Chapter 3
The last chapter covered a series of leases, concessions,and acquisitions of railway rights in east Asia. These events set in train in China a process which to the journalist went by the name of 'slicing the melon'. More technically, it was an acquisition of spheres of interest by the various powers. 'Spheres of interest' in China were rather vaguely drawn zones spreading from a lease on the coastline into the hinterland where the acquiring power tried to claim, and seemed likely to exercise, monopolistic powers and commercially exclusive rights. These spheres were liable to injure the competitors of the 'monopolist' and thus break down the conceptions of free trade in China; they were also liable to injure her political integrity. While each of the spheres was a challenge to China's integrity, it was widely believed that there was nothing more injurious to the survival of China than Russia's sphere of interest in Manchuria, since it came so close to the Chinese capital itself.
The Chinese and their friends tried to limit the effectiveness of these spheres. Within the Chinese élite the pro-Russian group and the prowestern group tried to resolve this problem by setting one imperialist country off against the other. Thus, when Germany extracted Tsingtao and Russia Lushun (Port Arthur), Britain appears to have been offered Weihaiwei as a deliberate act, in the hope of offsetting these earlier leases. China's friends too — including those of the Imperial Maritime Customs like Robert Hart and Alfred Hippisley — were also lobbying to neutralize and limit Russian expansion. Our concern in this chapter is, however, with the ways adopted by the powers to neutralize Russia's acquisitions in Manchuria before it was too late. It is perhaps too early yet to speak of an anti-Russian front in the far east. But those opposed to Russia acted, partly by separate, partly by coordinated, moves to that end, without making a frontal assault upon her.
Japan’s Discreet Advances
Itō's non-party ministry may have been persuaded to follow a low-posture foreign policy because of the political strife and financial difficulties it was facing. In the general election in March the Liberals (Jiyūtō) and Progressives (Shimpōtō) gained substantial support. The Ito ministry was unable to reach the necessary political alliance with these parties which attacked its land tax bill in June. The government suspended the Diet; and the opposition parties retaliated by combining to form the Kenseitō. Itō thought it opportune to resign and leave the inexperienced party politicians to take office in what was to be the first truly party cabinet. Although his 'safety first' attitude in foreign affairs was notorious, Itō had before his resignation secured Japan's position in China during the scramble for concessions there. On 22 April Japan had asked China through her minister there, Yano Fumio, for a non-alienation agreement for the province of Fukien, which lay opposite the Japanese colony of Taiwan. The Tsungli Yamen promised not to alienate the territory and thus consented to its becoming virtually a Japanese sphere of interest.1
Okuma Shigenobu presided over a short-lived cabinet (June-October 1898), combining the offices of prime and foreign minister. Ōkuma's standpoint on Chinese affairs was different from Itō's. He was less prepared to forgive Russia and seek accommodation with her. For the present he confined himself to a policy of 'assurances'. After the Japanese troops had been withdrawn from Weihaiwei in June, the last remnant of the force left as a result of the peace settlement in 1895, Ōkuma consolidated Japan's position by seeking rights in foreign settlements at Hankow (16 July), Shashih (18 August) and Tientsin (29 August). These were followed subsequently by similar agreements with China relating to Fuchow (28 April 1899) and Amoy (25 October 1899).
Okuma also wanted to place China under Japan's guidance as a way of ousting the Russians at the Chinese court. This may have been one of the reasons for the visit paid to China by the former prime minister, Marquis Ito. This coincided with the Hundred Days of Reform. But within three months, the Chinese emperor and the reform party were crushed by the conservatives. Ōkuma granted the reformer K'ang Yuwei and other liberals full protection if they sought asylum in Japan.2
Yamagata, whom we have last seen as the Japanese emissary to Russia in 1896, took over as prime minister in October 1898. He appointed as his foreign minister Aoki Shūzō, who was an experienced diplomat and a former foreign minister. While Aoki was well known for his anti-Russian sentiments, Yamagata was a man of caution who was by no means certain of the best approach to Russia.
In November, Yamagata managed to attain one of his prime objectives. Taking advantage of the political crises of 1898 in east Asia, he succeeded in getting his military-naval budget through the Diet. He was assisted in this by strong nationalist influences which were at work in the country. November had seen the inauguration of the To-A Dōbunkai (a cultural society for east Asia) under the presidency of the prominent aristocrat, Prince Konoe Atsumaro. Basically it was dissatisfied with Japan's record since 1895 and wanted her to acquire territories in the way that the imperial powers had done. While Japan's oligarchic rulers were by no means persuaded of the need for violent action, they realized that they had time on their side, provided they kept up their national strength.
Japan was developing her commercial and industrial stake in Korea, which Russia had granted in the Nishi-Rosen protocol. The number of Japanese living there increased; Japanese language newspapers were developed.3 Between 1898 and 1900 there was a great expansion of trade: Japan was strongest in Korea's export trade and less strong in the import trade where she took second place to the Chinese merchants. Japan also acquired railway rights, first for the short Seoul—Chemulpo railway and then for the Seoul—Fusan railway. Some Japanese thought they should go easy with the construction because of possible Russian objections, but Yamagata and his war minister, General Katsura, believed that strategic priorities were more important than political niceties.4 Capital for investment abroad being short, the group of entrepreneurs led by Shibusawa were slow to take up both surveys and proceed with the actual construction.
