Chapter 4
The summer months of 1900 saw a mighty transformation of the east Asian scene. By the autumn the armies of the powers were in control of the provinces around Peking, while the armies of Russia had moved in in great strength to occupy strategic points in China's three eastern provinces. This was in retaliation for the actions of the Boxers in north China culminating in the siege of the foreign legations in Peking from 4 June to 15 August (which will be discussed briefly in this chapter) and for the slightly later outbreaks in Manchuria (which will be considered in more detail in the next chapter). The Russian occupation of Manchuria was to drag on for year after year and be a major cause of the Russo-Japanese war.
The Boxer turmoil which afflicted China in 1900 was the culmination of a series of incidents which had been taking place since 1898 over a wide area of China north of the Yangtse. These incidents, given by foreigners the sinister name 'Boxer' (because of their association with secret societies of that name), were the result of peasant uprisings, brought on by food shortages and droughts, but they developed momentum also against missionaries and foreign nationals. Since the successes of Christian missions and the foreign inroads of 1898 were blamed on the weakness of the Chinese court, the 'Boxers' also became anti-dynastic. The empress dowager and her acolytes, who had come to power after the failure of the Hundred Days' Reform two years earlier, appear eventually to have succeeded in turning the thrust of the Boxers' energies away from themselves and directing it against the foreign communities. Nowhere could these energies be more effectively employed than around the imperial capital; and the Boxers had since August 1899 been converging there.
On his arrival in St Petersburg in May, the new Japanese minister, Komura Jūtarō, observed how surprised he was to find the Russian foreign minister able to take a remarkably sanguine view of the situation in China. We know from Russian sources that Muraviev took the view that there was a special relationship between Russia and China and that Russia's position there was different from, and more favourable than, that of other powers. The tsarist government's great concern was that the powers, in attempting to suppress the Boxers, would intervene in China's domestic affairs to such an extent as to bring down the regime of the empress dowager, who, in the Russian view, represented the stable element in Chinese society. The fact that the empress dowager and Li Hung-chang were also in Russia's pocket and should not be disturbed was a major ingredient in her thinking. This was the basis for Russia's softly, softly approach. The Russian minister in China, Mikhail (de) Giers (1898-1901), was a past master of this approach. In the diplomatic body in Peking, Giers was heartily disliked and distrusted for going his own way. But then the Peking diplomats failed to see either the 'special relationship' or indeed any special generosity of spirit on Russia's part towards China.1
As the Boxers were approaching Peking, the Russians took their own stand. When the Peking diplomatic body called on the Tsungli Yamen at the end of January to suppress the 'anti-foreign societies', Giers refused to join it. When its members agreed to petition their home governments on 10 March for a naval demonstration to be made in northern Chinese waters with a view to bringing pressure to bear on the Manchu government to put down the Boxers, Giers again refused to join and even tried to persuade some of the ministers to change their minds. It was, therefore, possible for the others to argue later that, if the Russians had only joined in showing solidarity at this stage, the situation would not have deteriorated as it later did. In the event, the European governments did not agree to take the kind of gunboat action recommended. When in May they did make a naval demonstration, Russian vessels were present but did not take an active part.2
What factors lay behind this individualistic and more sympathetic approach to China? Japan's new minister was quick to make his own diagnosis: Russian officials were specialists in European and near eastern questions and were generally weak in understanding the far eastern situation; when they received information from north China, they could not understand the place-names; it was, therefore, difficult for them to assess the realities of the situation. Many foreign ministry bureaucrats asked Komura to help them in assessing this information; and he alleges that he had a backstairs influence in this way, being able to pick up much information about Russian attitudes which he was able to convey to Tokyo.3
A second aspect was that the Russians claimed that they were not the target of the anti-missionary zeal of the Boxers. They held that, though Russia was a deeply Christian country, she had taken no part in missionary work in China. Though the Russian Orthodox Church did pursue missionary activities elsewhere in the world, it had not looked to China proper as a mission field, as the French, British, Italians, Americans and Germans had done. The tsar was moreover critical of the actions of other countries' missionaries, saying that they cloaked their shameless enterprises in the saintly name of Christ.4
A third factor was that Russia's prime concern was not with China proper but with Manchuria and her railway there. Not only did Russia have a long indefensible frontier with China but she also had a railway on Chinese territory which was not readily defensible. The fact was that the constructors of the Chinese Eastern railway had all along been meeting with attacks on their workers and on the Russian guards by Chinese (call them 'Boxers' if you will). These were being kept secret but were a source of great anxiety. In keeping with the increased tempo of disturbances in the Peking area, the attacks in Manchuria increased. It was not that Russia could not in the long term cope with the situation because she could mobilize about 160,000 reservists in the area. But many of these were west of Lake Baikal and, by the time they were on the spot, the Russians would be fully stretched in keeping control of the line. In this sense, Manchuria was Russia's top priority; and Peking only secondary.
