WHAT WAS STALIN THINKING DURING THE LONG, COLD Russian spring of 1941, as the intelligence data piled up, as the evidence that his erstwhile partner, Adolf Hitler, was—in contradiction to his sworn pledges—preparing to attack the Soviet Union?
Certainly, Stalin knew that times were changing, that the heyday of the Nazi-Soviet entente had passed.
The novelist Ilya Ehrenburg had returned to Moscow from Paris after the fall of France. He was a violent Francophile, and the Nazi rape of France had deeply moved him. He was writing a novel about the French events, called The Fall of Paris. Because of the Nazi-Soviet pact no Moscow publisher would touch it. The censorship would not even clear his chapters for serial publication.
At his wit’s end Ehrenburg sent a copy of the book to Stalin, hoping that he might get some support. One morning in April his telephone rang. It was Stalin. Ehrenburg was flustered. His daughter’s dog was yapping. He had never spoken to Stalin before. Stalin said, “We’ve never met, but I know your work.” Ehrenburg mumbled, “Yes, I know yours, too.”
Stalin told him he had read the manuscript and that he would try to help get it through the censorship. “We’ll work together on this,” Stalin said.
The politically sophisticated Ehrenburg knew that this meant only one thing: war. Stalin was preparing for war with Germany.
Ten days later Stalin gave a reception in the Kremlin to young officers graduating from the Soviet military and naval academies. It was May 5. He spoke for forty minutes and mentioned the threat of war in serious terms. He indicated he did not believe the Red Army was yet ready to fight the Wehrmacht. “Keep your powder dry,” he said, warning the officers to be prepared for anything.
One account of the speech quotes Stalin as observing that the next few months would be critical in relations between Germany and Russia and that he hoped to stave off war until 1942. But in 1942, he indicated, war was certain to come. Another account suggested Stalin sought to prepare a “new compromise” with Germany.1
The next day, May 6, Stalin for the first time in his career assumed governmental office. He became Premier in place of Molotov, who was made Deputy Premier and continued as Foreign Commissar. Stalin ordered certain precautionary steps in this period. Instructions were issued in May for the transfer of a number of reserve forces from the Urals and the Volga region to the vicinity of the Dnieper, the western Dvina and border areas.
Some Soviet students find in Stalin’s conduct in May contradictory signs: on the one hand he clung to his old dogma that there would be no attack; on the other he began to display concern lest the Germans actually would move against Russia.
How the situation looked to others may be judged by the tart comment of Aleksandr Zonin, a Soviet naval writer, speaking of the atmosphere of that time:
“Everything clearly shouted that Hitler soon would break his treaty. It demanded the supercilious blindness of Nicholas I or the pompous naïveté of an actor to insist with confidence that there would be no war, to declare: ‘Be quiet. We will decide, we will announce when the time has come to mow down the weeds.’ ”
The epidemic of rumors about German attack, the visible evidence along the frontiers of concentrations and overflights, began to affect the morale of the armed forces. The Chief Naval Political Commissar, I. V. Rogov, reported “unhealthy moods” among fleet personnel. Rogov was a strict, demanding man. His nickname was “Ivan the Terrible” (his name and patronymic were “Ivan Vasilyevich,” the same as those of the terrible Czar). He was in the habit of shifting his staff without explanation from one fleet to another, from the Arctic Command to the Black Sea, from the Danube to the Pacific. He arbitrarily promoted men “by two"—two ranks—and demoted them “by two” with equal arbitrariness. His eyes were slightly hooded, and he had heavy black eyebrows. He was suffering from a heart complaint, but none of his associates were aware of this. Now this stern, self-contained, imperious man lacked confidence in what line to take.
“What are we going to do about all the talk that the Germans are preparing to attack the Soviet Union?” he asked Admiral Kuznetsov. The difficulty lay, of course, in the dichotomy between the rumors and the bland tone of the press. Persons who talked of war were branded “provocateurs” Rogov and Kuznetsov decided to order their political workers to hew to the line that vigilance must be heightened and that Germany was the probable enemy.
This was done in the navy. But it was not done generally in the military and for an excellent reason. On June 3 a meeting of the Supreme Military Council was convened in Moscow to approve a draft of instructions for the army’s political workers which would emphasize the need of vigilance and the danger of war. Stalin’s close associate, Georgi M. Malenkov, attacked the draft in the sharpest terms, contending that it sought to prepare the troops for the possibility of war in the nearest future. Such a presentation, he said, was entirely unacceptable.
“The document is formulated in primitive terms,” Malenkov sneered, “as though we were going to war tomorrow.”2
Stalin supported Malenkov’s opinion, and the instructions were not issued. The official attitude was unchanging: all rumors and reports of war were but a British trick to sow trouble between Russia and Germany.