Britain’s Involvement in Northern Railways
In April 1898, one month after China had granted Russia the lease of Liaotung, the Chinese Railway Administration asked the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation for a loan to fund the extension of the Northern line to Hsinmintung and Niuchuang. These negotiations led to a preliminary agreement early in June. On the insistence of Witte, Chargé d'affaires Pavlov complained bitterly to China about the loan on the grounds that it ran counter to the Additional Treaty which he had just signed whereby no line close to the Chinese Eastern Railway should be built by any country but Russia. Nonetheless the preliminary details of the loan were worked out on 15 June. In reply to Russian protests the Chinese stated that the proposed line would come under the control of China and not of Britain and that the railway itself would not become a mortgage for the loan. Pavlov repeatedly protested that the railway property should be held by the Chinese and not be allowed to pass into the hands of another country.5 Since an impasse had been reached, it became necessary for the British government to discuss the matter with the Russians. Britain gave the firm assurance that China should have control of the railway which should not become the mortgage of a foreign country. This merely reiterated what Pavlov had earlier been told in Peking; but, coming from London and the British government, the statement had greater force.
Despite Russian objections, the negotiations were able to proceed haltingly in September on a more general basis. Some Russians had claimed since 1895 that Britain had been trying to strengthen her economic and commercial hegemony in China with the help of the Japanese. They were therefore highly suspicious of British interference in Manchuria, especially when it had railway implications.6 The British ambassador, Sir Charles Scott, diagnosed the anti-British lobby as follows:
Any difficulties in settling the Chinese railway difficulties come not from the Government but from the old evil of Balkan days, non-official Russia — in this case the Hebrew financiers on the Board of the Russo-Chinese Bank who have very great power in the Russian money market and of whose services the Finance Department has often need ... Of the President of the Board Ouchtomsky [sic] he [Muraviev] made very light and treated as a myth the idea of his having any political weight in the Emperor's Councils but a Jewish banker named Rothstein had to be reckoned with.7
But the government itself may not have been as reconciled to British activities as this assessment suggests.
Meanwhile in October the British and Chinese Corporation entered into a formal agreement with China to extend the Peking—Shanhaikuan railway to Hsinmintung. This involved Britain in lending China the sum of £2,300,000 repayable over forty-five years. The new agreement covered also the construction of a branch line to Yingkow (Niuchuang) and provided that the chief engineer would remain a British national, namely Claude Kinder, who had been responsible for the line within the Great Wall.8
Even though the Russians had a guarantee that the mortgage would extend only to the Shanhaikuan—Tientsin section of the line, they were still filled with distrust. Their fear was that the Chinese's line' would be a feint; that these would in fact be British railways, operating under the disguise of formal Chinese control; and that Britain would thereby acquire political interests in the trans-Liao part of Manchuria to the north of the Great Wall. Even if the British government gave specific assurances, private interests would subvert them. Moreover, were British activities not the thin end of the wedge? Would they not be followed by Japanese and American entrepreneurs, if Russia showed any sign of weakness towards the British? The Northern Extension itself — and any other railways that followed it — would break the Russian monopoly of trade in the area and upset the calculations on which Witte sought to recoup the colossal expenditure made on the Russian railways in the east.
During the talks on the Northern Railway Extension, Russia had proposed that the two countries reach some understanding over China. The charge d'affaires in London, P. M. Lessar, who is later to play an important part in our story as Russian minister to China (1901-5), proposed a reciprocal agreement whereby Russia would not interfere with British railway interests in the Yangtse area while Britain would not interfere with Russian railway developments in Manchuria. The Russians were informed on 15 August that Britain would be required to enter upon a self-denying ordinance in Manchuria apart from the Northern Railway Extension as the price for holding her more valuable interests along the Yangtse.
While the idea secured the agreement of Muraviev and Lamsdorf, it met with resistance from Witte whose finance ministry was most closely concerned in the enterprise. The British ambassador, Sir Charles Scott, put the proposition to Witte in November thus:
[Britain's aim was] to retain, for our trade and enterprise in China, equal opportunities, with a fair field and no favour, and the object of the proposed Agreement was to prevent the development of the commerce and enterprise of both countries being blocked by the exercise of foreign diplomatic influence at Peking, in opposing the grant of railway concessions or loans for their construction, or by the creation of artificial barriers such as differential treatment or preferential railway rates in favour of any particular nation.9
This bears a resemblance to what later became the Open Door doctrine for China and anticipated the American initiative over Manchuria. Though Witte was reassuring that Russia was now content and was not aiming at further expansion, he was not favourable to the suggested terms of an Anglo-Russian agreement. His own proposals for a general agreement were regarded by the British ministers as derisory.
The delayed Russian proposals were not handed over until 8 February 1899 and then reverted to the simple idea of an exchange of notes rather than a formal agreement by treaty. By February Muraviev was satisfied with the Niuchuang Railway loan and the assurances that the security did not give the British bank control of lines north of the Great Wall. Witte was also pacified but took a different view over the 'main' line to Hsinmintung which featured in the prospectus of the Northern Extension line, saying that he could not possibly acquiesce in any recognition of this part of the line, as it would seriously impair the commercial value of the Russian line.10 Hsinmintung was some 200 miles from Mukden, the central point of the Russian extension plans, and a line to that point could arguably be used by foreign interests or the Chinese as a challenge to Russia. This last-minute dissension on the Russian side was overcome and Muraviev was able to hand over the text of the identic notes in virtually final form.
Patience prevailed. On 28 April the Anglo-Russian Railway (or Scott—Muraviev) Notes were signed in St Petersburg. Their substance, which is relevant to us, must be given here:
1. Russia engages not to seek for herself or on behalf of Russian subjects or others railway concessions in the Yangtse basin, and not to place obstacles either directly or indirectly in the way of railway enterprises in that region supported by the British Government.