Only when Russian interests suffered did Giers join the others. On 28 May the diplomats at Peking called for reinforcements from naval vessels off Taku; and a small force of 350 men reached Peking. After disjointed disturbances in north China, they reported to their governments a week later their fear that they might be besieged in Peking and asked for an expeditionary force to be sent. Russia's minister endorsed the request; and Admiral Sir Edward Seymour, commander-in-chief of the British far eastern squadron, set off from Taku on 11 June at the head of an allied force of some 2,000 men including Russians from Port Arthur; but, finding his way barred by Boxer forces around Peking, he was forced to retreat to Tientsin. Unaware of the fate of these forces, Sugiyama Akira, shokishi (chancellor or senior clerk) of the Japanese legation, was sent to make enquiries at the Yamen but he was killed and decapitated by Chinese. This forced the Japanese cabinet to consider intervention in an enterprise which was only marginally of interest to their people. There was no reason why Japan should support the various contingents of the European powers or associate herself with the missionary cause. Moreover, the Japanese had no illusions about the opposition they would face if they sent a large-scale expedition to the Peking area. Prime Minister Yamagata's interim decision was that it was unwise to send a large force on its own and sensible to wait for an invitation from the powers.5
Peking Hostages and their Liberation
The news from China suggested the existence of a horrific emergency. On 13 June the Boxers entered Peking after the court had given orders for any allied force to be resisted. The allied vessels seized the north and south forts at Taku, led by Japanese marines with great spirit. In retaliation for this 'invasion', the Chinese court decided to make war on the allies and raised no objection to a siege of the legation quarter in Peking. In the gruelling circumstances, the German minister, Baron von Ketteler, decided to protest to the Tsungli Yamen in person and was killed by the Boxers on 20 June.
On 21 June, at the height of the crisis, Count Muraviev died suddenly. Because there was an ugly wound on his left temple at the time of death, there were persistent rumours that he had committed suicide on the ground that he had contributed to the trouble in China and to a deterioration of his country's position there. The night before his death he had dined till 1 a.m. with Witte and Kuropatkin on the Islands. It appears that there had been acrimonious political discussion during the course of which Witte had laid a good deal of the blame for the crisis in China on Muraviev's insistence in 1898 on taking Port Arthur (against Witte's advice). Whether such harsh criticism from the blunt Witte would have led Muraviev to commit suicide is hard to say. Certainly the official government announcement asserted that, after rising late, he had merely slipped in his study and grazed his temple on the sharp side of a bureau; death had been immediate. But Witte felt some remorse at the reproaches he had made against Muraviev's policy the night before he died.6
Muraviev's death left the foreign ministry numb. Lamsdorf, for long his close associate and sole confidant, took over as acting minister in the interim. But it was not expected that he would succeed ultimately, since he was highly strung at the best of times and suffered from palpitations of the heart. It was impossible to predict where the succession might come to rest: and it was possible that a new man might be found among the strong group which disapproved of the 'peaceful' approach which Muraviev had followed.7 Le Temps, which had the ear of St Petersburg society, was bold enough to announce the appointment of Izvolskii, then minister in Tokyo, to the vacancy. But Komura, while admitting that there was such an intention in court, did not think it likely that one who was unable to see eye to eye with Muraviev should be appointed. Eventually Lamsdorf was approved as acting minister on 7 August, and this was confirmed six months later. But Muraviev's state funeral and its aftermath disrupted affairs at the height of the China crisis.