The strongest support for the conclusion that Stalin remained confident even on the eve of war in his ability to prevent its outbreak is provided by the fact that on June 6 he approved a comprehensive plan for the shift-over of Soviet industry to war production. This timetable called for completion of the plan by the end of 1942I It was an excellent, detailed schedule, calling for the conversion of large numbers of civilian plants to military purposes and the construction of much-needed defense facilities.
“Stalin underevaluated the real threat of war against the Soviet Union from the side of Fascist Germany and did not believe in the possibility of attack on the U.S.S.R. in the summer of 1941,” the Soviet economist Krav-chenko commented after a careful examination of the Soviet economic military plans of the period. As of June 22, 1941, the Soviet Air Force had on hand only 593 new-model fighters and bombers. Only 594 of the powerful new 60-ton KV tanks and 1,225 of the serviceable new medium T-34 tanks had been put in the hands of the army.3
“Stalin never believed in the possibility that Germany would attack the U.S.S.R. in June, 1941,” concluded Marshal Andrei Grechko, onetime Chief of Staff.
On the very day (June 6) that Stalin approved the plan for converting Soviet industry to a wartime basis by the end of 1942, the NKGB put before him an intelligence evaluation that German concentrations on the Soviet frontiers had reached the four-million mark.
Warnings came from all directions. There were more from London. Lord Cadogan, permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office, on June 10 called in Ambassador Maisky.
“Take a piece of paper,” Cadogan said, “and write down what I’m going to dictate.” He proceeded to list for Maisky (with dates and military designations) the identity and location of units the Germans had concentrated on the Soviet frontier. Maisky sent the data by urgent cipher to Moscow. The only response Maisky ever got—if it was a response—was the June 13 Tass statement brushing aside rumors of Soviet-German war as a British provocation.
The Soviet Embassy in Berlin noted a curious and alarming circumstance. Near the embassy on Unter den Linden stood the studio of Hoffmann, Hitler’s court photographer, the man who took the pictures of Eva Braun. Hoffmann had a display window in which he put up maps of European theaters in which operations were contemplated. In the spring of 1940 he put up maps of Holland and Scandinavia. In April, 1941, it was Yugoslavia and Greece. Toward the end of May a huge map of Eastern Europe, the Baltic states, Byelorussia and the Ukraine appeared. The hint was obvious.
Yet Moscow showed no signs of alarm. Large numbers of Soviet personnel, their wives—even pregnant wives—and children continued to arrive in Germany after June 1.
The consequences of Malenkov’s intervention against realistic political instructions for the army quickly assumed a sinister aspect. Officers who continued to warn about German attack or speak out on the danger of war were branded as provocateurs. Some were arrested. Others were threatened with arrest.4 Political commissars were sent out from Moscow. They described Stalin as carrying out the most delicate balancing act in order to avoid war. “Stalin,” one said, “can walk so quietly he doesn’t even shake the china.” They referred to Bismarck’s dictum that Germany could not fight a war on two fronts.
This atmosphere produced disaster. For instance, on the vital Bug River frontier, defended by the Fourth Army, more than 40 German divisions had been identified by June 5. It was known that at least 15 infantry, 5 tank, 2 motorized and 2 cavalry divisions were massing in the direction of Brest-Litovsk. Yet, on June 10, after getting the latest evaluations from Army General D. G. Pavlov at district military headquarters in Minsk, General A. A. Korobkov assured his associates that Moscow did not fear German attack.
Marshal Ivan K. Bagramyan was then a colonel attachéd to the Kiev Military District and Deputy Chief of Staff. By late May he had intelligence reports that the Germans were moving all civilians out of border areas. On June 6 the Germans replaced their border guards with field troops and put military directors in chargé of all hospitals. An estimated two hundred troop trains a day were arriving at the Ukraine frontier, and the rumble of truck traffic all along the border was sufficient to keep residents from sleeping at night.
Colonel General M. P. Kirponos, the Kiev commander, ordered some of his troops to occupy sections of the frontier fortifications which had not yet been completed. The move had hardly started when the Chief of Staff, General Zhukov, telegraphed peremptory orders from Moscow: “The chief of NKVD border troops reports the chief of the fortified region has received orders to occupy the forward works. Such action may quickly provoke the Germans to armed clash with serious consequences. You are ordered to revoke it immediately and report specifically who ordered such an arbitrary disposition.” According to one version, this intervention was directly inspired by Police Chief Beria.
Actually, a good deal was being done in Kirponos’ command to prepare for possible war. Bagramyan had been working since winter on plans for meeting any threat to the Western border. A variant had been approved in early February and sent to the General Staff in Moscow, but delay followed delay and revision followed revision. Not until May 10 was the plan approved by the Kremlin.