2. Similar engagement, mutatis mutandis, by Great Britain with regard to railway concessions north of the Great Wall.
Supplementary notes were also exchanged, providing that the above general arrangement was not to infringe in any way the rights acquired by the British and Chinese Corporation under their loan contract in regard to the Shanhaikuan—Niuchuang line, and
that the Chinese Government may appoint an English engineer and a European accountant to supervise the construction of the line and the expenditure of the money appropriated to it ... As regards the extension to [Hsinmintung] from the point where the line branches off to Niuchuang, it is further agreed that it is to be constructed by China, who may permit European, not necessarily British, engineers to periodically inspect it and certify that the work is being properly executed.11
American Attempts to Restrain Russia: The Open Door Doctrine
The story of the Open Door notes is alread known from the varied works on the subject. Without repeating the story, we here wish to argue that the United States, in canvassing the support of foreign governments for the Open Door, was primarily aiming at restraining Russian activities in Manchuria.12
It is broadly accepted that Open Door ideas developed in the brains of Alfred Hippisley, one of the senior officials of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs, and William W. Rockhill, a junior of John Hay at the State Department in Washington. Earlier in his career as a diplomat, Rockhill had been secretary of legation in Peking in the 1880s, when he had met Hippisley. Hippisley had a wife from New England and so commonly spent part of his furlough in the United States. It appears that he sojourned there on his way to Britain in 1899. Before going on leave, Hippisley had been serving in Peking as relief for the chief secretary. He had therefore been close to Sir Robert Hart; but there is no evidence that he had a mandate to speak for him since Hart had the reputation of having no confidants in China. Yet in what Hippisley said he was reflecting Hart's rather gloomy thinking at that time, particularly that the division of China into spheres would be the death of that country. He had written on 3 April 1898: 'What I always feared is slowly but surely approaching, a Russian protectorate [over China]'.13
It appears that Rockhill engineered a meeting between Hippisley and John Hay, who had assumed office as secretary of state on 30 September 1898. Evidently Hippisley argued that those powers which had laid claim to a sphere of interest in China would soon impose a preferential tariff on merchandise passing through it and should be prevented from doing so. His friend, Rockhill, clearly favoured some sort of American initiative. Urged to develop his ideas by letter, Hippisley wrote in detail:
Spheres of interest — euphemistically termed 'the economic and geographical gravitation of certain portions of the Chinese Empire' —have now been recognized and must be treated as existing facts. So far, however, the special rights and privileges claimed by each Power in its own sphere, consist only of preferential or exclusive rights to construct railroads and exploit mines in it. They have not as yet been extended to a claim to impose a differential tariff on merchandise consumed in or passing through it; but how soon such a claim may be advanced no one can say.14
While this was an attack on spheres of influence and their long-term effects, it was couched in general terms and not explicitly directed at Russia. In passing this to Hay with his strong commendation, Rockhill replied to Hippisley at Lenox, Massachusetts:
I would like to see [the United States] make a declaration in some form or other, which would be understood by China as a pledge on our part to assist in maintaining the integrity of the Empire. I fear, however, that home politics and next year's elections will interfere with this adoption of a policy advocated by England.15 [my italics]
There is no evidence that Hippisley was urged by the British government to make his proposals, only that the Hippisley—Rockhill idea reflected existing British practice. Hay urged Rockhill to go ahead: he was 'more than ready to act' but thought 'the very vague assurances given by Great Britain, Russia and the other Powers should be expressed in much stronger terms'.16
It was primarily Russia which provoked the new American initiative. In a letter which crossed with the above, Hippisley passed on the latest news he had received from Peking: 'the activity of the Russians in Manchuria is simply wonderful.... The Russification of Peking and of North China will proceed as rapidly as has that of Manchuria.'17 These are precisely the districts which are great consumers of American textile fabrics, Hippisley added. American exports tended to be concentrated by coincidence in Russian and, to a lesser extent, German spheres of interest. If Manchuria were to be closed, some of America's trade would be lost. In other words, an essential part of Hippisley's advocacy was that a new dimension had to be taken into account — Russian activities in Manchuria, the need to guarantee the integrity of the Ching empire, and the damage which might be sustained by United States trade. In coming round to support Hippisley's views, Rockhill had of course to think of a much wider range of grounds for American action, but the danger of Russia was an essential one for him also. When Hay received Rockhill's note of 18 August, he agreed that it was a good starting-point for obtaining a declaration of intentions from the powers on the basis of American leadership. The notes in which both Hippisley and Rockhill had a hand were prepared and issued on 6 September. They took the form of identic notes, inviting various governments to adhere to the principle of equal commercial opportunity in China. More specifically the notes added that, while the United States accepted the existence of spheres of influence in China, it called for the elimination of discriminatory practices over rail tariffs, harbour dues, etc. in these spheres. While the American notes appealed to the sense of national commercial advantage on the part of the recipients, they also contained a broader implication of 'moral diplomacy', an attempt to shame the expansive powers into committing themselves against monopolistic spheres against their will.
On 13 October Rockhill wrote that 'much depends on what the Russian Government may say'. This re-emphasizes the point that it was Russia which was the focus of American attention and her action in Manchuria which led the Americans to launch the Open Door policy. Did the Russians interpret the notes in this way? Professor Langer writes 'We know that Muraviev was enraged by the American démarche and determined to make no reply. When the French deserted them and replied, the Russians were obliged to crawl out as best they could.'18 The Rockhill papers tell another story: Russia was, to be sure, deliberately dilatory; but Rockhill had a conversation with Count Cassini, the Russian ambassador in Washington and formerly minister in Peking, on 24 November in the company of Pavlov, the chargé d'affaires in Korea. Cassini had visited Paris around 19 October when Foreign Minister Muraviev was received by President Loubet. He reported that Muraviev did not seem to know anything about the Open Door notes because he did not refer to them. It may be that Muraviev had left the Russian capital in the company of the tsar before the Hay note had been studied.19 But ignorance was a pose which he often adopted and was by no means untypical of his lackadaisical approach. Since the court was to continue on tour while the tsar went on a state visit to Britain, Cassini was asked to handle the negotiations arising out of the Open Door notes in Washington.
