to occupy defenses along the frontier and had brought shells up to the front lines. Kuznetsov ordered the ammunition returned to the supply depot. Ivanov disregarded the order, and when the Germans attacked his corps they were beaten off.
Kuznetsov was so dilatory that not until June 15 did he request Moscow to hurry up with the delivery of 100,000 antitank mines, 40,000 tons of explosives and 45,000 tons of barbed wire that had been ordered long ago.
He called for a blackout of Baltic cities and military objectives on June 18, but when General Zhukov in Moscow ordered him to cancel the blackout, Kuznetsov meekly obeyed and the lights stayed on in Riga, Kaunas, Libau, Siauliai, Vilnius, Dvinsk (Daugavpils) and Evgav.2
Ordinary summer maneuvers began early in June. Kuznetsov and his staff set up a special field headquarters near Panevezys on the eve of the war.
On the evening of June 21 a large group of political workers from the Central Political Administration of the Red Army visited almost every unit of the Eleventh Army, one of the three commanded by Kuznetsov. The political workers assured officers and troops that there would be no war and that the rumors were simple provocations. Influenced by these views, emanating from Moscow, some commanders canceled precautionary instructions which they had given earlier. Work on laying down a mine field near Taurage was suspended.
At about 2:30 A.M., June 22, Kuznetsov, having received the alert sent out by Timoshenko, ordered his armies to occupy their forward positions, to issue live ammunition, to lay down mine fields and tank traps and prepare to repel any major action by the Germans—but not to fire on German planes or respond to provocations. Not many front units got the order before they found themselves engaged in what seemed to them completely mysterious combat.3
Lieutenant General P. P. Sobennikov commanded the Eighth Army of the Special Baltic Military District. He was chargéd with defense of the East Prussian littoral, the coastal areas. To the greater part of his forces, Sobennikov was to recall, the attack came completely without warning. During the predawn hours he managed to issue orders to some units to begin moving up to the frontier. But the troops from the rear had no notion of what was going on to their west, where the German attack had already started.
In the General Staff building in Leningrad the situation was not quite so catastrophic. General Nikishev rushed back to headquarters from Smolny and at about 5 A.M. called in his waiting commanders and staff.
“It’s war, comrades,” he said. “Fascist Germany has attacked us. Proceed to carry out the mobilization plans.”
The commanders dashed to their offices. With trembling hands they fitted keys into the locks of the big war safes and drew out the sealed red packets containing the mobilization orders and ripped them open.
“Suddenly,” Bychevsky recalled, “there loomed before us heaps of unfinished business. Two engineer regiments and one pontoon regiment had to be reorganized into individual battalions and prepared for dispatch to reinforce army units. We had to break off work on laying the concrete in the fortified regions.”
Even then not all the officers were prepared to act.
Major Nikolai Ivanov said doubtfully, “Maybe we should not hurry with this? After all we haven’t any orders from Moscow.”
Bychevsky sternly instructed Ivanov to carry out his orders. All available steel and cement must be thrown into second-line fortifications.
Ivanov thought a minute. He cleaned his glasses with a white handkerchief. “That means it’s war!” he said decisively. “Allright. We’ll fight.”
Another officer who had been summoned hurriedly to the General Staff building was General Mikhail Dukhanov, soon to become known as the heroic commander of the Sixty-seventh Army, one of the toughest fighting units on the Leningrad front. Dukhanov was an old cavalry man. His career dated back to czarist times. In recent years he had been an inspector of Soviet military academies.
He was roused from sleep by a phone call and found a staff car waiting on the street outside his building before he was dressed. The streets were empty of traffic as he whirled down Profsoyuz Boulevard and past the Admiralty, sputtering about “fools who call training alerts in peacetime.”
In his office he had hardly stopped sputtering when word was passed along of the German attack. Automatically he looked at his calendar and was surprised to see staring at him in red letters the new date: “June 22 Sunday.” The year, 1941, was in black letters. His adjutant had torn off Saturday’s leaf before leaving the previous afternoon.
Within the hour Dukhanov had his orders. He was to go to Kingisepp, sixty-five miles to the southwest, with instructions for the 191st Infantry Division to deploy along the Finnish Gulf coast and protect the sandy shore from Kunda to Ust-Narva against possible troop landings.
Dukhanov’s chauffeur awaited him outside the General Staff building. Dukhanov looked across the broad Palace Square, freshly washed. The rosy tints of sunrise were reflected from the windows of the Winter Palace and shafts of sunlight threw the gray statues into sharp relief. The tip of the Alexander I column was caught in the sun’s rays. Not a person was in sight.