At the same time, on May 5 the frontier districts got new directives about disposition of their forces for defense, providing for concentration of heavy reserves, especially tanks in a deep interior defense region. The Kiev Command was instructed to prepare to receive large reinforcements from the Caucasus, including the 34th Infantry Corps of five divisions, headed by Lieutenant General M. A. Reiter, and three divisions of the 25th Corps. This group was transformed into the Nineteenth Army, and Lieutenant General I. S. Konev was placed at its head. A bit later the district was advised that it would receive the Sixteenth Army headed by Lieutenant General M. F. Lukin from the Trans-Baikal district. It was due to arrive between June 15 and July 10.5
Did Stalin still believe that Germany was not planning to attack or that, if she did harbor such plans, he could outmaneuver Hitler?
Admiral Kuznetsov visited the Kremlin June 13 or 14. He saw Stalin for the last time before the outbreak of war. He gave him the latest intelligence evaluations from each fleet, advised him that the Black Sea Fleet was about to begin maneuvers and that the Germans had for all practical purposes abandoned work on the unfinished cruiser Lützow in Leningrad. He submitted a report on the number of German ships in Soviet ports and a chart drawn up by his Chief of Staff showing how quickly these numbers had fallen. Kuznetsov felt that the chart provided dramatic evidence of German preparations for war and of the little time that remained. Should not orders be given to Soviet ships to avoid German waters? Kuznetsov wanted to put the matter to Stalin, but, as he recalled, “it appeared to me that my further presence was clearly not desired.” He left Stalin’s office without a question having been raised about preparing the fleets for action. There was no evidence that his presentation was ever followed up.
This was the day that Stalin approved publication of the Tass statement implying that rumors of war were a British trick. Kuznetsov believed that Stalin’s intense suspicion of the British (and to a lesser extent of the Americans) blinded him to the validity of the intelligence evaluations he received. Anything that came from Churchill or the British was, Stalin was certain, part of a scheme to draw him into war. Thus, when Ambassador Maisky in London passed on British information about the divisions Germany had concentrated on the Soviet border, Stalin rejected the data. He took the same attitude when Maisky reported on June 13 that the British were ready to send a military mission immediately to Moscow in event of German attack and when Maisky advised on June 18 that Cripps had told him the German attack was imminent and that the Germans now had 147 divisions on the Soviet frontier.
By curious irony Richard Sorge in Tokyo turned over to his wireless operator the last message he was to send before the outbreak of war on the very day he read in the Japanese press the Tass statement of June 13. Sorge had received a message from Moscow on June 12 strongly doubting the validity of his earlier reports of German preparations for attack. Sorge expressed to a colleague his concern. He wondered whether Stalin could be doubting his information. He dictated a new telegram, saying: “I repeat: nine armies of 150 divisions will attack on a wide front at dawn June 22, 1941.” The message was signed with his customary code name, “Ramsey.”6
In the opinion of Soviet historians none of the intelligence data altered the fixed opinion of Stalin and his closest associates, Zhdanov, Beria and Malen-kov, that there would be no immediate Nazi attack. Order after order in the last ten days before the war forbade moves along the frontier lest they be interpreted by the Germans as provocations.7
Not even when German reconnaissance planes accidentally landed at Soviet airports June 19 was Moscow’s evaluation shaken. True, that same day General Kirponos was instructed to advance his command post to Ternopol, closer to the border. The shift was to be made June 22. But no orders came through to move up troops or put planes on the ready.8
Political workers in the army were briefed to carry out a new line which was said to reflect the intentions of the Tass communiqué. There were three main points: first, talk of war is pro vocational; second, the communiqué proves that there is no disagreement with Germany; third, thanks to Stalin’s policy peace has been secured for a long time.
These views certainly were shared by both Stalin and Zhdanov. Zhdanov was Chief of the Party’s Propaganda and Agitation Department. The Party line of “No War” was being laid down under his strict guidance.
Only in the navy did it prove possible to maintain some vigilance. There, due to Kuznetsov and his chief political officer, I. V. Rogov, the line of imminent danger and possible attack by Germany continued to be presented in lectures to the troops.9 But not without repercussions. When the Deputy Political Chief Kalachev lectured along these lines to the Military Medical Academy in Leningrad, a letter quickly turned up in Moscow complaining that the press spoke of peace and Kalachev of war.
Rogov sent a strong group of propagandists to lecture to the Black Sea Fleet during their maneuvers. The group was headed by Vice Admiral I. I. Azarov. The Party line was to warn the sailors of the threatening situation with Germany. On the very day Azarov spoke before the personnel of the cruiser Krasny Kavkaz, Tass denounced war rumors as a provocation.
Captain A. V. Bushchin came to Azarov and said: “Comrade Commissar, you will have to speak again before the command and tell them whom to believe. Are those who talk of the nearness of war provocateurs or not?”
It was a difficult moment for Azarov, but he held to his position, telling the men the Tass communiqué was solely for foreign consumption.
Throughout the Black Sea maneuvers alarming naval reports came in. The Danube flotilla commander advised that Nazi military engineering work was being pressed night and day on the west bank of the river. Deserters said that military action was expected by month’s end. Marine units were seen at Rumanian ports and German officers along the Danube. Daily calls from the Baltic commanders told of German ship and plane movements.