Cassini took up with Rockhill the question of the leased territory in China and of the conventions recently concluded with Britain concerning their exclusive rights over railways and mines in their area north of the Great Wall. All of these had to be protected. Referring to Liaotung, he said that his government could not bind itself to give any pledges concerning it; that for the term of the lease it was an integral part of the Russian Empire and under Russian law. Neither could it bind itself to maintain the port of Dalny for the whole period of the lease as either an open port or a free port, but that for the time being, of course, everybody was ensured 'the same enjoyments' in it as Russian subjects. Pavlov, who was present as the local expert, said not too accurately that the organization of the customs service in Manchuria had not yet been formed; that it was still a question whether the duties would be levied by the Chinese customs service or a Russian service acting for them. Rockhill drew the inference that Russia's policy would be to give preferential rights to her subjects located in the leased territory (apart from Dalny which the tsar's ukase of 30 July 1899 declared to be a free port). It is clear too that the Russians had drawn far-reaching conclusions about their leases and the rights they had derived from the Anglo-Russian agreement.20
Cassini's negotiations in Washington led eventually to the preparation of a delphic note. Muraviev replied to Hay on 30 December:
[Russia] has already demonstrated its firm intention to follow the policy of the open door by creating Dalny (Talienwan) a free port; and if at some future time that port, although remaining free itself, should be separated by a customs limit from other portions of the territory in question, the customs duties would be levied, in the zone subject to the tariff, upon all foreign merchandise, without distinction as to nationality.21
The artful Russian note referred to one part of the lease and not to spheres of interest. Rockhill commented that 'the acceptance of Russia is not as complete as I would like it; it has ... a string attached to it'.22 Though Rockhill was not the mouthpiece of the State Department, it was evidently unhappy with the response also. Japan too was highly suspicious about the Russian reply. What, for example, did it mean to say that Dalny might at some 'future time be separated by a customs limit from other portions of the territory in question'? It seemed to imply that, though Dalny might become an open port and a free port, the Russians had different ideas for the rest of 'Manchuria'.
When the United States had made her move, the Yamagata cabinet was delighted. Japan was not one of the countries approached in the first instance, presumably because she was not thought to have a 'sphere of interest'. She asked, however, to be invited to subscribe to the note in view of her existing interests in China. It was not until 20 December that the Hay proposals were put to Japan; and she adhered without reservations shortly after. In the spring of 1900 she was, however, to demand a non-alienation agreement for the province of Fukien in south China, which was on the mainland opposite her colony of Taiwan.23
It was on 20 April 1900 that the American secretary of state disseminated the text of the various powers' replies. They were a disparate bunch. Yet the president expressed gratification at the successful outcome of the negotiations. While the European powers kept their own counsel, Japan was surprisingly the country which tried to prick the bubble of American complacency. On 29 May Aoki stated what was incontrovertible: 'These answers are no more than declarations of the intention of these Powers to apply the m.f.n. treatment to all nations and cannot be construed as categorical replies to the three propositions contained in the original American proposals.'24 In particular, the responses of Germany, Russia and France were little more than assurances about the application of most favoured nation principles. On 30 July John Hay replied that he 'did not seek to obtain replies [from the powers] couched in identical terms', desiring only statements of the policy they proposed pursuing in China as regards foreign trade. He was satisfied that the various governments intended to maintain 'liberty of trade and equality of treatment for all the world within the territory in China over which they exercise control or influence'.25 By this admittedly limp response Hay was trying to apply Open Door doctrine both to leases and to spheres of influence. By giving the maximum of publicity to the replies of the powers, he hoped to put them on their honour and thus achieve what was important for the United States, the preservation of her trade interests in China as far as possible.
In many ways, the Open Door notes fell short. Japan looked in vain to them for a positive guarantee of action in restraint of great-power expansion in the area. Since the United States was content with such evasive replies, Japan could not regard the first Hay note as a major breakthrough. It did nothing to stay the hand of those who seemed to be set on expansion in China, notably Russia in Manchuria. Rockhill as one of the architects of the Open Door, nonetheless, claimed that there were some international merits in the whole operation. Hereafter, he argued, the United States holds the balance of power in China: 'the success of these negotiations places in the hands of the U.S. great power for doing good in the east; I only hope that they will use it to good advantage'.26 Would this offer the Chinese American protection against inroads by foreigners?
Whatever else happened, Washington became a factor in the unfolding drama in the far east. To Russia the United States had become a partisan, one of the powers seeking to delimit her activities. It was true that there was not much threat of American military involvement: her land forces in the area, stationed in the Philippines, were too few; and her China squadron was relatively small and had no base in China. Nor did America's policy of avoiding entanglements with foreign powers suggest that she would align herself too closely in the area. Yet she had become the spokesman for what was generally regarded as a British policy. The historian can say that Britain did not put Hay up to the issue of his notes and, while Hippisley had his importance in the formulation of the doctrine, his ideas were meshed into many others coming from other quarters. Moreover Hippisley did not speak with the tongue of Whitehall, of Sir Robert Hart or the British mercantile community in China.
