CHAPTER ONE
As the month of August 1944 drew to a close, the Allies were sweeping across France and the Low Countries in full pursuit of the German Army. On 4 September, huge crowds met British troops as they entered the vital sea port of Antwerp. Although the city had been liberated without difficulty, little did the Allied generals know that it would take more than three months of hard fighting before the docks could be put to use. Rather than clearing the banks of the Schelde estuary of German troops, they turned their attentions to more tempting targets. It was a decision many would regret over the coming months.
As British and American spearheads advanced deeper across North-West Europe, Allied High Command was coming to terms with a new problem, supplies. Even as late as September the Allies had not managed to establish sufficient deep water facilities. Last ditch stands by Geman troops in Calais and Boulogne had reduced the docks to ruins and the majority of supplies were still being landed at the temporary harbours in Normandy. With winter only a few weeks away, the need for a sheltered port was becoming paramount.
The docks at Antwerp with some undamaged Belgian and Dutch barges. However, this vital port could not be used until the banks of the Schelde estuary had been cleared of German forces.
Although 21st Army Group had secured the city of Antwerp, the port could not be used. Great steps had been taken to guard to entrance to the Schelde estuary with coastal batteries. Ships then had to navigate a thirty-kilometre length of water, bordered by enemy held territory and dotted with hundreds of mines. It would take all the attentions of the First Canadian Army to clear the Schelde estuary.
As the front moved further east, General Dwight Eisenhower faced the dilemma of what route to follow next; in the meantime, his lengthening supply lines were beginning to curtail movement. He preferred to engage the German border at many points, executing a ‘broad front policy’. However, Eisenhower acknowledged that the time needed to stockpile ammunition and fuel for such attacks would allow the Germans time to regroup and dig in.
Meanwhile, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, 21st Army Group’s commander, wanted to push on while the front was still fluid, anxious to deliver a concentrated attack across the Rhine to enter the Ruhr. Montgomery was convinced that a rapid thrust into Germany could end the war before Christmas and within hours of Antwerp falling, he had managed to persuade Eisenhower to try for a knockout blow. In Eisenhower’s own words:
The attractive possibility of quickly turning the German north flank led me to approve the temporary delay in freeing the vital port of Antwerp.
The initial plan, Operation COMET, called upon the 1st Allied Airborne Army to seize bridgeheads over the River Maas at Nijmegen and the River Rhine at Arnhem. However, planning pressures delayed the operation and over the following week the scheme expanded to include ground troops. While three airborne divisions formed a corridor of troops over the rivers, XXX Corps would drive forward crossing the Rhine within forty-eight hours. The new name for expanded scheme was Operation MARKET GARDEN.
Two days before Operation MARKET GARDEN was launched, Eisenhower penned a memorandum to his generals. The Ruhr, Saar and Frankfurt areas were in sight and he wanted a consensus of opinions before deciding future strategy. Montgomery’s reply arrived quickly. He was determined to pursue the narrow front strategy, driving towards the Ruhr.
Although the matter was discussed in detail at Eisenhower’s headquarters on 22 September, Montgomery was unable to attend due to the deepening crisis on the road to Arnhem. Instead his Chief of Staff, Major-General Sir Francis de Guingand, heard how the ‘possession of an additional major deep water port on our north flank is an indispensable prerequisite for the final deep drive into Germany’. Everyone present at the meeting agreed that the Allies’ future logistical needs were going to be far greater than the present requirements. Without Antwerp, demand would exceed supply. De Guingand returned to his headquarters with new orders for 21st Army Group:
…to open the port of Antwerp as a matter of urgency and to develop operations culminating in a strong attack on the Ruhr form the north.
However, Montgomery was first committed to extricating the remnants of the 1st British Airborne Division across the Rhine, followed by a consolidation of his front. Operation MARKET GARDEN had left the right flank of his Army Group holding a precarious salient pointing to Nijmegen.
Operations VITALITY and SWITCHBACK cleared the Breskens Pocket and South Beveland
British troops observing Walcheren from Breskens.
The 1st Canadian Army received its new directive on 27 September. After clearing Calais and Boulogne, the Canadians were to turn their attentions to the Schelde estuary. Initially, General Simmonds planned to push two divisions north from Antwerp, capturing Bergen-op-Zoom before clearing the South Beveland peninsula. However, before the attack began Montgomery intervened. The Canadians had to create a united front along the south bank of the River Rhine before dealing with the Scheide. Although the advance through Tilburg and ‘s-Hertogenbosch made strategic sense, it would seriously weaken the forces available to clear the Schelde estuary.
Meetings were held as early as 23 September to discuss the opening of Antwerp and the proposed scheme envisaged three distinct phases. The 2nd Canadian Division would strike north closing South Beveland at Bergen-op-Zoom. The division would then advance west along the peninsula, through the town of Goes as far as Walcheren Island. Meanwhile, the 3rd Canadian Division would clear the small port of Breskens on the south bank of the Scheide. The two operations would be known as VITALITY and SWITCHBACK.
The final stage of the plan, Operation INFATUATE, was going to be the most dangerous. The First Canadian Army would make an amphibious assault across the Schelde estuary to clear Walcheren Island. The island posed many problems for the Allied planners and the Combined Operation Report compiled after the battle described it as one of the most fortified places in the world. In four years German engineers had built an impressive array of defensive measures, including eighteen major batteries armed with guns of 150mm calibre or above. Many of the guns were fully encased in concrete bunkers and nothing barring a lucky rocket strike could harm the guns or their crews. An impressive array of air defences protected the batteries from air attack.
Field Marshal Erwin Rommel visited Walcheren’s defences in April 1944. Major-General is at the centre of the group (with glasses). H Houterman
Offshore hazards were another major concern for the planners. Shoals and sandbanks would make it difficult to sail close to the shore with confidence. Meanwhile, the Germans had littered the estuary with mines and, so far, their coastal batteries had prevented Allied mine sweepers from clearing a safe passage.
A task force also faced a mass of defensive measures on the beaches. Landing craft could be wrecked by an array of concrete blocks, wooden stakes and steel obstacles littering the beaches. Once ashore, the assault troops had to navigate their way through minefields before they could reach the enemy bunkers. Operation INFATUATE was going to be a hazardous undertaking.