The NKGB reported to Stalin personally June 11 that the German Embassy in Moscow had on June 9 received instructions to prepare to evacuate its quarters in the course of seven days. There was evidence that the embassy was burning documents in the basement. Five days later the NKGB reported that German troops concentrated in East Prussia had been ordered to occupy take-off positions for attacking Russia by June 13. Then the date was changed to June 18.
By this time rumors had begun to circulate among high staff officers of warnings which Stalin had received from Churchill and Roosevelt. Tension in the Defense Commissariat was high.10 Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky told a questioner June 18: “Things will be all right if Germany doesn’t attack in the next fifteen or twenty days.”
On what did Vasilevsky base this remark? In part, certainly, on the movement of reinforcements to the west, which was now, belatedly, under way on a fairly large scale. There had been a steady build-up of Soviet forces, roughly parallel to that of the Germans.
The German troop movement had been carried out in three stages. About thirty divisions were sent to East Prussia and Poland in the fall of 1940. This force was built up to seventy divisions by mid-May. In the same period Soviet forces in the west were increased to about seventy divisions, but with the difference that the Soviet divisions generally were not at war strength nor disposed in frontier positions.
The Germans began heavy troop movements May 25, sending in about one hundred military formations each twenty-four hours. The Soviet reinforcements, ordered in mid-May, soon began to arrive in the west. These movements were carried out on an urgent basis, troops being moved without equipment and arms. They were concentrated on the line of the western Dvina and the Dnieper from Kraslava to Kremenchug. This was the destination of Konev’s troops from the north Caucasus and Lukin’s Trans-Baikal army. They were assembling at Shepetovka, southeast of Rovno. But only slowly were the frontier troops advanced to border positions.
The movement of troops from the interior was to be completed only in the second half of July—the critical period to which Vasilevsky referred.11
By June 21, 1941, the Soviet had deployed about 2.9 million troops in the Western defense districts against an estimated 4.2 million Germans. The total strength of the Soviet military establishment had been strongly expanded from the 1939 level—up to 4.2 million in January, 1941, against 2.5 million in January, 1939. The total stood just below 5 million June 1. The air force had been tripled and land forces increased 2.7 times. The army had 125 new rifle divisions.
But the numbers were deceptive. The army had only 30 percent of the automatic weapons provided by the table of organization; only 20 percent of the planes were of new modern types and only 9 percent of the tanks. When General S. M. Shtemenko took over the 34th Cavalry Division in July, 1941, he found it had no arms whatever. He finally got some 1927 vintage cannons but was unable to obtain enough rifles or ammunition to equip his troops. There were no antitank guns—nothing but Molotov cocktails (gasoline bottles with wicks). He got twelve antitank guns, but not until October, 1941.
The chiefs of the Soviet Air Force and the air construction industry were hastily summoned to the Kremlin in early June and denounced for failure to develop a system of camouflaging Soviet planes. Stalin had learned, through a letter from an aviator, that air force planes along the Western border were parked in parade formation at the airdromes, gleaming in aluminum, beautiful targets for attack. No one had ever given the question of camouflage the slightest thought. The Air Construction Commissariat was ordered to come forward with a comprehensive plan for camouflage within three days. The plan was submitted in early June but had not been carried out, except in part, by the time the attack started.
Thus some precautions, even though sluggish, were being taken.
Is it credible in the face of all the evidence that Stalin genuinely believed Germany would not attack—or that he could stave off the attack by a diplomatic maneuver?
It seems not only possible but certain. In mid-June Major General A. A. Korobkov of the Soviet Fourth Army on the Bug River told his commanders that the higher-ups in Moscow were inclined to interpret the German concentrations as a blackmailing maneuver, designed “to strengthen the argument of Germany in the decision of some political discussions” with the Soviet Union.
The Soviet historian A. M. Nekrich observed that if this represented Stalin’s view, he had no real idea of what was going on in the world.
This seems to have been the case. Marshal Voronov is certain that Stalin persisted to the end in believing that war between Russia and Germany could only arise as a result of provocations, not by Hitler, but by “military revanchists.” In other words, Stalin trusted Hitler but not his generals!
There were some final efforts by field commanders to take the necessary steps before it was too late. General M. P. Kirponos, the commander in Kiev, became convinced a week or so before June 22 that war was coming. He sent Stalin a personal letter asking permission to evacuate from frontier regions along the Bug River 300,000 civilians, to prepare defense works and set up antitank barriers. To this the reply was the same as all the others: This would be a provocative act. Do not move.
There is a possibility that Stalin thought he had an ace in the hole. Beginning about mid-May there circulated in both Moscow and Berlin rumors that Russia and Germany were exploring the possibility of reaching a new economic and political accord. Grigore Gafencu, the Rumanian Minister in Moscow, thought there might be substance to the reports. He heard that the Germans had made very stiff demands—the right to exploit the Ukraine, the turning over of all Russia’s airplane production and other proposals which sounded outrageous. But some felt Stalin was ready to pay an extremely high price to avoid war.