The importance of the episode is that the United States had decided that her national interest in relation to Russia's activities in Manchuria made it opportune for her to seize the initiative. By taking this initiative, she took also the leadership in the crisis and, despite the weakness of the initiative, she could not extricate herself later from the Manchurian problem. America was committed also to the defence of the territorial integrity of China and therefore Manchuria, at least on paper and in the rhetoric of public pronouncements. Of course, like Britain in her Anglo-Russian agreement, she was not prepared to confront Russia directly and openly but sought to ensure her own position by means other than force and to defend the interests of her merchant community.29
Korean Tensions
Meanwhile the Russians were as active as ever outside China. A. I. Pavlov, the Russian chargé in Peking since Cassini had left because of ill health, moved in August 1898 to Seoul and was replaced by M. N. de Giers. In China Pavlov had been the diplomatic instrument for Russia's expansive policies and, even by the standards of these imperialist times, he was tough-minded, unyielding and conspiratorial. Now he applied the tactics of Peking to the situation in Seoul. For Russia to expand her sphere there was a need to ignore the Nishi—Rosen protocol, for, even if that had not called for Russia to withdraw from the peninsula, it had at least implied that there should henceforth be a balance between Japan and Russia. Instead Pavlov and his consuls became active in the south at places like Masampo, Mokpo and Kojedo. In pursuit of Russian privileges at these points he was overbearing and tried to capitalize on Korea's goodwill towards Russia for services in the past.
This can best be illustrated by the case of Masampo, one of the finest harbours in east Asia, though still only a fishing-village. This port particularly interested the Japanese, being just west of Fusan, the starting-point of Japan's railway project in Korea. In October 1898 Ōkuma, during his brief period as foreign minister, had authorized his consul-general in Seoul to purchase for strategic purposes certain areas at Masampo.28 Certainly both the army and navy were actively reconnoitring the area. Japan's leading expert on the subject, Professor Yamawaki Shigeo, identifies the central figure in this to have been Colonel (later Major-general) Tamura Iyozō, who expressed the view in June 1899 that 'if Russia gets her hands on Masampo, Japan must become useless'.29 Tamura is later to play an important part in the run-up to Japan's war with Russia.
In May 1899 the Russian navy tried to obtain a piece of ground for its own use at Masampo. Tamura immediately took steps to take possession of landing facilities there for the Japanese army. The problem, of course, was that if in any war in the neighbourhood of the Tsushima Straits Japan did not have command of the seas, she ought to have facilities for urgent landing.
In November, in the electric atmosphere of Fusan, there was a local disturbance involving Russian and Japanese seamen which greatly annoyed the tsar. So ugly did the confrontation become that the press speculated whether a collision might not take place between Japan and Russia. Ito, now in opposition, wrote to Admiral Yamamoto, the navy minister, on 1 December that there was talk in the Russian capital of Japanese preparations for war. If nothing were done about it, Russia would reinforce her garrisons in the far east even further and increase her fleet. Japan must therefore take steps to clear away Russian misunderstandings.30
By February 1900 the rumour circulated that Pavlov on return from overseas was demanding a lease of land for military-naval use at Mokpo or Masampo. A large Russian squadron including the battleships Rossiya, Donskoi, and Rurik sailed from Port Arthur and weighed anchor at Masampo threateningly. The Japanese cabinet, while not proposing to intervene to prevent any action, laid down that Russia should not acquire any site which would command the harbours of Kojedo island. Her minister at Seoul was asked to ensure that the Russian lease should be selected inside the harbour of Masampo or its immediate vicinity. Japan also appealed to Muraviev to this effect. Japan argued that Korea should inform the Russians that there was already an understanding between Japan and Korea over Kojedo; 'if any money is necessary to secure such an answer it will be remitted by me'.31 Whether this was really done is not easy to discover.
Agreement was reached between Korea and Russia regarding the lease in Masampo open port on 12 April. It turned out, however, that some of the lots transferred were already the property of Japanese landowners who had purchased them privately during the scramble for concessions of the previous year. It was decided that the lots should be exchanged amicably for others. This was finally accomplished in September. And Russia acquired a concession at Pankumi, Masampo. A secret agreement between Russia and Japan laid down that Russia would not seek a lease of Koje island (Kargodo) and Korea in turn would not alienate it to any other power. When this leaked out, the Japanese decided not to press on with one of their ambitions, a lease of Koje, which could in the new circumstances only be acquired at the risk of war. Could Russia's promise not to take Koje island be trusted? Many in Japan had no confidence in it. They believed that Russia's long-term intention was to command the Tsushima straits and that this must be resisted at all costs. That was why, when the Russo-Korean agreement was nearing completion, Japan placed her fleet on a war footing.
Masampo had been the focus of a war scare. But this passed with the coming of the Boxer disturbances in China in June. The Masampo quarrel was forgotten but it was by no means resolved. It was a symptom of the continuing malaise between Russia and Japan over Korea. A well-informed commentator like Dr Ernest Morrison predicted that a rupture would not come in 1900 but it would take place sooner or later.32 For the present the Japanese leaders were cautious. As their representative in St Petersburg said on 22 July, 'the Korean question is to be settled between Japan and Russia independently of the other Powers which take no serious interest in Korea'.33 Japan, in other words, was not prepared to entertain an international solution to the problem. Nor was she ready for a head-on clash with Russia.