Dukhanov took his place in the front seat of his car, the driver beside him. From under the great arch of the General Staff building a boy and girl appeared. The boy put his arm around the girl and tenderly kissed her. The girl’s happy laughter sounded gaily in the quiet morning air.
Soon, thought Dukhanov, that charming laugh will be stifled by the grim word “War!” He turned to his chauffeur. “Let’s go! It’s a long way.”
It was still early morning when Dukhanov arrived at 191st Division headquarters. The duty officer mechanically saluted: “Nothing of importance has happened.”
All through his discussion with the 191st Division commander Dukhanov could not get those words out of his mind. “Nothing of importance has happened.”
It was a troubled night in the solid stone house on Leontiyevsky Pereulok, a narrow lane which leads from Gorky Boulevard through the old Moscow merchant quarter to emerge at the Nikitsky Gates. The house, at No. 10, with its sturdy columns guarding a massive door, was heavily curtained. From the street there was no sign of unusual activity, but there had been no sleep in the German Embassy that night. After returning from his mid-evening Kremlin conference with Molotov the Ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg, sat down with his trusted friend and confidant, Gustav Hilger, to draft what was to be his last dispatch from Russia.
The task was a painful one. For days the embassy had been destroying its secret files and documents. Schulenburg knew that only a sudden and unexpected turn of events could keep Germany from going to war against Russia—in all likelihood before dawn. The prospect filled him with gloom. Hilger shared his despondency, indeed felt it even more keenly. Hilger had been born in Moscow, son of a prosperous German merchant family, and had devoted his life to Russia. He was almost as Russian as he was German. He and the Ambassador had done everything in their power to halt the onrush of war. They had even taken their lives in their hands and attempted to warn the Russian Ambassador to Berlin, Dekanozov, when he chanced to be in Moscow in mid-May. They told him as plainly as they dared that Hitler was preparing to attack. This was treason, they knew, and they would be shot if Hitler ever learned what they had done, but the danger to Germany of the prospective war was so great, in their belief, as to justify the risk. Dekanozov, with that stubbornness of which only Stalin’s best-trained lackeys were capable, shut his ears to von der Schulenburg. He insisted he could not talk of such matters; only Molotov was competent to listen.
Finally, von der Schulenburg and Hilger, utterly balked, gave up their perilous effort.4
Now on this evening of June 21–22 von der Schulenburg drafted a telegram to the Foreign Office in Berlin, reporting the curious conversation he had had an hour before in the Kremlin with Molotov, patiently explaining to his chiefs Molotov’s almost pitiful effort to open up at this hour (when Hitler’s armies already were moving to the frontier for their dawn assault) new conversations aimed at appeasing whatever appetites Hitler might have.
Neither Schulenburg nor Hilger had hope that this cablegram would affect Berlin’s action. Both knew the die had been cast. Yet they were determined to play out the game.
The cable was drafted, encoded and sent to the message center. It was timed at 1:17 A.M., and the Ambassador went to his residence to await events. One of his aides, Gebhardt von Walther, went with him. Hilger remained at the embassy. There were few persons left there. Not only the women and children and German businessmen, but the German experts in Russia on various missions (many of them in connection with the supplies Russia was providing to the Nazis) had gone back home. The German technicians who had been working in Leningrad to supervise the completion of the new cruiser Lützow had vanished. The naval attaché, Captain von Baum-bach, in chargé of the Lützow work had left that very evening—the last to go. The consulates had packed up. Everyone had been rounded up except a small group of Germans aboard the Trans-Siberian express, bound from Tokyo to Moscow.
Now it was the morning of June 22. The Ambassador had known for a week that this was the date set for the attack. He knew that the hour was supposed to be 4 A.M. Walther had brought this information from Berlin only the day before. Suddenly, the duty officer telephoned. A long telegram was starting in from Berlin. There was hardly any doubt what it might be. The Ambassador arose with a sigh and returned to his chancellery. The time was 3 A.M. The message was prefixed: “Very Urgent. State Secret.” It was for delivery to the Ambassador personally.
As soon as von der Schulenburg read the opening words he knew what the remainder would say. It began:
(1) Upon receipt of this telegram, all of the cipher material still there is to be destroyed. The radio set is to be put out of commission.
(2) Please inform Herr Molotov at once that you have an urgent communication to make to him and would therefore like to call on him immediately. . . .5
The weary Ambassador turned to Hilger and Walther. The men shook their heads. The message was long. It took nearly two hours to transmit and decode. A clerk was ordered to telephone the Kremlin. The Ambassador’s limousine was brought around front again.