Ulrich von Hassell, the famous German diplomat and diarist, in Berlin heard much the same thing. There were, he noted in his diary, “whispers everywhere that Stalin will make a kind of peaceful capitulation.” Von Hassell was skeptical of this, and so, he noted, was Weizsäcker. Von Hassell was certain Hitler was going to carry out his campaign against Russia.
But as time passed, as German preparations for war mounted at an ever-faster tempo, the rumors did not die. They grew. Von Hassell again took note of them, just after the fateful Tass communiqué of June 13. His entry for June 15 reported: “With astonishing unanimity come rumors—in the opinion of ‘knowing men’ spread for propaganda (why?)—that an understanding with Russia is imminent, Stalin is coming here, etc.”12
Was this Stalin’s ace in the hole? Did he plan, if worse came to worst, if Hitler was really preparing to attack, to make the pilgrimage himself? To emulate Ivan Kalita (Moneybags), the medieval Czar, who solidified his power by making the submission to the great Tatar Khans, by accepting the yarlik? Did he harbor the intention of going to Berlin at the last moment and buying his way out of the cul-de-sac into which his policy had led his country and himself?
Some curious evidence points in this direction.
On June 18 Ambassador Dekanozov in Berlin asked to see Weizsäcker. The Soviet Ambassador was received, but, according to one account, “nothing important resulted” because Weizsäcker had no instructions.
Weizsäcker’s own report stated that Dekanozov brought up only “a few current matters.” He described Dekanozov as chatting “with complete un-constraint and in a cheerful mood” about such trivialities as Weizsäcker’s recent trip to Budapest and the situation in Iraq. He got into no detailed discussion of Soviet-German relations.
On June 20 Haider placed a cryptic note in his diary: “Molotov wanted to see the Fuhrer on June 18.”
Was this subject raised in the Dekanozov meeting on the eighteenth? Was there an eleventh-hour effort to arrange a Hitler-Stalin meeting? The Italian Ambassador in Berlin, L. Simoni, heard rumors of a Stalin trip for the purpose of making last-minute concessions.
This hypothesis is given support by the fruitless efforts of Molotov and Dekanozov to get into meaningful discussions with the Germans on the evening of June 21, when the preparations for attack could hardly have been overlooked by a ten-year-old child.
As good a portrait of Stalin in these days as is available is that drawn by Admiral Kuznetsov. In the Admiral’s view, Stalin unquestionably expected war with Hitler. Stalin regarded the Nazi-Soviet pact as a time-gaining stopgap, but the time span proved much shorter than he anticipated. His chief mistake was in underestimating the period he had available for preparation.
“The suspiciousness of Stalin relative to England and America made matters worse,” Kuznetsov concluded. “He doubted all evidence about Hitler’s activity which he received from the English and Americans and simply threw it to one side.”13
The suspiciousness of Stalin complicated matters in other ways. It was not ordinary suspiciousness, but what Kuznetsov called the “sick suspicious-ness peculiar to [Stalin] at that time.” And under its influence Stalin not only rejected the plain evidence before him but refused to share with anyone whatever plans he had for the conduct of war should it break out.
“I did not know in that time [the eve of the war] whether we had any kind of operative-strategic plan in case of war,” observed Marshal Voronov, one of the highest officers in the Soviet Army. “I only knew that the plan for artillery and combat artillery tactics had not yet been approved, although the first draft had been worked out in 1938.”
It was not possible for responsible commanders in the General Staff or the High Command to take even ordinary precautions. They had no war plans —except offensive plans for carrying war beyond the frontiers of the Soviet Union. They had no contingency plans for liaison between staffs. They had no prepared schemes on which to fall back in event of sudden Nazi attack because Stalin had decreed that there would be no Nazi attack. If a dictator decrees that there will be no attack, an officer who prepares for one is liable to execution as a traitor.
The men around Stalin were so dominated by him that when the crisis came, in Admiral Kuznetsov’s words, “they could not take in their hands the levers of direction.”
“They were,” he noted, “not accustomed to independent action and were able only to fulfill the will of Stalin standing over them. This was the tragedy of those hours.”
General Tyulenev, commandant of the Moscow area, and Marshal Voro-shilov met in the Kremlin on the morning of June 22 a few hours after the German attack.
“Where has the combat command post been prepared for the Supreme Command?” Voroshilov asked.
Tyulenev noted that the question “considerably embarrassed me.”
And with good reason. No underground bomb shelter for the Supreme Command existed. None had ever been provided. No orders had been given to Tyulenev. Neither Stalin nor his associates of the Politburo nor his top generals had lifted a finger to prepare for this simple eventuality. Admiral Kuznetsov had provided a concrete shelter for the Navy Commissariat. But he did so without orders and at his “own risk and fear.”
In the end Tyulenev gave to the Supreme Command his own Moscow District Command underground headquarters.