Japan's caution over Russia may be illustrated by a story of Admiral Yamamoto, Japan's navy minister in the Yamagata cabinet (1898-1900). Late in 1899 the Japanese naval attaché in Russia, Commander Nomoto, reported that Russia, which had hitherto allowed him to inspect navy-yards, had withdrawn that privilege because equivalent facilities had not been given to the Russian naval attaché in Tokyo. It was alleged that preparations for mobilization were being hurried forward in these navy-yards, hence the withdrawal of the reciprocal privileges. When it came before the cabinet, Prime Minister Yamagata was very worried. Outside the cabinet the elder statesman, Ito, was similarly alarmed and wrote specially to Yamamoto. As a result, Admiral Yamamoto sought an interview with the Russian minister, Rosen, who said that naval matters were reported by the attache, Captain Chagin, direct to the tsar. It was not therefore a matter under his jurisdiction. Yamamoto nevertheless explained that he had told Chagin that he would be given permission to witness the review of the fleet but would not be allowed to see naval manoeuvres; this was not only to suit the convenience of the Japanese but was also universal practice. He told Rosen that the notion that Japanese navy-yards were being worked to death in preparations for mobilization was a complete misunderstanding. Rosen went on to discuss the suspicious movements of a Japanese called Hidaka at Masampo where he seemed to be spying on Russia's coal stocks at that port. Again Yamamoto gave mild reassurances which Baron Rosen undertook to report to St Petersburg. Before long the privileges of the naval attachés were restored in both capitals.34
It was possible to improve Russo-Japanese relations on ad hoc problems by using personal contacts. But there was a deep-seated unease, especially among men on the frontier, say, in Seoul or Masampo.
Russia in the East on the Eve of the Boxers
The early Soviet historians of the Krasnyi Arkhiv assembled under the title 'Tsarskaya diplomatiya o zadachakh Rossii na Vostoke v 1900' a number of memoranda by the tsar's closest advisers in the early part of 1900. These throw important light on the motives of those in European Russia over the affairs of Manchuria and Korea. These memoranda are not primarily concerned with the far east, but with 'the east', by which they mean all territories from the Maritime Provinces and Korea to Iran and even Africa.35 Foreign Minister Muraviev prepared a memorandum in order to reach a consensus with his colleagues on the shape which Russian policies should take at this time of high imperialism. It was written in the light of two events: the south African war which had broken out in the autumn of 1899 and was to hold Russia's arch-rival, Britain, in its clutches for three years; and the Hague peace conference which owed much to the initiative of the tsar himself. In the masterly way typical of this period of high imperialism, Muraviev discussed Russia's problems, beginning with Africa, Turkey, and Persia, before turning to Afghanistan and the far east. The argument reflected Muraviev's prime interest in Europe or at least with the near east. While he argued in favour of taking advantage of Britain's preoccupation to improve Russia's position in Afghanistan, Persia and Turkey, even to the extent of acquiring the Bosphorus, he gave a negative answer on whether she should 'take compensation of some sort in the far east'. While in recent years all the aspirations of Russia had been focused on her search in the far east, it was desirable at this time to wait for the completion of the Trans-Siberian railway. He declared himself against taking a naval station on the southern coastline of Korea, which would only excite the opposition of Japan and involve Russia in serious expenditure. Muraviev's three conclusions pertaining to the far east which he regarded as 'undoubtedly necessary for the purpose of protecting our paramount interests' in the area were:
1. to proceed with bringing the forces of the Priamur military zone and those on the Kuantung peninsula to a state of warlike preparedness as was initiated by the War Minister in the previous year;
2. to attend to the speediest possible equipment of Port Arthur and the construction of the railway lines on the Kuantung peninsula, which would join that peninsula to the Siberian 'mainline'.
3. not to forget that, for the sake of holding Russia's power in the Pacific ocean at an appropriate level, a prime condition is to maintain a squadron which is strong and provided with supplies for all eventualities. [Muraviev's emphasis]36
While professing to agree with the findings of their 'Dear Colleague', the other ministers had considerable reservations to make. As befitted the finance minister, Witte opposed the three points above on the ground that the Russian budget was already burdened by heavy outlay on railways and other projects in the far east and would not be able to stand up to opposition from Japan and Britain. Kuropatkin was more concerned with central Asia. It was the navy minister who concentrated on far eastern problems. Admiral Tyrtov on 27 February in a rather muddled and contradictory letter wrote that it was indispensable for the Pacific fleet to have a coaling station in southern Korea, in view of the traffic plying between Vladivostok and Port Arthur, which were 1,100 miles apart. His conclusion was that:
Russia has no need for territorial seizures of any kind, as is accurately explained in your [Muraviev's] memorandum; and we shall not follow aggressive policies in the far east. But we can only keep Japan in check by the threat of effective force. For this peaceful objective the tsar has established a particular credit for the construction of a fleet which will be 30% larger than the Japanese in the Pacific ocean; for this objective it is necessary to have also a port in southern Korea, which is envisaged as being in Mozampo [sic] bay with the island of Kargodo adjacent to it. If the occupation of such a port cannot be realized at the present time for the sound reasons set out in the memorandum, it is necessary to proceed with the acquisition of it gradually by diplomatic methods and by purchase and to achieve our goal, to which we must press on unswervingly. Regrettably, however, the case last year where proper respect was not shown by Korea for our rights in Mozampo [sic] indicated that the influence of Japan is evidently greater in Korea than is ours.37
While Muraviev, Witte and Kuropatkin were more concerned about railways with their destination in Manchuria, Tyrtov reflected the preoccupation of the far eastern fleet with Korea. His object was not merely to obtain a base for its own sake but also to hold Japan in check. Allowing for the fact that Tyrtov was probably playing down his views to make them more palatable to his colleagues and the tsar, it does seem that he comes close to advocating an 'aggressive policy', despite Malozemoffs disclaimer on this point.38
Muraviev then summarized the views of his correspondents for the tsar and in some cases modified his recommendations. It would appear that these were seen by the tsar on 13 March without his making any comment on them. It is an interesting example of a Russian perspective on Asian policy, a sort of St Petersburg view of the world. They were evidently not entirely up to date in their information about railway progress. Nor were they in line with the thinking which their juniors in Korea, Manchuria and China shared. If there was a general will to go slow in the area and allow moderation to prevail among the leaders of the tsarist government, M. N. Pokrovskii in his editorial note to these documents writes of the awareness of the three departments of state of the necessity to leave the decision on these paramount problems to the exercise of diplomatic skills or face 'the cost of a decisive European war'.39
Although the tsar's advisers were content to tread water, Russia's fortunes in the far east had made great headway over the previous five years due to the energies of the men on the spot. Firstly, the Russian railways were making rapid progress. No sooner had the concession for the Chinese Eastern Railway Extension been granted than construction was undertaken in sections, beginning in south Manchuria. From April 1899, steamer after steamer, laden with railway material, came into the various ports and, by arrangement with the Chinese, were cleared free of duty. The result was that by the end of the year the railway from Port Arthur and Talienwan as far north as Mukden, a distance of some 300 miles, was opened. The rails had been laid down but they were only spiked to the sleepers. Permanent bridges were not completed and so it was not possible for regular traffic yet to pass along it. It was, however, possible to proceed by engine and observation car along its length, as also along the line from Niuchuang to the junction point with the main line at Tashihchao. By June 1900 the line north to Harbin had come into use on this basis. It was not only the Russians who had made great strides. So too had their rivals on the Anglo-Chinese line. The furthest point to which the Northern Extension was open to traffic was Chunghouso, though it was also possible in that case to travel up further by trolley.