A little after 5 A.M. von der Schulenburg and Hilger were moving swiftly down Herzen Street toward the Kremlin. Their car swung right on the Mokhovaya and then made the left turn up the raised approaches beside the Alexandrinsky Gardens to the Borovitsky Gate of the Kremlin. The city slept, but it was already almost full daylight. Beyond the rose-brick Kremlin walls the Moskva River flowed softly and smoothly, its waters mirror-calm. The air was heavy with the scent of acacia and early roses from the Alexandrinsky Gardens.
The Kremlin guards brought their hands up to their blue-and-red caps in a smart salute, glanced at the diplomats and waved them inside.
Von der Schulenburg and Hilger entered Molotov’s offices in the cream-and-yellow Government Palace just about 5:30 A.M. Molotov, tired, worn and dour, showed them to seats at a long table covered by green baize. Von der Schulenburg drew out his message and began to read: “The Soviet Ambassador in Berlin is receiving at this hour from the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs a memorandum—”
Unable to contain himself Molotov blurted out: “Heavy bombing has been going on for three hours!”
Von der Schulenburg looked up from his papers but said nothing. He droned on for ten minutes and concluded: “Thereby the Soviet Government has broken its treaties and is about to attack Germany from the rear, in its struggle for life. The Flihrer has therefore ordered the German armed forces to oppose this threat with all the means at their disposal.”
Several moments of complete silence followed. Molotov seemed to be struggling to maintain his stony demeanor. Finally he said, “Is this supposed to be a declaration of war?”
Schulenburg lifted his shoulders helplessly.
Molotov then spoke with indignation. He said the message could be nothing but a declaration of war since German troops had already crossed the border and Soviet citizens had already been bombed. He called the Nazi action a “breach of confidence without precedent.” He said Germany had attacked Russia without reason, that the excuses given were nothing but pretexts, that the allegations of Soviet troop concentrations were sheer nonsense, that if the German Government had felt offense, it merely needed to send a note to the Soviet Government instead of unleashing war.
“Surely we have not deserved that,” said Molotov.
The Ambassador replied with a request that the embassy staff be permitted to leave the Soviet Union in conformity with international law. Molotov icily rejoined that the Germans would be treated with strict reciprocity.
The Ambassador and Hilger shook hands with Molotov and re-entered their car. As it purred down the gentle slopes and out of the Kremlin compound, they saw, Hilger later recalled, a number of cars arriving. He thought he recognized several high-ranking generals in the machines.
The Germans drove in silence back to the embassy, which lay less than five minutes from the Kremlin. It was a region of Moscow with which Hilger had been familiar since boyhood. As he passed through the streets, he thought with sinking heart that he would never see them again.6
The telephone in the Soviet Embassy in Berlin rang at 3 A.M., awakening Counselor Valentin Berezhkov from a restless sleep. A voice that was unfamiliar said that Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop was in his office and wished to see Ambassador Dekanozov immediately. The unknown voice and the official tone of the language struck a sudden chill into Berezhkov, but he shook off his apprehension and said he was pleased that the Foreign Minister was prepared to receive Dekanozov in response to his repeated requests.
“We know nothing of any requests,” the voice said coldly. “I have been instructed to advise you that Reich Minister Ribbentrop wishes to see the Soviet representative immediately.”
Berezhkov said it would take a little time to rouse Dekanozov and get the car sent around. He was told that Ribbentrop had sent a car which was already outside the Soviet Embassy.
When Berezhkov and Dekanozov emerged on the Unter den Linden, they found a black Mercedes waiting. A uniformed officer of the SS Toten-kopf Division, death’s head gleaming on his cap, escorted them, together with a Foreign Office protocol officer, also in uniform. Over the Brandenburg Gates the first rays of the sun were already visible. It was going to be a fine, clear, warm day.
Entering the Wilhelmstrasse they saw a crowd. Floodlights illuminated the entrance to the Foreign Office. There were cameramen, movie crews, journalists, officials. Berezhkov’s sense of alarm deepened. The two Russians walked up the long staircase and down a corridor to Ribbentrop’s suite. The corridor was lined with uniformed men who snapped to a smart salute and clicked their heels. They turned to the right into Ribbentrop’s office, a vast room with a desk at the far end where Ribbentrop sat in his gray-green minister’s uniform. To the right of the door was a group of Nazi officials. They did not move when the Russians entered. Dekanozov walked silently across the long room, and Ribbentrop finally rose, silently bent his head, offered his hand and invited the two Russians to sit at a round table nearby. Berezhkov noticed that Ribbentrop’s face was bloated. It was muddy in color and his eyes were bloodshot. He swayed a bit as he walked, and the thought entered Berezhkov’s mind: “The man is drunk.” As they sat at the table and Ribbentrop began to speak, slurring his words, it was obvious that he was, in fact, intoxicated.