Meanwhile in Tokyo Yamagata convened an emergency meeting of his cabinet on 15 June and, after consultation with Ito, the 'opposition' leader, agreed to send two infantry divisions to China under Major-general Fukushima, one of the Japanese army's Russian experts. In London the cabinet felt especially powerless, with the main force of the British army employed in south Africa. Despite moves to take the lead in asking Japan to intervene, it was not until 22 June that it agreed to send British reinforcements and seek support in Europe for Japan to send an emergency force to China of (say) 25-30,000 men. Knowing the financial difficulties of the Yamagata government, Britain offered the sum of one million pounds towards the cost of the expedition. The Japanese declined this and insisted that the main consideration with them was not money but support of the powers. In other words, they wished to be sure that there would not be a repetition of 1895, that is, that Japan's intervention would not be faced by a hostile three-power coalition of Russia, Germany and France. Certainly there was much talk in the press and in diplomatic circles about the 'revival of the Shimonoseki Treaty Triad' in the interest of preserving China's territorial integrity. The result was that Britain for the rest of the month had to argue persuasively for a major role to be given to Japan in the relief of the legations.
The European powers did have suspicions of Britain and Japan. Britain's attempt to 'sponsor' Japan was regarded with grave suspicion. It was considered to be Britain's way of compensating for her international powerlessness during the south African war by calling in the Japanese. Moreover, it was regarded as Britain's way of forestalling Russia in any plans she had. These suspicions were of course by no means groundless. The Russians therefore stalled, pretending to misunderstand Salisbury's intentions and raising matters of little substance. European countries were suspicious also of Japan, arguing along lines already made familiar by the kaiser, namely that Japan was working for the solidarity of the yellow race. Certainly France was anxious to take advantage of every crisis to breathe new life into her alliance with Russia and Delcassé offered to go to St Petersburg.8
The military position of the allies was uncertain. On 17 June they had landed a force to capture the Taku forts, with Japanese and Russian participation. Russia was in a position to supply 8,000 men from Port Arthur (so Kuropatkin estimated), while retaining 4,000 for the defence of that port. But she was awaiting reinforcements from Siberia. Admiral Alekseyev, the Russian commander, agreed that without substantial reinforcement the allies could not advance beyond Tientsin. On the Japanese side, they had agreed on 26 June to mobilize some 10,000 additional men who would not be transported to China until replies from the powers. Their estimate of the number of troops needed for the retaking of Peking was 70,000, because the maize was standing high in the fields, roads were non-existent and the Chinese had opened the sluices on the Pei-ho, thereby stopping river-craft sailing up to Peking. Though not everyone accepted this pessimistic estimate, it did serve to illustrate how perilous and difficult an operation to relieve the legations would be.
In this emergency, the European powers could not afford to delay their approval. The Russians, though still opposed to any mandate being given to Japan for the despatch to China of a massive army, would not interfere with her freedom of action to send troops of her own volition provided she acted in conjunction with the other powers. Izvolskii's reply to Japan was rather curt and tepid but Russia was not going to stand in the way of Japanese participation. Since Germany's troops were still on the high seas, she and her partners were not inclined to give the Japanese too much encouragement but did not object. Using this authority, the Japanese cabinet on 6 July agreed to mobilize the fifth division for service in China; and arrangements for its transportation were completed immediately.9
The allied armies had some success with the occupation of Tientsin on 14 July — a significant victory which demoralized the ill-disciplined Boxer forces. The Japanese fifth division reached there a week later. But there was still a wide gulf between the military commanders of the various countries about the size of force which would be needed to relieve the legations. Many commanders, including the Japanese, wanted to defer the attack until the number of troops available exceeded 50,000 men. Two things made a decision more urgent: one was the indication that those in the legations were still alive whereas previously they had been thought dead; the other was that the intensity of the siege was stepped up from 28 July onwards and the capacity of the foreigners for survival was less certain. The commanders took the plunge and moved west early in August and on the 14th freed the foreigners from the eight-week siege.10
Even as this advance on Peking was being made, a strange diplomatic exchange was taking place among the powers involved. For some time the issue of whether there should be an overall commander for the expeditionary force had been discussed. The Russians had not approved of Admiral Seymour, while others had not liked Admiral Alekseyev. Now that victory was in sight, the need for a peace-time general as commander-in-chief became an issue. On 6 August the German emperor asked the tsar: 'Is it your special wish that a Russian should be commander in chief? Or would you eventually like one of my generals? In the latter case, I place Field-marshal Count Waldersee at your disposal' [English original]. The tsar replied, quite privately, that he had no objection in principle. The kaiser then approached other monarchs, saying that the tsar was sponsoring the name of Waldersee and that he would set out from Europe very soon. Britain refused to act as sponsor; Japan was keenly hurt; and France was very annoyed at the breakdown of consultation with Russia.11