Apart from railways, the Russians were putting down roots in many areas. The banks were establishing themselves in this frontier situation. Vladivostok and Port Arthur were being developed as naval bases for a large-scale and expanding building programme. Russian consular and customs representatives were becoming more numerous on the scene. All in all, the Russians had good grounds for taking pride in their achievement and the speed of their accomplishment. As a corollary there was no little jealousy on the part of the other powers.40
The jealousies tended to be worked out not in Port Arthur or Dalny which were already Russian preserves but in the more developed — and more international — treaty port of Niuchuang. There the new Russian consul, Ostroverkov, who arrived in July 1899, acted as though he was in full control straight away. The Russians, using the plausible excuse that an outbreak of bubonic plague which had led to the death of six Chinese during the summer might spread up the railway line, tried to take over the port. They devised a scheme for a Sanitary Board, which would consist mainly of Russian officials and Russian doctors, in whom the sanitary and police control of the town — in effect its administration —was to be vested. This ploy was opposed by the consular body who successfully argued that the new board must be a Chinese one with the Taotai, the chief Chinese figure in the area, at its head. This illustrates that long before the military measures which Russia took in 1900 there was bitterness and tension between her and the other powers over the treaty port of Niuchuang and that Russia, despite the strength of her position, did not always emerge successful.
There was no shortage of international incidents. Increasingly Russia came to be faced by Japan in association with Britain and the United States as the countries most opposed to Russian expansion. Their attitude to the Russians was often a 'bitter-sweet' one. We may quote the case of Niuchuang again. Since small foreign communities at treaty ports were always vulnerable to the actions of the Chinese, there were advantages in having the Russians around in strength. There was a Russian gunboat, generally the Otvajnii, in the river; and its sailors patrolled the settlement every night. On the other hand, jealousy grew like wildfire. As soon as the Otvajnii seemed to be permanently installed, the Japanese in July 1900 sent their gunboat the Tatsuta, while the British followed suit by sending HMS Fame, commanded by Lieutenant Roger Keyes. Any action which was not warranted by existing treaty rights was immediately challenged by the consular body.41
Wherever one went in north-east Asia there was evidence of resistance to the current wave of Russian expansion. The Russians clearly thought it unreasonable. They also held rightly that there was likely (in the climate of the south African war which had begun in 1899) to be little resistance from Britain. If therefore diplomatic activity was necessary, it should be directed at the Japanese. Since Russia was inclined to go slow and adopt conciliatory tactics, she wanted to employ her negotiating skills. To this end Muraviev sent his most highly regarded diplomat, Aleksander Petrovich Izvolskii, as minister to Tokyo in June 1900. He relieved Rosen who had been in Tokyo since August 1897. The popular Rosen commented that Izvolskii would have a difficult job. But he hoped his successor, who was a clever man, would have some success. Others thought that it was a panic measure: 'The Russian Government became alarmed and sent Izvolskii who was regarded as their best diplomatist to Tokyo in order to keep the peace for a few more years till the railway was completed. In this they were successful.'42 Certainly Rosen had had his full stint and was due for re-posting but Izvolskii was a new face and not immediately popular. Sir Claude MacDonald, the British minister, described him as 'a very slippery customer but most plausible and pleasant withal'.43 In discussing Russian representation in the Japanese capital, the anti-Russian foreign minister, Aoki, described Rosen as 'a nice fellow to deal with but the Russians are always trying to grab something'.44 When it was suggested that Rosen's recall was connected with Masampo, Aoki replied that Rosen had asked for a change: anyhow, even if Izvolskii were the active personage he was represented to be, that would not matter, just as in the case of Khitrovo, whom they had not found difficult to deal with.45
This chapter has covered the aftermath of the scramble for concessions in China in so far as it was relevant to the ever-growing tension between Japan and Russia. The Russians were surprisingly uncertain about their priorities but in east Asia had no realistic option other than to proceed with their railways in which a great national investment had been made and considerable progress was manifest in surveys and construction. Naturally they had no wish to embark on war for which they were in any case ill-prepared in the area. They were therefore in a mood of consolidation and negotiation, in which they had great expectations from Izvolskii's appointment to Tokyo. From the Japanese side also, there was no wish for outright confrontation. In the crisis over Port Arthur, Japan had been discreetly silent, largely because of the cautious viewpoint of Marquis Itō. Instead she tried to negotiate with Russia a 'package deal' linking Manchuria with Korea, the so-called Man-Kan kōkan formula. Although the Russians would not accept a deal on this basis, the Nishi—Rosen protocol which emerged was serviceable for the role which the Japanese envisaged for themselves, that of peaceful economic penetration of the peninsula. But behind the diplomatic niceties of the Nishi—Rosen protocol there was incessant squabbling in the ports on the southern tip of Korea, notably at Masampo. Japan was not alone in trying to keep Russia at arm's length. The powers were also taking action in restraint of Russia: Britain in the Anglo-Russian Agreement on Manchurian railways; and the United States in the Open Door diplomacy which they had launched. As a result Japan was becoming part of a group of anti-Russian powers which was being formed and whose course of action in the future was far from clear. While suspicion of Russia's east Asian activities was everywhere to be seen, it was still on a modest scale compared with what emerged when China herself took a hand in events with the outbreak of the Boxer disturbances.