Dekanozov had brought the text of his latest instructions from Moscow with him. But Ribbentrop brushed the subject aside. It was another matter that he wished to discuss. The German Government had become aware of concentrations of Soviet troops along the German frontier. It was apprised of the hostile attitude of the Soviet Government and the serious threat this presented to the German state. The Soviet forces had repeatedly violated the German state frontiers. He presented Dekanozov with a memorandum detailing the Nazi allegations. The Soviet Government was preparing to strike a deadly blow at the Nazi rear at a moment when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle with the Anglo-Saxons. The Führer could not endure such a threat and had ordered appropriate military countermeasures.
Dekanozov interrupted. He said that he had been seeking an interview with Ribbentrop, that his government had instructed him to raise certain questions concerning Soviet-German relations which required clarification.
Ribbentrop cut Dekanozov off sharply. He had nothing to add to what he had said except to say that the German action was not to be regarded as aggression. He rose a bit unsteadily and said: “The Führer ordered me to announce to you officially these defensive measures.”
The Russians rose. Ribbentrop said that he was sorry that matters had arrived at this pass for he had earnestly sought to put relations between the two countries on a sound and sensible basis. Dekanozov said he, too, was very sorry. The German Government had a completely erroneous conception of the position of the Soviet Union.
As the Russians neared the door, Ribbentrop hurried after them. Speaking very rapidly, the words tumbling one after the other in a hoarse whisper, he said, “Tell Moscow that I was against the attack.”
The Russians walked out into the street. It was fully light. The cameras clicked. The movie cameras whirred. Back at the embassy they tried to call Moscow. The time was 4 A.M. (6 A.M. in Moscow). The telephone connections had been broken. They tried to send a messenger to the telegraph office. He was turned back. Berezhkov slipped out the rear door in a small Opel Olympia. He managed to make his way to the main post office and handed in his telegram to a clerk.
“Moscow!” the clerk said. “Haven’t you heard what has happened?”
“Go ahead,” Berezhkov said. “Send it anyway.”
The telegram never arrived in Moscow.
What took place in the Kremlin once the formal declaration of war— despite its Hitlerian perversity—had been delivered is still not easy to determine.
Directive No. 1 of the Defense Commissariat signed by Marshal Timo-shenko and General Zhukov was not issued until 7:15 A.M., after the German attack had been under way for nearly four hours. It was received in Leningrad at General Staff headquarters at 8A.M. The order was a curious one. It did not define Russia and Germany as actually being in a state of war. It read like the document of men who were by no means certain that they were dealing with actual war. Little wonder that the Soviet armed forces were confused.
The Soviet commanders were instructed to attack and exterminate enemy troops which had entered Soviet territory, but they were barred from crossing into German territory. They were permitted air reconnaissance and attacks but only to a depth of sixty-six to a hundred miles. Permission was given to bomb Königsberg and Memel. Flights over Rumania or Finland were forbidden without special permission.
If this was war, then surely it was limited war. When the Leningrad commanders read the prohibition on flights over Finland, they were dumf ounded. They had already shot down at least one German plane based in Finland.
Colonel Bychevsky met one of his old Leningrad colleagues, P. P. Yevstigneyev, chief of intelligence, in the General Staff corridor.
“Have you read the order?” Yevstigneyev asked.
“I read it,” Bychevsky said. “What do you think, Pyotr Petrovich, will the Finns fight?”
Yevstigneyev snorted. “Of course they will. The Germans are heading for Murmansk and Kandalaksha. And Mannerheim is dreaming of revenge. Their aviation is already in action.”
In Moscow Admiral Kuznetsov grew more and more nervous as the hours rolled by. He had two major concerns—possible landing attempts in the Baltic behind the Soviet lines and German air attacks on his Baltic naval bases. And what was most alarming was the silence of the Kremlin. The last communication he had had was Malenkov’s surly call displaying anger and distrust of Kuznetsov’s report of the German attack on Sevastopol. No orders came to Kuznetsov from the Kremlin, none from the Defense Commissar. Although on his own responsibility he had ordered his fleets to oppose the German attack, it was not enough simply to “oppose the enemy.” It was time to direct the Soviet forces to strike counterblows as swiftly and effectively as possible.