How does one explain the Russian action? Was it the inept act of a tsar who could be easily browbeaten? Certainly there were Russian generals who were ambitious for the post. General Kuropatkin and Admiral Alekseyev are two that were mentioned. Moreover, Russia's ally, France, was strongly in favour of a Russian general becoming allied commander-in-chief and was reluctant to have a German. Certainly, Waldersee (1832-1904) was not an ideal choice. High as was his reputation as a strategist, he had never been in tropical climes or had any experience of military operations there. Moreover he was largely a court general — and one in his late sixties to boot.12
Perhaps Russia's attitude during the episode has to be interpreted in the light of her desire to have limited commitment to operations in the Peking area. She was prepared to join the other powers for the relief of Russian nationals in Peking and her legation there. But her commitment to international action was not a wholehearted one. Moreover there were likely to be difficulties with China and between the allies if Peking was relieved.13 The effect of Waldersee's appointment would therefore be to immerse Germany in many of the unwelcome problems of north China for some time to come. Nor was the appointment of Waldersee likely to be so catastrophic. He was appointed for operations in Chihli only; and this would not affect the autonomy of the generals of other forces acting elsewhere. Moreover he would not reach the scene for some two months, by which time the situation was likely to be radically changed.
The fact that the appointment of a German commander-in-chief had been made over the head of a Japanese general did not enter into Russian thinking. None the less it was a slight to Japan that the elderly Waldersee should be appointed rather than the Japanese divisional commander-in-the-field, Lieutenant-General Yamaguchi. But the Japanese swallowed the affront without protest.
Russo-Japanese Evacuation of Peking
History is full of surprises. When the siege of the legations had been broken, there were in the Peking-Tientsin area substantial foreign contingents, all with a sense of triumph and each with its own national ambitions in mind. Moreover the German force, though still on the high seas, had been seen off by the kaiser with a speech which was bloodthirsty and revengeful. There was the prospect, therefore, of the province of Chihli being overrun by foreign troops in order to stamp out the Boxers. They had, of course, not been defeated or disarmed but only demoralized; those in the immediate vicinity of Peking had been most seriously affected.
To the surprise of all, the Russians on 25 August announced that they would withdraw their legation and troops from Peking to Tientsin. We now know that the tsar had been furious that Russian troops under General Linievich had taken such a prominent part in the attack on Peking and had been (as the Russians imagined, though each general claimed it for his own) the first troops to enter the Chinese capital. The tsar's reaction was part of the softly softly approach and was intended to hasten the return to the capital of the Chinese court which had gone into hiding at Sian, and also to prepare the way for the return to Peking of Li Hung-chang, Russia's ally in China. Russia pinned her hopes on Li's readiness to believe that she was more reliable than the other powers.
The orders for withdrawal were sent to Minister Giers and General Linievich on 25 August. The army there was seriously dissatisfied with the prospect of withdrawing from Chihli and the railway zone, suspecting that it had been designed as part of a weak-kneed policy towards Britain. Indeed, Linievich had earlier announced that Russian troops were to winter in Peking and the province of Chihli in the present strength of 15,000 men. France was also doubtful of the wisdom of the new Russian policy, stating that her objections were mainly over 'timing and conditions'.14 But Russia went ahead with the recall, even if it was not followed by any of the other powers.
Gradually the reservations, internal and international, were overcome and the evacuation took place. Perhaps because of talks between Delcasse and Witte in Paris around 5 September, the French came over to the Russian position. They agreed to act together over Tientsin. Russian troops began to evacuate Peking on 13 September. By the 29th they had been pulled out, leaving only an enhanced guard at the legation. They then undertook an overland march by 5,000 men towards Shanhaikuan of which we shall have more to say in the next chapter. Minister Giers was reluctant to evacuate Peking and adjourned his departure several times before he withdrew on the 29th. Though the senior diplomat, he was absent from the decisions of the diplomatic body as it faced the whole range of post-Boxer problems, punishment of pro-Boxer officials, demand for an indemnity, reparations for atrocities, etc. But his absence proved to be a temporary one and by the end of October he was back in Peking for diplomatic conferences.