An even stranger circumstance: On Tuesday, June 24, a group of naval political workers arrived at Kronstadt from Moscow. These men had been studying in the Military Political Academy in Moscow. They heard about the war on June 22 while eating their Sunday midday meal. Two hours later they were assembled by the director of their courses, a battalion commissar, in a building on the Bolshaya Sadovaya. They were told to collect their things and meet at 6 P.M. at the Leningrad railroad station. They were being sent to the front.
Each man was told to pack a white uniform, starched shirt and collar, and complete parade paraphernalia. They were told that victory would be forthcoming very soon and they must be prepared for the celebration.
The men, following instructions, arrived with their parade uniforms. It was a long time before they had a chance to use them.
What possible motivation could there have been for these orders? Whence did they come?
Stalin’s authority was so great that it went unchallenged until a fortnight or so before the attack. Only then did some officers begin to speak cautiously, questioning what was happening. But it was too late. And there were still too many commanders who took the attitude: since there are no orders from Moscow to prepare for war, there will be no war.
Thus it went to the end, Stalin trying in the final hours to stave off attack by ordering his armed forces not to fire at German planes, not to approach the frontiers, not to make any move which might provoke German action.
He held this conviction so stubbornly that (as Khrushchev was to point out) when the firing started on the morning of June 22, Moscow still ordered the Soviet forces not to return it. Even then Stalin sought to convince himself that he was only contending with a provocation on the part of “several undisciplined portions of the German Army.”
Between 7:15 A.M. of June 22, when the Defense Commissariat first officially advised the armed forces to resist the German attack, and the speech to the Russian people at noon by Molotov informing them that war had started, Stalin was still trying to stave off war.14
Russian historians make several allusions to the fact that even after the attack Stalin was casting about for diplomatic means of averting the fatal collision. “Only when it became clear that it was impossible to halt the enemy offensive by diplomatic action” says Karasev, one of the most precise of Soviet historians, “was the government announcement about the attack of Germany and the start of war for the Soviet Union made at noon.”
What was this “diplomatic” action? There is a clue in the Haider diary, which notes under date of June 22:
“Noon. Russians have asked Japan to act as intermediaries in the political and economic relations between Russia and Germany and are in constant radio contact with the German Foreign Office.”15
The evidence is overwhelming that the Nazi attack came as a total surprise and shock to Stalin. Describing Stalin’s reaction to the events of June 22, Nikita Khrushchev pictured him in collapse, thinking “this was the end.”
“All that Lenin created we have lost forever,” Stalin exclaimed. In Khrushchev’s words, Stalin “ceased to do anything whatever,” did not for a long time direct military operations and finally returned to activity only when the Politburo persuaded him he must because of the national crisis.
Ivan Maisky paints a similar picture. From the moment of the Nazi attack, he says, Stalin locked himself in his office, refused to see anyone and took no part in the affairs of government. For the first four or five days of the war Ambassador Maisky in London was without instructions from Moscow, and “neither Molotov nor Stalin showed any signs of life.”16
Why was Hitler’s assault such a stunning surprise to Stalin?
The real question, as Marshal Andrei Grechko puts it, was “not so much one of suddenness as of evaluation.”
“Probably,” Marshal Bagramyan remarks dryly, “certain figures among Stalin’s entourage shared this evaluation.”
The record strongly suggests that Stalin, Zhdanov and his associates were living in a world turned inside out, in which black was assumed to be white, in which danger was seen as security, in which vigilance was assessed as treason and friendly warning as cunning provocation. Indeed, had anyone in the inner circle suggested to Stalin that his estimate of the situation was mistaken, he would, in all probability, have been ordered to the firing squad.
1 This reconstruction of Stalin’s speech was obtained by Alexander Werth from Soviet sources. It coincides clÖsely with several other evaluations of Stalin’s attitude. For example, Stalin told Lord Beaverbrook in October, 1941, that he never doubted that war would come but hoped to hold it off for six months or so. Margaret Bourke-White, who was in Moscow in May, 1941, heard that the theme of Stalin’s talk was: “Germany is our real enemy.” She found gossip about the speech general in Moscow. The Soviet censorship killed dispatches on the topic, and one correspondent, she said, was expelled within a week for smuggling out the story. The suggestion of a “new compromise” was contained in a version of the remarks obtained by the German DNB correspondent and forwarded to Berlin by the German Embassy June 4. Some Soviet commentators suggest that the flight of Rudolf Hess from Germany to England on May 8, 1941, tended to disorient Stalin, reinforcing in some manner his Anglophobia. (Alexander Werth, Russia at War, 1941–1945, New York, 1965, pp. 122–123; Gustav Hilger and Alfred G. Meyer, The Incompatible Allies, New York, 1953, p. 330; Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941, Washington, 1948, p. 337; Henry C. Cassidy, Moscow Dateline, Cambridge, 1943, p. 2; Margaret Bourke-White, Shooting the Russian War, New York, 1942, p. 31; Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, Vol. XII, p. 964.)