Yet he, the most independent of the Soviet commanders, was not willing to order this on his own responsibility.
“The fleet could not do this alone,” he noted. “There had to be agreed plans and unity of action by all the armed forces.”
He knew his fleets were ready; he was confident they would meet the challenge. But what really was going on in Libau, in Tallinn, in Hangö arid throughout the Baltic approaches to Leningrad?
The morning flowered—beautiful, sunny, fresh. Finally about ten o’clock Kuznetsov could no longer contain himself. He decided to go in person to the Kremlin and report on the situation. He found the traffic light as he drove down Komintern Street. Not too many people in the center of town. Everyone* he thought, was already on his way to the country. A normal peacetime scene. Here and there a fast-moving car, sending pedestrians scurrying with the horn.
At the Kremlin it was quiet. The flowers, newly set out in the Alexandrin-sky Gardens, blazed with purple and red. The walks had been freshly raked with reddish sand for the benefit of Sunday strollers. Elderly babushkas with their grandchildren were already sunning themselves on the park benches. The guards at the Borovitsky Gate, in their parade white jackets and blue trousers with the wide red stripes, snapped to a salute, glanced into the car and waved it on. The Admiral’s machine speeded up the incline and whirled into the courtyard outside the Government Palace.
Kuznetsov peered in all directions. No cars. No strollers. No signs of activity. Nothing. One car was coming out. It halted to let the Admiral have the right of way in the narrow drive.
“Apparently the leadership has met somewhere else,” Kuznetsov decided. “But why hasn’t there yet been any official announcement about the war?”
Where could the leaders be? What was going on?
He was still pondering this question when he got back to the Naval Commissariat.
“Did anyone call?” Kuznetsov asked his duty officer.
“No,” the officer replied. “No one called.”
Kuznetsov waited all day. No one called from the government. He did not hear from Stalin. Not until evening did Molotov telephone to ask how the fleet was making out.
1 The navy alert telegram took one to two hours for delivery. The army telegrams probably took longer. The warning did not arrive at Fourth Army headquarters at Kobrin until nearly 5:30 A.M. One source claims the telegrams were sent at 11:45 P.M. but in cipher, which caused further delay. (V. Khvostov, A. Grylev, op. cit.)
2 The authors of the official fiftieth anniversary volume on the Soviet armed forces make the assertion that commanders of border districts were ordered between June 14 and 19 to put their frontier troops into field dispositions and instructed on June 19 to camouflage airports and military installations. No source for this order is cited nor is a text given. The recollections of field commanders and the operational journals of border units indicate that when efforts were made to move to a higher degree of preparedness on the eve of the war, very sharp, very serious reprimands were forthcoming from Moscow. (V. D. Ivanov, editor, 50 Let Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR, Moscow, 1967, p. 250.) V. Khvostov and A. Grylev (op. cit.) claim border commands were ordered to field headquarters June 19.
3 One German Army unit intercepted Soviet field messages saying, “We are being fired on. What shall we do?” Headquarters replied: “You must be crazy. Why is your signal not in code?” (John Erickson, The Soviet High Command, London, 1962, p. 587.)
4 V. I. Pavlov, who served as Stalin’s principal translator at the Big Three conferences in World War II, accompanied Dekanozov as interpreter. In personal conversation with Dr. Gebhardt von Walther, then a secretary of the German Embassy in Moscow (in 1967 West German Ambassador to Moscow), he still insisted twenty-five years later that the Russians thought the warning by von der Schulenburg was a “blackmail” attempt. Walther, who was present at the Dekanozov–von der Schulenburg talk, recalled that Pavlov telephoned him the day after the fateful interview, asking him “how the conversation should be understood.” Walther assured him the Ambassador’s words should be taken just as they had been spoken. (Walther, personal conversation, June 16, 1967.)
5 The text is from the German Foreign Ministry files. Hilger is quoted as saying it was not received in precisely this form in Moscow. But no other text has been discovered. (Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, Vol. XII, p. 1063.)
6 While von der Schulenburg and Hilger were at the Kremlin, Walther gathered up some of the embassy personnel from their homes and brought them to the embassy. He then went to the railroad station to await the arrival of the Trans-Siberian in order to escort the German party from the train to the embassy. While he waited there, an NKVD officer appeared and politely told him that he must return to the German Embassy. Walther did so. The Russians did not even bother to accompany him. The German diplomats in Moscow were treated throughout with complete courtesy. In contrast, the Soviet personnel in Berlin and elsewhere in Germany were subjected to rude and even brutal treatment. (Walther, personal communication, July, 1967.)