The search for Russian motives is a difficult one. They seem to have been a mixture of idealism and self-interest. The decision to recall forces was technically the responsibility of the war minister. Kuropatkin put it on record that 'the aim is to stop all military measures in China as soon as possible, as once Russian troops are loosed on the warpath, they cannot be easily kept in hand, and seem to care little for the political complications which their action may cause.'15 But the military on the spot was not inclined to pull out too soon. Indeed Kuropatkin, during the emergency, had earlier been an advocate of vigorous action around Peking. In order to prevent any evasion of the responsibility for withdrawal, Lamsdorf asked the emperor to specify in an irreversible form that the military would evacuate all Chinese territory. This suggests a basic suspicion between the civilians and the military as well as between the command at St Petersburg and at the front. When the emperor stood firm for withdrawal, it was not challenged by Kuropatkin.16
The thinking of Lamsdorf and the emperor was that the recapture of Peking so soon had been unfortunate in its effects. The joint expedition had been too successful in relieving the legations so quickly; but the allies had had to pay the price when the imperial family was evacuated to Sian, leaving no legally constituted government to deal with the incoming armies. The sheer success of the military action, brought about by a sense of rivalry between the military commanders of the various powers, had caused the Chinese court to panic and might cause the emperor to abdicate.
Russia's objective was to keep Peking as the centre of Chinese administration and to ensure the safe return of the emperor and empress dowager to their capital as soon as possible. It was Lamsdorf's fear that, if they did not return and did not negotiate, the powers as a body would be forced to assume some responsibility for 'occupying' the territory, that is, at the very least, for governing and policing this country of over 400 million. This was a recipe for disaster and was quite alien to the thinking of the tsarist government.
Of course, Russia's views were not disinterested. She did not want the decentralization of power in China proper and in particular the passing of authority from Peking to the viceroys. If central authority were to pass to the Yangtse viceroys, then Russia would be the prime sufferer. Moreover there was the dilemma of Li Hung-chang, still returning to the north from Canton. It was in Russia's interest to re-establish him in power and to return to the status quo ante. This would be easiest if Russia were to be inconspicuous in the imperial capital and were widely seen to be so.
Just as Russia was withdrawing in order to further her interests in Manchuria, Japan was considering which interests she should be pursuing at this juncture. Within a week of the entry into Peking, the cabinet instructed General Kodama, the governor-general of Taiwan, to land a force at Amoy where there was an international settlement. At least one of the objects of the expedition was to give the Chinese inhabitants a stern warning against 'riotous movements threatening the safety of the foreign residents and [especially] the burning of a Japanese temple'.17 Japan's action was immediately followed by jealous foreign powers. Before the expedition had achieved anything, it was called off from Tokyo. No one knows why but it would appear from the coincidence of dates that the cabinet thought that Russia's withdrawal from Peking presaged a crisis in the north and it would be dangerous for Japan's forces to be embroiled in a southern adventure.
After that brief episode where the international gamekeepers curbed the activities of the Japanese poacher, the Japanese, who had the largest forces in China proper, proceeded to withdraw them as speedily as possible. Such a sizeable expedition had been a substantial drain on the Japanese exchequer. The ninth brigade was withdrawn in October and other units progressively in the following months.