2 Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voina Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1941-194$, Moscow, 1965, p. 58. Survey, June, 1967, mistakenly dates this discussion June 17, 1941, and makes the argument take place between Malenkov and Kuznetsov.
3 Kravchenko concluded that the “cult of personality” adversely affected Soviet military preparations throughout the prewar period. There were great delays in putting new military items into production. For example, in 1940 Germany produced 10,250 planes of advanced design; England 15,000. The Soviet turned out only 64 YAK-i’s, 20 MIG-3’s and 2 PE-2’s. In 1940 only 2,794 tanks were produced, mostly old model T-26’s and BT’s. Only 243 60-ton KV’s and 115 T-34’s were built. The production of the 45-mm antitank gun was phased out, but the 57-mm gun had not yet been put into production. Only 2,760 antiaircraft guns were manufactured. (G. Kravchenko, Voyenno-lstoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 4, April, 1965, p. 37.) In the first half of 1941 production of T-34’s rose to 1,110, according to I. Krapchenko. (Voyenno-lstoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 10, November, 1966, p. 48.) In the first half of 1941, 1,946 MIG-3’s, YAK-i’s and LAGG-3’s were produced, as well as 458 PE-2’s and 249 IL-2 Stormoviks. (A. Yakovlev, Tsel Zhizni, Moscow, 1966, p. 239.)
4 Aleksandr Rozen’s novel, Fosledniye Dve Nedely, Moscow, 1963, treats this subject extensively. The Soviet critic A. Plotkin finds Rozen’s account fully justified by the historical data. (A. Plotkin, Literatura i Voina, Moscow-Leningrad, 1967.)
5 On June 13 General M. I. Kazakov, flying from Tashkent to Moscow, saw below him on the Trans-Siberian railroad, train after train, headed west. He recognized the trains as troop convoys. He knew they did not come from Central Asia (his own command) and deduced that a large-scale movement from Eastern Siberia or Trans-Baikalia was in progress. The next day his guess was confirmed when he met General Lukin, the Trans-Baikal commander, in the Defense Commissariat. (M. I. Kazakov, op. cit., p. 68.)
6 The date of transmission is given as June 17 by M. Kolesnikov. (Takim Byl Rikhard Sorge, Moscow, 1965, p. 171.) Sorge’s information was transmitted to Stalin. (P. N. Pospelov, Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voina Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1941–1945, Moscow, 1965, p. 58.)
7 The Soviet Defense Ministry’s study of the Communist Party’s role in World War II flatly says that Stalin had ample and excellent intelligence data on the date when he could expect war. He ignored it, and so, asserts the ministry, did Marshal Zhukov and the responsible Defense Chiefs. (I. M. Shlyapin, M. A. Shvarev, I. Ya. Fomi-chenko, Kommunisticheskaya Partiya v Period Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny, Moscow, 1958, p. 42.)
8 General Bagramyan was in command of the headquarters detachment which left Kiev for Ternopol on the morning of June 21. He had been too busy to read the papers, and en route he looked at Red Star, the army paper. Nothing alarming struck his eye, but he was seriously disturbed by the intelligence reports from the frontier. About 5 A.M. the morning of the twenty-second his column passed through Brody, just as the fighter field was bombed by Nazi planes. The headquarters detachment arrived at Ternopol between 6 and 7 A.M. after going through two Nazi air attacks. (Bagramyan Voyenno-lstoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 3, March, 1967, p. 61.)
9 Vice Admiral V. N. Yeroshenko recalls that the Black Sea Commander, Admiral F. S. Oktyabrsky, visited the refitting yards at Nikolayev in mid-June to warn his commanders of the imminence and possibility of a Nazi attack. (V. N. Yeroshenko, Lider Tashkent, Moscow, 1966, p. 22.)
10 However, General Kazakov was astonished to find Defense Commissar Timo-shenko and General Zhukov spending Wednesday night, June 18, watching a long—and poor—German documentary film rather than coping with urgent defense problems. Two days later, June 20, General P. I. Batov was received by Timoshenko and given a new command—the land defenses of the Crimea. Batov had heard much talk and rumor of German preparations for attack, but Timoshenko assured him there was nothing dangerous in the frontier situation and that Batov’s apprehensions were groundless. Batov received no special instructions, no contingency orders in the event of war, no plans for cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet nor for preparing the Crimea for military operations. “This was the twentieth of June, 1941,” Batov wryly recalls. (P. I. Batov, V Fokhodakh i Boyakh, Moscow, 1966, p. 7.) On the other hand, on June 19 General S. I. Kabanov, in chargé of the Soviet base at Hangö on leased Finnish territory, learned that the Soviet military attaché in Helsinki and the Soviet political representative had suddenly removed their families from a country villa near Hangö. He guessed correctly that they acted in the belief that war was imminent. (Vice Admiral N. K. Smirnov, Matrosy Zashchishchayut Rodinu, Moscow, 1968, p. 16.) Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov claims S. I. Zotov, the Soviet emissary in Finland, warned Kabanov June 19 of the impending Nazi attack. {Oktyabr, No. 8, August, 1968, p. 164.)