References and Notes
1. NGNB, vol. 1, p. 185.
2. Miyazaki Tōten, My 33 Years' Dream, ch. 19.
3. FO 46/453, Lowther to Salisbury, enclosing Gubbins, 10 July 1895.
4. Inouye Yūichi, 'Russo-Japanese relations and railway construction in Korea', pp. 92-4.
5. BD, vol. i, p. 1.
6. A. L. Galperin, Anglo-Iaponskii Soiuz, p. 39.
7. Scott to Salisbury, 8 Sept. 1898, Scott papers, 52,297.
8. BD, vol. 1, p. 1.
9. BD, vol. 1, no. 59.
10. Scott to T. H. Sanderson, 6 Apr. 1899, Scott papers 52,303.
11. Ambassador Scott reported 'The Vedemosti, Prince Ouchtomsky's paper (he, you know, is a Director of the Russo-Chinese Bank) violently attacks the agreement with England and the Russian press is farfrom enthusiastic about it' (Scott to Bertie, 18 May 1899, Scott Papers 52303; BD, vol. 1, no. 61.)
12. See M. H. Hunt. The Making of a Special Relationship, for a bibliographical note containing an up-to-date review of American studies on the Open Door.
13. J. K. Fairbank et at. (eds) The I.G. in Peking, vol. 1, no. 1102.
14. Hippisley to Rockhill, 25 July 1899, Rockhill letterbook.
15. Rockhill to Hippisley, 3 Aug. 1899, ibid.
16. Rockhill to Hippisley, 18 Aug. 1899, ibid.
17. Hippisley to Rockhill, 16 Aug. 1899, ibid.
18. W. L. Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890-1902, New York 1951, p. 687.
19. Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1870-1914, 1st series, vol. 15 for 1899, no. 286. (Hereafter cited as 'DDF'.)
20. Rockhill to Hay, 24 Nov. 1899, Rockhill notebook Q; A. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, pp. 117-18.
21. Malozemoff, op. cit., p. 118.
22. Rockhill to Hippisley, 16 Jan. 1900, Rockhill notebook Q.
23. I. H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1894-1907, pp. 75-6.
24. A slightly different version of this message is in NGB 33, no. 30.
25. NGB 33, no. 32.
26. Rockhill to Hippisley, 16 Jan. 1900, Rockhill notetook Q.
27. On American policy, see Akira Iriye, From Nationalism to Internationalism: U.S. Foreign Policy to 1914, London 1977, p. 165.
28. Yamawaki Shigeo, 'Masampo Jihen' (3 parts) in Tōhoku Daigaku Bungakubu Kenkyū, 1959-60.
29. Ibid., part 1, pp. 7-13.
30. Japanese navy microfilm.
31. NGB 33, nos. 148-56 and 168.
32. Morrison to V. Chirol, 10 April 1900, in Lo Hui-min (ed.), The correspondence of G. E. Morrison, vol. 1, no. 78.
33. NGB 33, no. 221.
34. Japan, Navy Ministry, Yamamoto to kaigun, pp. 105-7. See also I. H. Nish, 'Korea, focus of Russo-Japanese diplomacy, 1898-1903' in Asian Studies, Manila, 4 (1966), pp. 70-83.
35. Krasnyi Arkhiv, 18 (1926), pp. 3-29.
36. Ibid., p. 20.
37. Ibid., p. 21.
38. Malozemoff, op. cit., p. 122.
39. Krasnyi Arkhiv. 18 (1926), pp. 2-3.
40. A. Hosie (Niuchuang) to Salisbury, 14 Feb. 1900.
41. See (Admiral) Roger Keyes, Papers, pp. 1-3.
42. C. Hardinge, Old Diplomacy, p. 71. Among Izvolskii's strongest sponsors was Nicholas II's mother.
43. MacDonald to Hardinge, 30 June 1904, Hardinge papers 3.
44. Satow to Salisbury, 12 Oct. 1899, E. M. Satow, Korea and Manchuria between Russia and Japan, p. 95.
45. See Satow to Salisbury, 25 Jan. 1900, in Scott Papers, 52,302: 'The chief cause of ill-feeling was a row at Fusan [?] between some Russian man of war's men and the Japanese, which had come to the knowledge of the Emperor Nicholas. The latter then had instructions sent out to Rosen [Nov. 1899] to express his deep personal displeasure.'