While the China crisis was coming to a head, Japan was considering her long-term role in east Asia. She seemed to have a choice between expansion in the south where she would not seriously ruffle the other powers — the line of lesser resistance — and in the north where she was bound to run into trouble from Russia. Was it a good moment to move into Korea when the Russians were accumulating great strength in Manchuria? There had been desultory negotiations over Korea. Firstly Izvolskii had presented a neutrality plan for solving the Korean issue but Japan responded that to discuss Korea during the Boxer troubles was liable to drag in third parties and this would not suit those directly involved. She preferred to stick to the Nishi—Rosen protocol.18 Meanwhile in St Petersburg the Japanese minister, Komura, had been discussing the orient unofficially, putting forward the hypothesis that Korea might be allotted to Japan, while Manchuria was allotted to Russia; and neither side would challenge the other's.rights. This Man-Kan kōkan proposal did not interest the Russian side which was not inclined to abandon its stake in Korea, even if it was now greatly inferior to what she was acquiring in Manchuria. The Japanese therefore considered invading Korea, as many pressure groups were demanding, but decided as a preliminary to consult the Germans. They delayed their reply until a cabinet crisis in Japan made such an expedition impossible.19
The Russian withdrawal from Peking led to a far-reaching reexamination of policy in Japan. Among the various ministers who contributed memoranda on what the country should do in the autumn, Prime Minister Yamagata prepared one which argued that Japan should not use the present crisis in north-east Asia to consolidate her position in Korea before it was too late. He took the view that the Japanese were not yet prepared to challenge the might of Russia and would be sensible not to bring up the question of opportunities in Korea for the time being. His line of argument was as follows:
Even if Britain privately agreed to it and the United States raised no objections, Russia, Germany and France would join together and oppose [Japan's taking Korea], In the event of war, would Britain still help us with her military-naval forces? If we cannot rely with confidence on Britain allying with us, we will be forced to fight alone against a threefold enemy?20
Yamagata's memorandum seems to indicate that he was ready to take some advantage of the conditions of chaos in China — and the expectation that the European powers would capitalize on the presence of their forces there — by acquiring either territory or a sphere of influence. The greatest constraint on such actions was that the Dreibund of 1895 would re-emerge. It would take a fresh form but, with the armies of Germany and Russia so strong in north and north-east China, it would be clearly advisable for Japan to avoid any advance in that area which would lead in all likelihood to a confrontation. The prime minister was inclined therefore to give his preference to an advance in the provinces of Chekiang and Fukien, opposite the Japanese colony of Taiwan. Japan's fear of an adverse French reaction to a forward move in the neighbourhood of Taiwan was obviously less than the real fear of a hostile Russian reaction if Japan advanced in Korea. In either event, there is the feeling that Japan would not take steps on her own. She looked to Britain for defence against the Dreibund but did not have confidence that much help would be forthcoming. While Japan was as calculating as the other powers in the crisis of 1900, she was less determined and more cautious.
The Great Divide over China
The Chinese court had meanwhile moved to the safe distance of Sian, fearing retribution and punishment for some of the princes who had inclined to cooperation with the Boxers. They left their corner to be argued by Li Hung-chang, the former viceroy of Kwantung. On 14 September Li set off by English ship from Shanghai. From Taku he came under the protection of the Russian forces. He reached Tientsin on 20 September and finally returned to Peking on 11 October. One observer describes him as a prisoner of the Russian troops,21 though Li as always had his own corner to defend. Certainly the Russians were not inclined to sacrifice the investment they had made in Li over the decade of the 1890s. The British minister, Sir Ernest Satow, who had recently reached Peking, commented that his diplomatic colleagues resented de Giers's 'somewhat dictatorial manners in our conferences and his apparent desire to pose as the friend of China. They suspect him of communicating to Li the details of our conferences.'22 But how much of Russia's 'special relationship' still held good in the autumn?
In a way the Russians had had some success. They had manoeuvred back to Peking their ally among the Chinese leaders. They had tried to give the Chinese the impression of conciliating the court and the empress dowager. The Chinese had responded to this by the telegram of thanks which the emperor had sent to Tsar Nicholas for having removed his troops.23 They had ensured their influence in Peking. There were, however, contradictions in Russian policy. The doubt persisted that Russia proposed to annex Chinese territory in Manchuria, despite the tsar's explicit declaration against any annexation of territory. But for the present their action in Manchuria was presented as a temporary occupation, while they were posing as the protector of the dynasty (so they claimed) against internal rebellion.
With that scant regard for international crisis which afflicted Russian leaders, the tsar set off for his shooting lodge in Poland in August. He proceeded thence to Livadia in the Crimea to avoid the unpleasant autumn temperatures of the Russian capital and the empress fell ill with abdominal typhus.24 Early in October Lamsdorf set off to join his sovereign at Yalta. He worked there throughout the autumn, only returning to St Petersburg on 12 January. The foreign affairs of the country were conducted in the very special secrecy of the Crimea and were the despair, needless to say, of the idle diplomats at St Petersburg.