11 The strategic deployment of troops to cover the Soviet frontiers was carried out according to plans which had been worked out by the General Staff in autumn 1940. However, the very extensive movements up to the western Dvina and Dnieper river lines were not designed to be completed before the latter part of July. By that time the Red Army was fighting for its life around Smolensk. (General V. Ivanov, Voyenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 6, June, 1965, p. 80; P. Korodinov, Voyenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 10, October, 1965, p. 30.) General S. M. Shtemenko reports that five armies had been ordered to move from the interior to western areas: the Twenty-second under General F. A. Yermakov, the Twentieth under General F. N. Remizov, the Twenty-first under General G. F. Gerasimenko, the Nineteenth under Konev and the Sixteenth under Lukin. (S. M. Shtemenko, Generalnyi Shtab v Gody Voiny, Moscow, 1968, p. 26.) V. Kvostov and A. Grylev (op. cit.) contend the Trans-Baikal and Far East commands were ordered April 26 to prepare to send a mechanized corps and two infantry corps west.
12 I. F. Filippov, Tass correspondent, heard these rumors from Schneider, editor of the National Zeitung, in the latter part of May. (Filippov, op. cit., p. 194.)
13 Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky noted that the more the evidence of German preparations for war mounted, the more firmly Stalin denied its authenticity. (M. Bragin, Novy Mir, No. 9, September, 1961, p. 268.)
14 A. Yakovlev, one of the Soviets’ leading military aircraft builders and Deputy Commissar of Aviation Construction at the moment of the outbreak of war, writes: “It is perfectly incomprehensible why our troops were forbidden (in Timoshenko’s 7:15 A.M.directive) to cross the frontier without special permission.” He called the directive “more than cautious, even confusing.” “Why was the air force forbidden to attack at a depth of greater than 100-150 kilometers into German territory? War had already started, but the command didn’t know what it was: An isolated incident? A German mistake? A provocation? Not to mention that the Commissar’s directive was extremely tardy and didn’t reflect knowledge of what was happening at the front.” (A. Yakovlev, Tsel Zhizni, Moscow, 1966, pp. 240–240.)
15 Dr. Gebhardt von Walther, now German Ambassador to Moscow and then a secretary in the German Embassy, regards it as inconceivable that Stalin could have supposed the attack to have been made by Nazi generals, acting without Hitler’s orders. He regards it as equally impossible that the Russians should have made an effort to contact Berlin through the Japanese. At the same time he feels certain Stalin believed until the last that Hitler was trying to blackmail him and that war could be averted. (Walther, personal conversation, June 16, 1967.)
16 The question of Stalin’s leadership and the precise assessment of responsibility for the terrible failures of policy and intelligence in the months before the Nazi attack is one of the most sensitive topics in Soviet historiography—so sensitive as to reveal clearly the role Stalin and his conduct still play in Kremlin politics. For example, Maisky spoke freely of his doubts about Stalin and his alienation from Stalin’s policies in the version of his memoirs published in NovyMir (No. 12, December, 1964). But when the book version of the memoirs appeared six months later, Maisky’s expressions of doubt regarding Stalin’s leadership had vanished. And Maisky’s description of Stalin’s difficult, labored broadcast of July 3, 1941, was sharply censored. (I. M. Maisky, Vospominaniya Sovet-skogo Posla, Moscow, 1965, pp. 140-147.) Also compare Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov’s account of 1965 and that of 1968, in which Stalin’s collapse vanishes! (Oktyabr, No. 11, November, 1965, and Oktyabr, No. 8, August, 1968.)
Even more striking is the controversy over the work of one of the ablest Soviet historians, A. M. Nekrich. Nekrich published in 1966 an intensive study of the pre-June 22, 1941, events, called 1941, 22 lyunya. Nekrich presents an account of the warnings, intelligence reports and growing concerns of the front commanders over the mounting evidence that Hitler was preparing to attack. He concludes that Stalin consistently discounted this evidence and continued to assume that no attack was likely before autumn 1941 or spring 1942. Nekrich’s work was reviewed favorably inNovy Mir (No. 1, January, 1966, p. 260), which called it “clear, intelligent and interesting” and highly recommended the book to the general public. Nekrich’s work was published under the auspices of the Marxism-Leninism Institute, the highest Marxist scholarly institution in the country. It was translated in other Eastern European countries, where it was reviewed in glowing terms. Then, after an acrimonious discussion under the auspices of the Institute of History in Moscow, Nekrich was expelled from the Communist Party in June, 1967, and his work was severely censured. It was plain that twenty-five years after the events the moves and countermoves of the period 1940–41 still possessed major significance in Soviet contemporary politics.