Meanwhile the Japanese minister, Komura, had been chosen to represent his country in Peking. This was a signal honour for him as the problems which China faced were serious ones and demanded the services of a competent official able to take part in international negotiation. The mandate reached him on 23 October. In order to conform to the conventions of the Russian court, he had to proceed to the Crimea to announce at an audience with the emperor the end of his mission. There he met Lamsdorf, Witte and Kuropatkin and also the Chinese minister to Russia, Yang Yu, who, despite the opposition of the Russian officials, had accompanied the court to the south. He had been told not to neglect any opportunity to influence the Russian court and stuck doggedly to his task.25
Komura set off for Peking on 8 November via London and the United States: he showed no interest in returning by the Trans-Siberian railway. While he was staying in New York he prepared a memorandum on the situation, especially his reflections on the problems of China, Britain and Russia in the east. This is an extract from the document:
With the recent sudden ending of the China affair, I am returning home and shall go immediately to Peking. It is in fact no time since I went to Russia and there were many things that I wanted to study. But there is an anxiety that, if we lose the present opportunity, the agony which we have suffered up to now over the problem of China will burst like a bubble (i.e. will be in vain). Japan's fundamental object is China. For the problem of China the forthcoming Peking conference will be vital. Since my experience hitherto has primarily been with China, it will undoubtedly be a marvellous opportunity to tackle it again . . .
Before leaving Russia recently, I went to the Crimea to have an audience with the tsar, and saw quite a bit of southern Russia at the same time. I observed the condition of the Russian peasants in the countryside. It is rather similar to that in Korea or China. I examined the situation of troops which Russia sends to the east from Odessa where transportation is very difficult. It would be difficult enough if they were only sending some thousands of soldiers; but there would undoubtedly be special difficulties in despatching tens of thousands of troops to the east. To this would have to be added the problems over horses and provisions. But now that Russia is pursuing the building of the Siberian railway, it looks as though she is determined to establish her base in the east.26
Komura returned to Tokyo on 19 December and set off for China forthwith. He is to play an important part in our story; and his sojourn in Russia gave him a rare experience and insight.
References and Notes
1. Hardinge to T. H. Sanderson, 4 Oct. 1900, Hardinge Papers 3.
2. I. I. Rostunov, Istoriya Russko-Iaponskoi Voiny, p. 40; B. A. Romanov, Russia in Manchuria, pp. 178-9.
3. Japan, Foreign Ministry, Komura Gaikōshi, vol. 1, pp. 150-1.
4. Romanov, op. cit., p. 179, records that the tsar believed that the Boxers were fighting against 'west European missionaries', i.e. not against the Russian Orthodox Church.
5. Tokutomi Iichirō, Kōshaku Yamagata Aritomo den, vol. 2, Tokyo 1933, pp. 410-11.
6. Scott to Sanderson, 30 June 1900, in Scott papers, 52,303.
7. Scott to Salisbury, 28 June 1900, in Scott papers, 52,303.
8. I. H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, pp. 83-6.
9. Ibid., pp. 86-7.
10. Ibid., pp. 86-8.
11. William II to Nicholas II and reply, 6 August 1900, in Willy-Nicky Correspondence, no. 23.
12. Nish, op. cit., pp. 88-9.
13. Before his death, Muraviev had written that Russia should not become leader of an international force. Krasnyi Arkhiv, 18 (1926), pp. 14-15.
14. DDF, 1st series, vol. 16 (1900), no. 285.
15. Romanov, op. cit., pp. 185-6.
16. A. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, p. 135.
17. I. H. Nish, 'Japan's indecision during the Boxer disturbances', Journal of Asian Studies, 20 (1961), pp. 451-5.
18. Izvolskii to Lamsdorf, 23 Mar. 1901, in Krasnyi Arkhiv, 63 (1934).
19. NGB 33, no. 522.
20. I. H. Nish, 'Boxer disturbances', Journal of Asian Studies, 20 (1961), pp. 451-5.
21. Komura Gaikōshi, vol. 1, p. 168.
22. Satow to Salisbury, 1 Nov. 1900, Satow Papers 11.
23. Hardinge to Sanderson, 4 Oct. 1900, Hardinge Papers 3. Hardinge thought Russia's object was 'to make the Chinese believe that Russia was the Power which prevented the partition of China.'
24. Hardinge to Sanderson, 15 Nov. 1900, Hardinge Papers 3.
25. Komura Gaikōshi, vol. 1, p. 151; Hardinge to Sanderson, 7 Nov. 1900, Hardinge Papers 3.
26. Komura Gaikōshi, vol. 1, pp. 151-3.